Stodgell v. Weissman
N.M. Ct. App.
Opinion
Office of the New Mexico
Director Compilation
Commission
2025.01.10
'00'07- 14:39:00
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: 2025-NMCA-003
Filing Date: October 23, 2024
No. A-1-CA-41416
RYAN STODGELL and KATHARINE
STODGELL,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
LINDA OAK WEISSMAN and BLACK
OAK LLC,
Defendants-Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TAOS COUNTY
Emilio Chavez, District Court Judge
Robert Richards
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellants
The Simons Firm, LLP
Frieda Scott Simons
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellees
OPINION
HANISEE, Judge.
{1} This case arises from a dispute over damage deposit funds between tenants
Ryan and Katharine Stodgell (Tenants), their former landlord, Linda Oak Weissman
(Landlord), and the company Landlord owned that held the subject property, Black Oak,
LLC. We write formally to address whether a landlord who timely complies with the
requirements of NMSA 1978, Section 47-8-18 (1989) (governing damage deposits) may
subsequently file suit for harms to the rented property not previously identified and
deducted from the damage deposit within the statute’s thirty-day window. We must also
address whether the district court correctly determined Landlord to be the “prevailing
party” in the underlying lawsuit as contemplated by NMSA 1978, Section 47-8-48(A)
(1995) such that she may be awarded attorney fees and court costs. The district court
concluded that Landlord timely complied with Section 47-8-18 and is not prohibited from
filing a subsequent action for previously unidentified damages to the rental property. It
further found Landlord to be the prevailing party. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
{2} On March 8, 2021, Tenants signed a lease agreement with Landlord to rent the
subject property for a term of sixteen months. Rent was set at $1,600 per month and the
total initial deposit for future damages was $2,600. The parties subsequently agreed to
end the lease several months early, and Tenants departed the residence on June 30,
2022. On July 9, 2022, Landlord sent Tenants an accounting that itemized her
deductions from their damage deposit, which totaled $832.62, and a check for the
remaining balance, $1,776.38. 1 A final note on the accounting provided by Landlord
stated, “By cashing [the] check . . . you acknowledge all monies due have been
satisfied.” Tenants, however, disputed $672.92 of the deductions, leaving only $159.70
undisputed. 2 They feared, based on the statement in the accounting sheet, that if they
cashed the check with their refund, they would lose any right to dispute the deducted
amount. Landlord notified Tenants in writing that she would issue a “stop payment” on
the check containing their refund on August 1, 2022, and after such date passed, did so.
Tenants then filed the underlying action in magistrate court contesting the amount
Landlord deducted from their damage deposit.
{3} In response, Landlord filed a cross-claim stating that she was entitled to
additional damages beyond those itemized in the deductions. Tenants repeatedly
argued to the district court, as they do now on appeal, that Section 47-8-18(C), (D)
requires a landlord to “provide a tenant with an itemized listing of all damages to
property within thirty days of the date the lease ends,” and any claim for damages not
then identified is forfeited. The district court rejected this argument and concluded that
the plain meaning of Section 47-8-18 only prohibits a landlord from filing an independent
claim for damages if the landlord failed to comply with the statute’s terms regarding
return of the damage deposit, which the district court ruled was not the case here. The
case went to trial, and Tenants were found liable to Landlord for $2,249.07 in property
damage. 3 However, because Tenants never cashed Landlord’s check refunding a
1We note that there appears to be a mathematical error in the accounting in which Landlord states the
total damages to the property amount to $832.62, but then deducts $823.62 from Tenants’ damage
deposit, resulting in the $1,776.38 refund. Such an error is not discussed by the parties on appeal and
only prejudices Landlord, who apparently deducted nine dollars less than she intended from Tenants’
deposit. Because Landlord does not address this discrepancy on appeal, and because it is clear from the
record that Tenants did not dispute $159.70 of the deductions, we do not discuss it further. For clarity,
however, and because this discrepancy affects other figures pertinent to this appeal, such as whether
Tenants disputed $663.92 or $672.92 of itemized deductions from their deposit, we note that we rely on
the $832.62 and $672.92 figures throughout this opinion.
