State v. Owen

We have for review a decision ruling upon the following question certified to be of great public importance:

DO THE PRINCIPLES ANNOUNCED BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN [DAVIS v. UNITED STATES, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) ] APPLY TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS IN FLORIDA, IN LIGHT OF [TRAYLOR v. STATE, 596 So.2d 957 (Fla.1992)]?

State v. Owen, 654 So.2d 200, 202 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

Duane Owen was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for the 1984 stabbing death of a fourteen-year-old babysitter in Delray Beach. The essence of the State’s case against Owen consisted of incul-patory statements made by Owen while he was in police custody and under interrogation. On direct appeal, we reversed Owen’s convictions and remanded for retrial, holding that although Owen’s confession had been voluntary and free of improper coercion under the Fifth Amendment, the statements nevertheless had been obtained in violation of Owen’s rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Owen v. State, 560 So.2d 207, 209-11 (Fla.1990).

Our decision in Owen turned on two responses that Owen had given to police questions about what we characterized as relatively insignificant details of the crime. We determined those responses to be, “at the least, an equivocal invocation of the Miranda right to terminate questioning.” Owen, 560 So.2d at 211. Based upon our interpretation of federal law at that time, we held that upon a suspect’s equivocal invocation of the right to terminate questioning, police are required to stop all further questioning except that which is designed to clarify the suspect’s wishes. Id. Rather than limiting their questions to clarify what Owen meant, the police continued to question him about the details of the murder. At that point, Owen began to give the inculpatory answers that led to his conviction. We ruled the statements inadmissible and reversed because we were unable to find that the error in admitting them was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Subsequent to our decision in Owen but before Owen’s retrial, the United States Supreme Court announced in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), that neither Miranda nor its progeny require police officers to stop interrogation when a suspect in custody, who has made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his or her Miranda rights, thereafter makes an equivocal or ambiguous request for counsel. Thus, under Davis police are under no obligation to clarify a suspect’s equivocal or ambiguous request and may continue the interrogation until the suspect makes a clear assertion of the right to counsel.

Prior to retrial the State moved the trial court to reconsider the admissibility of Owen’s confession in light of Davis, but the trial court held the confession inadmissible. The State next filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the district court of appeal. The district court observed:

If we were certain that Davis was the law in Florida, and if this specific confession had not already been held inadmissible by the Florida Supreme Court, we would grant certiorari, because the pretrial refusal to admit this confession would be a departure from the essential requirements of law for which the state would have no adequate remedy by review.

Owen, 654 So.2d at 201. Because the suppression of Owen’s confession was the law of the ease, the court denied the petition but certified the foregoing question.

At the outset, we recognize that Davis involved an ambiguous request for counsel whereas Owen’s case turns on his purported decision to terminate interrogation. However, the reasoning of Davis applies when a defendant makes an equivocal assertion of any right under Miranda. This is well illustrated by the case of Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420 (11th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1086, 115 S.Ct. 1801, 131 L.Ed.2d 727 (1995), in which the court considered the question of whether the defendant’s response to a police inquiry constituted an invocation of his right to remain silent. In upholding the admissibility of the confession because the defendant’s response had been equivocal, the court reasoned:

Because we are bound to follow the Supreme Court’s holding in Davis, our decisions creating a duty to clarify a suspect’s intent upon an equivocal invocation of counsel are no longer good law. Furthermore, we have already recognized that the same rule should apply to a suspect’s ambiguous or equivocal references to the right to cut off questioning as to the right to counsel. Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918, 924 (11th Cir.1985) (“We see no reason to apply a different rule to equivocal invocations of the right to cut off questioning.”), modified on other grounds, 781 F.2d 185 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 909, 107 S.Ct. 307, 93 L.Ed.2d 281 (1986). The Supreme Court’s concern in Davis was to craft “a bright line that can be applied by officers in the real world of investigation and interrogation without unduly hampering the gathering of information.” 512 U.S. at 453, 114 S.Ct. at 2352. The Court rejected a rule requiring that police cease questioning a suspect after an ambiguous or equivocal invocation of his Miranda rights out of a fear that the “clarity and ease of application” of the bright line rule “would be lost.” Id. Because this concern applies with equal force to the invocation of the right to remain silent, and because we have previously held that the same rule should apply in both contexts, we hold that the Davis rule apples to invocations of the right to remain silent. A suspect must articulate his desire to cut off questioning with sufficient clarity that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be an assertion of the right to remain silent. If the statement is ambiguous or equivocal, then the police have no duty to clarify the suspect’s intent, and they may proceed with the interrogation.

Id. at 1424. We agree that Davis applies as much to requests to terminate interrogation as it does to requests for counsel. Davis now makes it clear that, contrary to our belief at the time, federal law did not require us to rule Owen’s confession inadmissible.

