Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio

Former San Antonio policemen and firemen filed this class action against the Pension Fund Board of Trustees and its individual members seeking damages and refunds of the amounts they obligatorily contributed to a pension fund during their employment but which they were barred from receiving after their separation under Article 6243f, § 19, Vernon’s Texas Civil Statutes. They raised a myriad of constitutional challenges to the no-refund provisions of the statute. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. A panel of this Court, finding that the no-refund provisions of Article 6243f were reasonable and constitutional, affirmed on the merits.

The Court took this case en banc because it posed questions of jurisdictional importance in the ever burgeoning area of relief sought under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Two basic questions are presented. First, is the Board of Trustees of the Pension Fund a “person” and therefore suable under Section 1983? Second, is there jurisdiction over the individual members of the Board of Trustees to require them to cause payments from the fund to be made to the plaintiffs as restitution for the money paid into the fund? We answer both questions in the negative.

I.

In his dissent to the panel opinion Judge Godbold adopted the rationale underlying the grant of immunity to cities, Monroe v. Pape, 1961, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492; Kenosha v. Bruno, 1973, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109, to the governmental entity here involved, the Board of Trustees of the Pension Fund, and concluded that the Board was not a “person” within the contemplation of Section 1983. We agree with the reasons undergirding this holding and without iterating them, we approve and adopt them as the opinion of the Court en banc.

II.

With respect to the court’s jurisdiction over the individual members of the Board of Trustees, again we agree with Judge Godbold’s dissent, and his. conclusion that there is a want of jurisdiction under Section 1983 to entertain plaintiffs’ suit seeking an accounting, restitution and refunds, all of which “strik[e] directly for the pocket of the Pension Fund.” Muzquiz at 1007. We only wish to make clear the basis for this decision.

The panel opinion argues that it is incongruous to hold that the individual board members are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983 when some forms of relief, such as money damages, are sought, and at the same time to hold that the board members are not “persons” when other forms of relief, such as restitution, is sought. But this is not the basis of our decision. We do not hold that the status of the board members as “persons” is variable, dependent upon the relief sought. Rather, we hold that this is a suit not against the nominal defendants, the individual board members who are “persons”, but instead is a suit against an unnamed, though very real, party defendant, the Pension Board itself, an entity which, as we have held previously, is not a “person”. Therefore, § 1983 jurisdiction must fail.

In form, plaintiffs seek against the individual members of the board a mandatory injunction ordering the individual members -to refund past contributions to the fund. However, in substance, this is nothing more than restitution against the fund itself. If we allowed this action to proceed, then the bar which has been created by the judicial interpretations of § 1983 would be effectively eliminated, for any action which seeks restitution against a “nonperson” may be framed in terms of a mandatory injunction against the officials responsible for the fund from which restitution is sought. The congressional intent which impels the “nonperson” limitation cannot be so lightly construed. The detailed analysis of Judge Godbold’s dissent fully supports this position.

We take issue with only one aspect of that dissent. Judge Godbold concludes that the action against the individual members of the board should be dismissed insofar as it seeks monetary relief in the form of restitution. However, he also concludes that the action against the individual members is maintainable, insofar as it seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. The declaratory and injunctive relief sought is a declaration that Article 6243f is unconstitutional, and an injunction against its enforcement. Article 6243f is prohibitory in nature, barring refunds of monies previously paid into the fund. A declaration that it is unconstitutional, or an injunction against its enforcement, is in substance a determination of plaintiffs’ entitlement to restitution from the fund itself. This determination, as we have held, is barred under § 1983 because of the “nonperson” status of the fund’s Board of Trustees.

Thus, we conclude that under the peculiar facts of this case, either a mandatory injunction directed against the individual members of the board, or injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to the statute is tantamount to a money judgment for restitution against the fund, an entity against which relief may not be directed under the court’s § 1983 jurisdiction.

III.

Since jurisdiction fails, we do not reach the merits.

Affirmed.

. ■ The Act provides in pertinent part:

“[N]o member of either of said Departments or of said Fund shall ever be entitled to any refund from said Fund on account of the money deducted from that amount of their pay . . . which money is in itself declared to be public money, and the property of said Fund for the benefit of the members qualifying for benefits, and their beneficiaries.”

. The facts and issues are fully stated in the panel opinion, Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 5 Cir. 1975, 520 F.2d 993.

. For like jurisdictional reasons the Court also considered en banc Warner v. Bd. of Tr. of Pol. Pen. Fund, etc., 5 Cir. 1975, 522 F.2d 1384, this day decided, 528 F.2d 505.

. On oral argument plaintiffs withdrew their claims for damages.

. As we noted earlier, on oral argument plaintiffs withdrew their demand for damages. If this were a suit seeking damages against the individual members of the Board for their alleged deprivations of a constitutional right, jurisdiction under § 1983 would exist. In that instance, plaintiffs would not be using the members of the Board as conduits to reach the Fund. Plaintiffs, of course, would have to prove fi'iir case and the board members could raise valid defenses. See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 1975, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396; Wood v. Strickland, 1975, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214.