Newell v. People ex rel. Phelps

This case comes before the -■ court on a mandamus, directed by the supreme court to Newell, auditor of the canal department, commanding him to draw his warrant, as auditor, upon the treasurer of the state, for the payment of a draft for $110, made by one of the canal commissioners, in favor of Shippey, a contractor to construct certain culverts on the Erie canal, and indorsed by him to Phelps, the *relator. The draft was drawn for money due . J Shippey on a canal contract, made in pursuance, or under color, of the act entitled i“ An act to provide for the completion of the Erie Canal enlargement and the Genesee Valley and Black River canals,” passed July 10th. 1851. Two questions were raised on the argument in this court: 1st. Whether the contract was regularly approved by the canal board, in pursuance of the 12th section of the act aforesaid; and, 2d, whether the act itself was constitutional. If the objection to the validity of the act is well grounded, it follows as a necessary consequence, that the canal contract was made without authority ; that the auditor was justified in refusing to pay the draft, and the judgment of the supreme court in directing a peremptory mandamus, was erroneous. Having, after a careful examination of the case, come to the conclusion, that the act is, in its main provisions, unconstitutional and void, it is unnecessary to decide whether the contract with Shippey was regularly approved and perfected. The decision of the second question disposes of the whole case.

The constitution, art. vii., § 1, appropriates and sets apart, in each fiscal year, out of the net revenues of the state canals, commencing on the first day of June 1846, a certain sum as a sinking fund, to pay the interest and redeem the principal of that part of the state debt called the canal debt. The sum thus appropriated and set apart was $1,300,000, in- each fiscal year, from the date above mentioned, until the first day of June 1855, and afterwards $1,700,000, until the canal debt should be fully paid; and the principal and interest of the sinking fund is to be sacredly applied to that purpose.

By § 2, it is ordained, that, after complying with the provisions of the first section, there shall be appropriated and set apart, out of the surplus revenues of the state canals, in each fiscal year, commencing on the first day of June 1846, a further sum, as another sinking fund, to pay the interest and redeem the principal of that part of the state debt called the general-fund debt. The sum thus appropriated and set apart by § 2, was $350,000 in each fiscal year, until a sufficient *sum had been raised, in pursuance of the first section, to' pay *- the interest and extinguish the entire principal of the canal debt; and after that period, then the sum of $1,500,000, in each fiscal year, until the general-fund debt should be wholly paid.

By § 3, it is ordained, that after satisfying the requirements o- the first and second sections above mentioned, “ there shall be paid out of the surplus revenues of the canals, to the treasury of the state, on or before the thirtieth day of September in each year, for the use and benefit- of the general fund, such sum, not exceeding $200,000, as may be required to defray the necessary expenses of the state; and the remainder of the revenues of the said canals shall, in each fiscal year, be applied in such manner as the legislature shall direct, to the completion of the M’ie Canal enlargement and the Genesee Valley and Black River canals, until the said canals shall be completed.” The third section contains a further provision, that after the general-fund debt shall be paid, or the canals shall be completed, then the sum of $672,500, or so much thereof as shall be necessary, may be annually appropriated to defray the expenses of the government.

The first objection to the validity of the act of the 10th of July 1851, and the only objection which it would seem necessary to discuss, is this: That the act directs the borrowing upon interest of $9,000,000 upon canal-revenue certificates, payable out of the future surplus revenues, after the completion of the canals; and further provides for the application of the whole sum to the completion of the canals, within three years. This is repugnant to the mandate in the constitution that the remainder of the revenues of the canals shall, in each fiscal year, be applied to the completion of the canals, until they shall be completed. And if the act should be carried into effect, it defeats and annuls another clause in the constitution above quoted, by which a power is given to the legislature to apply the remainders ^ 82 i of the revenue to the general *expenses of the -* government, immediately after the completion of the canals.

In the language of this constitutional mandate, there is no obscurity. We know what is meant, by “the remainder- of the revenues of the canals.” It is the annual residue of their net income, after having set apart the sums pledged by the constitution for the specific purposes previously mentioned. This remainder has averaged for five years preceding the 30th September 1837, more than $800,000 annually. The manner in which these remainders are to be applied is left by the constitution to the direction of the legislature, and so far as respects the manner of their application, the power of the legislature is unlimited. They may apply each remainder, as it accrues, to such portion of the enlargement of the Erie canal, or to the completion of either of the others, as they may deem expedient; they may divide it among the other three, or they may apply the whole to either one. They may direct the width, depth and shape of the trunk of the canals, and the dimensions and mode of constructing the locks. All this relates to the manner of applying the money, and it is, therefore, within the power conferred on the legislature.

But the manner in which the money is to be applied is one thing; and the time when the application is to be made, is another and a different thing. The difference between the manner in which a thing is to be done, and the time when it is to be done, is obvious to the plainest understanding. The mechanic who mends a shoe comprehends it as readily as the contractor who constructs a canal, or the convention which frames a constitution. The distinction cannot be reasoned down, or even obscured by argument; it perpetually recurs to the mind, whatever attempt may be made to obliterate it. The principal may instruct his agent, specifically and strictly, as to the time when the agency is to be executed, while he leaves the manner in which it is to be performed to the discretion of the agent; or he may give special directions to his agent as to the manner in which a work is to be done, while he leaves the time to the agent’s discretion. But in either case, it is the *agent’s duty to obey the specific directions of f his principal. A discretionary power may be *- conferred upon the agent, as to the manner in which a duty is to be performed, while all discretion as to the time is withheld; and in such case, the mode or manner in which the duty is to be performed, is subordinate to, and must be in conformity with, the time specifically directed. No discretionary authority with respect to the time when each remainder is to be applied to the work, is conferred upon the legislature; on the contrary, the time is fixed, the command is positive; and all discretion in that respect is withheld.

The remainder of the revenues “ shall, in each fiscal year, be applied,” &c. The remainders are annual, separate and successive; and if the remainder be applied, in each fiscal year, the application must also be annual, separate and successive. The constitution is disregarded, if a year is suffered to pass without the application of a remainder to the purpose specified; and it is disobeyed, if, by intentional anticipation, more remainders than one are applied in the same year. The words are “the remainder” (in the singular number) “ shall, in each fiscal year, be applied;” thus requiring each remainder to be applied successively as it accrues. The direction is not that the remainder shall be applied, in some or any fiscal year, but in each fiscal year; thus speaking of and treating each remainder as a separate fund, to be applied by itself in its own year. The language of the constitution, by thus fixing the time when each remainder is to be applied, precludes both anticipation and delay. The application cannot be intentionally accelerated or retarded, without disobeying the command.

This has been said to be too narrow a construction of the clause in question. But the first maxim in the construction of instruments is — “ That it is not allowed to interpret what has, no need of interpretation. When an instrument is worded in clear and precise terms — when its meaning is evident, and leads to no absurd conclusion — there can be no reason for refusing to admit the meaning which the words naturally import. To go elsewhere in search of conjectures, in order to restrict or extend it, is but to elude it. If this dangerous method be once admitted, *there will be no instrument f ... R . which it will not render useless.” (Vattel, book L II, c. 17, § 263.)

This meaning of the clause under consideration is, undoubtedly, too narrow to admit of the consolidation of the separate and successive remainders of the revenue, for a number of years, into one fund, for the purpose of applying the entire fund at once, or within three years, for the object to be accomplished. Before this can be done, we must blot out the words “ in each fiscal year,” which fix the time when each remainder is to be applied. In the language of Mr. Justice Bronson, in People v. Purdy (2 Hill 32) — “For one, I dare not venture on such a course. Written constitutions will soon come to be regarded as of little value, if their injunctions may be thus lightly overlooked; and the experiment of setting a boundary to power, will prove a failure. We are not at liberty to presume, that the framers of the constitution, or the people who adopted it, did not understand the force of language.”

