JOSEPH

                                                                  Interim Decision #3398




                    In re Samuel JOSEPH, Respondent

                               File A90 562 326 - York

                                 Decided May 28, 1999

                            U.S. Department of Justice
                     Executive Office for Immigration Review
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

(1) For purposes of determining the custody conditions of a lawful permanent resident under
section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 

 (Supp. II 1996), and 

(h)(2)(ii) (1999), a lawful permanent resident will not be considered “properly
included” in a mandatory detention category when an Immigration Judge or the Board of
Immigration Appeals finds, on the basis of the bond record as a whole, that it is substantial-
ly unlikely that the Immigration and Naturalization Service will prevail on a charge of remov-
ability specified in section 236(c)(1) of the Act.

(2) Although a conviction document may provide the Service with sufficient reason to believe
that an alien is removable under one of the mandatory detention grounds for purposes of charg-
ing the alien and making an initial custody determination, neither the Immigration Judge nor the
Board is bound by the Service’s decisions in that regard when determining whether an alien is
properly included within one of the regulatory provisions that would deprive the Immigration
Judge and the Board of jurisdiction to redetermine the custody conditions imposed on the alien
by the Service. Matter of Joseph, 

 (BIA 1999), clarified.

(3) When an Immigration Judge’s removal decision precedes the determination, pursuant to 

(h)(2)(ii), whether an alien is “properly included” in a mandatory detention cat-
egory, the removal decision may properly form the basis for that determination.

(4) An automatic stay of an Immigration Judge’s release order that has been invoked by the
Service pursuant to 

(i)(2) is extinguished by the Board’s decision in the
Service’s bond appeal from that release order.

Sandra L. Greene, Esquire, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for respondent

Jeffrey T. Bubier, Assistant District Counsel, for the Immigration and Naturalization Service

Before:   Board En Banc: DUNNE, Vice Chairman; HEILMAN, HOLMES, HURWITZ,
          FILPPU, COLE, MATHON, JONES, GRANT, SCIALABBA, and MOSCATO,
          Board Members. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: SCHMIDT, Chairman;
          joined by VACCA, VILLAGELIU, ROSENBERG, and GUENDELSBERGER,
          Board Members.

FILPPU, Board Member:

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Interim Decision #3398


    On May 19, 1999, the Board issued an order which dismissed the
Immigration and Naturalization Service’s appeal from the Immigration
Judge’s January 20 and 22, 1999, bond orders releasing the respondent on
his own recognizance. Our order informed the parties that this decision
explaining the reasons for the order would be forthcoming.


                     I. THE ISSUES AND SUMMARY

     Our jurisdiction in this timely Service appeal is pursuant to 

(b)(7) (1999). See also Matter of Joseph, 

, at 13-14
(BIA 1999); 

(h)(2)(ii), 236.1(c)(11), (d)(3) (1999). Today,
we explain the import of our ruling in Matter of Joseph, supra, in light of
the Service’s arguments in this bond appeal. We also address the question
of when an Immigration Judge will have jurisdiction to set bond for a law-
ful permanent resident who has been charged by the Service with a ground
of removability that would otherwise require the alien’s mandatory deten-
tion pending an administratively final order of removal.
     As explained below, the Immigration Judge may make a determination on
whether a lawful permanent resident “is not properly included” in a mandato-
ry detention category, in accordance with 

(h)(2)(ii), either
before or after the conclusion of the underlying removal case. If this threshold
bond decision is made after the Immigration Judge’s resolution of the removal
case, the Immigration Judge may rely on that underlying merits determination.
     If the Immigration Judge addresses whether the permanent resident is
properly included in a mandatory detention category prior to completion of
the case in chief, the Immigration Judge must have very substantial grounds
to override the Service’s decision to charge the alien with a ground that sub-
jects the alien to detention. Thus, in this context, a lawful permanent resi-
dent will not be considered properly included in a mandatory detention cat-
egory only when an Immigration Judge is convinced that the Service is sub-
stantially unlikely to establish, at the merits hearing, the charge or charges
that subject the alien to mandatory detention.
     In either situation, the Immigration Judge’s bond ruling as to whether
the alien is “properly included” in a mandatory detention category is sub-
ject to the Service’s invocation of the “automatic stay” discussed in our
prior ruling in this case.


              II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

    The respondent, a native and citizen of Haiti, was admitted as a lawful
permanent resident in 1989. The respondent was convicted of the offense of
“obstructing and hindering,” a crime under the common law of Maryland.

