Mendenhall v. Riser

Appellants appeal from the district court’s order denying their Motion for Summary Judgement, seeking dismissal of appellee John Mendenhall’s § 1983 civil rights complaint on the basis of qualified immunity. Because we determine that the officers acted reasonably in arresting John Mendenhall for the crime of murder, we reverse the district court and grant appellants qualified immunity on all claims asserted by Mendenhall.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On a fateful Friday the Thirteenth in September of 1996, William Myles at*228tempted to rob Deon Grisby in Cullen, Louisiana. Early that morning, sometime around 7 a.m., Myles and several purported members of a drug gang accosted Gris-by while he was inside his girlfriend’s home, in what is presumed by all parties involved to be a drug-related transaction. When Grisby refused to turn over a sum of money on demand, Myles and his cohorts forced Grisby into the car they were driving. As they began to drive off, however, Grisby attempted to escape by leaping from the moving vehicle. His efforts to flee were met with gunfire. He was shot several times, as the would-be kidnappers took flight.

The exact sequence of these chaotic events is unclear, but somehow, perhaps in response to a call for help, Cullen Police Officer Jimmy Wayne White, appellee Mendenhall’s half brother, arrived shortly thereafter, in time, remarkably, to apprehend two of the renegade gang. Due to this fortuitous arrival of the cavalry, Gris-by was rushed to the hospital and his life was saved. Myles, in the meantime, escaped on foot, in the direction of Lee street.

Perhaps even more notable than his brother’s timely appearance at the scene of this shooting, John Mendenhall also arrived moments later, dressed in his police officer’s uniform, apparently on his way home from work.1 Upon consultation with Officer White, Mendenhall gave chase to Myles.

Mendenhall was not the only individual in pursuit early that morning. Several other individuals led a small procession in the chase after Myles. Mendenhall, driving his red pickup truck, fell in behind them.

It is at this juncture that the exact sequence of events is somewhat unclear from the record. Nonetheless, one indisputable event occurred: Near the corner of Lee Street and Boucher Extension, Myles was killed instantly from a single gunshot wound to the back of the head by someone in the group that gave chase. It is the events subsequent to this shooting that give rise to this appeal.

Medical personnel arrived on the scene shortly after Myles was shot, followed by Officer White accompanying Deputy Shaw and Deputy Ashley. Sometime shortly thereafter, Mendenhall simply left the scene. Deputies Cropper and Null, both appellants in this matter, were notified and dispatched to the scene as lead investigators. Upon their arrival, they began in earnest the investigation of the presumed homicide.

The investigators’ focus soon shifted to Mendenhall, as two witnesses at the scene identified him as the shooter. In an effort to obtain his statement, appellant Deputy Newton visited Mendenhall at his home, requesting that he return to the Webster Parish Sheriffs Office sub-station in Springhill. While it does not appear that Mendenhall immediately complied with this request, he did later make an appearance at the sub-station. He was greeted by appellant-deputies Steve Cropper, Alva Null, Jim Bell, and Wayne Newton. The deputies mirandized Mendenhall, and then proceeded to inquire as to the day’s events. Mendenhall, however, refused to cooperate. He left the station shortly after arriving, and apparently reported to duty with the Haynesville Police Department.

Considering the information gathered from the day’s investigation,2 Deputy *229Cropper prepared a complaint-affidavit for the arrest of John Mendenhall on charges of second degree murder in violation of Louisiana law.3 Using this affidavit, and another prepared for the purpose of obtaining a search warrant, Cropper sought and obtained a warrant for the arrest of John Mendenhall, as well as a search warrant for his home. Upon issue, the arrest warrant was faxed to Mendenhall’s place of employment, at which time he was stripped of his weapon and badge and placed into custody. Upon being processed into the system, Mendenhall was locked in the Webster Parish jail, where he spent one night, before being released on bond the next day.