The direction contained in the constitution, with respect to the time when the remainders of the canal revenues shall be applied to the enlargement and completion of the canals, is too clear and explicit, to be disregarded, even if we were at a loss as to the motive and reason on which it was founded. But we are under no such embarrassment; the object and purpose of the convention cannot be misunderstood. It was, to prevent the contracting of debt for the completion of the canals; and to preclude any device or contrivance by which the state, or its revenues, should be subjected to the payment of interest on money borrowed, or revenues anticipated, for the completion of the canals. It is an undisputed historical fact, that, for the last fourteen years, at least, the state has been agitated by a great financial question in regard to the canals, and, more especially, in regard to the enlargement of the Erie canal. This question was, whether the enlargement should be gradually carried on and completed by means of the surplus revenue of the canal, after satisfying the pledges to which it had been subjected, or whether it should be more speedily accomplished, by means of money borrowed. In 1838, the policy of borrowing # gg money *prevailed, and between that year and -* 1842, the canal debt was greatly increased.

In 1842, the financial condition of the state had become embarrassed; the means in the treasury were not sufficient to satisfy the demands upon it; money could no longer be borrowed at the ordinary rate of interest; and the credit of the state had become essentially impaired. The cost of the public works had greatly exceeded the estimates upon which they were undertaken: the revenues of some of them had fallen far short of public calculation; instead of contributing to the resources of the treasury they were a burden upon it. From these and other causes, the policy of the government in relation to the means by which the public works were to be completed, underwent, in that year, a total and radical change. All further expenditure on the public works, then in progress of construction, was suspended by law; a direct tax was laid, and such further loans, at an unusual rate of interest, were authorized, as were necessary for the purpose of putting the treasury in condition to pay the demands upon it, as they should become due; and a portion of the surplus revenue of the canals was devoted to the formation of a sinking fund for the redemption of the canal debt. (Laws of 1842, c. 114.)

The enlargement and completion of the canals remained in a state of suspension, when the constitution of 1846 was framed; the same financial question was agitated and debated in the convention. The revenues of the Erie canal had, in the meantime, greatly increased ; together with the direct tax laid in 1842, they were abundantly sufficient to have paid the interest on the public debt, and to have completed the public works, witiiin a comparatively short period. But the policy of speedily extinguishing the public debt prevailed in the convention, over that of a speedy enlargement and completion of the canals. This is manifest, not only from the debates and proceedings of the convention, but from almost every section of the financial article in the constitution. It is shown, by the large sums devoted to that purpose out of the canal revenues; by the restraints imposed upon borrowing; by the prohibition against the release *or compromise of demands against r * gg incorporated companies; by the application of *- all sums collected from such companies to the augmentation of the sinking fund of the public debt; by the prohibition against loaning the credit of the state; by the injunction that all money raised by borrowing shall be applied exclusively to the object specified in the act authorizing the debt, or to the repayment of that debt.

No language can be better adapted to the carrying out and enforcing of this policy in the completion of the canals, than that which requires each remainder to be applied, in its own fiscal year. This direction is incompatible with a sale of the future remainders, for the purpose of applying them out of their proper time; and equally so, with the plan of borrowing on the credit of the fund, and applying the avails in mass. And it is incompatible with the expenditure of any portion of the remainder for the payment of interest, except in the single case provided for in the 10th section of article vii., by which, if the appropriation should exceed the revenue, a loan, not exceeding $1,000,000 may be contracted, for the purpose of meeting the deficit.

By far the strongest objection to the borrowing of money for public purposes, arises from the obligation to pay interest on the loan. The debts thus incurred have usually a long time to run; and the interest often amounts, in the end, to a greater sum than the principal. In this respect, it makes no difference whether the debt is contracted on the general credit of the sftite, or on the credit of a fund belonging to the state. When the interest on the loan is raised by a tax, it comes from the pockets of the people individually; when it is paid out of a fund belonging to the people, it is paid out of their common purse. In respect to the profit and loss of the transaction, the objection is as great to the one mode of borrowing as to the other. • The chief object of the restraint imposed by the 12th section of article vii. of the constitution, upon the contracting of public debt, was to protect the people against the exhausting burden of paying interest. The 5th section authorizes a loan upon the credit of the sinking funds, to procure means * to satisfy the ^claims of the creditors of the state, -1 as they become payable, and this is the only authority for such a loan. The restraints imposed by the 12th section are, in effect, annulled, if the legislature may borrow, without limit, upon a pledge of the public .property, or the public revenue. The extent to which this -may be carried, if tolerated in the present instance, renders the 12th section of the constitution nugatory and useless. The main design of the direction that th'e remainders should be annually applied, undoubtedly was, to prevent the adoption of any scheme involving 'the. payment of interest on the funds used in the completion of the canals.

It has been suggested, that the remainders of the canal revenues cannot be appropriated and applied, during the fiscal year in which they accrue,, because their amount cannot be actually ascertained, until the close of the year. If this were true, it would not, in the slightest degree, affect the question under consideration; it would prove nothing, except that the year in which the remainder is ascertained, is the proper year for its application. The objection to the act of 1851 is, that it applies the revenues in mass, and not successively, as required by the constitution; and if it be admitted, that the year when the amount of the remainder is ascertained, is the fiscal year to which the remainder belongs, in respect to its application, the force of the objection remains undiminished.

But there is no impracticability, nor, indeed, any difficulty, in applying each remainder, during the year in which it accrues. The revenue of previous years affords the basis of an estimate sufficiently accurate for the appropriation for the current or following year; and if there should be a deficit in the surplus revenue, to meet any prudent engagement, made upon the faith of the appropriation, the deficiency may be supplied by a loan, in pursuance of the 10th section of the 7th article of the constitution. This is understood to be in conformity with the practice of the government, since the adoption of the constitution of 1846. Most of the appropriations in the United States government, and in this state, are made before the revenues out of which they are to be paid are actually collected. They are *based r * gg upon estimates, which are founded on the reve- ^ nue of previous years; and the estimate of the net canal revenues, after deducting the sums set apart for the sinking fund, is the estimate of the remainder. There is no more difficulty in the case, if it should ever happen, where the actual surplus revenue should exceed the estimate and appropriation. There would, in such case, be a failure on the part of the officers of the government to apply the revenue according to the literal requirement of the constitution, and the surplus on hand would remain to be disposed of by the legislature, whose duty it would be, to apply it to the completion of the canals, with the next year’s revenue. Such a case, under an intelligent and faithful administration of the government may always be avoided. The 3d and the 10th sections, taken together, made ample provisions for an appropriation which shall embrace the entire remainder. But if, by the culpable omission of the legislature (a case not to be presumed), or by an erroneous, although honest estimate, the whole remainder should not be applied, during the fiscal year in which it accrues, the error may be corrected by the legislature of the succeeding year, in the same manner as if the appropriation should be entirely omitted, when it ought to have been made. The supposed impracticability of applying the remainders, annually, according to the requirement of the constitution, is entirely imaginary.

The act of 1851 is also repugnant to the last clause of § 3, of article vii. of the constitution. By this clause, it is ordained, that “ after the general-fund debt shall be paid, or the said canals shall be completed, then the sum of $672,500, or so much thereof as shall be necessary, may be annually appropriated to defray the expenses of the government.” This power, conferred by the constitution upon the legislature, takes effect immediately upon the completion of the canals. It is a power to apply to the general expenses of the government, a part (a large part) of the subsequent remainders of the canal revenues which, by the completion of the canals, will be released from their pledge to that object. The power cannot be exer.cised by the legislature, until ^ gg the revenue is released by the completion *of -* the canals, because, until then, there is nothing to appropriate. By the act of 1851 (§ 3), it is enacted, that, “after the close of the fiscal year in 1854, or at such earliest period as the said enlargement and canal shall be declared by the canal board to be completed, the whole of the said surplus revenues specified in the first section of this act (the canal revenue remainders), as the same shall be ascertained at the end of each fiscal year, shall constitute a separate fund for, and be applied to, the payment of interest on the said canal-revenue certificates, so issued by the comptroller, as the same shall fall due, and to the redemption of the said certificates, as they shall become redeemable, or to the purchase of the said certificates as hereinafter provided.” Thus the remainder of the canal revenues, which, by the constitution, might, immediately upon the completion of the canals, have been appropriated to defray the expenses of the government, are, by this act, pledged, for a great number of years after the completion of the canals, to the payment of the canal-revenue certificates. The canal-revenue certificates may be issued, until the end of the third year after the passing of the act, and be made payable at any time within twenty-one years after their date. Thus, the power which the constitution gives to the legislature is defeated, if the pledge contained in the act of 1851 is valid.

