People v. Hampton

Defendant and a codefendant, Lewis Griffin, were charged with two counts of first-degree murder (premeditated and felony murder), MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548, resulting from the fatal shooting of Edgar Coleman, Jr. At their trial, defendant made a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal at the conclusion of the people’s case. The motion was denied after the judge said that the prosecution had presented evidence on each element of the offense. The motion was renewed at the close of all the proofs and the trial judge reserved his ruling on this motion until after the jury returned a verdict. After the jury found defendant guilty of second-degree murder on both counts, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549, the judge ordered that the verdict be set aside and ordered a new trial. The prosecutor sought leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals but leave was denied. The prosecutor applied for leave to appeal in this Court which was granted and limited to the issue of: "Whether, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court invaded the province of the jury when he granted the defendant’s motion for directed verdict after the jury had returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty.”

I

On appeal, the prosecutor claims that the trial judge erred in directing a verdict of acquittal. He claims that the judge erred by employing an improper standard in ruling on the motion, by failing to view the evidence presented by the prosecution, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable to the prosecution, by considering evidence presented by the defendant and by allowing an inaccurate view of the possible punishment to affect his decision. The prosecutor argues that the standard to be applied in determining whether a motion for a directed verdict should be granted is whether there is any evidence on each material element of the offense and that questions of the sufficiency of the evidence are for the jury unless there is no evidence at all upon a material point, see People v Garcia, 398 Mich 250; 247 NW2d 547 (1976), People v Johnson, 397 Mich 686; 246 NW2d 836 (1976), People v Abernathy, 253 Mich 583; 235 NW 261 (1931), People v Eaton, 59 Mich 559; 26 NW 702 (1886), People v Miller, 78 Mich App 336; 259 NW2d 877 (1977), People v Maliskey, 77 Mich App 444; 258 NW2d 512 (1977). Defendant contends that the proper standard for ruling on a motion for a directed verdict is whether the evidence is sufficient to justify a reasonable person in concluding that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, see People v Edgar, 75 Mich App 467; 255 NW2d 648 (1977), People v Royal, 62 Mich App 756; 233 NW2d 860 (1975).

Recognizing that the reported opinions of the appellate courts of this state contain different and sometimes conflicting statements of the standards for directed verdicts, we granted leave to appeal in this case to resolve and settle the significant jurisprudential issue of what is the proper standard to be applied in passing on motions for directed verdicts in criminal cases. However, the resolution of this issue is now controlled by the rationale underlying the decision in Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307; 99 S Ct 2781; 61 L Ed 2d 560 (1979).

Jackson held that a Federal habeas corpus court, in determining whether a state conviction was based on sufficient evidence, must consider not whether there was any evidence to support the conviction but whether there was sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

In explaining the constitutional considerations underlying the decision in Jackson the Court stated:

"In short, [In re] Winship [397 US 358; 90 S Ct 1068; 25 L Ed 2d 368 (1970)] presupposes as an essential of the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment that no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof — defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense.

"[T]he Federal Courts of Appeals have generally assumed that so long as the reasonable-doubt instruction has been given at trial, the no-evidence doctrine of Thompson v Louisville [362 US 199; 80 S Ct 624; 4 L Ed 2d 654 (1960)] remains the appropriate guide for a federal habeas corpus court to apply in assessing a state prisoner’s challenge to his conviction as founded upon insufficient evidence. We cannot agree.

"The Winship doctrine requires more than simply a trial ritual. A doctrine establishing so fundamental a substantive constitutional standard must also require that the factfinder will rationally apply that standard to the facts in evidence. A 'reasonable doubt,’ at a minimum, is one based upon 'reason.’ Yet a properly instructed jury may occasionally convict even when it can be said that no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the same may be said of a trial judge sitting as jury. In a federal trial, such an occurrence has traditionally been deemed to require reversal of the conviction. Under Winship, which established proof beyond a reasonable doubt as an essential of Fourteenth Amendment due process, it follows that when such a conviction occurs in a state trial, it cannot constitutionally stand.” (Citations omitted.) Jackson, supra, pp 316-318.