Upon release, Mendenhall sought and secured counsel. A Motion for Expedited Preliminary Examination was filed on September 16 — a Monday — and the hearing was scheduled for the following Monday. Mendenhall requested the expedited hearing out of concern for his candidacy in the upcoming election for Cullen Police Chief, to be held the following Saturday. He was naturally worried about the impact of a pending murder trial on his chances in the election. His concern may have been well founded, as Mendenhall subsequently lost the election.

At the hearing, Deputy Cropper testified as to the facts and circumstances supporting probable cause. Mendenhall, in his defense, presented the affidavit of Ted Nellams, an individual indisputably at the scene of Myles’ shooting, who claimed to have fired the fatal bullet. The presiding judge, considering Nellams’ affidavit, failed to find probable cause to bind Mendenhall over for trial as required under Louisiana law.4 The district attorney subsequently dismissed the prosecution against Menden-hall.

Mendenhall filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 nearly one year later, asserting that appellants violated his civil rights by falsely arresting him for the murder of William Myles. Each side respectively filed motions for summary judgment. Finding that “genuine issues of material fact remain in this matter” with respect to the claims made by each party, the district court denied summary judgment to all. Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal concerning the failure of the district court to grant summary judgement on qualified immunity grounds.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

While no party contests our jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory appeal, we write briefly to note that, although denials of qualified immunity on summary judgment are not final orders, they are immediately appealable under the collater*230al order doctrine if based on an issue of law. See Rodriguez v. Neeley, 169 F.3d 220, 222 (5th Cir.1999) (citing Cantu v. Rocha, 77 F.3d 795, 802 (5th Cir.1996); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)).

When as here the district court fails to make specific findings of fact or state specific conclusions of law, we will "undertake a cumbersome review of the record to determine what facts the district court, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, likely assumed." Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996). In essence, we will give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt with regard to any disputed issues of fact, in an attempt to reconstruct the district court's findings and conclusions, and thus review ~s a matter of law whether under such a factual scenario the § 1983 complaint may proceed. See Colston v. Barnhart, 130 F.3d 96, 98-99 (5th Cir.1997). If those facts do not materially affect the outcome-i.e., if even under such a factual scenario the officers' actions may be deemed as a matter of law objectively reasonable-the denial of summary judgment is immediately reviewable as a question of law, and qualified immunity should be granted. See Id. (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995); Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996); Nerren v. Livingston Police Dep't, 86 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir.1996)).

Our review of the district court's order denying summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is conducted de novo. See Nerren, 86 F.3d at 472 (citing Johnston v. City of Houston, Tex., 14 F.3d 1056, 1059 (5th Cir.1994)).

B. Probable Cause and Objective Reasonableness

It is, by now, well settled and understood that "[f]ederal immunity law shields state officials from personal liability under federal law for civil damages as long as their conduct could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated." Cantu, 77 F.3d at 805 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). Qualified immunity protects against novel theories of statutory or Constitutional injury-any purported harm must stem from rights clearly established under law at the time of the incident, and the contours of that right must be sufficiently clear such that a reasonable officer would understand that his actions were violative of the right at issue. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638-39, 107 S.Ct. 3034. Thus, the qualified immunity standard "gives ample room for mistaken judgments" by protecting "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986).

When an individual asserts a claim for wrongful arrest, qualified immunity will shield the defendant officers from suit if "`a reasonable officer could have believed [the arrest at issue] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [arresting] officers possessed.' Even law enforcement officials who `reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present' are entitled to immunity." Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034); see also Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir.1994). "Thus, a qualified immunity defense cannot succeed where it is obvious that a reasonably competent officer would find no probable cause. On the other hand, `if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized.'" Babb, 33 F.3d at 477 (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092).

