People v. Grant
Ill.
ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Supreme Court
People v. Grant, 2013 IL 112734
Caption in Supreme THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. RONNIE
Court: GRANT, Appellee.
Docket No. 112734
Filed February 7, 2013
Held There was probable cause to arrest for the municipal ordinance violation
(Note: This syllabus of soliciting unlawful business on a public way where police saw
constitutes no part of defendant yell “dro, dro” at a passing vehicle and there was testimony
the opinion of the court that this is slang for the sale of cannabis.
but has been prepared
by the Reporter of
Decisions for the
convenience of the
reader.)
Decision Under Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that court
Review on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. Maura
Slattery Boyle, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Appellate court judgment reversed.
Circuit court judgment affirmed.
Counsel on Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez,
Appeal State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Annette Collins and
Kathleen Warnick, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the
People.
Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Alan D. Goldberg, Deputy
Defender, and Brian A. McNeil, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the
Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee.
Justices JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Kilbride and Justices Thomas, Garman, Karmeier, Burke,
and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 After a stipulated bench trial, the circuit court of Cook County found defendant Ronnie
Grant guilty of Class 4 possession of cocaine and sentenced him to three years’
imprisonment. On appeal, defendant argued police lacked probable cause to arrest him, and
the circuit court erred in denying his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. A divided
appellate court agreed, and reversed defendant’s conviction and vacated his sentence. 2011
IL App (1st) 091107. We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal, and now reverse
the judgment of the appellate court.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 Defendant’s conviction arose from his 2008 arrest for soliciting unlawful business on a
public way, a municipal offense. Chicago Municipal Code § 10-8-515 (added Apr. 1, 1998).
After his arrest, defendant was initially charged with possession of less than 15 grams of
cocaine, possession of cannabis, and soliciting unlawful business. Subsequently, in a two-
count information, the State formally charged him with possession of cocaine with intent to
deliver within 1,000 feet of a Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) building (count I), and
possession of cocaine with intent to deliver (count II).
¶4 Prior to trial, defendant moved to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. At the hearing
on the motion, Chicago police officer Stephen Hefel testified as the only witness. At about
11 p.m. on November 29, 2008, Hefel was one of several officers involved in a narcotics
suppression mission. He was in the front passenger seat of an unmarked car, the first of two
police vehicles traveling west on Fifth Avenue in Chicago. From a distance of about 100 to
150 feet, Hefel spotted defendant standing at the entrance of a CHA building, in an area
known as a “highly used narcotics sales spot.” Hefel testified that this particular area was
known as “the weed spot.” When Hefel was about 20 to 25 feet from defendant, he
-2-
“specifically observed” defendant yelling “dro, dro” to a passing vehicle. According to Hefel,
who was familiar with terms used in the sale of narcotics, “dro, dro” is “basically said for the
sale of cannabis.” Hefel explained that he had been a police officer for nearly three years, had
made “[a] couple hundred” narcotics arrests, and had learned the meaning of “dro, dro” from
“numerous” past arrestees. Hefel testified further that after observing defendant yell “dro,
dro,” he conferred with the other two officers in his car. The three of them agreed that “that’s
what he said,” and determined they would detain defendant.
¶5 Hefel’s car pulled up to a spot a few feet from defendant, who looked in the officers’
direction but did not run. “Basically it was as if he just froze.” The three officers exited the
car and arrested defendant for solicitation of unlawful business. Hefel acknowledged that
defendant had nothing in his hands, and Hefel did not see defendant drop anything. Hefel
also acknowledged he did not observe defendant involved in any narcotics sales. A custodial
search of defendant recovered four plastic bags containing a green leafy substance the
officers believed to be cannabis. Defendant was then taken to the police station, where a
second custodial search recovered a plastic bag from defendant’s rear waistband. That bag
contained four smaller bags of a white rock-like substance believed to be cocaine. Police also
recovered $160. Hefel acknowledged they did not have an arrest warrant or a search warrant.
¶6 Defendant argued the police lacked probable cause that he violated the city ordinance and
their search incident to arrest was unwarranted. The circuit court disagreed and denied
defendant’s motion. The court found Officer Hefel testified “credibly,” noting in particular
his three years’ experience as a police officer and his “numerous narcotics arrests.” The court
also noted that defendant was in a “high narcotic[s] area” when he was detained.
¶7 The State dismissed count I of the information, and removed the intent language from
count II. The case then proceeded to a stipulated bench trial on the amended charge of
possession of a controlled substance. In addition to Hefel’s testimony, the parties stipulated
to the chain of custody of the four bags believed to contain cocaine, and to the results of the
crime lab analysis that one of the bags tested positive for less than 0.1 grams of cocaine and
the total estimated weight of all four bags was 0.3 grams. Defendant was found guilty of
Class 4 possession of cocaine (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2008)) and sentenced to three
years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the appellate court majority reversed the denial of
defendant’s motion to quash and suppress, concluding the facts elicited from Officer Hefel
did not constitute probable cause that defendant violated the city ordinance. 2011 IL App
(1st) 091107, ¶¶ 34-35, 37. There was thus no probable cause to support defendant’s
warrantless arrest. Id. ¶ 35. The court also reversed defendant’s conviction outright because
“[w]ithout the evidence that should have been suppressed, the State cannot prove the
defendant’s guilt.” Id. ¶ 37.