In rejecting the any evidence test, the Court focused on the differences between the concepts of relevancy and sufficiency of the evidence. Under MRE 402, all relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise excluded. Relevant evidence is defined as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence, MRE 401. The test of relevancy is designed to determine whether a single piece of evidence is of such significant import that it warrants being considered in a case. The standards for admissibility are designed to permit the introduction of all relevant evidence, not otherwise excluded, on the theory that it is best to have as much useful information as possible in making these types of decisions, Turnbull v Richardson, 69 Mich 400, 416; 37 NW 499 (1888).

The concept of sufficiency, on the other hand, is designed to determine whether all the evidence, considered as a whole, justifies submitting the case to the trier of fact or requires a judgment as a matter of law. This is in contrast to the standards for relevancy which usually focus on one particular piece of evidence. The fact that some evidence is introduced does not necessarily mean that the evidence is sufficient to raise a jury issue. Because there is no requirement that the evidence be sufficient to support a conviction to be admissible, it does not necessarily follow that merely because some evidence is admitted, the evidence is sufficient to raise a jury issue. In quantitative terms, the fact that a piece of evidence has some tendency to make the existence of a fact more probable, or less probable, does not necessarily mean that the evidence would justify a reasonable juror in reasonably concluding the existence of that fact beyond a reasonable doubt.

Due process requires that the prosecutor introduce sufficient evidence which could justify a trier of fact in reasonably concluding that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before a defendant can be convicted of a criminal offense, see, Jackson, supra. If sufficient evidence is not introduced, a directed verdict or judgment of acquittal should be entered. The statements in Johnson, supra; Abernathy, supra; Eaton, supra, to the effect that a trial judge should direct a verdict only where there is no evidence on a material element of the offense are specifically disapproved.

In summary, the trial judge when ruling on a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal must consider the evidence presented by the prosecution up to the time the motion is made, Garcia, supra, view that evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, People v Vail, 393 Mich 460, 463; 227 NW2d 535 (1975), and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, Jackson, supra, p 319.

II

However, the standards governing directed verdicts do not require that the jury’s verdict of guilty be reinstated. From the facts as they have evolved, we find that the trial judge did not direct a verdict of acquittal. He set aside the jury’s verdict and ordered a new trial. Although this ruling was made following arguments on defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, the judge actually ordered a new trial and did not direct a verdict. The trial judge’s order provided:

"Defendant having moved for a directed verdict at the close of the prosecution’s proofs, and that motion having been denied, the court ruling that the prosecution had presented some evidence on all the elements of the offense; and that motion having been renewed at the close of all proofs, and decision reserved by the court until after return of the verdict, and the jury having returned verdicts of guilty of second-degree murder against defendant; this court hereby finds that the evidence presented was not sufficient to convince a reasonable person beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt, consequently:

"It is ordered that the jury verdicts as to Defendant Hampton [handwritten by Judge Crockett] be set aside, defendant’s renewed motion for--a- directed vordiet — is granted, and a new trial is ordered.” (Cancellations made by hand in original.)

The statements in the two paragraphs of the order are ambiguous and even confusing in light of the judge’s oral explanatory statements. We do not interpret the order as representing a conclusion by the trial judge that a verdict of acquittal was required as a matter of law, even under the Jackson standards. The testimony, arguments of counsel and statements by the trial judge preceding the rulings on these issues clearly indicate that when ruling on these motions, the trial judge did not consider the prosecution’s evidence in its best light, considered evidence offered by the defense and may have permitted an inaccurate view of the possible punishment to affect his decision. Because the trial judge weighed the evidence presented by both the prosecutor and defendant, we conclude that his findings and order are more consistent with the ordering of a new trial than with the direction of a verdict of acquittal.

The standards governing the grant or denial of a motion for a new trial are different from those for a directed verdict. MCL 770.1; MSA 28.1098, provides:

"The court in which the trial of any indictment shall be had may grant a new trial to the defendant, for any cause for which by law a new trial may be granted, or when it shall appear to the court that justice has not been done, and on such terms or conditions as the court shall direct.”

Under this statute, a new trial may be granted if the trial judge finds that the guilty verdict was not in accordance with the evidence introduced and that an injustice has been done. People v Henssler, 48 Mich 49, 51; 11 NW 804 (1882), People v Rayford Johnson, 391 Mich 834; 218 NW2d 378 (1974). See, also, GCR 1963, 527.1(5). The decision whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial is entrusted to the discretion of the trial court and that decision will not be disturbed on appeal without a showing of an abuse of discretion, People v Andrews, 360 Mich 572; 104 NW2d 199 (1960), People v Lowenstein, 309 Mich 94; 14 NW2d 794 (1944).

