S-H

BIA

Court: Board of Immigration Appeals

Citations: 23 I. & N. Dec. 462

Decision Date: 7/1/2002

Docket Number: ID 3478

Bluebook Citation: S-H, 23 I. & N. Dec. 462 (BIA 2002)

More Cases: BIA decisions from 2002

Cite as 
23 I&N Dec. 462
 (BIA 2002)                                  Interim Decision #3478




                         In re S-H-, et al., Respondents
                            Decided September 12, 2002
                          U.S. Department of Justice
                    Executive Office for Immigration Review
                        Board of Immigration Appeals

   Under new regulations that become effective on September 25, 2002, the Board of
Immigration Appeals has limited fact-finding ability on appeal, which heightens the need for
Immigration Judges to include in their decisions clear and complete findings of fact that are
supported by the record and are in compliance with controlling law. Matter of Vilanova-
Gonzalez, 
13 I&N Dec. 399
 (BIA 1969), and Matter of Becerra-Miranda, 
12 I&N Dec. 358
(BIA 1967), superseded.
FOR RESPONDENT: Stanley A. Cohen, Esquire, New York, New York
FOR THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE: Wen-Ting Cheng,
Assistant District Counsel
BEFORE: Board Panel: HOLMES, HURWITZ, and MILLER, Board Members.

HOLMES, Board Member:

  In this case, an Immigration Judge found the adult respondents deportable
and granted their applications for asylum under section 208(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 
8 U.S.C. § 1158
(a) (Supp. V 1999). 1 The
Immigration and Naturalization Service has appealed from the Immigration
Judge’s decision. The appeal will be sustained, and the record will be
remanded for further proceedings. This decision will also briefly discuss
changes to the Board’s authority to review an Immigration Judge’s findings
of fact pursuant to new regulations that will become effective on
September 25, 2002. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms
To Improve Case Management, 
67 Fed. Reg. 54,878
, 54,902 (2002) (to be
codified at 
8 C.F.R. § 3.1
(d)(3)).
                                      I. APPEAL
   The respondents are natives and citizens of Iraq who conceded their
deportability before an Immigration Judge. The Immigration Judge granted
the adult respondents’ applications for asylum. The Immigration Judge’s
1
  The third respondent is a minor child who was placed in proceedings with his parents. The
Immigration Judge’s decision and order refers only to the adult respondents. This matter
should be addressed on remand.

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23 I&N Dec. 462
 (BIA 2002)                        Interim Decision #3478



decision consists of a very brief summary of some of the testimony presented
at the hearing, a reference to his concern regarding two clauses in a
Department of State country report on Iraq, and his conclusion that the
respondents “on balance . . . have demonstrated a well-founded fear and a
clear probability of persecution should they return to Iraq.” The Immigration
Judge did not make any specific findings of fact, did not include any explicit
credibility determinations, and did not meaningfully discuss the documents
that had been offered into evidence. It is possible that the Immigration Judge
was under the mistaken impression that the Service did not object to a grant
of relief to the respondents. However, the Service had made clear at the
conclusion of the final hearing that it did affirmatively contest the
respondents’ eligibility for asylum.
   On appeal, the Service objects to the Immigration Judge’s grant of asylum
and raises various issues regarding the respondents’ eligibility for this form
of relief. The Service also asserts that the Immigration Judge’s decision does
not adequately set forth the reasons underlying his grant of relief. The
Service requests that the Board conduct an independent review of the record,
find that the respondents did not meet their burden of proof for asylum, and
reverse the decision of the Immigration Judge.
   We agree with the Service that the Immigration Judge’s decision before us
is inadequate. The decision does little more than briefly summarize some of
the testimony and then, without further findings or analysis, state that the
respondents are eligible for, and deserving of, relief. As pointed out by the
Service, one option presently available to us in this situation is to conduct an
independent evaluation of the evidence of record, make appropriate findings
of fact, and adjudicate the asylum claim on appeal on that basis. See, e.g.,
Matter of Vilanova-Gonzalez, 
13 I&N Dec. 399
, 402 (BIA 1969) (stating that
the Board has authority to engage in de novo review of the record and, based
on such a review, make its own independent findings on questions of fact and
law, irrespective of those made below).
   However, because of the specific nature of the Immigration Judge’s
decision before us, including the almost complete lack of factual findings and
legal analysis, the record will be remanded for further proceedings and the
entry of a new decision. See Matter of Rodriguez-Carrillo, 
22 I&N Dec. 1031
 (BIA 1999) (discussing the importance of a full and separate decision
by an Immigration Judge). Our decision to remand this case is tied to the
deficiency of the decision and should not be read as indicating disagreement
with the Immigration Judge’s ultimate resolution of the respondents’
applications for asylum. We have not addressed this latter issue on the
present record.




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Cite as 
23 I&N Dec. 462
 (BIA 2002)                                     Interim Decision #3478



                            II. THE NEW REGULATION
   As noted above, the Board has had broad authority to engage in a de novo
review of the record underlying an Immigration Judge’s decision and make its
own independent findings of fact, irrespective of those made by the
Immigration Judge. See, e.g., Matter of Vilanova-Gonzalez, supra; Matter
of Becerra-Miranda, 
12 I&N Dec. 358
, 368 (BIA 1967); see also Matter of
B-, 
7 I&N Dec. 1
 (BIA 1955; A.G. 1956).
   Under recently issued regulations, the Attorney General has specified a
new scope of review to govern Board adjudications. Effective September 25,
2002, the regulations provide as follows:
    (i) The Board will not engage in de novo review of findings of fact determined by an
    immigration judge. Facts determined by the immigration judge, including findings as to the
    credibility of testimony, shall be reviewed only to determine whether the findings of the
    immigration judge are clearly erroneous. 2

    (ii) The Board may review questions of law, discretion, and judgment and all other issues
    in appeals from decisions of immigration judges de novo.