One answer to this objection to the validity of the act, as given upon the argument, was, that the canals are not to be regarded as completed, until the canal-revenue certificates shall have been paid. This is an extraordinary proposition; a proposition not only at variance with the plain import of the language of the constitution, but in direct contradiction of the act of 1851. It has always been understood, that the canals will be completed, when the work shall have been done, and so the act of 1851 regards it. But for the purpose of reconciling the act with the constitution, we are required to reject the plain meaning of the words used, and to understand them in a newly-invented sense; in a sense in which they were never understood, either by the convention of 1846, or by the legislature of 1851. We are required to say, not only that the canals are *not ^ ^ completed, when the work is done, but that they *- are not completed, when the canal board, acting officially under the authority of the act, shall have declared them completed. We cannot assent to the propssition contended for; it is untrue, as a fact; and its untruth is apparent on the face of the constitution, and on the face of the act in question. The act provides for the finishing of the whole work, within three years. When that is done, it directs the canal board to declare the enlargement and canals to be completed; and then, in éntire disregard of the constitutional provision, which authorizes the future remainders, upon the happening of that event, to be applied to defray the general expenses of the government, it directs them to be funded to pay the canal-revenue certificates.

It was not contended, on the argument, and it cannot be successfully contended, that the legislature of 1851 could control or defeat the exercise of a power which the constitution confers on a future legislature. It was even admitted, that the disposition which the act of 1851 makes of the remainders, in advance, beyond two years from the passing of the act, was inoperative, except as a pledge of the remainders. The act purports, however, to give explicit directions for the funding of the re* mainders, and to make an absolute disposition of the fund.

But if it is to be regarded only as a valid pledge, it defeats the execution of the constitutional power as effectually, as an absolute disposition of the fund, unless it be admitted, that the legislature may rightfully violate lawful pledges made by its predecessors. The design of the constitution was, that the remainders, subsequent to the completion of the canals, should be left subject to the disposition of the legislature, at and after their completion ; and they cannot, therefore, be disposed of, nor pledged, until that time arrives, without subverting that design.

It is true, that, if the remainders are applied annually according to the constitutional requirement, the canals cannot be completed, as soon as the end of the fiscal year in 1854, according to the plan of the act of 1851; and the revenues will not, until after that time, be released and made applicable to the ^general ex- ^ penses of government; but this does not remove L the objection, that the act is repugnant to the constitution. To make it an answer to this objection, even upon the forced supposition, that the canals are not completed, until the certificates shall have been paid, it must be demonstrated to a certainty that, by the completion of the canals, according to the plan of the act of 1851, the canal-revenue certificates will be paid off, and the.revenues themselves be made applicable to general purposes, as soon as the canals would be completed by the more gradual process prescribed by the constitution. This is impossible; no human foresight or sagacity can authorize the assertion, that the canal-revenue certificates can be paid off or redeemed, according to the plan of the act, as soon as the remainders would finish the canals, according to the plan of the constitution; every probability is against such a proposition. But it is unnecessary to enter into an estimate of probabilities. All that part of the people of this state who have a greater pecuniary interest in the early application of the canal revenues to the general expenses of the government, than in the early completion of the canals (and there are many such), will be defrauded of their constitutional rights, if, by the operation of the act of 1851, the time when the canal revenues may be used for general purposes, shall be deferred or delayed; and any plan or system, which, by a departure from the plan of the constitution, puts this right at hazard, is a wrong done to them, and a violation of the constitution.

But the concluding part of the 3d section, above quoted, is important, in another point of view. It confirms the construction already given to the previous part of the same section, which directs the annual application of the remainders to the completion of the canals. The concluding clause shows, that the completion of the canals and the release of the remainders from their application to that object, were events to happen at the same time; the release of the revenues was to be the immediate consequence of the completion of the canals. But this consequence cannot follow, unless the work is paid for as it progresses, by the annual application of Q2 -i th® remainders, as directed *by the previous - clause; and without leaving a debt chargeable on the remainders, after the work is done. The two clauses are adjusted to each other, on the same plan of completing the work by means of the revenue, without debt or anticipation. And the latter clause demonstrates, with entire certainty, that the former is to be understood according to the exposition hereinbefore given to it. Reading the two clauses in connection, it cannot be doubted, that the direction that “the remainder shall, in each fiscal year, be applied,” &c., was cautiously framed, for the purpose, and with the design, of precluding any scheme or device like that contained in the act in question. Without striking it out, or mutilating it by transposition (which was not contended for on the argument), there is no escape from the conclusion, that the plan and provisions of the act of 1851 are repugnant to its directions and commandment.

The act in question is, therefore, invalid on the following grounds:

1. Because it is in disobedience of the command of the constitution, that the remainder of the canal revenues shall, in each fiscal year; be applied to the completion of the canals, until they shall be completed.

2. Because it applies a large portion of the revenues to the payment of interest on the loan which it authorizes ; whereas, the constitution requires the revenues to be directly and wholly applied to the work itself, as fast as they accrue, and, therefore, without the payment of interest on money borrowed, or revenue anticipated, unless upon a loan made in the case specified in § 10.

3. Because, if the plan of the act is to be regarded as a loan on the pledge and credit of the revenues, and not on the general credit of the state, it is, nevertheless, forbidden by the spirit and intent of the 12th section of the 7th article, and is incompatible with the annual and direct application of the remainders, required by the constitution. The remainders cannot be made the basis of a loan, because, is applied as directed by the constitution, they cannot be paid or pledged to the lender.

*4. Because the act withholds the remainders of the canal revenues, after the completion of L the canals, from being applied to the general expenses of the government, and defeats the power which the constitution vests in the legislature, to devote them to that use, upon the- happening of the event specified by the constitution.

5. Because, if carried into effect, the act might, and in all probability would, defer and postpone the application of these revenues to the general expenses of the government, beyond the time when the canals would have been completed, by the successive application of the remainders.

I concur also in the opinion entertained by the majority of my brethren, that if this act should be carried into effect, it would impose an obligation upon the state to pay the canal-revenue certificates, in case the remainders pledged for that purpose should, by the course of future legislation, or from other causes, become insufficient.

There is no legal remedy to recover a debt against the state, in favor of its own citizens; in general, the state pays only by reason of its moral obligation. The fact that money borrowed under the authority of a statute is applied to the use of the state, creates, of itself, such an obligation as future legislatures would feel bound to respect. No one acquainted with the history of the legislation of this state can doubt, that money borrowed under the act of 1851, if applied to the completion of the canals, would be repaid, on the ground of this moral obligation, in case of a failure of the revenues. The provision contained in the 14th section of the act, professing to limit the liability of the state, might give rise to objection and controversy; but, sooner or later, the claim would prevail, and could not be effectually resisted. It is, therefore, in this respect, an evasion, if not a direct Violation, of the constitution.

The judgment of the supreme court should be reversed, and the application for a mandamus denied, with costs in the court below.

Johnson, J.

The question of the constitutionality of ^ _ the canal *act of 10th July 1851, is directly pre- -* sented by these cases, and must necessarily be decided. A decision against its validity will prove injurious to the interests of many persons, and disappoint the earnest wishes of many more. But this consideration, while it occasions regret on my part, detracts nothing from the obligation to preserve the constitution from infraction. The evil consequences to the community, from an example of judicial unfaithfulness to that duty, would far outweigh the worst to be apprehended from a decision adverse to the canal act.

Before proceeding to the consideration of the principal question involved in these cases, it may not be amiss, to advert very briefly to one or two topics which were urged upon our attention on the argument. For. there may be found persons so little familiar with the grounds of judicial procedure, as to attach to them much more importance than they really deserve. These topics were presented to us under a great number of distinct heads; but are reducible to two. The one, that the governor and other state officers, and two successive legislatures, had been of opinion, and had officially acted upon the opinion, that the act in question was not repugnant to the constitution; the other, that several gentlemen, occupying no official station, but of acknowledged learning and ability as lawyers and statesmen, had expressed opinions to the same effect. As to the first ground, although the action of the other departments of the government is always entitled to the respectful consideration of the judiciary, it can and ought to weigh nothing, when it conflicts with their settled conviction of the requirements of the constitution. As to the latter ground, it seems quite obvious that we should be very forgetful of our duty, and of the obligation and responsibility officially imposed upon us, if we allowed our judgments to be swayed by the opinions of any number of men, however respectable.