Moreover, there is no question that our holdings in Owen and our prior cases on the same subject were predicated upon our understanding of federal law that even an equivocal invocation of Miranda rights required the police to either terminate the interrogation or clarify the suspect’s wishes. In fact, before the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975), and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), this Court had implied, if not held, that an ambiguous request for a lawyer would not require police to clarify the suspect’s wishes. State v. Craig, 237 So.2d 737, 739-40 (Fla.1970) (concluding that interrogator was not required to convince defendant of need for counsel after defendant stated, “Well, I would like to have one [lawyer] in a way, but I don’t see how it can help me” and finding defendant had validly waived right to counsel). Thus, Davis has undercut the premise upon which our decision in Owen was based.

Owen cites Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957 (Fla.1992) in support of the argument that article I, section 9 provides an independent basis for requiring police to clarify a suspect’s equivocal request to terminate questioning. He relies specifically upon our statement in Traylor that “[u]nder Section 9, if the suspect indicates in any manner that he or she does not want to be interrogated, interrogation must not begin or, if it has already begun, must immediately stop.” Id. at 966 (emphasis added). In so doing, he reads a meaning into these words that we never attributed to them.

In Traylor, we reaffirmed the federalist principles which give primacy to our state constitution and pointed out that the federal constitution represents the floor for basic freedoms while our constitution represents the ceiling. Id. at 962. Though our analysis in Traylor was grounded in the Florida Constitution, our conclusions were no different than those set forth in prior holdings of the United States Supreme Court. The words “indicates in any manner” added nothing to federal law, as they were identical to the words used in Miranda itself. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473, 86 S.Ct. at 1627. Moreover, we did not construe these words in Traylor or discuss the appropriate police response to an equivocal request because the defendant in Traylor made no request whatsoever that he wished to invoke his Miranda rights. Tray-lor, 596 So.2d at 971. The words “in any manner” simply mean that there are no magic words that a suspect must use in order to invoke his or her rights.

Therefore, Traylor does not control our decision in this ease. It does, however, remind us that we have the authority to reaffirm Owen regardless of federal law. Upon consideration, we choose not to do so. We find the reasoning of Davis persuasive:

Although the courts ensure compliance with the Miranda requirements through the exclusionary rule, it is police officers who must actually decide whether or not they can question a suspect. The Edwards rule — questioning must cease if the suspect asks for a lawyer — provides a bright line that can be applied by officers in the real world of investigation and interrogation without unduly hampering the gathering of information. But if we were to require questioning to cease if a suspect makes a statement that might be a request for an attorney, this clarity and ease of application would be lost. Police officers would be forced to make difficult judgment calls about whether the suspect in fact wants a lawyer even though he hasn’t said so, with the threat of suppression if they guess wrong. We therefore hold that, after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.

Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. at 2356. This same principle applies to the exercise of the right to terminate interrogation. Coleman. To require the police to clarify whether an equivocal statement is an assertion of one’s Miranda rights places too great an impediment upon society’s interest in thwarting crime. As noted in Traylor: “We adhere to the principle that the state’s authority to obtain freely given confessions is not an evil, but an unqualified good.” 596 So.2d at 965. Thus, we hold that police in Florida need not ask clarifying questions if a defendant who has received proper Miranda warnings makes only an equivocal or ambiguous request to terminate an interrogation after having validly waived his or her Miranda rights.

Our decision today is in harmony with those of other states which have also held in the wake of Davis that police are no longer required to clarify equivocal requests for the rights accorded by Miranda. E.g., People v. Crittenden, 9 Cal.4th 83, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 499-500, 885 P.2d 887, 912-13 (1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 144, 133 L.Ed.2d 90 (1995); State v. Morris, 255 Kan. 964, 880 P.2d 1244, 1253 (1994); State v. Williams, 535 N.W.2d 277, 285 (Minn.1995); State v. Panetti 891 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Tex.Ct.App.1994) (noting that Davis removed federal foundation for rule that ambiguous request for counsel bars further questioning except for clarifying the statement; irrespective of primacy doctrine, no reason to mandate rule as a matter of state law and create greater rights for criminal defendants); State v. Long, 190 Wis.2d 386, 526 N.W.2d 826, 830 (App.1994), review dismissed, 531 N.W.2d 330 (Wis.1995). But see State v. Hoey, 77 Hawai'i 17, 881 P.2d 504, 523 (1994).

