Spain v. State

I.

On Sunday, 3 February 2002, Officer Cornelius Williams, assigned at the time to the Western District FLEX unit of the Baltimore City Police Department, was walking eastbound in the 1900 block of West Baltimore Street, near its intersection with North Monroe Street, when he saw a group of seven men at the corner. As Officer Williams, who was dressed in plain clothes, walked toward the group, one group member, a man wearing a gray sweat suit with a red stripe and later identified as Jesse Spain, Jr. (referred to as “Spain” or Petitioner subsequently), approached the officer and asked, “What do you want?” Interpreting this remark as ah inquiry about the possible sale of illegal narcotics, Officer Williams, trained and experienced in matters involving street level narcotics distribution, responded, “What do you have?” Spain responded, “Pve got some pills.” Officer Williams interpreted this statement to indicate that Spain was offering for sale heroin in gel cap form.

Spain then tapped the shoulder of another man in the group (later identified as Petitioner’s father, Jesse Spain, Sr.), who advised Spain, “I’m going to take [Officer Williams] up the street.” As Officer Williams and Spain, Sr. walked northbound on Monroe Street towards the 1900 block of West Fairmount Avenue, Spain, Sr. stated that he had “a kid on a bike, who’s got some pills on him.” After walking approximately 90 feet further, Spain, Sr. “whistled out.” A young man on a bicycle approached them. Officer Williams recognized the young man on the bicycle as Juan Wilson, whom Officer Williams previously had arrested for street level narcotics distribution. Wilson stopped his bicycle in front of Officer Williams and removed from his pocket a clear plastic bag that contained several gel caps filled with what was later stipulated to be heroin powder. Wilson, at this point, recognized Officer Williams and began to ride slowly away.

Officer Williams identified himself as a police officer and arrested Wilson. Meanwhile, Spain, Sr. fled through an alley on West Fairmount Avenue. When a patrol car and wagon responded to the scene of the narcotics transaction, the original group of men on the corner of West Baltimore Street and North Monroe Street dispersed. As Officer Williams was arresting Wilson, he observed Spain walk westbound on West Baltimore Street out of his sight. A few minutes later, as he was riding in a police wagon, Officer Williams arrested Spain, whom he found standing on the front steps of a residence on West Baltimore Street.

By criminal information filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Spain was charged with various violations relating to his role in the drug transaction on 3 February involving Officer Williams. At Spain’s jury trial, the State’s sole witness was Officer Williams, who testified as both a fact witness and an expert on the packaging, identification, and distribution of street level narcotics in Baltimore City. The defense consisted of only one witness, Spain’s sister, Dawn Spain, who testified that she spoke with Spain earlier on 3 February and he told her that he planned to attend a Super Bowl party later that evening at his grandfather’s house, which happened to be near the scene of the narcotics transaction. Spain’s defense at trial appeared to hinge on the contentions that Officer Williams was mistaken as to the encounter between himself and Officer Williams and that he was in no way involved in the narcotics transaction that followed.

Against this backdrop, the State’s Attorney advocated during closing argument as follows:

[STATE’S ATTORNEY]: The second point I wanted to make to you is that the Officer in this case — the Defense’s argument is that Mr. Spain was outside his house. He was going to attend a Superbowl party and was buying beer. Part of what you have to determine is the credibility of the witnesses. The defense put on a witness who testified, and the State put on one witness, the Officer in this case. You have to weigh the credibility of each individual. Who has a motive to tell you the truth. The Officer in this case would have to engage in a lot of lying, in a lot of deception and a conspiracy of his own to come in here and tell you that what happened was not true. He would have to risk everything he has worked for. He would have to perjure himself on the stand.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.

THE COURT: Basis?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Reference to the Officer perjuring himself your Honor. It’s as far as credibility.

THE COURT: Okay, well the jury understand^] that this of course is closing argument, and that they will [consider the statements to be] lawyers’ arguments. Overruled.