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The charge to which the respondent pleaded guilty asserts that he “did
intentionally and knowingly obstruct and hinder a police officer . . . in the
performance of the [police officer] victim’s duties.” The respondent
received a 1-year sentence. A statement appended to the criminal charging
document asserts that the respondent, after departing his residence in a
vehicle, was chased by a police officer and was finally apprehended in
Delaware after jumping from his moving vehicle. It is not clear why the
respondent was being pursued.
     It appears that the respondent was taken into Service custody and
removal proceedings were commenced in November 1998, charging that he
was subject to removal under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 

(a)(2)(A)(iii) (Supp. II 1996), as an
alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in section
101(a)(43)(S) of the Act, 

(a)(43)(S) (Supp. II 1996)
(obstruction of justice). The Immigration Judge, however, terminated the
underlying removal proceedings on January 20, 1999, after deciding that
the respondent’s conviction does not qualify as an aggravated felony.
     That same day the Immigration Judge issued an oral order in bond pro-
ceedings releasing the respondent from custody. The Immigration Judge fol-
lowed his January 20, 1999, oral order with a written release order, dated
January 22, 1999. The Service timely appealed both the Immigration Judge’s
decision terminating the respondent’s removal proceedings and the
Immigration Judge’s order releasing the respondent on his own recognizance.
The Service obtained an automatic stay of the release order during the penden-
cy of its bond appeal, in accordance with our earlier ruling in this case. Matter
of Joseph, supra. At present, we only address the Service’s appeal from the
Immigration Judge’s release order and thereby resolve the bond appeal.


                      III. THE SERVICE’S POSITION

     The Service maintains that the respondent’s conviction is for an aggra-
vated felony, that he is therefore ineligible for release, and that the
Immigration Judge lacked jurisdiction to redetermine the custody conditions
imposed by the Service. The Service further argues that the Immigration
Judge’s decision in the respondent’s removal proceedings, finding that the
respondent is not an aggravated felon, is an improper basis for making a bond
determination. The Service points out that it has timely appealed the
Immigration Judge’s removal decision and that it could prevail in its merits
appeal. It argues that releasing an alien charged as an aggravated felon would
be inconsistent with congressional intent in such circumstances.
     Nevertheless, the Service has only provided a brief overview of its
arguments on the underlying merits of the removal case, and it declines to
“burden these bond proceedings with a complete exposition of its position

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on the merits.” According to the Service, the respondent remains ineligible
for release because his conviction record provided the requisite “reason to
believe” that he is removable as an aggravated felon, in accordance with our
earlier ruling in this case. See Matter of Joseph, supra, at 10 (discussing the
“reason to believe” language contained in the regulatory history of the cur-
rent bond regulations).


                               IV. THE GOVERNING LAW

     The provisions governing the respondent’s detention, pending an
administratively final order in removal proceedings, are section 236 of the
Act, 

 (Supp. II 1996), and the regulations in 

 and 236.1. The statute prescribes mandatory detention for certain
aliens, including those who are deportable by reason of having committed
aggravated felonies. Section 236(c)(1)(B) of the Act. An exception, per-
taining to cases involving witness protection, does not apply here. Section
236(c)(2) of the Act.
     The regulations generally do not confer jurisdiction on Immigration
Judges over custody or bond determinations respecting those aliens subject
to mandatory detention, such as aggravated felons. 

(h)(2)(i)(D). The regulations, nevertheless, specifically allow an alien
to seek a determination from an Immigration Judge “that the alien is not
properly included within” certain of the regulatory provisions which would
deprive the Immigration Judge of bond jurisdiction, including the one at
issue here. 

(h)(2)(ii). We must examine the import of this lat-
ter provision given the present posture of this case.1

     1
      

(h)(2)(i) provides, in relevant part:
         Upon expiration of the Transition Period Custody Rules set forth in section
         303(b)(3) of Div. C. of 

an immigration judge may not redeter-
         mine conditions of custody imposed by the Service with respect to the following
         classes of aliens:
              ...
          (D) Aliens in removal proceedings subject to section 236(c)(1) of the Act (as in
         effect after expiration of the Transition Period Custody Rules) . . . .
     Aliens convicted of aggravated felonies fall within section 236(c)(1) of the Act, taking
them outside the bond and custody jurisdiction of Immigration Judges. Nevertheless, 

(h)(2)(ii) provides in part:

           [W]ith respect to paragraphs (h)(2)(i)(C), (D), and (E) of this section, nothing
         in this paragraph shall be construed as prohibiting an alien from seeking a deter-
         mination by an immigration judge that the alien is not properly included within
         any of those paragraphs.