Having determined that Florida’s Constitution does not place greater restrictions on law enforcement than those mandated under federal law when a suspect makes an equivocal statement regarding the right to remain silent, we now face the question of how to treat Owen’s confession. Generally, under the doctrine of the law of the case, “all questions of law which have been decided by the highest appellate court become the law of the case which must be followed in subsequent proceedings, both in the lower and appellate courts.” Brunner Enters., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 452 So.2d 550, 552 (Fla.1984). However, the doctrine is not an absolute mandate, but rather a self-imposed restraint that courts abide by to promote finality and efficiency in the judicial process and prevent relitigation of the same issue in a case. See Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1965) (explaining underlying policy). This Court has the power to reconsider and correct erroneous rulings in exceptional circumstances and where reliance on the previous decision would result in manifest injustice, notwithstanding that such rulings have become the law of the case. Preston v. State, 444 So.2d 939 (Fla.1984).

An intervening decision by a higher court is one of the exceptional situations that this Court will consider when entertaining a request to modify the law of the case. Brunner, 452 So.2d at 552; Strazzulla, 177 So.2d at 4. Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis qualifies as an exceptional situation. Moreover, we find that reliance upon our prior decision in Owen’s direct appeal would result in manifest injustice to the people of this state because it would perpetuate a rule which we have now determined to be an undue restriction of legitimate law enforcement activity.

Because Owen’s responses were equivocal, the State would have this Court reinstate Owen’s convictions on the ground that a retrial is unnecessary in light of our decision. We are unwilling to go that far. Our prior decision which reversed Owen’s convictions and remanded for a new trial is a final decision that is no longer subject to rehearing. With respect to this issue, Owen stands in the same position as any other defendant who has been charged with murder but who has not yet been tried. Just as it would be in the ease of any other defendant, the admissibility of Owen’s confession in his new trial will be subject to the Davis rationale that we adopt in this opinion. However, Owen’s prior convictions cannot be retroactively reinstated.

We answer the certified question in the affirmative. We quash the decision below and remand with directions to grant the petition for certiorari. We recede from Owen, Long, Valle, Waterhouse, and Cannady to the extent that they are inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

OVERTON, HARDING and WELLS, JJ., concur.

SHAW, J., concurs specially with an opinion.

KOGAN, C.J., dissents with an opinion.

ANSTEAD, J., recused.

. Owen also was convicted of burglary and sexual battery.

. Videotapes of the interrogations revealed that Owen had initiated the sessions, was repeatedly advised of his rights to counsel and to remain silent, and acknowledged that he was familiar with his Miranda rights and knew them as well as the police officers. None of the six questioning sessions was individually lengthy, and Owen was given food, refreshments, and breaks during the sessions. Owen v. State, 560 So.2d 207, 210 (Fla.1990).

. The facts of the murder are set forth more fully in Owen, 560 So.2d at 209 (Fla.1990).

. At one point, one of the officers asked whether Owen had targeted the house or whether he had just been going through the neighborhood. Owen responded, "I’d rather not talk about it.” Then later the officer asked Owen about where he had put a bicycle, to which Owen responded, “I don't want to talk about it.”

. Recently, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held "that a suspect's refusal to answer certain questions is not tantamount to the invocation, either equivocal or unequivocal, of the constitutional right to remain silent and that questioning may continue until the suspect articulates in some manner that he wishes the questioning to cease.” United States v. Mikell, 102 F.3d 470, 477 (11th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1459, 137 L.Ed.2d 563 (1997). This holding is precisely applicable to the instant case because the basis upon which Owen's statements were previously suppressed was because he had refused to answer two questions.

. If anything, requests for counsel have been accorded greater judicial deference than requests to terminate interrogation. As the Minnesota Supreme Court explained in State v. Williams, 535 N.W.2d 277, 285 (Minn.1995):

Because the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not require police officers to confine their questioning to clarifying ques-turns when an accused ambiguously or equivocally attempts to invoke his right to counsel, Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460-62, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2356, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), it follows by even greater logic that the Constitution does not require such a clarifying approach when an accused ambiguously or equivocally attempts to invoke his [or her] right to remain silent. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 n. 10, 96 S.Ct. 321, 326 n. 10, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (distinguishing between the procedural safeguards triggered by a request to remain silent and the greater procedural safeguards triggered by a request for an attorney).

.See, e.g., Long v. State, 517 So.2d 664, 667 (Fla.1987); Valle v. State, 474 So.2d 796, 799 (Fla.1985), vacated on other grounds, 476 U.S. 1102, 106 S.Ct. 1943, 90 L.Ed.2d 353 (1986); Waterhouse v. State, 429 So.2d 301, 305 (Fla.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977, 104 S.Ct. 415, 78 L.Ed.2d 352 (1983); Cannady v. State, 427 So.2d 723, 728-29 (Fla.1983).

. We reject Owen's argument that because we termed his comments to be "at least equivocal” in our earlier opinion we should now construe his comments as unequivocal.