State v. Godejohn

Defendant, Cecil Godejohn, pleaded guilty to simple burglary, La.R.S. 14:62, and was sentenced to three years at hard labor. He appealed and filed two assignments of error. '

In his brief in this court, defendant calls our attention to the trial court’s failure to perform his duty to determine that defendant expressly and knowingly waived his constitutional rights in entering his guilty plea. Article 920(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits consideration on appeal of “[a]n error that is discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence.” This article is an embodiment of the rule to be found in State v. Stanford, 248 La. 630, 181 So.2d 50 (1965) where this court said:

The record in a criminal case for the purpose of considering whether there is error patent on the face of the record * * includes the caption in the case, a statement of time and place of holding the court, the indictment or information with the endorsement, the arraignment, the plea of the accused, the mention of the impanelling of the jury, verdict, and judgment of the court. (Emphasis Added.)

The court went on to say, “testimony not attached to or made a part of a bill of exception cannot be considered by this court even though the testimony is included in the transcript.” State v. Palmer, 251 La. 759, 206 So.2d 485 (1968).

The colloquy which occurs when the court canvasses the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequences is a part of the plea of the accused. It is in the nature of a pleading or proceeding, rather than testimony or evidence. Therefore, a review of it for error on appeal constitutes a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings without inspection of the evidence.

At the plea proceeding, the trial court questioned the defendant on the following topics: whether he understood that restitution would be a condition if probation were granted; whether there were any other agreements, conditions or promises attached to his plea; whether anyone had forced him to plead; whether he understood the nature of the offense and the maximum allowable sentence; and whether he was satisfied with the work and advice of his attorney.

The trial court did not advise the defendant of his right to a jury trial, his right to confront his accusers, and of his privilege against self-incrimination or make any inquiry as to his understanding of these rights and that by pleading guilty he was waiving them. The plea of the defendant and the proceedings, therefore, do not disclose that the defendant waived these constitutional rights. Accordingly, the due process requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) require that the guilty plea be vacated, the conviction and sentence reversed, and that the defendant be permitted to plead anew. State v. Williams, 384 So.2d 779 (La.1980). See also, State ex rel. Jackson v. Kenderson, 260 La. 90, 255 So.2d 85 (1971).

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR DEFENDANT TO ENTER A NEW PLEA.

BLANCHE, LEMMON and MARCUS, JJ., dissent and assign reasons.

The boilerplate type minutes of court indicate that the defendant was properly Boykinized, but the minutes are obviously incorrect in light of the record of the guilty plea proceedings, and the state does not contend otherwise.