    (iii) The Board may review all questions arising in appeals from decisions issued by Service
    officers de novo.
    (iv) Except for taking administrative notice of commonly known facts such as current
    events or the contents of official documents, the Board will not engage in factfinding in the
    course of deciding appeals. A party asserting that the Board cannot properly resolve an
    appeal without further factfinding must file a motion for remand. If further factfinding is
    needed in a particular case, the Board may remand the proceeding to the immigration judge
    or, as appropriate, to the Service.

67 Fed. Reg. at 54,902 (to be codified at 
8 C.F.R. § 3.1
(d)(3)). Therefore,
effective September 25, 2002, Matter of Vilanova-Gonzalez, supra, Matter
of Becerra-Miranda, supra, and any other Board precedents setting forth the
Board’s scope of review are superseded to the extent that they are
inconsistent with the newly promulgated regulation. See Matter of Ponce de
Leon, 
21 I&N Dec. 154, 158
 (BIA 1996, 1997; A.G. 1997) (“A regulation
promulgated by the Attorney General has the force and effect of law as to this
Board and Immigration Judges.”).
   Under the new regulation, the Board must defer to the factual
determinations of an Immigration Judge in the absence of clear error. Further,

2
  The final rule provides that 
8 C.F.R. § 3.1
(d)(3)(i) “shall not apply to appeals filed before
September 25, 2002.” 67 Fed. Reg. at 54,905 (to be codified at 
8 C.F.R. § 3.3
(f)). The
Department determined that “it would be more efficacious simply to continue the current scope
of review standards for pending cases, and to apply the clearly erroneous standard only to the
review of immigration judge decisions in those appeals filed on or after the effective date.”
67 Fed. Reg. at 54,899 (Supplementary Information). The remaining provisions of 
8 C.F.R. § 3.1
(d)(3) will apply to all cases pending as of September 25, 2002.

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23 I&N Dec. 462
 (BIA 2002)                         Interim Decision #3478



if there are deficiencies in an Immigration Judge’s decision in this regard,
including absent or unclear findings of fact, the Board is more restricted in its
authority to engage in fact-finding on appeal, which might be necessary to
bring a case to resolution. This regulatory change adds significant force to
the Immigration Judge’s decision and, concomitantly, makes it increasingly
important for the Immigration Judge to make clear and complete findings of
fact that are supported by the record and in compliance with controlling law.
   Most Immigration Judges presently issue comprehensive and thorough
decisions, which are adequate under the present regulations and which should
suffice under the newly promulgated rules. Moreover, Immigration Judges
have increasingly used specific section headings in their decisions, including
designated sections for the “discussion of the evidence” and “findings of
fact.” While Immigration Judges have latitude in the manner and format of
their decisions, this structured approach to decision-making assists the parties
in understanding the decision; aids the Board and the courts if the decision is
subject to appellate review; and, importantly, helps to assure that an
Immigration Judge does not overlook essential findings in the press of
rendering oral decisions.
   Under the new regulation, it is even more important for the Immigration
Judges to make comprehensive findings of fact, including explicit findings as
to the credibility of witnesses, rather than just those findings pertinent to one
issue that the Immigration Judge may deem dispositive of the case (e.g., in a
case involving an application for cancellation of removal under section
240A(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2000), to address only the facts
pertinent to whether the respondent had been a person of good moral
character, without finding facts regarding the respondent’s continuous
physical presence or the hardship that could result from removal). If
incomplete findings of fact are entered and the Immigration Judge’s decision
ultimately cannot be affirmed on the basis that he or she decided the case, a
remand of the case for further fact-finding may be unavoidable. We
recognize that there will continue to be cases in which a dispositive issue is
sufficiently clear that resolving the case on that basis alone will be a sound
exercise of judicial economy by an Immigration Judge. See generally INS v.
Bagamasbad, 
429 U.S. 24
 (1976). However, it must be recognized that, even
in such cases, an unforeseen change or interpretation of law, for example, may
render the decision inadequate for a dispositive resolution of the case on
appeal.
   To reiterate, upon the effective date of the new regulation, the Board will
have limited fact-finding authority, particularly as to appeals from
Immigration Judge decisions that are filed on or after September 25, 2002.
This regulatory change adds meaningful force to an Immigration Judge’s
decision and heightens the need for Immigration Judges to include clear and
complete findings of fact in their decisions. Such findings are important to

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Cite as 
23 I&N Dec. 462
 (BIA 2002)                        Interim Decision #3478



the parties’ understanding of the decision, to the appellate process, and to the
avoidance of unnecessary remands for further fact-finding by the Immigration
Judge.
                             III. CONCLUSION
   Based on the specific and unusual deficiencies in the Immigration Judge’s
decision in the instant case, we will remand the record for further proceedings
and the entry of a new decision, rather than conduct a de novo review of the
record, as requested by the Service. Under the new regulatory provisions, the
Board will not engage in de novo review of findings of fact determined by an
Immigration Judge in any case in which the appeal is filed on or after
September 25, 2002. Thus, we emphasize at the outset, before the newly
implemented regulations take effect, that it is more important than ever for
Immigration Judges to include in their decisions clear and complete findings
of fact that are supported by the record and are in compliance with controlling
law.
   ORDER: The appeal of the Immigration and Naturalization Service is
sustained, and the record is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision.




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