Even the defendant, who argued that this Court should adopt a directed verdict standard similar to the one required by Jackson, concludes that the trial judge’s findings and order were consistent with the standards governing the ordering of new trials. In his brief, it is argued that:

"Here, the record shows that the trial judge in passing upon defendant-appellee’s motion gave full pay [sic, play?], to the right of the jury to determine credibility, draw inferences of fact, and determine whether a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial judge determined upon the evidence that a reasonable mind might have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant-appellee and so set the verdict aside and ordered a new trial. In doing so he was not required to apply the standards required had he acquitted the defendant-appellee.

"Wherefore, appellee respectfully requests that the order of the trial judge vacating the defendant’s conviction be upheld and a new trial ordered.”

For these reasons and because defendant has not appealed or requested a review of this order, we would decline to reverse the order for a new trial and to order that a directed verdict of acquittal be entered.

A review of the record in this case does not show that the trial judge abused his discretion in granting a new trial or that his actions impermissibly invaded the province of the jury.

Affirmed.

Fitzgerald, J., concurred with Coleman, C.J.

See People v Hampton, 402 Mich 828 (1977).

In ruling on defendant’s motion the trial judge stated that he did not think the evidence came "through with as much clarity as I think the law requires if you are going to send a man away under a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment”. However, the jury had returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree which does not carry a mandatory life sentence, see MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549.

At oral arguments, the prosecutor claimed that Burks v United States, 437 US 1; 98 S Ct 2141; 57 L Ed 2d 1 (1978), held that it was a violation of double jeopardy to order a new trial after setting aside a jury’s verdict of guilty as being against the great weight of the evidence. Traditionally, the granting of a new trial on this basis with the defendant’s consent was not viewed as violating double jeopardy, see People v Fochtman, 226 Mich 53; 197 NW 166 (1924), 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law, § 209, p 253. The holding in Burks, supra, does not directly apply to or resolve this issue because it concerned the ordering of a new trial after a directed verdict of acquittal. In fact, the question of whether the ordering of a new trial on the basis that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence violates double jeopardy was specifically left unresolved in Greene v Massey, 437 US 19, 26, fn 10; 98 S Ct 2151; 57 L Ed 2d 15 (1978), decided the same day as Burks, supra.

During the arguments on the motion made at the close of all the proofs, the following discussion occurred:

"The Court: The only basis on which you can get a conviction against the defendant Hampton is on the theory that he aided and abetted in the commission of this homicide. And as I recall the proofs, I’m inclined to think that you are dependent almost entirely on that evidence as to whether he was the one who pressed the release in the Buick that opened the trunk. I think everything else that you claim he did lends itself to the conclusion that it was not done voluntarily, that it was done under' maybe two or three different species of compulsion. One, for his own protection dealing with a person considerably his senior, a former Marine, who had regaled him time and time again about his exploits, and who during all of this period of time is with Mr. Hampton’s knowledge armed with a sawed-off shotgun. And secondly, for the safety of his sister, who seemed to be dumb enough to cultivate that kind of friendship and posed the danger for her younger brother. And third, his own immaturity.

“Now I am wondering if that sort of summary of the evidence with respect to him isn’t enough to warrant the conclusion that no reasonable person could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty.

"[Prosecutor]: I would think that’s not the case, your Honor. There are a chain of events here which would lead or should be able to lead a jury to reasonably find that he is guilty. The only element of compulsion that was ever testified to was that the defendant Mr. Griffin somehow touched his gun at the time when he first picked up the car and told the defendant Mr. Hampton to get in.

"The Court: Well, you don’t mean the only element of compulsion. You might mean the only overt threatening act.

"[Prosecutor]: Yes.

"The Court: All right. That’s different from an element of compulsion.

"[Prosecutor]: The only overt threatening act was that. After that time there was ample opportunity for Mr. Hampton to disassociate himself with the chain of events that led to Mr. Coleman’s death. He in fact was present during the time when Mr. Coleman was being bound and gagged. There is some evidence, at least the way I look at the evidence, to indicate that Mr. Griffin could not have bound and gagged and retained possession of the shotgun in the home.