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     In a case such as this, the structure of the bond regulations means that
the Immigration Judge’s jurisdiction over custody issues is dependent on
the answer to the very same question that underlies the charge of remov-
ability in the case in chief. In other words, if the respondent is removable as
an aggravated felon, the Immigration Judge lacks any bond jurisdiction.
Conversely, the Immigration Judge would have authority to redetermine
custody conditions if the respondent is not removable as an aggravated
felon.


           V. THE REMOVAL DECISION MAY BE A BASIS
                    FOR THE BOND RULING

     Given the regulatory scheme, we find no basis to the Service’s contention
that the Immigration Judge should not be able to use his ruling on the under-
lying merits of the removal proceedings as the basis for his finding of juris-
diction over the respondent’s bond claim. Nothing in the regulations prohibits
such action by the Immigration Judge, and the regulatory structure would
actually seem to encourage the approach taken by the Immigration Judge,
because the essential question is identical in both contexts.
     The Immigration Judge could have made a threshold assessment in the
bond context of whether the respondent’s conviction was properly classified
by the Service as an aggravated felony. However, the Immigration Judge
elected first to complete the removal hearing. The Immigration Judge found
that the respondent had not been convicted of an aggravated felony, the only
charge of removability, and terminated the removal proceedings in the
respondent’s favor. Relying on his removal finding, the Immigration Judge
then made a determination in bond proceedings that the respondent was not
subject to mandatory detention and ordered his release. Nothing in this
sequence of events violates the structure or spirit of the regulations, given
that the Service’s appeal of the removal order meant that there was no final
order in place. See 

(d) (“Once a removal order becomes
administratively final, determinations regarding custody and bond are made
by the district director.”).


                 VI. MATTER OF JOSEPH EXPLAINED

     We also reject the Service’s contention that the same basis for its initial
charge of removability, which we found sufficient for purposes of the auto-
matic stay as well, is adequate in this case to provide the needed “reason to
believe” that the respondent is an aggravated felon when we reach the sub-
stance of the bond appeal. In this respect, the Service’s reading of our deci-
sion in Matter of Joseph, supra, is erroneous.

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     What was decided in Matter of Joseph, supra, was the question
whether an alien remains “subject to” section 236(c)(1) for automatic stay
purposes after the Immigration Judge has decided that he is not subject to
mandatory detention. 

(i)(2). The Service quotes language
from that decision stating that “the respondent’s conviction record provid-
ed the Service with the requisite ‘reason to believe’ that the respondent was
removable as an aggravated felon, and the respondent thus became ‘subject
to’ section 236(c)(1) of the Act when charged with removability under sec-
tion 237(a)(2)(A)(iii).” 

. The Service appears to argue that the “rea-
son to believe” which led it to bring the aggravated felony charge against
the respondent is sufficient to control for bond purposes until the final res-
olution of the underlying removal case. While the Service’s position may
often be correct as a practical matter in other cases, this is because the
nature of many convictions quite clearly make aliens subject to mandatory
detention. But that will not be true in all cases, and we do not find it to be
true here.
     To clarify what we said in Matter of Joseph, supra, the respondent’s
conviction record provided the Service with the requisite “reason to
believe” that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony for purposes of
charging and making the initial custody determination. However, the
Service’s decision in that regard is not unreviewable by the Immigration
Judge or the Board in either the bond or the removal context. We found in
Joseph that the automatic stay regulation was intended as a means for the
Service to preserve the “status quo” of the district director’s determination
that the respondent must be detained, but only until we decide the Service’s
appeal from the Immigration Judge’s release order. Matter of Joseph, supra,
at 16.
     The Service evidently misunderstands the discussion in our earlier
decision of the regulatory history of the automatic stay provision, which
provides that the Board retains full authority to accept or reject the Service’s
contentions in its bond appeal. See Procedures for the Detention and
Release of Criminal Aliens by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
and for Custody Redeterminations by the Executive Office for Immigration
Review, 

, 27,447 (1998); Matter of Joseph, supra, at 12.
The Service’s position fails to recognize either the Immigration Judge’s or
the Board’s role in the detention review process, apparently viewing our
authority as being confined to looking only to whether the Service had a
basis for charging the respondent with removability under one of the
grounds listed in section 236(c)(1) of the Act.
     Our role in this appeal is, instead, to determine whether the
Immigration Judge correctly found that the respondent was not properly
included in the mandatory detention scheme. This requires consideration of
the evidence and argument offered during the bond proceedings on this
question and of the force of the Immigration Judge’s reasoning. It is more

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than just a perfunctory review and ratification of the fact that the Service
may have had a “reason to believe” the respondent was an aggravated felon
at the time it began the proceedings.