¶8 ANALYSIS
¶9 Section 10-8-515 of the Chicago Municipal Code, titled “Soliciting unlawful business,”
provides, in pertinent part:
“(a) No person may: (i) stand upon, use or occupy the public way to solicit any
unlawful business; or (ii) interfere with or impede any pedestrian or anyone in a
-3-
vehicle on the public way, for the purpose of soliciting any unlawful business.
(b) As used in this section, ‘unlawful business’[ ] means any exchange of goods
or services for money or anything of value, where the nature of the goods or services,
or the exchange thereof, is unlawful. Unlawful business includes, but is not limited
to, prostitution or the illegal sale of narcotics. For purposes of this section,
‘soliciting’ may be by words, gestures, symbols or any similar means.” Chicago
Municipal Code § 10-8-515(a), (b).
¶ 10 The parties agree that probable cause for arrest may be based on a violation of a
municipal ordinance. Accordingly, we do not address that issue. There remains the question
of whether police had probable cause to arrest defendant in this instance.
¶ 11 An arrest executed without a warrant is valid only if supported by probable cause. People
v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 274-75 (2009). Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts
known to the officer at the time of the arrest are sufficient to lead a reasonably cautious
person to believe that the arrestee has committed a crime. People v. Wear, 229 Ill. 2d 545,
563 (2008). In determining whether the officer had probable cause, his factual knowledge,
based on law enforcement experience, is relevant. People v. Smith, 95 Ill. 2d 412, 419-20
(1983). The existence of probable cause depends upon the totality of the circumstances at the
time of the arrest. Wear, 229 Ill. 2d at 564. Whether probable cause exists is governed by
commonsense considerations, and the calculation concerns the probability of criminal
activity, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Hopkins, 235 Ill. 2d 453, 472
(2009).
¶ 12 In reviewing a ruling on a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, we apply a two-
part standard of review. Id. at 471. While we accord great deference to the trial court’s
factual findings, and will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight
of the evidence, we review de novo the court’s ultimate ruling on a motion to suppress
involving probable cause. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d at 274.
¶ 13 Here, section 10-8-515 sets out the elements of the offense of soliciting unlawful
business, stating that no person may stand upon the public way to solicit any unlawful
business. It specifies that the illegal sale of narcotics constitutes unlawful business and states
that “soliciting” may be accomplished by words, which were the means employed here.
Officer Hefel’s testimony at the pretrial hearing established that defendant yelled “dro, dro”
to a passing vehicle, and that “dro, dro” was “basically said for the sale of cannabis.” See
United States v. Foxx, 544 F.3d 943, 947 (8th Cir. 2008) (“ ‘Dro’ is slang for higher quality
marijuana or hydroponic marijuana, according to an officer who testified at trial.”). Hefel’s
testimony on these points was unrebutted. Defendant made no objection to Hefel’s
explanation of “dro, dro” based on his law enforcement experience.
¶ 14 This is not surprising. Courts in other jurisdictions allow such testimony by police
officers. In State v. Mason, 2004-Ohio-4896, ¶¶ 25-28, the court held there was no error in
allowing a police detective to testify regarding the meaning of the term “40,” which meant
“ ‘$40 worth of crack cocaine.’ ” The court stated:
“ ‘[A] police officer is permitted to testify concerning his own expertise as to the
behavioral and language patterns of people commonly observed on the streets,
-4-
including people associated with criminal activities, in a manner helpful for the jury’s
clear understanding of the factual issues involved. In particular, the police officer’s
knowledge of the slang terminology usually accompanying drug transactions is
permissible.’ ” Id. ¶ 34.
See also State v. Paul, 2002-Ohio-591, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 551, at *26 (“Because some
police officers, like the undercover officer in this case, make thousands of drug arrests, they
bring a great deal of experience to a case. The courts generally permit the police to explain
why they believe that certain actions by an accused constituted drug trafficking.”). Accord
Noe v. United States, 601 F.3d 784, 787, 792 (8th Cir. 2010) (affirming denial of habeas
petition based in part on police detective’s testimony that “cutie pie” is slang for a quarter
pound and that “seven” refers to $7,000 and that, based on that price and the quantity
mentioned (two cutie pies), drug being discussed was methamphetamine); Johnson v. State,
383 S.E.2d 146, 148 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (finding no reversible error in admission of
officer’s testimony concerning his opinion of the definition of slang words used by defendant
in regard to the taking of drugs); Turner v. Commonwealth, No. 1754-04-3, 2005 Va. App.
LEXIS 368, at *4-8 (Va. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2005) (affirming conviction based in part on
police officer’s testimony that street slang term “a twenty” meant cocaine) (collecting cases).
¶ 15 Here, Officer Hefel observed defendant yelling “dro, dro” to a passing vehicle, and thus
witnessed him committing the offense of solicitation of unlawful business in violation of
section 10-8-515. Hefel had probable cause to arrest defendant. See Wear, 229 Ill. 2d at 563.