Leaving these matters, without further observation, let us turn to the main question which we are called upon to examine. The people of this state, in the exercise of their underived and sovereign authority, established the constitution; as part of the machinery of government, under it, they created a senate *and ^ assembly, and vested in them the legislative power of the state. The authority of the legislature is not inherent, but is entirely derived from and subordinate to the constitution. “ The constitution is the basis of legislative authority; it lies at the foundation of all law, and is a.rule and commission by which both legistors and judges are to proceed.” (2 Dali. 304.) If, therefore, an act of the legislature is contrary to any provision of the constitution, it cannot possess the force of law. Ever since the formation of constitutional governments, this principle has, on all proper occasions, been asserted and enforced by the courts, and is now one of the acknowledged maxims and fundamental rules of the law.

The provisions of the - .constitution which bear most immediately upon the question before us, are contained' in article vii., §§ 3 and 12. The 3d section provides, that after paying certain expenses of the canals, and the sums appropriated by the first and second sections of the same article, not more than $200,000 shall be paid out of the surplus revenues, annually, to defray the necessary expenses of the state, “ and the remainder of the revenues of the said canals shall, in each fiscal year, be applied in such manner as the legislature shall direct, to the completion of the Erie Canal enlargement, and the Genesee Valley and Black River canals, until the said canals shall be completed§ 12 provides, that “no debt shall be hereafter contracted, by or on behalf of -this state” (except certain debts specified in the 10th and 11th sections, which have no bearing upon the question under consideration), unless authorized by a law imposing an annual tax to pay the interest and provide for the discharge of the principal; such law to be submitted to the people at a general election, before it can take effect. If it shall be found, that the act in question purports to dispose of the remainders of the revenues of the canals, at a time or in a manner unauthorized by the 3d section, or that it purports to create a debt unauthorized by the provisions of the 12th section, then the act is void.

To look at the provisions bearing upon the first of these questions, from the same point of view, and in the #. qq -i light of the same *facts, as did the convention -* who framed the constitution, and the people who adopted it, will facilitate our arriving at a just conception of its meaning. In the years 1834 and 1835, the project of enlarging the Erie canal began to be carried into effect; the financial policy adopted was, substantially, to apply the surplus revenues to the work, and carry it on just so fast as the means thus furnished would permit. This policy was pursued until 1838, when another and wholly different course was adopted; it went upon the basis of considering the revenues of the canal as a fund to provide for the repayment of the principal, and to pay the interest of moneys to be borrowed and applied to the completion of the work; and this is in substance the plan of the present canal act. Upon this plan, the state proceeded till 1842, when, judging from the legislative action of that year, the scheme was found wholly to have failed.

When the convention assembled in 1846, these two financial schemes were fresh in the recollection of every one. That the difference between them is not formal, but of their very essence, may be rendered entirely apparent, from a consideration of the results which would follow the adoption of each plan, taking, for the sake of illustration, certain assumed amounts for the revenues of the canals, and for the total cost of construction. These amounts are obviously wholly unessential, and in no way affect the principle of application. They are assumed, not because they are supposed to represent with accuracy the actual condition of the canals, or the probable results of the bill in question, but because they afford a striking illustration of the different results which may follow from the adoption of the one plan or the other. In order, therefore, to determine the question proposed, let us assume the annual remainder of revenues to be $500,000, and the total cost of completion $15,000,000. By the annual application of the remainders, the canals would certainly be completed in thirty years. What would be the result on the principle of anticipation adopted by the act in question ? The annual interest on the loan of $9,000,000, at six per cent., is $540,000; the annual remainder applicable to its payment $500,000; and the annual deficit $40,000. So that, *at the end of thirty years, instead of f ^ Qf_ having the canals completed, and no debt, they *- would stiff need an expenditure of $6,000,000 to compíete them, and the amount.of money owing, by reason of the deficiency of the remainders to keep down the annual interest, would have swelled up from $9,000,000 to $10,200,000. It is obvious, therefore, that the difference between these two schemes is not formal or modal merely, but is a difference in their very nature and essence. Having fruits so widely different, they do present a choice, and we might not unnaturally expect, that a convention, or any other body having to act upon the subject, would perceive the difference, and signify their choice. Does the section in question show that the convention and the people did choose between these two schemes ?

Whether we are considering an agreement between parties, a statute or a constitution, with a view to its interpretation, the thing we are to seek is, the thought which it expresses. To ascertain this, the first resort, in all cases, is, to the natural signification of the words employed, in the order and grammatical arrangement in which the framers of the instrument have placed them. If, thus regarded, the words embody a definite meaning, which involves no absurdity, and no contradiction between different parts of the same writing, then, that meaning, apparent upon the face of the instrument, is the one which alone we are at liberty to say was intended to be conveyed; in such a case, there is no room for construction. That which the words declare, is the meaning of the instrument; and neither courts nor legislatures have the right to add or to take away from that meaning. . This is true of every instrument, but when we are speaking of the most solemn and deliberate of all human writings, those which ordain the fundamental law of states, the rule rises to a very high degree of significance. It must be very plain, nay, absolutely certain, that the people did not intend, what the language they have employed, in its natural signification, imports, before a court will feel itself at liberty to depart from the plain reading of a constitutional provision.

[* 98 On this subject, Chief Justice Marshall says, speaking *of the constitution of the United States: “ As men whose intentions require no concealment generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they said.” (Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 188.) To the same effect, is the case of People v. Purdy (2 Hill 31, and 4 Id. 384), upon the construction of that clause in the former constitution of this state, requiring the assent of two-thirds of the members of the legislature to every bill “ creating, continuing, altering or renewing any body politic or corporate.” The attempt, in that case, was to exempt municipal corporations from the provision. Bronson, J., dissenting from the judgment of the supreme court, says: “I do not so read the constitution. These words are as broad in their signification as any which could have been selected for the occasion from our vocabulary, and there is not a syllable in the whole instrument tending, in the slightest degree, to limit or qualify the universality of the language. If the clause can be so construed, that it shall not extend alike to all corporations, whether public or private, it may then, I think, be set down as an established fact, that the English language is too poor for the framing of fundamental laws, which shall limit the powers of the legislative branch of the government.” “In this way, a solemn instrument, for so, I think, the constitution should be considered, is made to mean one thing by one man, and something else by another, until, in the end, it is in danger of being rendered a mere dead letter, and that too, where the language is so plain and explicit, that it is impossible to malee it mean more than one thing, unless we first lose sight of the instrument itself, and allow ourselves to roam at large in the boundless field of speculation. For one, I dare not venture on such a course. Written constitutions of government will soon come to be considered of little value, if their injunctions may be thus lightly overlooked; and the experiment of setting a boundary to power, will prove a failure. We are not at liberty to ^ g presume, that the framers of the constitution, *or -* the people who adopted it, did not understand the force of language.” The judgment thus dissented from was reversed in the court for the correction of errors; and Senator Paige, in his opinion in that court, says: “ For one, I cannot consent to palter in a double sense with any part of the constitution. Through no agency of mine, shall it be made to keep the word of promise to the ear and break it to the hope. I trust, that the court will not hesitate to array itself in favor of the old and revered doctrine of strict construction — the only sound and safe doctrine for the government of either judges or legislators. If courts are allowed to depart from it, and venture upon the perilous experiment of substituting, for the clear language of the instrument, their own notions of what it ought to have been, or what its framers intended, there will be an end of written constitutions, and of all attempts to fix limits to legislative and judicial power.”