        VII. THE INTERPRETATION OF 

(h)(2)(ii)

     Our construction of the regulation at issue here flows directly from
what we said in Matter of Joseph. Any presumption that the respondent is
an aggravated felon based on his conviction record and the charge brought
by the Service is insufficient, by itself, to control the outcome of the bond
appeal if the record as a whole shows otherwise. In this regard, we under-
stand that the very purpose of the regulation, 

(h)(2)(ii), is
to provide an alien, such as the respondent, with the opportunity to offer
evidence and legal authority on the question whether the Service has
properly included him within a category that is subject to mandatory
detention.
     Here, the Immigration Judge was convinced by the respondent’s argu-
ments that his Maryland common law “obstructing and hindering” charge
is not an aggravated felony. The Immigration Judge compared the Maryland
case law argued by the respondent to federal law and agreed with the
respondent that the elements of the crime, and the types of conduct which
it includes, are not analogous to “obstruction of justice” as contemplated by
the aggravated felony definition at section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act.
     The Service argues, however, that it has appealed the merits decision
terminating removal proceedings. And it contends the following in its
appeal brief: “If the Service turns out to be right, absent the Board’s sus-
taining of the instant bond appeal, the respondent, an aggravated felon sub-
ject to mandatory custody, will have been released from custody. That is not
the disposition envisioned by Congress in enacting the mandatory custody
provision of section 236(c).”
     But this case involves a lawful permanent resident who has been
charged with only one ground of removability. Under our laws, the respon-
dent would be allowed to reside and work in the United States, but for the
pendency of the aggravated felony charge brought by the Service. And, as
noted above, the bond regulations specifically accord a level of protection
for aliens charged with grounds that would require mandatory detention.
Those regulations allow for an independent assessment by an Immigration
Judge and the Board, in the preliminary bond context, of whether the alien
is “properly included” in a category subject to mandatory detention.
     The mere fact that the Service has appealed in the underlying removal
case, and in theory could prevail, cannot be sufficient, by itself, to require the
reversal of the Immigration Judge in this bond appeal. If it were, there would
seem to be little or no point to the regulatory provision that allows the

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Immigration Judge, and the Board on appeal, to make a determination on
whether the alien is “properly included” in a mandatory detention category.
     A determination in favor of an alien on this issue does not lead to auto-
matic release. It simply allows an Immigration Judge to consider the ques-
tion of bond under the custody standards of section 236(a) of the Act. Yet,
under the Service’s approach, an alien such as the respondent would seem
to have no recourse to that ordinary bond provision, even in cases where the
Service is wrong in its charge and will lose on appeal. As we explained in
connection with our discussion of Matter of Joseph above, the regulation
must have meaning beyond simply allowing for a perfunctory review of the
basis for the Service’s charge. Indeed, the regulatory history indicates that
this rule was intended to provide “for an individualized hearing on whether
an alien in custody actually falls within a category of aliens subject to
mandatory detention.” 63 Fed. Reg. at 27,444 (emphasis added).
     This, however, is a case of first impression, and the regulations do not
spell out the precise role of an Immigration Judge or the Board in assess-
ing, in the bond context, whether an alien is “properly included” in a
mandatory detention category. Yet, this case also involves a lawful perma-
nent resident. And, as we explain below, we find that the Service is sub-
stantially unlikely to establish the charge of deportability in its appeal of the
underlying removal case. Under such circumstances, we find it inappropri-
ate to continue to treat the respondent as an alien who is subject to manda-
tory detention, if we are to give meaningful life to the regulations allowing
for an examination by Immigration Judges and the Board of this question.
Thus, subject to the automatic stay provision, we determine that a lawful
permanent resident will not be considered “properly included” in a manda-
tory detention category when an Immigration Judge or the Board is con-
vinced that the Service is substantially unlikely to establish at the merits
hearing, or on appeal, the charge or charges that would otherwise subject
the alien to mandatory detention.
     The Immigration Judge here issued his bond ruling after the conclusion
of the removal case. As indicated above, the Immigration Judge was enti-
tled to rely on that merits decision in making the related bond determina-
tion that the respondent was not properly included in a mandatory detention
category.
     The regulations, however, allow this determination to be made by the
Immigration Judge at a very early stage of the overall proceedings. The
Service is, of course, entitled to bring any charge it deems warranted in a
given case. Importantly, as the Service points out, the statutory scheme
envisions the detention of aliens subject to grounds such as the aggravated
felony charge here. Consequently, the Immigration Judge must have very
substantial grounds to override the custodial effect of the Service’s charge
in those cases where the Immigration Judge addresses whether the perma-
nent resident is properly included in a mandatory detention category prior