We agree with the State that the circuit court properly denied defendant’s motion to quash
arrest and suppress evidence.
¶ 16 Notwithstanding the foregoing, defendant contends the facts known by police at the time
of his arrest were insufficient to constitute probable cause. Defendant notes, for example, that
he said “dro, dro” only once, to a single passing car. In defendant’s view, this makes it less
likely that he was soliciting unlawful business, and more likely that he was specifically
addressing a single car for an innocent reason such as “trying to get the attention of someone
in that car known as ‘Dro.’ ” We disagree. Nothing in the officer’s testimony supports the
view that the officers acted unreasonably under the circumstances. See Wear, 229 Ill. 2d at
563-64 (probable cause exists when facts known to officer would lead reasonably cautious
person to believe arrestee committed a crime).
¶ 17 Defendant next argues, similarly, that a single iteration of “dro, dro,” without repetition,
is insufficient to support probable cause. This argument fails as well. It is premised on
People v. Taylor, 165 Ill. App. 3d 64(1987), and People v. Rucker,346 Ill. App. 3d 873
(2003), where police observed a series of seemingly innocuous actions which, when taken
together, provided probable cause to believe a crime was being committed. “Although an
isolated act may appear innocent, a series of similar transactions, by virtue of the repetition,
may be sufficient to support an arrest.” Taylor, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 67. However, repetition
is unnecessary where the police possess more specific information that a crime is being
committed. See People v. O’Neal, 176 Ill. App. 3d 823 (1988) (upholding probable cause
where police overheard voice later identified as defendant’s stating he would exchange
money for five grams of heroin, and then saw defendant handing plastic bag to codefendant).
The facts here are stronger than in O’Neal because here the police actually observed
-5-
defendant committing the offense of solicitation of unlawful business. Defendant’s reliance
on Taylor and Rucker is misplaced.
¶ 18 Turning to his presence in a known high-crime area, defendant argues, based on Illinois
v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000), and People v. Pence,225 Ill. App. 3d 1061
, 1064
(1992), that such presence alone does not establish probable cause. But defendant was not
arrested for merely being present at a known narcotics sales spot. Instead, his location was
just one factor contributing to probable cause. The facts adduced at the pretrial hearing
established that he yelled “dro, dro” to a passing vehicle and thus was not arrested merely
because he was present in a high-crime area. The cases relied upon by defendant are
inapposite.
¶ 19 Defendant next maintains that even though police knew he was in a known high-crime
area when he yelled “dro, dro” to a passing vehicle, the police were aware of other factors
indicating he was not involved in criminal activity: they did not observe defendant engaging
in any transactions, they did not see anything in defendant’s hands, and defendant did not flee
when the police approached. According to defendant, the information the police possessed
thus was, at most, ambiguous or equivocal, and therefore insufficient to support probable
cause. Defendant essentially argues that because some of the traditional indicia of drug
activity were absent here, the police should have taken a wait-and-see approach to determine
what, if anything, occurred next. In support of this argument, defendant relies on People v.
Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476(2005), People v. Marchel,348 Ill. App. 3d 78
(2004), and People v.
Rainey, 302 Ill. App. 3d 1011 (1999). Defendant’s reliance on these cases is misplaced.
¶ 20 In Rainey and Marchel, for example, the defendants were arrested after they were
observed making “furtive” movements toward their mouths. In each case, the appellate court
concluded the defendant’s conduct was merely ambiguous or equivocal, and could not
provide the basis for probable cause. Rainey, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 1015; Marchel, 348 Ill. App.
3d at 80-81.
¶ 21 The case at bar is distinguishable from Rainey and Marchel, where the defendants were
arrested for alleged possessory drug offenses based on equivocal conduct. Here, by contrast,
defendant was arrested for the ordinance violation of soliciting unlawful business after he
was observed committing that offense.
¶ 22 Defendant’s argument here is misguided because it assumes that probable cause for the
ordinance violation of soliciting unlawful business also requires some of the traditional
indicia of drug possession or sales. This is incorrect. What is required are facts sufficient to
lead a reasonably cautious person to believe that the arrestee solicited unlawful business in
violation of section 10-8-515. Here, the facts known by the officers at the time of defendant’s
arrest met this requirement, even without the traditional indicia of drug activity.
¶ 23 In sum, we agree with the State that the facts known to police at the time of defendant’s
arrest provided them with reasonable grounds to believe defendant was committing a
criminal offense, the soliciting of unlawful business, and thus constituted probable cause for
defendant’s arrest. We reverse the judgment of the appellate court, which reversed the denial
of defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence and reversed defendant’s
conviction outright.
-6-
¶ 24 CONCLUSION
¶ 25 For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm
the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 26 Appellate court judgment reversed.
¶ 27 Circuit court judgment affirmed.
-7-
Chat with this case using AI
Ask CiteLaw's AI Navigator anything about this case, check whether it is still good law, and see every case that cites it. Sign up for CiteLaw free today to get started.