*231Thus armed, we turn to the facts of the case now before us. In essence, we must determine whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Mendenhall, support a finding that no reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed to arrest Mendenhall on charges of second degree murder in the shooting death of William Myles. We note that our determination concerning probable cause is guided by the Supreme Court’s mandate in Illinois v. Gates: We look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether probable cause, or in this case arguable probable cause, existed. 462 U.S. 213, 241, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). We are mindful of the notion that “probable cause is a fluid concept — turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts — not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Id. at 232, 103 S.Ct. 2317. Thus we embark on a “practical, common-sense [determination] whether given all of the circumstances” a reasonable officer could have believed “there is a fair probability” Mendenhall committed the crime charged. Id. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317.5

Appellee repeatedly draws our attention to the Preliminary Examination, conducted some 10 days after his arrest, in an effort to demonstrate the purported lack of probable cause in this case. While we recognize that the state judge failed to find probable cause at the Preliminary Examination hearing, we reject the notion that this finding bears any relevance to our task in resolving this appeal. The law charges us with determining the reasonableness of the actions taken in light of the cause that existed at the time of arrest. See Hunter, 502 U.S. at 228, 112 S.Ct. 534 (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964)) (‘Whether [an] arrest [is] constitutionally valid depends in turn upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it — whether at that moment the facts and circumstance within their knowledge and of which they had reasonable trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense.”) (emphasis added).

Mendenhall further emphasizes in his brief that the timing of his arrest itself is suspect, and lends support to his suit. Specifically, he draws our attention to the election for police chief to be held approximately one week after he was arrested. In essence, Mendenhall contends that his arrest was executed with the intention of undermining his chances in the election.

We are compelled to note first that it defies logic to conclude appellants in this matter successfully orchestrated the shooting of Deon Grisby by William Myles, followed by a chaotic chase in which Menden-hall happened to participate, concluding in the shooting death of Myles in which Men-denhall was subsequently implicated, all out of motivation to defeat Mendenhall’s chances at the polls.

However, regardless of logic, and even assuming the worst — i.e., the appellant-deputies seized upon a mystical confluence of events to accomplish their nefarious goal of defeating Mendenhall in the upcoming election — we are compelled by our case law that clearly dictates subjective intent, motive, or even outright animus are irrelevant in a determination of qualified immunity based on arguable probable cause to arrest, just as an officer’s good intent is irrelevant when he contravenes settled law. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-20, 102 S.Ct. 2727).

We proceed. Mendenhall was arrested pursuant to a valid arrest warrant secured by Deputy Cropper. Cropper obtained the warrant relying on information learned by him and other investigating deputies over the course of the day of the *232murder. While a valid arrest warrant would normally insulate officers against a claim for false arrest, in a case such as the one before us where the officers charged with false arrest were responsible for securing the warrant, we are required to test the validity of that warrant, applying the usual standards. See Malley, 475 U.S. at 345-46, 106 S.Ct. 1092.

The first and primary piece of evidence relied upon was the fact of the shooting itself. It is undisputed that Myles was killed by a single gun shot wound to the back of his head, indicating he was shot while fleeing the scene.6

Further information obtained from Wayne Walsh, the first emergency medical technician to arrive on the scene, pointed to Mendenhall as the prime suspect. Specifically, Walsh reported to investigating officers that Mendenhall, at the scene providing crowd control when the ambulance arrived, related that Myles was taken down by a “single head shot,” in response to inquiries concerning the circumstances of the shooting. This fact was not immediately evident, as Myles was lying face up in the road.7 Mendenhall related firsthand information through the revelation of this fact. Further investigation proved Mendenhall correct.

Walsh further reported that Mendenhall tampered with evidence at the scene. Specifically, Walsh reported witnessing Mendenhall pick up a silver revolver that was lying at the feet of the victim, uncham-ber the rounds of ammunition in the weapon, examine them, replace them in the chamber, and then place the weapon back on the ground in essentially the same position in which it was originally found.8

This foregoing information was obtained without the benefit of John Mendenhall, as shortly before investigating officers Cropper and Null arrived at the scene, Men-denhall simply left, without offering any statement concerning the events of the day.9 His sudden absence from the scene *233of a homicide, without any explanation, warranted further inquiry in the minds of lead investigators.