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to completion of the merits hearing.
     It follows from what we said in Matter of Joseph, supra, at 10, that the
“reason to believe” that the alien “falls within a category barred from release,”
which led the Service to bring a particular charge, can often be expected to
suffice until the Immigration Judge resolves the merits of the removal case, a
resolution that frequently occurs speedily in cases involving detained crimi-
nal aliens. 63 Fed. Reg. at 27,444-45. But the Immigration Judge is able to
examine the basis for that charge and make an independent determination
whether the alien “actually falls within a category of aliens subject to manda-
tory detention.” Id. at 27,444. In requiring that the Immigration Judge be con-
vinced that the Service is substantially unlikely to prevail on its charge, when
making this determination before the resolution of the underlying case, we
provide both significant weight to the Service’s “reason to believe” that led to
the charge and genuine life to the regulation that allows for an Immigration
Judge’s reexamination of this issue.
     In addition, we note that the bond regulations generally allow for great
flexibility in making rulings on custody issues. For example, 

(d) provides in part: “The determination of the Immigration Judge as
to custody status or bond may be based upon any information that is avail-
able to the Immigration Judge or that is presented to him or her by the alien
or the Service.”
     Further, in assessing whether an alien is “properly included” in a
mandatory detention category during a bond hearing taking place early in
the removal process, the Immigration Judge must necessarily look forward
to what is likely to be shown during the hearing on the underlying removal
case. Thus, for example, the failure of the Service to possess a certified copy
of a conviction record shortly after taking an alien into custody would not
necessarily be indicative of its ability to produce such a record at the mer-
its hearing. And the same could be true of evidence tendered by the alien
during an early bond hearing.


         VIII. THE SERVICE’S PROSPECT FOR SUCCESS IN
                      THE REMOVAL CASE

     Turning to the bond record in this case, we do have evidence respect-
ing the respondent’s conviction for “obstructing and hindering” under
Maryland law. We agree with the Immigration Judge that this evidence
strongly indicates that the respondent’s conviction resulted from his actions
to obstruct or hinder his own arrest.
     The Maryland case law relied upon by the Immigration Judge, Cover v.
State, 

 (Md. 1983), reflects that the crime of obstructing and
hindering encompasses three types of offenses: (1) positive direct obstruc-
tion (i.e. resisting one’s own arrest), (2) passive direct obstruction (where a

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subject refuses or fails to act as directed by a police officer), and (3) posi-
tive indirect obstruction (where the police are not acting directly against the
subject, but are acting indirectly against another who has committed, or
may commit, a criminal offense, and the subject does an act which obstructs
them in their general duty to prevent or detect crime, intending to frustrate
them in the performance of that duty).
     At least in this bond case, the Service has provided little to challenge
the Immigration Judge’s determination that the respondent’s offense is not
correctly classified as an aggravated felony. The Service cites to Matter of
Batista-Hernandez, 

 (BIA 1997), as support for its posi-
tion. However, we agree with the Immigration Judge that, unlike Batista-
Hernandez, the respondent in the present case was seeking to evade his
own arrest, rather than obstructing the arrest of another. The Service’s
reliance on United States v. John, 

 (4th Cir. 1991), is likewise
unpersuasive. This sentence enhancement case indicates that mere flight
from an arresting officer is not sufficient, in itself, to warrant an adjustment
of a defendant’s offense level under the obstruction of justice provision in
the United States Sentencing Guidelines in U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (1990). See 18
U.S.C.A. ch. 3, § 3C.1.1 (West 1996). The Service has also not addressed
the Immigration Judge’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Aguilar, 