Applying these principles to the section in question, we are unable to see, that the words “in each fiscal year,” are not placed in such connection with the residue of the sentence, as to convey the meaning which the convention and the people intended. We see no ground for thinking that a different arrangement of the words of the clause would be better calculated to express that meaning, and no ground for altering the arrangement, except a dislike of the meaning which is now clearly conveyed-. The words in question, placed where they are, are full of significance, and say as plainly as language can, that the application of the remainders of revenue to the enlargement and completion of the canals, is to be made in each fiscal year, until their completion. The convention and the people have then chosen between the two schemes of finance of which we have spoken, both of which had been tried and their results ascertained. Taught by experience, they selected that scheme which they saw insured success, avoided debt and facilitated economy — the scheme of paying as the means of payment should be produced from the revenues of the canals.

It is, however, contended, that conceding the words “ in each fiscal year,” to be so placed as to convey the meaning which *the people and the convention ^ intended, the whole clause, taken together, con- ^ fers upon the legislature entire discretion over the manner of applying the revenues to the enlargement and completion of the canals. That, although this application is directed to be made in each fiscal year, yet the scheme of the canal act is one mode of thus applying these revenues. That, therefore, as the whole subject of the manner of application is within the discretionary power of the legislature, the particular manner adopted in the act is necessarily constitutional.

If the words of the constitutional provision had been, “ in such manner as the canal-board shall direct,” no one would have supposed that the board intrusted with the power to get up such a financial scheme as the act in question contains. No one would have doubted, that the clause fixed, in the first place, the thing to be applied, viz., the remainders of revenue; next, the object to which they were to be applied, the enlargement and completion of the canals; and next, the time of application, “ in each fiscal year, until the canals shall be completed.” And no one would have hesitated to admit, that the discretion conferred by the use of the words “ in such manner as the canal-board shall direct,” had reference to other points than those which had thus been fixed. Now, it was never heard of, as a matter of law, that the character of the agent had anything to do with the extent or nature of the power conferred upon him; that depends altogether upon the terms in which it is conferred, and not at all upon the character of the agent. This proposition is abundantly plain, and, in general terms, would scarcely be denied by any one; yet, the position we are examining is founded upon its practical denial, on the notion of the sovereignty of the legislature, which, although entirely accurate in reference to the parliament of Great Britain, as to which body it was first announced, has a very limited application to legislative bodies existing under and subject to the provisions of a written constitution. That the legislature possesses the legislative power of the state, under the constitution, is true; but this does not touch the question of the extent of that power. That depends upon the restrictions which the ^constitution -* has imposed; because, subject to those restrictions, the whole legislative power of the state is granted.

In respect to the revenues of the state, the legislature has not been intrusted by the people with unlimited power. On the contrary, the limitations to be placed on its power, seem to have called for and received the anxious attention of the convention. The whole scope of the 7th article of the constitution manifests the most careful purpose to assign limits to a power which would otherwise be unrestrained. These restrictions, it is to be remembered, are imposed by the sovereign power upon one of the agents it has constituted to carry on government. We are not at liberty to think, that restrictions upon the power of the legislature are unnecessary; the fact that such restrictions are contained in the constitution under which we sit, is, for us, conclusive proof that these restrictions are necessary. Nor can we regard them or unwise, or against a liberal and enlightened policy,- and, therefore, to be evaded, or construed otherwise than according to the spirit and policy of the provision themselves. If that policy differs from any other line of policy, then the latter is that which we are bound to avoid. The policy of the constitution is, for us, liberal, enlightened, wise, and must be sustained by us, so long as it remains embodied in the fundamental law.

Under the constitution, the thing to be applied to the enlargement of the canal is revenue — money. It is that which is to be applied; not something else, the product of the use of that money. It is to be applied, moreover, in each fiscal year. The application is not to be delayed by accumulation, nor hastened by anticipation, but is to proceed, year by year, using the revenues of the year for the work of the year, until the canals shall be completed. We are not at liberty so to construe the discretion conferred on the legislature, as to the manner of application, as to bring it into conflict with the time of application, which the constitution expressly specifies. The act in question provides, that after 1854, the remainder of the revenues shall be applied, not to completing the canals, nor conditionally in case the canals shall then be completed, but ^absolutely, to the creation of a fund, to pay canal-revenue certificates and interest thereon. If the canals should not be completed, before that period, then the act and the constitution are directly in conflict; the one declaring that the revenues shall be applied to the completion of the work, the other that they shall be accumulated in a fund for paying the certificates.

We might, with entire confidence, rest the determination of these cases upon the grounds which we have already considered; but we think it proper also, to consider the question, whether this act does not purport to authorize the creation of a debt against the state, within the meaning of the prohibitions contained in the 7th article of the constitution. In considering that question, we will, for the present, omit to take into account the latter part of the 14th section of the canal act, because,if that has the effect ascribed to it by the counsel who maintain the constitutionality of the law, then it matters not what obligation the residue of the act seems to create, though it be the incurring of a debt in the most direct and unequivocal form. Even if the act and the certificates contained a positive promise to pay, and a pledge for payment of the faith of the state and of all its revenues, this clause in the 14th section would, in their view, prevent the act from being unconstitutional. Confining our attention, at present, however, to the inquiry, what obligations, if any, are assumed by the state, in case the provisions of the act are constitutional, let us consider the extent and nature of those obligations. For, if the act creates any obligation which is to be regarded as a debt, within the meaning of the constitution, then, even if we might have thought the scheme a mode of application, within the meaning of the 3d-section of the 7th article, looking at .that section alone, we should, nevertheless, be bound to construe the two sections together, and hold that the 3d section did not intend to authorize what the 12th section forbade.

If language has any meaning, the legal effect of the act, if valid, is, at least, to devote so much of the surplus revenues of the canals as shall actually be received after 1854, to the creation of a fund to pay the canal-revenue * 103 1 cer^ca*es anc* the ^interest thereon. If this -* can be -done in regard to one source of revenue, we see no reason why the same thing may not be done in regard to every source of revenue of the state, including not only all revenue which may arise from property, but also all which may be realized by the exercise of the power of taxation. Such an anticipation of revenue would no more create a debt than this bill does.

It may be objected, that there is distinction between a pledge of the revenues of property owned by the state, and of the revenues to be derived from taxation; but the distinction does not affect the question. Whatever consumes the revenues of the property of the state, tends to render a resort to taxation necessary, just to the extent to which the revenues from property have been consumed. It is, therefore, a matter of entire indifference, whether one or another part of the resources of the state is drawn upon; for the substantial effect upon the financial condition of the state is the same in eithei case. If the constitutioual provision against incurring debts permits such a scheme as this to be effectual, it is of small moment, to inquire what it prohibits; for it provides no practical restraint whatever upon the power of the legislature. To attribute such an intention to the convention, or to the people, as to permit the one and prohibit the other, is to attribute to them an entire incapacity to comprehend the subject on which they were acting, and the effect of their own language. It is construing the constitution as if it were a penal statute or a disfavored agreement in conflict with public policy rather than as being the supreme law of the state, prescribed by the immediate source of all authority, to set bounds to the power delegated to its agents. We might, on this branch of the subject, rely wholly upon the plain sense of the constitutional provision in question; but a brief examination will serve to show, that the obligations which purport to be created by this act constitute, in its ordinary sense, a state debt.

National or state debts assume a great variety of forms. Sometimes, they take the most usual form of private debt — an obligation to pay the principal at a specified period, with interest *in the meantime. Sometimes, the period of payment of the principal is wholly at the election of the government; while, at others, the government is at liberty to pay at any moment, after a fixed period. Sometimes, the principal is not to be paid at all, but only a perpetual annuity, and sometimes, only an annuity dependent on a life or lives, or for years. In short, these obligations assume every form which can tempt the possessor of money to part with it to. the government, and are varied, from time to time, as one or the other seems most likely to accomplish the purpose of putting out promises and getting money in return. In all these forms, one common attribute is found, and one only; viz., that in consideration of money advanced to the state, the state promises whatever it is thought will be most likely to procure money to be advanced, it matters not what; and that which is thus promised is debt. It may relate only to the income of particular property, or it may embrace the whole resources of the state. The extent of the obligation does not affect or qualify its nature; so long -as there is an obligation assumed by the state, it constitutes a debt — something due from the state.

