Polyglycoat Corp. v. Hirsch Distributors, Inc.

This was a suit on a contract. Trial produced a judgment in favor of plaintiff, Hirsch Distributors, Inc. Defendant, Po-lyglyeoat Corporation, appeals.

We affirm the judgment insofar as it determines liability. We reverse and remand for a new trial on the issue of damages.

During a substantial portion of the testimony concerning damages, the trial court excluded the parties. This act is an appellate grievance asserted by Polygly-coat. Gloria Fiveson was present at the trial as the designated corporate representative of Polyglycoat. She was excluded, leaving no one present in the courtroom on behalf of Polyglycoat except, of course, its attorney. This was error.

For as much as the record discloses, the basis for the court’s exclusion was the protection of witnesses’ trade secrets. Since such ban, assuming it was appropriate, would necessarily apply to any corporate representative whomever, we thereby distinguish the case of City of Miami Beach v. Washburn, 88 So.2d 555 (Fla.1956). In the Washburn case, one Mooney was the City’s trial representative. He was also an eye witness to the accident. The Wash-bum court held that Mooney was primarily a witness, and he was not an indispensable representative of the City. The court judicially noticed that a City the size of Miami Beach is well provided with possible representatives. In other words, in the Wash-bum case there were easy alternative City representatives who were not primarily witnesses; while in the instant case, there were no alternative representatives because the trial court determined to protect the secrets from disclosure to any representative of either party.

We reverse upon authority of Seaboard Air Line Railroad v. Scarborough, 52 Fla. 425, 42 So. 706 (Fla.1906) and Purvis v. Inter-County Telephone & Telegraph Co., 203 So.2d 508 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967).

Since the exclusion was limited to testimony on the damages issues only, we bifurcate and require retrial only on the damage issues.

Additionally, parties are each variously aggrieved concerning the damage award. Upon retrial, more and different evidence may be presented. So we decline to academically exercise ourselves with specificity as to what was earlier done. We are, though, concerned with the trial court’s approach to damages by way of lost profits. Without dictating the result which will depend upon future events, we do record generally our understanding of the principles applicable to this problem.

The general rule is that anticipated profits of a commercial business are too speculative and dependent upon change in circumstances to warrant a judgment for their loss; but the rule is not an inflexible one, and if profits can be established with reasonable certainty, they are allowed. Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Santa Rosa Tractor Co., 415 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Loss of profits may be recovered where the plaintiff makes it reasonably certain by competent proof what the amount of his actual loss was. Proof of income and of the expenses of the business for a reasonable time anterior to the interruption charged, or of facts of equivalent import is usually required. However, recovery for lost profits is not generally allowed for injuries to a new business with no history of profits. The prospective profits of a new business are generally regarded as being too remote, contingent, and speculative to meet the legal standards of reasonable certainty. 17 Fla.Jur.2d Damages § 80; Tochette v. Bould, 324 So.2d 707 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), quashed and remanded, 349 So.2d 1181 (Fla.1977).

However, if the business is completely destroyed, the proper total measure of damages is market value on date of loss. Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Little, 384 So.2d 213 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Aetna relied upon Allied Van Lines, Inc. v. McKnab, 331 So.2d 319 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), wherein the court stated that the proper measure of damages for loss of personal property is its market value on the date of the loss, as compared to partially destroyed property whose damages is the difference between the value before and after the damage or the reasonable cost of repair with due allowance for the difference between the original value and the value after repair, and compensation for the loss of use. Hillside Van Lines v. Matalon, 297 So.2d 848 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); 22 Am. Jur.2d Damages § 177.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a new trial on the damage issues.

BERANEK and DELL, JJ., concur.