[STATE’S ATTORNEY]: So basically you have to determine who has the credibility. Who’s telling you the truth. Is the Officer coming here and making up a story? What’s his incentive to lie and frame Mr. Spain? The reality is that this Officer — they attempted to sell this Officer drugs on the street. They didn’t know he was a police officer. He was out there trying to enforce the law. But, you have to understand that Officer Williams has no motive to lie, because he has everything to risk in this case. Because he doesn’t have to go out and make up drug arrests. Because he has plenty of legitimate drug arrests. There’s absolutely no incentive for him to come in here and tell a story about Mr. Spain. So is Mr. Spain the victim of circumstance? He was just taken up in front of his house, trying to attend a Superbowl party? That’s the defense’s theory in the case. You will ultimately have to decide who you want to believe.

On 6 March 2003, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. Spain timely appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed his conviction in an unreported opinion. He then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted, 383 Md. 256, 858 A.2d 1017 (2004), in order to consider the following question:

Did the trial court properly exercise discretion in regulating the scope of closing argument when it allowed the State’s Attorney to argue that the police officer in this case had no motive to lie and would risk his career by testifying falsely?

II.

In Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 722 A.2d 887 (1999), we outlined the “great leeway” attorneys are afforded in presenting closing arguments to the jury:

The prosecutor is allowed liberal freedom of speech and may make any comment that is warranted by the evidence or inferences reasonably drawn therefrom. In this regard, [generally, ... the prosecuting attorney is as free to comment legitimately and to speak fully, although harshly, on the accused’s action and conduct if the evidence supports his comments, as is accused’s counsel to comment on the nature of the evidence and the character of witnesses which the [prosecution] produces.

While arguments of counsel are required to be confined to the issues in the cases on trial, the evidence and fair and reasonable deductions therefrom, and to arguments of opposing counsel, generally speaking, liberal freedom of speech should be allowed. There are no hard-and-fast limitations within which the argument of earnest counsel must be confined — no well-defined bounds beyond which the eloquence of an advocate shall not soar. He may discuss the facts proved or admitted in the pleadings, assess the conduct of the parties, and attack the credibility of witnesses. He may indulge in oratorical conceit or flourish and in illustrations and metaphorical allusions.

Id. at 429-80, 722 A.2d at 901-902 (citations omitted).

Despite this lack of “hard-and-fast limitations” on closing arguments, one technique in closing argument that consistently has garnered our disapproval, as infringing on a defendant’s right to a fair trial, is when a prosecutor “vouches” for (or against) the credibility of a witness. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 373 Md. 360, 403-04, 818 A.2d 1078, 1103-04 (2003) (finding improper vouching to have occurred where a prosecutor made assertions, based on personal knowledge, that a witness was lying). Vouching typically occurs when a prosecutor “placets] the prestige of the government behind a witness through personal assurances of the witness’s veracity ... or suggests] that information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s testimony.” U.S. v. Daas, 198 F.3d 1167, 1178 (9th Cir.1999) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court recognizes that prosecutorial vouching presents two primary dangers:

[S]uch comments can convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the defendant and can thus jeopardize the defendant’s right to be tried solely on the basis of the evidence presented to the jury; and the prosecutor’s opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government’s judgment rather than its own view of the evidence.

U.S. v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1048, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985).

In the present case, Spain argues that the prosecutor, during his closing argument, improperly vouched for the credibility of the State’s sole witness, Officer Williams, by implying that the officer 1) did not have a motive to testify falsely, and 2) in fact had a motive to testify truthfully because to testify falsely would expose him to the penalties of perjury and lead to adverse consequences to his career as a police officer. Although we agree that the latter of the prosecutor’s comments transcended the boundaries of proper argument, we conclude ultimately that those statements did not mislead or influence the jury unduly to the prejudice of Spain, and therefore constituted harmless error. Degren, 352 Md. at 430-31, 722 A.2d at 902 (citations omitted).

A.

No one likely would quarrel with the notion that assessing the credibility of witnesses during a criminal trial is often a transcendent factor in the factfinder’s decision whether to convict or acquit a defendant. During opening and closing arguments, therefore, it is common and permissible generally for the prosecutor and defense counsel to comment on, or attack, the credibility of the witnesses presented.