Again, if, in the natural and expected course of events, a period will come, when the promises made by the certificates in question will ripen into a perfect obligation on the part of the state, then the issue of them conflicts with the prohibition of the constitution, as clearly as if the debt arose immediately upon their being signed. When remainders of revenue from the canal shall have been received into the treasury of the state, after 1854, the obligation of the state will have become perfect, to pay upon these certificates the amount so received. It is true, the payment cannot be made, without further legislative action, nor could it be, if the certificates were immediate and general obligations on the part of the state; an appropriation is always necessary to effect actual payment, but the obligation is as complete without the appropriation as with it.

There is another view in reference to the obligation assumed by the state, which clearly shows that they amount to a debt. The 9th section of the act appropriates $540,000 to pay interest during the first two years. We have, then, the certificates containing, in conformity with the 2d section of the act, a promise to pay interest semi-annually, and an appropriation to pay that interest. If this does not make a complete and perfect obligation, I am at a loss to conceive what would. It is true, that the constitution authorizes appropriations for two years, but it does not authorize the creation of debts, and we are not at liberty so to construe the power to make appropriations, as to bring it in conflict with the prohibition against creating debts. The appropriation, in this case, is to be taken in connection with the promise to pay, contained in the certificate, and the scheme of raising money in which they form part of the machinery. Thus viewed, the certificates, so far as the two years’ interest is concerned, are as complete obligations of the state to pay money, as the promissory note of an individual is an obligation upon him to pay money.

It is, however, to be observed, that the 9th section, which makes the appropriations in question for the payment of interest, directs the payment to be made out of the avails of the sale of the certificates, the premiums thereon, and the interest which may have accrued on the deposit of such avails. On the other hand, the 8th section, which contains the appropriations for two years’ work upon the canals, directs the payments to be drawn from the same sources, and also from the surplus revenues. If the appropriation to the payment of interest had been directly from the general resources of the state, we have seen that a debt would result. Does this indirect process alter the effect ? The moneys arising from the sale of certificates are, when received, the property of the state; they can be paid out only in virtue of an appropriation by law. The persons who paid them to the state for certificates, no longer retain any interest in or control over them. The only ground on which a dis- 106 ] tinction can be suggested between payment from these funds in the hands of the state, and from its general resources, is, that such payment is refunding part of the price of the certificates to the purchaser. Besides the answer, that the transaction was not originally a sale of the certificates (for an advance of money on the original ^uttering of an obligation for the payment of money, is never a purchase of the obligation, but always a loan), it is sufficient to say, that the ground taken is not warranted by the provisions of the act. The amount which is to be repaid to the purchaser or lender, for principal, is not diminished by these payments under the appropriation in question. It is not part of what he advanced, which he is receiving back, but a compensation for the use of what he advanced. This compensation, being payable by the state in all events, creates a debt within the narrowest definition of that term, which was pressed upon us at the argument.

It remains to consider the effect of the last clause of the 14th section of the act; this provides as follows: “ The certificates to be issued under the act shall, in no event or contingency, be so construed as to create any debt or liability against the state, or the people thereof, within the meaning of § 12, article vii., of the constitution.” The section of the constitution referred to had already rendered it impossible that the certificates should create any debt or liability against the state or the people, and a legislative provision of this sort was-not necessary for the protection of that instrument. Is its effect, to preclude us from inquiring whether the certificates, or the provisions of the act, taken in connection with the certificates, purport to create a debt or liability against the state, or the people thereof? We think not. It does not alter, or profess to alter, any one provision of the act; it leaves them all standing on the statute book, with the apparent force of law, and with the sanction of legislative approval, forming together a single scheme for raising money, on the faith of which capital is invited to assist the state. Under this state of things, can we be asked to take the ground that the state is to be regarded as coming into the money-market, with a cunningly-devised plan of promises, seemingly efficacious, but really known to be wholly unlawful, and incapable of conferring any legal right, and by such means seeking to procure the advance of money? The respect which we owe to the legislature, forbids us to listen for one moment to the suggestion. The clause in question is *only a legislative declaration of the meaning of the constitution and an injunction upon the *- courts to construe the act accordingly. If it were to be regarded by us, and such effect given to it, as is contended for, then the most flagrant legislative violations of the constitution may always be screened from the scrutiny of the courts, by the addition of this simple clause.

A single illustration will suffice to make the position plain, that this clause is not to be regarded, in considering the validity of the act. Let us suppose an act of the legislature, directing that A. may make his certificate, stating that a mortgage from B. to C. is satisfied, and that upon such certificate being filed in the county clerk’s office, where the mortgage is recorded, the same should be satisfied and discharged of record; and further adding, that said certificate should not be construed to impair the obligation of a contract, within the meaning of the constitution of the United States. Does any one think,, that such a law could be enforced, or that such a certificate would be any more efficacious to discharge the mortgage, than a sheet of blank paper ? Its absurdity is too plain to admit of argument. Yet this is the very case which we are considering.

In conclusion, we have seen, that the act under consideration, in its material provisions and general scope, conflicts with the constitution of the state. Its provisions constitute a single financial scheme, and must stand or fall together. We have not been intrusted with the power of determining whether the policy of the constitution is wise or not; nor has any discretion been given to us, to enforce its provisions, or to refrain, as we may think the public welfare demands. Our duty is simply to declare what we believe to be the law, viz., that the act in question, being repugnant to the constitution, is void. The judgment- of the supreme court should, therefore, be reversed, and the mandamus refused.

Edmonds, J.

Two questions are presented for our consideration in this case: 1st. Whether the contracts made by the letting board are valid and complete, without the approval of *the canal board ? 2. Whether -* the law itself is not void, as repugnant to the constitution ?

The first question is of minor importance — perhaps, if we are correctly informed as to the action of the legislature, of no moment whatever, except as to its influence on the decision of this particular case. I have examined it, however, and am inclined to believe that the contracts were not valid, for want of the approval of the canal board.

The 12th section of the act directs the canal commissioners, state engineer, &c., to contract for the completion of the Erie Canal - enlargement, &c., upon such terms, and in such manner, as the canal-board shall direct and approve. The return to the mandamus shows that the canal board have merely directed the terms in which the subordinate board shall contract, and that the canal-board never have approved of the manner in which their directions have been carried out; never have inquired in what manner they have been attempted to be followed, nor whether they have not been entirely disregarded. It is evident to me, that it was the intention of the statute to require the judgment and decision of the canal-board, and to commit to the subordinate board the mere executive duty of carrying out such decision. It is in no other manner, that I can find aliment for the provision, that the canal-board shall “ approve.” Their refusing to do more than they have done, is, in effect, striking the word “approve” out of the statute. It was their duty to do more than merely direct the terms on which the contracts should be made; it was necessary for them to approve the manner in which it was proposed to contract. When they did that, and approved of the action of the other board, and not till then, were the contracts valid and effectual. It is thus alone that full force can be given to all the provisions of the statute.

The other question involves the constitutionality of the law, and whether the contracts executed under it, even if duly approved, would be valid ? *In examining this question, I shall inquire — 1. What *- is the scheme of the constitution ? 2. What that of the statute ? 3. Whether they are repugnant to each other ?

And I enter upon the examination thoroughly imbued with the principle, that the task of determining that a law is void, by reason of its repugnancy to the constitution, is at all times one of extreme delicacy; that it ought seldom, if ever, to be done in a doubtful case; that it is not on slight implication and vague conjecture, that the legislature is to be pronounced to have transcended its powers (Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 128); that it is only in express constitutional provisions, limiting legislative power and controlling the temporary will of a majority by a permanent and paramount law, settled by the deliberate wisdom of the nation, that we can find a safe and solid ground for the authority of courts of justice to declare void any legislative enactment (Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 382); that in construing the language of a constitution, we have nothing to do with arguments ab inconvenienti, for the purpose of enlarging or contracting its import, the only sound principle being to declare ita lex scripta est, to follow and to obey (People v. Morrell, 21 Wend. 584); that there is no safe rule for construing the extent or the limitation of powers in a constitution, other than is given by the language of the instrument which confers them, taken in connection with the purposes for which they were conferred (Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 188); and that the opposition between the constitution and the law should be such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility with each other (6 Cranch 188; 1 Cowen 564).