2See supra note 1, for explanation regarding the mathematical discrepancy relating to the undisputed
amount of Landlord’s deductions.
3This figure includes $2,325 in damages to the property less $75.93 in interest that was previously due to
Tenants.
portion of their damage deposit, the district court deducted this amount from the
damage deposit, $2,600, and ordered Landlord to refund Tenants the remaining
balance of their deposit, $350.93.
{4} The district court concluded that Landlord was the prevailing party in the case,
stating that Tenants sought, unsuccessfully, the return of their entire deposit, minus
$159.70 in undisputed damages. As such, the district court determined that Landlord
was entitled to reasonable attorney fees and court costs. See § 47-8-48(A) (stating that
“the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney[] fees and court costs”);
Rule 1-054(D)(1) NMRA (same). Landlord then moved for an award of such attorney
fees and court costs, which, despite the initial dispute in this case pertaining to less than
$700, were determined by the district court to be $26,266.55. The district court awarded
Landlord the requested costs and fees and set Tenants’ supersedeas bond at
$39,399.83, which it reasoned was “1.5 times the amount of the total judgment including
costs and attorney fees” and was “sufficient to cover the amount of the judgment, costs,
and interest during the pendency of appeal.”
{5} On appeal, Tenants present the same argument they did before the district court:
Section 47-8-18(D) requires a landlord to identify all damages to the rented property
within thirty days and any claim for damages not then identified is forfeited. Tenants
have further filed a motion with this Court, contending that they are the prevailing party
because, according to them, their $350.93 award is 51 percent of the $672.92 they
originally disputed whereas Landlord sought over $10,000 in damages at trial, but only
obtained an award for $2,249.07. We address each argument in turn.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 47-8-18(C), (D)
{6} Tenants’ argument that Section 47-8-18 requires identification of all damages to
a rental property by a landlord within thirty days presents an issue of statutory
interpretation we review de novo. See Roser v. Hufstedler, 2023-NMCA-040, ¶ 6,531 P.3d 615
. “The first and most obvious guide to statutory interpretation is the wording of the statutes themselves.” Quynh Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co.,2010-NMSC-009, ¶ 37
,147 N.M. 583
,227 P.3d 73
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Appellate courts have consistently adhered to this principle “through application of the plain meaning rule, recognizing that when a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.”Id.
(alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).
{7} We, thus, begin with the plain language of Section 47-8-18(C), (D), which states:
C. Upon termination of the residency, property or money held
by the owner as deposits may be applied by the owner to the payment of
rent and the amount of damages which the owner has suffered by reason
of the resident’s noncompliance with the rental agreement. . . . In the
event actual cause exists for retaining any portion of the deposit, the
owner shall provide the resident with an itemized written list of the
deductions from the deposit and the balance of the deposit, if any, within
thirty days of the date of termination of the rental agreement or resident
departure, whichever is later. The owner is deemed to have complied with
this section by mailing the statement and any payment required to the last
known address of the resident. . . .
D. If the owner fails to provide the resident with a written
statement of deductions from the deposit and the balance shown by the
statement to be due, within thirty days of the termination of the tenancy,
the owner:
(1) shall forfeit the right to withhold any portion of the
deposit;
(2) shall forfeit the right to assert any counterclaim in any
action brought to recover that deposit;
(3) shall be liable to the resident for court costs and
reasonable attorney[] fees; and
(4) shall forfeit the right to assert an independent action
against the resident for damages to the rental property.
Section 47-8-18(C) unambiguously requires a landlord to provide an itemized list of the
deductions from a tenant’s deposit, and the remaining balance of such deposit, within
thirty days of “termination of the residency.” Section 47-8-18(D) then provides a tenant
relief if a landlord fails to comply with these terms. In other words, Section 47-8-18(D),
by its own clear and unambiguous language, is only triggered by a landlord’s failure to
comply with Section 47-8-18(C). Tenants’ primary argument that Landlord was required
to identify all damages to the property within thirty days of lease termination, and that
failure to do so forfeited Landlord’s rights to assert any counterclaim in the future under
Section 47-8-18(D)(2), is not reflected in the plain language of the statute. See State v.