Part of the analysis of credibility involves determining whether a witness has a motive or incentive not to tell the truth. Cf. Pantazes v. State, 376 Md. 661, 680, 831 A.2d 432, 443 (2003) (describing as important the right to cross-examination because it allows a defendant to demonstrate to the factfinder a witness’s bias, interest, or motive to testify falsely); see also Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions § 3:10 (MICPEL 2003). Attorneys therefore feel compelled frequently to comment on the motives, or absence thereof, that a witness may have for testifying in a particular way, so long as those conclusions may be inferred from the evidence introduced and admitted at trial. See, e.g., U.S. v. Walker, 155 F.3d 180, 187 (3rd Cir.1998) (finding that “where a prosecutor argues that a witness is being truthful based on the testimony given at trial, and does not assure the jury that the credibility of the witness based on his own personal knowledge, the prosecutor is engaging in proper argument and is not vouching”).

The prosecutor’s comments about Officer Williams’s absence of a motive to lie did not implicate any information that was outside the evidence presented at trial. When a prosecutor argues that a particular police officer lacks a motive to testify falsely, such comments do not bear directly on a defendant’s guilt or innocence, but are merely an allusion to a lack of evidence presented by the defendant that the officer in this case possessed any motive to lie or devise a story implicating the defendant in criminal conduct. See Walker, 155 F.3d at 187 (finding that “prosecutorial comment that points to a lack of evidence in the record which supports a defendant’s argument that the witness is not credible is proper so long as the comment does not constitute an assurance by the prosecutor that the witness is credible”). The prosecutor’s invitation for the jury to consider whether the officer had a motive to lie did not amount to improper vouching because the comments did not express any personal belief or assurance on the part of the prosecutor as to the credibility of the officer. See, e.g., Reyes v. State, 700 So.2d 458, 460-61 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997) (finding that statements such as, “Did it appear as though [the police officer] was trying to lie?” did not “constitute an expression of the prosecutor’s personal opinion as to the credibility of the witness”). Nor did such comments, in isolation, explicitly invoke the prestige or office of the State or the particular police department or unit involved. Id.

B.

The prosecutor continued during closing argument that Officer Williams did not testify falsely because, if he were to do so, he would suffer adverse consequences to his career as a police officer. These comments were improper.

Courts consistently have deemed improper comments made during closing argument that invite the jury to draw inferences from information that was not admitted at trial. See Hill v. State, 355 Md. 206, 222, 734 A.2d 199, 208 (1999); Degren, 352 Md. at 433, 722 A.2d at 903. Although the notion of adverse personnel implications flowing from perjured testimony by a police officer resonates at a common sense level, at no time during the trial scrutinized in the present case did the State introduce evidence from which it could be inferred ineluctably that Officer Williams risked his career or any of its benefits if he were to testify falsely. See, e.g., U.S. v. Gallardo-Trapero, 185 F.3d 307, 320 (5th Cir.1999) (finding that a prosecutor’s argument that agents of the federal government would not risk their careers by testifying falsely was improper because it referred to evidence not in the record); U.S. v. Martinez, 981 F.2d 867, 871 (6th Cir.1992) (same); U.S. v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1125 (3rd Cir.1990) (finding improper vouching and bolstering where there was “no evidence backing the prosecutor’s comments that the U.S. Attorneys and law enforcement officers could not have behaved as unscrupulously as defense counsel alleged without violating their oaths of office and jeopardizing their careers”).