When such an incompatibility is manifested, I agree with Chief Justice Marshall, whose sentiments I have already quoted, that the court, when impelled by duty to render such a judgment, would be unworthy of its station, could it be unmindful of the high obligations which that station imposes.

* 110 1 ^ Procee<^’ *hen) t° inquire, *what is the scheme of the constitution, in that part bearing upon the question before us? In order properly to understand it, we must become acquainted with the circumstances out of which its provisions sprung, and upon which it was designed they should act.

The Erie and Champlain canals, extending a distance of 427 miles, were completed in October 1823, so far as to allow of their navigation to the whole extent. , On the 1st of January 1825, it was ascertained, that their cost had been about $10,000,000, and that the state was then owing a debt, contracted for their construction, amounting to $7,467,770.99. It was then already apparent, that their revenues would be sufficient to discharge that debt, at an early period. And as early as that date, there sprung up from these circumstances two conflicting systems of canal policy, which have more or less agitated our public councils, for the last quarter of a century. One of them proposed an extensive scheme, of internal improvements, involving the construction of many other canals, and the expenditure of many millions, which were to be obtained in the first instance by loans, and to be repaid out of the canal-revenues. The other deprecated the creation of a debt, and insisted that such works could be safely undertaken and carried on only out of surplus revenues as they should accrue.

As one or the other of these systems of policy prevailed, and in the process of time, each had by turns the ascendancy, our works of internal improvement advanced or halted, producing, however, in the meantime, as conditions, the Cayuga and Seneca, the Crooked Lake, the Chemung and the Chenango canals, adding many miles of canal to our public works, and involving the expenditure of many millions more. The means for these expenditures, also, were obtained by loans. No one, at that day, was bold enough, to advocate the policy of an irredeemable debt, but all looked forward to an early extinguishment of whatever might be contracted. This sentiment prevailed in the constitutional convention of 1821, and hence, it was provided in the instrument which they framed, that the *debt then ^ existing should be paid when it became due, *- and that the revenues of the canals, including the auction and salt duties, should be inviolably appropriated and applied to the completion of the navigable communication between the great western and northern lakes and the Atlantic Ocean, and to the payment of the interest and the reimbursement of the capital of money already borrowed, or which should be borrowed, to make and complete them (Constitution of 1821, Art. iii., § 10). During the ten years that ensued from 1824, the construction of five other canals had been authorized, and the canal-revenues had already produced nearly enough to extinguish the debt that was owing in 1825.

On the 1st of January 1835, the Erie and Champlain canal debt was about $5,000,000; there was in the. treasury, accumulated from the revenues, about $3,000,000, and it was evident, that the revenues of the ensuing two or three years would be more than sufficient to pay the whole of .that debt, nearly ten years before it should become due. At the.same time, the state owed a debt of over $2,000,000, contracted on account of the lateral canals, whose construction, as already mentioned, had been authorized within the preceding ten years, and an additional debt of at least $1,000,000 was anticipated to be necessary for their completion. The general fund, out of which alone the ordinary expenses of government were provided for, had been reduced by various drains upon it, from about $5,000,000 to about $200,000, so that it was evident that the ordinary expenses of government,, which amounted to about $450,000 a year, must be provided for by resort either to the canal revenues, to a system of continual "borrowing, or to direct taxation. The duties on auctions and on salt, which, at that time, amounted to $330,000 a year, and which by the constitution had been pledged to the payment of the canal debt, had been diverted for that purpose, from the general fund, to which they had once belonged, and where they had performed the office of contributing to defray the expenses of government. By amendments proposed ^ to the constitution of 1832 and 1834, *and which J were adopted in 1833 and 1835, those duties were released from the constitutional pledge, and returned to their original avocation. So that, in 1835, the original canal debt was provided for, another canal debt of about '$3,000,000 had been authorized, the ordinary revenues were not sufficient for the ordinary expenses of government, and the canals were yielding a surplus of revenue (above the interest on the debt and the expenses) of about $600,000 a year, with the certain prospect of continual augmentation.

Under this state of things, the legislature, at their session of 1835, directed the Erie canal to be enlarged, and a double set of lift-locks to be constructed, and enacted, that the cost of constructing, completing and maintaining the works, should be paid out of any moneys which might be on hand belonging to the Erie and Champlain canal fund, and provided, that after 1837, the expenditures should be so limited as to leave from the canal revenues, besides the auction and salt duties, an annual income to the state of at least $300,000. Thus appropriating out of the revenues previously pledged to the canal debt, five or six hundred thousand dollars a year, for the ordinary expenses of government, and devoting the remainder of the revenues, when received and “on hand,” to the task of enlarging the canal; and clearly defining the policy of effecting the enlargement by means of earnings actually on hand, and not by contracting a debt for that purpose. But, in 1838, that policy was abandoned, and instead of it, was adopted the policy of hastening the enlargement by loans. The sum of $4,000,000 was authorized to be borrowed that year, and that policy continued until 1842, when the whole debt of the state, over funds on hand, which in 1835 had been about $4,500,000 was now $24,674,000.

In the meantime, the construction of two additional canals had been authorized — the Black River canal at an expense of about $1,000,000, and the Genesee Valley canal at the cost of at least $2,000,000, and the moneys raised by loans for their construction had been in part expended. In that year (1842), the canal policy of the state again changed. Alarmed at the *magnitude of ^ the debt already contracted, and at the prospect *- of further augmentation, the legislature directed all further expenditure on the public works, then in the progress of construction, to be suspended, imposed a tax on all the real and personal estate within this state, and pledged one-half that tax to canal purposes, and so much of the canal revenue as should be equal to one-third of the interest of the canal debt, as a sinking fund for the redemption of the debt thus contracted.

And when the new constitutional convention assembled in 1846, the enlargement of the Erie canal, and the construction of the Black River and Genesee Valley canals were unfinished; the total of the liabilities of the state was $25,258,597.95; the canal revenues, derived from tolls and water-rents, since the completion of the Erie and Champlain canals, had exceeded the expenditure, on account of them, nearly $19,000,000; the net revenue for the preceding five years had averaged a fraction over a million and half dollars, with every reason to believe, that in ten years’ time, such net revenue would exceed two millions and a quarter a year.

It was under, such circumstances, and for such a state of things, that the constitutional convention of 1846 entered upon the duty of making permanent provision in relation to the finances of the state. Each of the conflicting systems of policy already mentioned had its friends and advocates in that body, and among the people, and they were distinctly presented to view, when the constitution was framed and adopted. These considerations must necessarily be borne in mind, in examining the question now before us; for, without them, we cannot know what were the purposes for which the constitution granted its powers or imposed its limitations, nor can we well comprehend the meaning or intention of the provisions it contains.

Such, then, was the subject on which the constitution was to operate, and the next inquiry is: What was its action on that subject? What rights, powers and privileges did it confer ? And what obligations or restrictions impose? *In answering these questions * J in a becoming spirit-of candor, it will never do, to content ourselves with confining our attention to detached portions of the instrument, but its whole scope and tenor must be considered, and in such a manner that full force must be given to all its provisions. Nor will it do, to invoke the aid of the familiar, though not very-well understood distinction between peremptory enactments, which must at all hazards be obeyed, and diredory ones, which may be disregarded with impunity. The principle relative to directory statutes applied to a fundamental law, granting or limiting power, would be fraught with very dangerous tendencies. Besides, when an enactment imposes an obligation to do or to abstain, its language is always imperative.

Keeping these principles in view, we find that this was the scheme of the constitution:

1. That no debt for the purpose of internal improvement, exceeding $1,000,000, should ever be contracted, unless sanctioned by the people, not speaking through the legislature, but voting directly on the subject, at a general election:

2. That out of the canal revenues, a certain amount should be set apart, each year, as a sinking fund, to pay the interest and redeem the principal of the canal debt then existing :

3. That a certain portion of the canal revenues should be set apart, as a sinking fund, in like manner, to redeem and pay the other debts of the state, not comprehended in the term “ canal debt

4. That after paying those sums, a certain amount ($200,000) should be annually set apart to defray the ordinary expenses of government; an amount not enough to meet all those expenses, but thereby relieving the people, in some degree, from the necessity of bearing direct taxation to carry on the ordinary operations of the government:

5. That the remainder of the revenues of the canals, after these objects should be accomplished, should, in each year, be applied to the purpose of enlarging the Erie canal, &c.;

6. That after these debts were all paid, and those * 115 1 wor^s a^ *completed, there should be appropri- -* ated, annually, from the canal revenues, a sum sufficient to defray all the expenses of government; and thus relieving the people from any taxation for that purpose for all time to come:

7. And that whenever any debt should be contracted under the direct authority of'the people, the same law which they should approve, should impose a direct tax sufficient to pay the interest and redeem the principal within eighteen years.