 (1995), for the proposition that an
“intent to influence judicial or grand jury proceedings” is more the sort of
activity constituting an “obstruction of justice” under the Act than is the
respondent’s conviction for obstructing or hindering his own arrest in a
manner that does not appear to have endangered the officer.
     We do not purport to make a final ruling on whether the respondent’s
conviction falls within the aggravated felony provision of section
101(a)(43)(S). The possibility remains that the Service might offer some
convincing argument in its merits appeal. However, it opted not to do so
here. On the basis of this bond record, it appears that Maryland’s “obstruct-
ing and hindering” law is divisible, encompassing the conduct of resisting
one’s own arrest. Even if some of the other categories of activities included
in this crime might potentially be construed as obstruction of justice, we
find that it is substantially unlikely that the offense of simply obstructing or
hindering one’s own arrest will be viewed as an obstruction of justice aggra-
vated felony under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act for removal purposes.
Consequently, we agree with the Immigration Judge that the respondent is
not “properly included” in the category of aliens subject to mandatory
detention for bond or custody purposes. 

(h)(2)(ii).


                         IX. THE RELEASE ORDER

    Our determination, in agreement with the Immigration Judge, that the

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respondent is not properly included in a mandatory detention category
would not ordinarily end the bond inquiry. It simply means that the lawful
permanent resident could be considered by the Immigration Judge for
release under the general bond provisions of section 236(a) of the Act. In
this case, however, the Service has not challenged the specific terms of the
Immigration Judge’s release order in its appeal brief.
     Consequently, for the foregoing reasons, on May 19, 1999, we entered
an order which extinguished the automatic stay that had attached upon the
tendering of the Form EOIR-43 (Notice of INS Intent to Appeal Custody
Redetermination) by the Service in this case. We now repeat that order for
the sake of clarity.
     ORDER: The appeal taken by the Service is dismissed.
     FURTHER ORDER: The respondent shall be released pursuant to
the terms of the Immigration Judge’s January 22, 1999, bond order.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION: Paul W. Schmidt,
Chairman; in which Fred W. Vacca, Gustavo D. Villageliu, Lory D.
Rosenberg, and John Guendelsberger, Board Members, joined

     I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
     I join entirely in the majority’s rejection of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service’s appellate arguments and in the unanimous conclu-
sion that, on this record, the Service is substantially unlikely to prevail on
the merits of the aggravated felony charge. Therefore, I agree that the
respondent is not properly included in the category of aliens subject to
mandatory detention for bond or custody purposes.
     However, I do not share the majority’s view that the proper standard in
a mandatory detention case involving a lawful permanent resident alien is
that the Service is “substantially unlikely to prevail” on its charge. Matter
of Joseph, 

, at 10 (BIA 1999). Rather, the standard in a
case such as the one before us should be whether the Service has demon-
strated a likelihood of success on the merits of its charge that the respon-
dent is removable because of an aggravated felony.
     Mandatory detention of a lawful permanent resident alien is a drastic
step that implicates constitutionally-protected liberty interests. Where the
lawful permanent resident respondent has made a colorable showing in cus-
tody proceedings that he or she is not subject to mandatory detention, the
Service should be required to show a likelihood of success on the merits of
its charge to continue mandatory detention. To enable the Immigration
Judge to make the necessary independent determination in such a case, the
Service should provide evidence of the applicable state or federal law under
which the respondent was convicted and whatever proof of conviction that
is available at the time of the Immigration Judge’s inquiry.
     The majority’s enunciated standard of “substantially unlikely to pre-

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vail” is inappropriately deferential to the Service, the prosecutor in this mat-
ter. Requiring the Service to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the
merits of its charge would not unduly burden the Service and would give
more appropriate weight to the liberty interests of the lawful permanent res-
ident alien. Such a standard also would provide more “genuine life to the
regulation that allows for an Immigration Judge’s reexamination of this
issue,” as referenced by the majority. Matter of Joseph, supra, at 10.
     The Service’s failure to establish a likelihood of success on the merits
would not result in the release of a lawful permanent resident who poses a
threat to society. Continued custody of such an alien would still be war-
ranted under the discretionary criteria for detention.
     In conclusion, mandatory detention should not be authorized where the
Service has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of its
charge. Consequently, while I am in complete agreement with the decision
to release this lawful permanent resident alien, and I agree fully that the
Service is substantially unlikely to prevail on the merits of this aggravated
felony charge, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s enunciation of
“substantially unlikely to prevail” as the standard to be applied in all future
cases involving mandatory detention of lawful permanent resident aliens.




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