Even if evidence had been admitted from which it could be inferred that a police officer would face serious employment consequences as a result of testifying falsely, we nonetheless would conclude that the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument constituted improper vouching because they also implied improperly that the witness’s status as a police officer entitled him to greater credibility in the jury’s eyes than any other category of witness about which the same might have been argued. Although the State is free to highlight the incentive, or lack of incentive, of a witness to testify truthfully, courts consistently have held that it is improper to argue that a police officer may be deemed more credible simply because he or she is a police officer. See, e.g., Fultz v. Whittaker, 187 F.Supp.2d. 695, 706 n. 5 (W.D.Ky. 2001); Reyes, 700 So.2d at 461; see also People v. Clark, 186 Ill.App.3d 109, 134 Ill.Dec. 138, 542 N.E.2d 138, 142-43 (1989) (stating that “[i]t is established that a prosecutor may not argue that a witness is more credible because of his status as a police officer”). By invoking unspecified, but assumed, punitive consequences or sanctions that might result if a police officer testifies falsely, a prosecutor’s arguments imply that a police officer has a greater reason to testify truthfully than any other witness with a different type of job. Although the factfinder generally is made aware that a witness who is a police officer is testifying as to events witnessed while on duty as a police officer, a prosecutor must be careful not to insinuate that the credibility of statements made in this capacity may be assessed at a level of scrutiny other than that given to all witnesses. U.S. v. Boyd, 54 F.3d 868, 872 (D.C.Cir.1995); see also People v. Allan, 192 A.D.2d 433, 596 N.Y.S.2d 793, 795 (N.Y.App.Div.1993) (holding that a “trial court’s instruction that the jurors could take into account a witness’s job, education, and status in the community in assessing credibility diluted its charge that the testimony of a police officer should be evaluated in the same way as that of any other witness”).

C.

Although we find that the prosecutor’s latter comments in this case improperly implied that a police officer be viewed by the factfinder as being more credible as a result of his or her status as a police officer, our inquiry does not end there. When statements made during closing argument stray beyond the outer realm of the latitude afforded prosecutors, we must inquire into the extent of any prejudice suffered by the defendant. As this Court in Degren stated,

Not every improper remark [made by a prosecutor during closing argument], however, necessarily mandates reversal, and “[w]hat exceeds the limits of permissible comment depends on the facts in each case.” We have said that “[reversal is only required where it appears that the remarks of the prosecutor actually misled the jury or were likely to have misled or influenced the jury to the prejudice of the accused.” This determination of whether the prosecutor’s comments were prejudicial or simply rhetorical flourish lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. On review, an appellate court should not reverse the trial court unless that court clearly abused the exercise of its discretion and prejudiced the accused.

352 Md. at 430-31, 722 A.2d at 902 (citations omitted).

When assessing whether reversible error occurs when improper statements are made during closing argument, a reviewing court may consider several factors, including the severity of the remarks, the measures taken to cure any potential prejudice, and the weight of the evidence against the accused. U.S. v. Melendez, 57 F.3d 238, 241 (2nd Cir.1995); see also Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 232, 596 A.2d 1024, 1038 (1991) (finding that “[i]n determining whether reversible error occurred, an appellate court must take into account ‘(1) the closeness of the case, 2) the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and 3) the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error’ ” (citations omitted)).

In this case, the prosecutor’s reference to potential consequences to Officer Williams’s career was an isolated event that did not pervade the entire trial. See Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md. 404, 425-26, 326 A.2d 707, 721 (1974) (rejecting the notion that one improper comment by the prosecutor during closing argument “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process” (citations omitted)); Mazile v. State, 798 So.2d 833, 834-35 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001). We note also the likely diminution of prejudice from the prosecutor’s comments as a result of the trial judge’s contemporaneous reminder that they were only an attorney’s argument, not evidence, as well as the pertinent instructions that the trial judge gave to the jury before sending it to deliberate. In response to the objection by defense counsel, the trial judge stated, “Okay, well the jury understand^] that this of course is closing argument, and that they will [consider the statements to be] lawyers’ arguments. Overruled.” Although the trial judge did not acknowledge the comments as improper, nor did he explicitly instruct the jury to disregard the comments, he reminded the jury that the prosecutor’s statements only should be considered as argument, not evidence. By emphasizing the argumentative nature of closing arguments contemporaneously with the improper comments, the judge took some effort to eliminate the jury’s potential confusion about what it just heard and therefore ameliorated any prejudice to the accused.