When investigating officers began to inquire of the officers on the scene as to the morning’s events, Deputy Ashley reported speaking with two witnesses.10 It appears that Ashley, being one of the first officers to arrive after the shooting, began a canvass of the immediate area in an attempt to obtain witness statements and any other relevant evidence. In so doing, he spoke with two witnesses who refused to give their names, but who affirmatively identified Mendenhall as the shooter.11

Somewhat later in the day, at the hospital where Grisby was receiving treatment, Ashley overheard what would be the third witness he reported identify Mendenhall as the shooter. Deputy Cropper received this reported identification not only from Ashley, but also from Deputy Newton, who while present at the hospital complied with Ashley’s request to question the woman. Newton was selected, apparently, as he was more familiar with the residents in the relevant neighborhood. When Newton questioned this witness, whom he identified as Pamela Neal, as to the events she observed that morning, Newton reported, *234consistent with Ashley’s report, that Neal identified Mendenhall as the shooter.

In an attempt to follow-up with Pamela Neal, who is also Deon Grisby’s half-sister, deputies went to the home she shared with her Mother, Gertie, located at the scene of the shooting, approximately sixty feet from where Myles body lay in. the street. Officer Jimmy Morgan, assisting with the investigation, accompanied Deputy Null to the Neals’ home that afternoon.12- He questioned the Neals as to the events they witnessed earlier that day. He maintains that Gertie and her daughter both reported seeing Myles running down the street, weapon in hand, followed by John Menden-hall, also bearing arms. They then reported hearing shots fired, and when they looked next, having apparently ducked in fear, they saw Myles fall to the ground. They further observed Mendenhall, weapon in hand, either standing somewhere near the slain body or near his vehicle. It was obvious at that time that Myles fell victim to the gunfire they had just heard. The Neals further stated no one else with a weapon was anywhere in the area. Sometime during this visit, Pamela Neal executed a written statement as to the day’s events.13

In deposition testimony concerning these events, Pamela Neal asserts that she never, in fact, identified John Mendenhall as the shooter, and she asserts her mother did not witness events nor answer questions concerning these events, as the deputies maintain.14 Specifically, she recalls discussing the day’s events with Deputy Newton at the hospital, and specifically recalls informing Newton that another man — not Mendenhall — who apparently was driving a green car, shot Myles. She claims, in her deposition testimony, that she was unaware of this individual’s identity at that time, and did not provide a name to Newton.15 In fact, she denies ever identifying Mendenhall as the shooter, thus disputing Ashley’s claim of overhearing her make just such a statement. We address the consequences of this factual dispute below.

*235Further evidence gathered that day concerning the suspected murder weapon. Specifically, officers at the scene recovered two spent nine-millimeter shell casings, despite finding no nine-millimeter weapon anywhere near the body. Inquiry by Deputy Null into whether Mendenhall possessed a weapon of that caliber revealed that Officer Todd Moore previously performed some repair work on a Tec-9 handgun, a nine-millimeter weapon, that belonged to John Mendenhall.

In an attempt to obtain Mendenhall’s version of events, Deputy Newton paid a visit to Mendenhall, at his residence. In response to inquires as to the day’s events, Mendenhall reported to Newton that he came upon Officer White at the scene of Grisby’s shooting and subsequently left in pursuit of the shooter. He said he chambered a round in his handgun — not his nine-millimeter weapon but a smaller caliber handgun he carried — but it jammed. He then refused further comment. Newton alerted Mendenhall that Cropper and Null, the investigating officers, wished to discuss the matter directly with him, and that he should report to the police station with all his weapons. Mendenhall apparently replied that he might make an appearance.

Later that day, Mendenhall did report to the station house. Prior to initiating the inquiry, Cropper read, and requested Mendenhall acknowledge by initialing, his Miranda16 rights. Cropper then proceeded to question Mendenhall concerning the shooting, beginning with questions as to whether Mendenhall possessed a nine-millimeter weapon. Mendenhall apparently answered those initial questions, but as soon as the interview focused more intently on the morning’s events, Mendenhall refused to provide additional information. Mendenhall maintains that his silence came in response to, and out of shock at, having been read his rights. He did nothing more, he now claims, than assert those rights as he understood them.