"There is an opportunity of Mr. — that Mr. Hampton had to reveal his predicament at the time when he got out of the car, went to the gas station, obtained some gas. There was another opportunity for him to disassociate himself with the chain of events when he returned the gas can. He didn’t make any of those efforts.

"The Court: Now during all of this time he is operating under circumstances where his sister is in the presence of his codefendant, who has a sawed-off shotgun.

"[Prosecutor]: But there is no evidence whatsoever, your Honor, that Mr. Griffin’s presence with the sister was threatening at all to the sister. There was no threats made to the sister. She apparently went along with this thing voluntarily. She didn’t testify that Mr. Griffin made her do anything at all.

"The Court: Wasn’t there some testimony to the effect that Mr. Hampton initially was reluctant or refused to get in the car when they were leaving the house and his sister, according to his testimony, indicated to him that he had better comply? Don’t you remember that testimony?

"[Prosecutor]: Once again, your Honor, that’s Mr. Hampton’s testimony. It’s not — it’s not — it’s not his sister’s testimony at all. There was ample opportunity for defense to bring that out. It never came out. There is no evidence whatsoever that his sister felt — felt threatened or that anyone felt threatened at any time except for that one instance when, if you believe Mr. Hampton, Mr. Griffin made a threatening gesture when he first obtained the car. That is the only evidence that any threats or any type of duress was used at all towards Mr. Hampton.”

After the verdict was returned, defendant requested a ruling on his motion and the following discussion took place:

"[Prosecutor]: Secondly, I think that we have a jury to decide these matters. I don’t believe that we can review their findings. I think that there was sufficient evidence that—

"The Court: What do you mean — you said you don’t think we can review their findings?

"[Prosecutor]: I think that — I think—

"The Court: Don’t you always do that on a motion to set aside the jury’s verdict and grant a new trial?

"The Court: The whole theory of the prosecution, as I indicated before, in prosecuting Hampton was that he voluntarily aided and abetted in this killing and also in the robbery. I indicated earlier when the motion was made at the close of all of the proofs for a directed verdict, that in my judgment the only act, assuming that the evidence established that act, on which the prosecution could rely to show aiding and abetting, was the contention that Mr. Hampton was the one who pressed the release that caused the back trunk to open to permit Mr. Griffin to take out the body.

"Mr. Hampton denied that he did that. The prosecution’s star witness, Mr. Griffin’s sister, who was sitting right on the front seat, denied that he did it, and testified that Mr. Griffin himself was — I didn’t mean to say Mr. Griffin’s sister; Mr. Hampton’s sister. And she testified that Mr. Griffin himself was the one that came back into the front of the car, pressed the release to open the trunk.

"The prosecution relies on the testimony of Mr. Griffin’s sister. But her testimony, as I recall it, is pretty clear to the effect that she not only was overly excited, she was frightened, she was down on the floor of the car behind the seat. And her only basis for concluding that Mr. Hampton was the one who pressed the release was that she believes he leaned over the back seat.”

A prior inconsistent statement in which Ms. Griffin stated that Mr. Hampton pressed the release button that opened the trunk was introduced to impeach her testimony that she did not see Mr. Hampton press the button.

"Now whether he leaned over the back seat to press the release or whether he leaned over the back seat for any other reason or whether in fact he leaned over the back seat, does not come through with as much clarity as I think the law requires if you are going to send a man away under a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.

"I am not satisfied that justice was done in this case. I am not satisfied that the jury followed the court’s instructions. I am not satisfied that the prosecution’s evidence was sufficient to convince a reasonable person beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hampton is guilty. The jury’s verdict is set aside. A new trial is ordered in the case of Mr. Hampton.”

"There is no incongruity or inconsistency in requiring the Court to submit the issues to the jury if there is substantial evidence to support a verdict of guilty, and at the same time in empowering it to set the verdict aside if it is deemed contrary to the weight of evidence. In directing a judgment of acquittal, the Court makes a final disposition of the case. On the other hand, in setting the verdict aside the Court merely grants a new trial and submits the issues for determination by another jury. It is appropriate that in the latter instance, the Court should have wide discretion in the interest of justice.” (Footnote omitted.) United States v Robinson, 71 F Supp 9, 11 (D DC, 1947).