More importantly, however, before jury deliberations began, the trial judge gave, among others, a jury instruction, based on Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions § 3:10, that emphasized the argumentative nature of closing arguments, and explicitly instructed the jurors as to relevant factors to consider and their roles as the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses presented at trial. Maryland courts long have subscribed to the presumption that juries are able to follow the instructions given to them by the trial judge, particularly where the record reveals no overt act on the jury’s part to the contrary. Wilson v. State, 261 Md. 551, 570, 276 A.2d 214, 223-24 (1971); Brooks v. State, 85 Md.App. 355, 360-61, 584 A.2d 82, 85 (1991). The jury in this case was instructed that it could reject or accept any testimony, and was to subject the credibility of all witnesses to an equivalent level of scrutiny. With these instructions in mind, we are confident that a reasonable jury would be able to fulfill properly its role and discern argument from evidence without undue prejudice to the defendant. Wilhelm, 272 Md. at 425-26, 445, 326 A.2d at 721-22, 732; see also Young v. State, 68 Md.App. 121, 136-37, 510 A.2d 599, 607 (1986) (finding that jury instructions such as those in this case were sufficient to apprise the jury of its duty to weigh testimony of police officers under the same scrutiny as other witnesses). We could find in the record no indicia, nor did Petitioner identify any, of the jury’s inability or refusal to follow these explicit instructions given by the trial court. See Brooks, 85 Md.App. at 360-61, 584 A.2d at 85 (finding that when a defendant fails to demonstrate any evidence of the jury’s inability or refusal to heed court’s instruction, mere speculation that the “jury could not possibly have discharged [its] task appropriately ... is totally insufficient”).

Many courts finding improper similar comments during closing arguments also have found jury instructions, such as the one in this case, to be ameliorative of any prejudice that resulted from the improper comments. Degren, 352 Md. at 434-35, 722 A.2d at 903-04; Henry, 324 Md. at 232, 596 A.2d at 1038; Boyd, 54 F.3d at 872; Martinez, 981 F.2d at 871.

Courts considering the prejudicial impact of improper prosecutorial comments also have examined the weight of evidence of the accused’s guilt. See Wilhelm, 272 Md. at 427, 326 A.2d at 722 (finding that “[ajnother important and significant factor where prejudicial remarks might have been made is whether or not the judgment of conviction was ‘substantially swayed by the error,’ or where the evidence of the defendant’s guilt was ‘overwhelming’ ”). We find this factor, however, to be of somewhat less weight in this case. Although the record contains adequate evidence of Spain’s guilt to support the convictions under a sufficiency analysis, we cannot say that the evidence of Spain’s guilt is truly overwhelming. Nonetheless, we find that the relative lack of severity of the improper remarks, the lack of potential impact of the erroneous argument (greater veracity of police officer due to adverse employment consequences if he lied) on the defense’s theory that Officer Williams’ had a faulty memory (not that he lied), and the instruction given by the judge lead us to the conclusion that Spain did not suffer undue prejudice, as a result of the prosecutor’s improper comments during closing argument, sufficient to warrant reversal of his convictions. We are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in no way influenced the verdict. Ragland v. State, 385 Md. 706, 870 A.2d 609 (2005); Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976).

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.

. The FLEX unit is a plain clothes squad within the Baltimore City Police Department that responds to varying locations during different time periods depending on crime trends.

. Spain was charged with one count of distribution of a controlled dangerous substance ("CDS”) in violation of Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27 § 286 (now codified, without substantive change, at Md.Code (2002), § 5-602 of the Criminal Law Article), one count of using a minor for distribution of a CDS in violation of Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27 § 286C (now codified, without substantive change, at Md.Code (2002), § 5-628 of the Criminal Law Article), one count of possession of a CDS with intent to distribute in violation of Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27 § 286 (now codified, without substantive change, at Md.Code (2002), § 5-602 of the Criminal Law Article), one count of possession of a CDS in violation of Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27 § 287 (now codified, without substantive change, at Md.Code (2002), § 5-601 of the Criminal Law Article), and three counts of conspiracy relating to the distribution of a CDS in violation of Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27 § 290. Spain was charged with using a minor for distribution of a CDS because Wilson's birthday was 1 June 1985, making him under the age of 18 at the time of the narcotics transaction. At the close of the State's case, Spain moved for judgment of acquittal on Count I relating to the charge of distribution of a CDS, which the trial court granted.