We pause in our factual recitation to quickly note that Mendenhall’s purported motivation in refusing to answer questions is irrelevant. The indisputable fact, for summary judgment purposes, is his refusal and his subsequent departure from the station house shortly thereafter.17

Deputy Null followed Mendenhall, in an attempt to convince Mendenhall to talk. Mendenhall refused, saying only that if the deputies could exercise patience until Monday, he would provide them with all relevant evidence concerning the shooting.

After this failed attempt to secure Men-denhall’s cooperation, Deputy Cropper sought and obtained the arrest and search warrants.18 Mendenhall was arrested later that evening.

*236Upon careful consideration of the above facts, and after an exhaustive review of the summary judgment record in this case, we find, as a matter of law, that a reasonable officer in Deputy Cropper’s position could believe probable cause existed to arrest Mendenhall for the murder of William Myles. Even after drawing all available inferences in Mendenhall’s favor, we are compelled by the facts to so hold.

Our exhaustive review of the record reveals one significant dispute with respect to the relevant facts: the identification provided by Pamela Neal. As we must, we view this factual dispute in the light most favorable to Mendenhall. The dispute can be briefly summarized: Ashley maintains that he overheard Neal identify Menden-hall as the shooter; Newton, Null and Morgan maintain that Neal made the same identification in response to inquiries; Neal maintains that she identified a different man.

Even if Neal is correct, and Null and Newton now mis-state her identification, we find this dispute to be immaterial to the inquiry now before us — whether a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed to arrest Mendenhall.

As we emphasized earlier, probable cause analysis requires us to look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the officers in this case behaved reasonably. Neal executed a handwritten statement placing Mendenhall at the scene with a weapon. Her statement made no indication of another as responsible for the shooting death of Myles. In fact, her statement omits entirely any reference to another party at the scene with a weapon. Even if, as she asserts, she informed Newton, in response to questioning, that the man in the green car committed the shooting, and even if she later repeated this statement to Null and Morgan, a reasonable officer — affording these statements appropriate weight in the probable cause analysis, reading them in conjunction with her handwritten statement which excluded any reference to this other man, and considering the totality of the remaining evidence pointing to Mendenhall as the shooter — could still conclude probable cause to arrest existed.

The undisputed facts, simply summarized, and disregarding the controversial identification from Pamela Neal, are: investigating deputies spoke with two witnesses who affirmatively identified Men-denhall as the shooter; another witness, Pamela Neal in her handwritten statement, placed Mendenhall at the scene with a weapon; medical personnel reported Mendenhall’s uncanny knowledge of the wound and Mendenhall’s eagerness to finger evidence relating to a homicide; investigating deputies obtained two spent nine-millimeter shell casings from the scene, and later became aware that Mendenhall possessed such a caliber weapon; and Mendenhall refused to cooperate or answer questions concerning the killing. Under such a factual scenario, we simply cannot conclude that it was unreasonable for an officer to believe he had probable *237cause to arrest John Mendenhall.19

III. CONCLUSION

Mendenhall was at the scene of a homicide, holding a weapon. He was identified as the shooter and was known to be in possession of a weapon that matched the suspected murder device. He fled the scene when investigators arrived, and he subsequently refused to answer questions. His arrest was reasonable, as it was based on arguable probable cause and a civil action for damages under § 1983 cannot be maintained on these facts. It matters not for the purposes of this analysis that a later hearing, aided by the confession of another individual, resulted in Menden-hall’s release from custody and bail. “The Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause, even though the wrong person is arrested.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (citing Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971)). As such, we REVERSE the order of the district court denying qualified immunity and REMAND to the district court for dismissal of the claims asserted by Mendenhall pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for such other proceedings that are not inconsistent with this opinion.

REVERSE and REMAND.