Greenwood, 2012-NMCA-017, ¶ 38,271 P.3d 753
(“The Legislature knows how to
include language in a statute if it so desires.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and
citation omitted)).
{8} Tenants present various arguments that such a reading of the statute nullifies
Section 47-8-18(C)’s thirty-day deadline. However, as we have stated before, “the
purpose of Section 47-8-18 is to prevent the unexplained retention of security deposits
to pay for alleged damages to the property.” Bruce v. Attaway, 1996-NMSC-030, ¶ 9,121 N.M. 755
,918 P.2d 341
(emphasis added). As we explained in Attaway, a case on which Tenants rely in their briefing, the thirty-day time limit in Section 47-8-18(C) prevents a landlord, who has sole control over the premises after a tenant departs, from making “excessive improvements at the tenant’s expense,” i.e., using the tenant’s damage deposit money to pay for damages not caused by tenants or other property improvements unrelated to the tenancy. Attaway,1996-NMSC-030
, ¶ 9. Tenants contend that the district court ignored Attaway in its ruling, but nothing in that case stands for the proposition that Section 47-8-18(C), (D) requires a landlord to identify all damages to the property, including undiscovered latent defects, within thirty days or the landlord otherwise forfeits their right to make a future claim for such damages. See Attaway,1996-NMSC-030
, ¶ 9 (stating “that failure to comply with Section 47-8-18(C)
results in forfeiture of any right to withhold any portion of the deposit or to file suit for the
alleged damages to the property” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
{9} Tenants further rely on another case, Garcia v. Thong, 1995-NMSC-030,119 N.M. 704
,895 P.2d 226
, to suggest that a landlord must identify all damages to a
property within thirty days. Garcia, however, stands for substantially the same
proposition as Attaway and does not support Tenants’ argument. See id. ¶ 8 (“We hold
therefore that since [the landlord] failed to comply with Section 47-8-18(C), she forfeited
her right to withhold any portion of the deposit or to file suit for the alleged damages as
provided by Section 47-8-18(D).” (emphasis added)); see also Attaway, 1996-NMSC-
030, ¶ 9 (expressly embracing and relying on Garcia). As stated above, the meaning of
Section 47-8-18(C), (D) is clear: a landlord must identify and itemize all deductions from
a tenant’s damage deposit and send the remaining balance, if any, to the tenant within
thirty days. Only if a landlord fails to comply with these requirements do they forfeit “the
right to assert any counterclaim in any action brought to recover the deposit.” See § 47-
8-18(D)(2).
{10} Here, Landlord sent Tenants an itemized list of deductions from their damage
deposit and a check for the remaining balance, $1,776.38, on July 9, 2022, well within
Section 47-8-18(C)’s thirty-day time limit. As such, Landlord complied with the statute
and was not prohibited from advancing a counterclaim for further damages she had not
previously identified. Tenants offer us no authority, and we can find none, that otherwise
prohibits Landlord from filing a claim for damages to her property within the applicable
statute of limitations. See NMSA 1978, § 37-1-4 (1880) (providing a limitation period of
four years for claims alleging “injuries to property”).
{11} Tenants argue that the “stop payment” Landlord issued on her refund check, or
Landlord’s final admonishment in the accounting she sent them, which stated that “[b]y
cashing [the] check . . . you acknowledge all monies due have been satisfied,” acted as
unlawful conditions on the refund and that it, therefore, does not satisfy the
requirements of Section 47-8-18(C). We find this argument similarly contradicted by the
statute’s text and, therefore, decline to accept it. Section 47-8-18(C) expressly states
that a landlord is “deemed to have complied with this section by mailing the statement
and any payment required to the last known address of the resident.” Landlord mailed
her accounting of the relevant deductions and a check for the remainder of Tenants’
deposit as required by the statute. The Legislature, by including the above language,
seems to have gone out of its way to specifically identify what constitutes compliance
with the section, and Tenants have again failed to provide us with any authority
supporting their argument. See Curry v. Great Nw. Ins. Co., 2014-NMCA-031, ¶ 28,320 P.3d 482
(“Where a party cites no authority to support an argument, we may assume no
such authority exists.”). For the above reasons, we conclude that Landlord fully and
completely complied with Section 47-8-18(C), (D) and, therefore, was not prohibited
from filing the instant cross-claim for damages to her property.