Such, in a few words and in plain terms, are the provisions of the constitution on this subject. The next inquiry is, what are those of the act in question ?

1. It appropriates the surplus revenues of the canal, for the years 1851, 1852, 1853 and 1854, directly to the work óf enlarging the canal, &c.:

2. It authorizes, by its peculiar machinery of canal certificates, the officers of the state to borrow $9,000,000, within three years, and expend that for the same purpose:

3. It directs that sum to be returned within twenty-one years, and in the meantime an interest, not over six per cent., be paid on it:

4. It pledges the surplus revenues, for that period of twenty-one years, to the repayment of that sum of $9,000,000, and the interest upon it: and

5. It does not submit the question to the electors to be passed upon directly at a general election, but instead of that, declares that the certificates shall, in no event or contingency, be so construed as to create a debt or liability against the state, or the people thereof, within the meaning of the constitution.

It only remains to inquire whether there is any incompatibility between the statute and the constitution. -

1. This act of borrowing $9,000,000, and providing for its repayment within a certain time, with interest for its use in the meantime, seems to me to create a debt. No subtlety of reasoning, no refinement of argument, have been sufficient to dispel from my mind this plain and simple idea.

[ *116 It is said, that it is not a debt, but merely anticipating the resources of the state as derived from the canals. Now, it seems *to me, that all debts, whether by individuals or states, is merely an anticipation of resources. Then again, it is said, that it is no debt, because only a portion of the resources of the state are devoted to the repayment. Does the fact that every householder has certain property that is not liable for the payment of Ms debts, destroy or even change the character of the obligation that rests upon him to repay the money that he has borrowed ? These, and such like suggestions, which were made to us on the argument, have not had the effect to persuade me, that borrowing money is not contracting a debt.

And, if I read aright, the national debt of Great Britain (the existence of which no one probably will, at tMs day, deny) was begun in the precise manner adopted in this statute. Smith’s Wealth of Nations (vol. 2, p. 449) says, that “When the resource of borrowing on personal credit was exhausted, and it became necessary, in order to raise money, to assign or mortgage some particular branch of the public revenue, government has done this in two different ways. Sometimes, it has made this assignment or mortgage for a short period only — a year, or a few years, for example — and sometimes, for perpetuity. In one case, the fund was supposed sufficient to pay, within the limited time, both principal and interest of the money borrowed; in the other, it was supposed sufficient to pay interest only, or a perpetual annuity equivalent to interest. When money was raised in the one way, it was said to be raised by anticipation —when in the other, by perpetual funding. In Great Britain, the annual land and malt taxes are regularly anticipated every year, by virtue of a borrowing clause constantly inserted into the acts which impose them. The Bank of England generally advances; at an interest, which, since the revolution, has varied from eight to three per cent., the sums for which those taxes are granted, and receives payment as their produce gradually comes in. If there is a deficiency, which there always is, it is provided for in the supplies of the ensuing year. The only considerable branch of the public revenues which yet remains unmortgaged, is thus regularly * 117 1 sPen* before comes in- Like an improvident -* spendthrift, whose pressing occasions will not allow him to wait for the regular payment of his revenues, the state is in the constant practice of borrowing of its factors and agents, and of paying interest for the use of its own money.”

If, then, it is a debt which this statute creates, it is in direct violation of the constitution, because it has never been submited to or passed upon by the people.

2. It seems to me, that the payment of interest on borrowed money, out of the canal revenues, was not intended by the constitution, because it tends to retard the advent of the period when the canal revenues can be applied to the general support of the government. Under this law, $540,000 a year, for twenty-one years, must be withdrawn from those revenues to pay interest on the $9,000,000 borrowed, and to that extent the appropriation, under § 3, of article vii., of the constitution, of $672,500 a year, to defray the ordinary expenses of government, must be postponed or affected, •and precisely to that extent, a resort to direct taxation be rendered necessary to meet those ordinary expenses.

This consideration is not an unimportant one, for both in and out of the convention, and long prior to it, it was insisted by a portion of the citizens of the state, that they had derived no benefit from the canals, and yet funds belonging equally to them as to others had been expended for their construction, until direct taxation was necessary to carry on government, and they claimed, that the canals should return those funds to the treasury, at least, to the extent of avoiding taxation for the necessary expenses of government. Hence the appropriation in § 3, article vii., of the constitution, of $200,000 a. year to defray the necessary expenses of the state, before anything should be applied to the enlargement of the canal, &c., the provisions that if, after eight years, the revenues unappropriated by that article should not be sufficient to defray those expenses, without a direct tax, the legislature might appropriate $350,000 a year from the canal revenues to those expenses, and the provision that when the canal debt should be paid and the *works completed, $672,500 annually should be for ever devoted *- to the ordinary support of government.

Thus, the constitution provided, by a regard to all the interests involved, and in a spirit of compromise, that the debt should be paid, the works completed, and the people at large be exempted from direct taxation, unless by a direct vote, given at a general election, they should themselves impose such tax. And I entertain no doubt, that it was the intention of the constitution, to afford to the people of the state, in due time, out of the canal revenue, a full protection against direct taxation for the support of government, by appropriating what the public works might yield to that purpose.

Whatever may be our individual views of the policy that prevailed in and characterized that instrument, it is our solemn duty, as a court, sacredly to preserve its compromises. And it requires no argument to show, that any act diverting those revenues to the payment of interest, or any other purpose, from that thus clearly defined in the constitution, must be in derogation of it.

3. The plain language of the constitution in reference to the surplue revenues is. that they “ shall, in each fiscal year, be applied to the enlargement of the canal,” &c. Does this authorize them to be anticipated, so that they may be expended before the fiscal year in which' they accrue ? If it does, then, with,equal propriety, they may be withheld a series of years from the object to which they are devoted, for if any deviation from the explicit injunction of the instrument is to be tolerated, it may be as well in one direction as another.

It seems to me, that it was the intention of the constitution, to adopt fully the policy of 1835, and have the contemplated works carried on just as fast, and no faster, than funds were actually on hand for the purpose; and that it would be as wrong for the state to delay the application of those funds on the- one hand, as it would be to anticipate them, on the other; as wrong to divert them to any other purpose, as to incumber and consume them by the payment of interest.

¡¡; *It is the plain language of the constitution which brings me to this result, and here, as throughout, I am governed by the rule laid down by the supreme court of the United States, in Gibbons v. Ogden (9 Wheat. 184), that as men whose intentions require no concealment generally employ the words which most aptly and directly express the ideas they intend to convey, the framers of the constitution must be understood to have employed words in" their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said.

I have thus been conducted to the conclusion, that this statute, in its general scope and purposes, is incompatible with the constitution, and must be declared void. I have not been unmindful of the consequences that may flow from such a result, and which were so strenuously pressed upon our consideration by one of the counsel. I see much in those anticipated consequences to awaken regrets, but nothing to justify me in construing the constitution otherwise than according to its plain import. It would be a dangerous principle, to permit the ' consequences that may flow from correcting an infraction of the fundamental law, to perform the office of perpetuating such infraction. “ The constitution and laws of a state are the basis of public tranquillity, the firmest support of political authority, and a security for the liberty of the citizen; but this constitution is a vain phantom, and the best laws are useless, if they be not religiously observed; the nation ought then to watch very attentively, in order to render them equally respected by those who govern, and by the people destined to obey.” Such is the duty which now devolves upon this court in behalf of the state, and it ought to be performed with a fidelity commensurate with its importance.

This opinion was delivered in the case of Rodman v. Munson, infra 140.