. The defendant stipulated that the substance in the gel caps was heroin, excusing the need for the State to call a witness to testify as to the identity of suspected CDS. Spain also did not object to the admission of the State’s documentary exhibits offered through Officer Williams.

. The Dissent would have us believe that the thrust of Spain's defense at trial focused on urging the jury to disbelieve Officer Williams because he lied about Spain's involvement ("Thus, notwithstanding the majority's ‘mistake’ characterization, the credibility of Officer Williams was placed at issue by the petitioner. Indeed, the petitioner's objection to the State's closing argument referenced Officer Williams' 'perjuring himself and his 'credibility'." Dissent at 1). To believe so would be wrong.

Although the defense at trial surely wanted the jury to believe its sole defense witness (Spain’s sister) and its theory that Spain, while in transit to a Super Bowl party at his grandfather’s home, was caught up in a drug transaction conducted by others, it’s rationale offered in closing argument for reaching that view was that Officer Williams’ memory was unreliable due to passage of time and mental commingling of similar events, to wit:

And let's remember again, this case happened over a year ago. The officer that is testifying-officers, like any other people who testily can make mistakes. Does he remember exactly what was said to him a year ago? I would submit to you ladies and gentlemen, that probably since that incident, Officer Williams has probably had hundreds of arrests. He’s an expert in drugs activity. He's working on the street. Does he remember, verbatim exactly what my client said to him that day? It is enough that he [Spain] may have directed the officer to where drugs were being sold, to find if he was working with these people in an agreement. It is not.

Trial transcript, 6 March 2003, Page 35, lines 9-20.

Consistently, Spam’s appellate counsel argued before us that Officer Williams’ “veracity” was not challenged, rather the "accuracy” of his memory was at issue. We were informed that the “defense from the minute of opening all the way through the end was he may have made a mistake.”

. The trial judge sentenced Spain to 10 years imprisonment for the conviction of using a minor to distribute, and 10 years imprisonment, to run concurrently, for the conviction of possession with intent to distribute. The trial judge merged all of the other convictions for sentencing puiposes.

. Before sending the jury to deliberate, the trial judge in Spam’s trial gave, among others, the following jury instruction, which, for the most part, mirrors Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions § 3:10:

You are the sole judges of whether a witness should be believed. In making this decision, you may apply your own common sense and everyday experiences. In determining whether a witness should be believed, you should carefully judge all the testimony and evidence and the circumstances under which the witness testified. You should consider such things as: the witness’ behavior on the stand and manner of testifying; did the witness appear to be telling the truth; the witness’ opportunity to see or hear the things about which testimony was given; the accuracy of the witness’ memory; does the witness have a motive not to tell the truth; does the witness have an interest in the outcome of the case; was the witness’ testimony consistent; was the witness’ testimony supported or contradicted by evidence that you believe and whether and the extent to which the witness’ testimony in the Court was different from any statement the witness made on any previous occasion.

You need not believe any witness, even if the testimony is uncontradicted. You may believe all, part or none of the testimony of any witness.

. We reserve for another day whether comments such as those made in this case would be allowed under the “invited response doctrine” as a response to a direct and specific attack on a police officer witness’s veracity. The "invited response doctrine” suggests that "where a prosecutorial argument has been made in reasonable response to improper attacks by defense counsel, the unfair prejudice flowing from the two arguments may balance each other out, thus obviating the need for a new trial.” Walker, 155 F.3d at 186 n. 5 (citations omitted); see also Degren, 352 Md. at 431-32, 722 A.2d at 902 (finding comments by the prosecution during closing argument, though "unprofessional and injudicious,” to be nonetheless acceptable when “made in response to the defense counsel's comments during closing argument that the jury should not believe the State’s witnesses because they had various motives to lie”). In this case, the defendant made no such specific and direct attack on Officer Williams's veracity.