{12} Tenants advance several other arguments in this appeal that all essentially turn
on their suggested reading of Section 47-8-18(C), (D): that it requires landlords to
identify all damages to a property within thirty-days of termination of residency. As we
determine the plain language of the statute addresses this issue, we need not address
these arguments.
II. Prevailing Party
{13} Tenants have filed a motion with this Court pursuant to Rule 12-207 NMRA
seeking modification of the amount of the supersedeas bond entered against them in
which the district court included attorney fees and costs related to the proceedings in
district court. The current amount of the bond, including Landlord’s attorney fees and
costs for litigation in both district and magistrate courts, is $39,399.83. Tenants contend
that the district court erred in determining Landlord, rather than Tenants, was the
prevailing party under Section 47-8-48. As a result, Landlord is not entitled to an award
of attorney fees and court costs, and inclusion of these amounts in the bond is
improper. We disagree and deny Tenants’ second application for order to modify the
supersedeas bond.
{14} A district court’s decision regarding the amount and application of a supersedeas
bond “shall be set aside only if it . . . (1) is arbitrary, capricious or reflects an abuse of
discretion; (2) is not supported by substantial evidence; or (3) is otherwise not in
accordance with law.” Rule 12-207(D). While we have previously applied de novo
review to the meaning of “prevailing party” in Section 47-8-48, see Hedicke v. Gunville,
2003-NMCA-032, ¶¶ 25-26,133 N.M. 335
,62 P.3d 1217
, a district court’s decision regarding who the prevailing party is, and thus who is entitled to attorney fees, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Fort Knox Self Storage, Inc. v. W. Technologies., Inc.,2006-NMCA-096, ¶ 35
,140 N.M. 233
,142 P.3d 1
(concluding that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining [the appellee] was the prevailing party”). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a ruling is clearly contrary to the logical conclusions demanded by the facts and circumstances of the case.” Benz v. Town Ctr. Land, LLC,2013-NMCA-111, ¶ 11
,314 P.3d 688
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{15} The prevailing party is “the party to a suit who successfully prosecutes the action
or successfully defends against it, prevailing on the main issue, even though not
necessarily to the extent of his original contention.” Hedicke, 2003-NMCA-032, ¶ 26
(alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Tenants claim, in various
ways, that they were the prevailing party in this case because they were awarded
“$350.93, or 51[ percent of] the amount requested in their [c]omplaint of $672.92.” This
argument mischaracterizes the record before us and ignores the fact that Tenants’
“award” is actually a refund of a portion of their damage deposit—a portion significantly
smaller than Tenants sought in their lawsuit. Tenants originally disputed $672.92 of the
$832.62 deducted from their damage deposit, which, if they were successful, would
have resulted in a return of $2,440.30 out of their $2,600 deposit. Instead, the district
court found that “not only was the $[672.92] properly withheld by . . . [L]andlord,
but . . . [L]andlord was entitled to an additional $[1,652.08].”
{16} Put simply, Tenants did not prevail in obtaining 51 percent of the amount they
sought. Nor were they successful in proving any other part of their claims. Tenants
sought the return of almost their entire damage deposit, less $159.70, but instead were
found liable for over $2,300 in damages to Landlord’s property. Tenants argue that
Landlord was only awarded “21 [percent] of [her] claim” because she initially claimed
that Tenants were responsible for over $10,000 in damage to her property. However,
given the fact that Tenants had no success at all in their claim disputing $672.92 worth
of damages, we cannot conclude that the district court’s determination that Landlord
was the prevailing party was an abuse of discretion. Landlord prevailed on the “main
issue” in her cross-claim, even if “not necessarily to the extent of [her] original
contention,” and the district court, therefore, properly considered her to be the prevailing
party. See Hedicke, 2003-NMCA-032, ¶ 26 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and
citation omitted). Thus, we deny Tenants’ application to modify the supersedeas bond at
issue.
CONCLUSION
{17} For the reasons set forth, we affirm.
{18} IT IS SO ORDERED.
J. MILES HANISEE, Judge
WE CONCUR:
KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge
JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge