Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc.

Delivered the opinion of the Court.

Pursuant to regulations promulgated by the North Carolina Department of Correction, appellants prohibited inmates from soliciting other inmates to join appellee, the North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc. (Union), barred all meetings of the Union, and refused to deliver packets of Union publications that had been mailed in bulk to several inmates for redistribution among other prisoners. The Union instituted this action, based on 42 U. S. C. § 1983, to challenge these policies. It alleged that appellants’ efforts to prevent the operation of a prisoners’ union violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of it and its members and that the refusal to grant the Union those privileges accorded several other organizations operating within the prison system deprived the Union of equal protection of the laws. A three-judge court was convened. After a hearing, the court found merit in the Union’s free speech, association, and equal protection arguments, and enjoined appellants from preventing inmates from soliciting other prisoners to join the Union and from “refus[ing] receipt of the Union’s publications on the ground that they are calculated to encourage membership in the organization or solicit joining.” The court also held that the Union “shall be accorded the privilege of holding meetings under such limitations and control as are neutrally applied to all inmate organizations . . . .” 409 F. Supp. 937. We noted probable jurisdiction to consider whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments extend prisoner labor unions such protection. 429 U. S. 976. We have decided that they do not, and we accordingly reverse the judgment of the District Court.

I

Appellee, an organization self-denominated as a Prisoners’ Labor Union, was incorporated in late 1974, with a stated goal of “the promotion of charitable labor union purposes” and the formation of a “prisoners’ labor union at every prison and jail in North Carolina to seek through collective bargaining . . . to improve . . . working . . . conditions. ...” It also proposed to work toward the alteration or elimination of practices and policies of the Department of Correction which it did not approve of, and to serve as a vehicle for the presentation and resolution of inmate grievances. By early 1975, the Union had attracted some 2,000 inmate “members” in 40 different prison units throughout North Carolina. The State of North Carolina, unhappy with these developments, set out to prevent inmates from forming or operating a “union.” While the State tolerated individual “membership,” or belief, in the Union, it sought to prohibit inmate solicitation of other inmates, meetings between members of the Union, and bulk mailings concerning the Union from outside sources. Pursuant to a regulation promulgated by the Department of Correction on March 26, 1975, such solicitation and group activity were proscribed.

Suit was filed by the Union in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina on March 18, 1975, approximately a week before the date upon which the regulation was to take effect. The Union claimed that its rights, and the rights of its members, to engage in protected free speech, association, and assembly activities were being infringed by the no-solicitation and no-meeting rules. It also alleged a deprivation of equal protection of the laws in that the Jaycees and Alcoholics Anonymous were permitted to have meetings and other organizational rights, such as the distribution of bulk mailing material, that the Union was being denied. A declaratory judgment and injunction against continuation of these restrictive policies were sought, as were substantial damages.

°A three-judge District Court, convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281 and 2284, while dismissing the Union’s prayers for damages and attorney’s fees, granted it substantial injunctive relief. The court found that appellants “permitted” inmates to join the Union, but “oppose{d] the solicitation of other inmates to join,” either by inmate-to-inmate solicitation or by correspondence. 409 F. Supp., at 941. The court noted, id., at 942:

“[Appellants] sincerely believe that the very existence of the Union will increase the burdens of administration and constitute a threat of essential discipline and control. They are apprehensive that inmates may use the Union to establish a power bloc within the inmate population which could be utilized to cause work slowdowns or stoppages or other undesirable concerted-activity.”

The District Court concluded, however, that there was “no consensus” among experts on these matters, and that it was “left with no firm conviction that an association of inmates is necessarily good or bad . . . .” Id., at 942-943. The court felt that since appellants countenanced the bare fact of Union membership, it had to allow solicitation activity, whether by inmates or by outsiders:

“We are unable to perceive why it is necessary or essential to security and order in the prisons to forbid solicitation of membership in a union permitted by the authorities. This is not a case of riot. There is not one scintilla of evidence to suggest that the Union has been utilized to disrupt the operation of the penal institutions.” Id., at 944.

The other questions, respecting the bulk mailing by the Union of literature into the prisons for distribution and the question of meetings of inmate members, the District Court resolved against appellants “by application of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.” Ibid. Finding that such meetings and bulk mailing privileges had been permitted the Jaycees, Alcoholics Anonymous, and, in one institution, the Boy Scouts, the District Court concluded that appellants “may not pick and choose depending on [their] approval or disapproval of the message or purpose of the group” unless “the activity proscribed is shown to be detrimental to proper penological objectives, subversive to good discipline, or otherwise harmful.” Ibid. The court concluded that appellants had failed to meet this burden. Appropriate injunctive relief was thereupon ordered.

II

A

The District Court, we believe, got off on the wrong foot in this case by not giving appropriate deference to the decisions of prison administrators and appropriate recognition to the peculiar and restrictive circumstances of penal confinement. While litigation by prison inmates concerning conditions of confinement, challenged other than under the Eighth Amendment, is of recent vintage, this Court has long recognized that "[1] awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.” Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 285 (1948); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 822 (1974); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 555 (1974). The fact of confinement and the needs of the penal institution impose limitations on constitutional rights, including those derived from the First Amendment, which are implicit in incarceration. We noted in Pell v. Procunier, supra, at 822:

“[A] prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system. Thus, challenges to prison restrictions that are asserted to inhibit First Amendment interests must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate policies and goals of the corrections system, to whose custody and care the prisoner has been committed in accordance with due process of law.”

Perhaps the most obvious of the First Amendment rights that are necessarily curtailed by confinement are those associational rights that the First Amendment protects outside of prison walls. The concept of incarceration itself entails a restriction on the freedom of inmates to associate with those outside of the penal institution. Equally as obvious, the inmate’s “status as a prisoner” and the operational realities of a prison dictate restrictions on the associational rights among inmates.

Because the realities of running a penal institution are complex and difficult, we have also recognized the wide-ranging deference to be accorded the decisions of prison administrators. We noted in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 405 (1974):

“[CJourts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism. Moreover, where state penal institutions are involved, federal courts have a further reason for deference to the appropriate prison authorities.” (Footnote omitted.)

See also Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319, 321 (1972). It is in this context that the claims of the Union must be examined.

B

State correctional officials uniformly testified that the concept of a prisoners’ labor union was itself fraught with potential dangers, whether or not such a union intended; illegally, to press for collective-bargaining recognition. Appellant Ralph Edwards, the Commissioner of the Department of Correction, stated in his affidavit:

“The creation of an inmate union will naturally result in increasing the existing friction between inmates and prison personnel. It can also create friction between union inmates and non-union inmates.”

Appellant David Jones, the Secretary of the Department of Correction, stated:

“The existence of a union of inmates can create a divisive element within the inmate population. In a time when the units are already seriously over-crowded, such an element could aggravate already tense conditions. The purpose of the union may well be worthwhile projects. But it is evident that the inmate organizers could, if recognized as spokesman for all inmates, make themselves to be power figures among the inmates. If the union is successful, these inmates would be in a position to misuse their influence. After the inmate union has become established, there would probably be nothing this Department could do to terminate its existence, even if its activities became overtly subversive to the functioning of the Department. Work stoppages and mutinies are easily foreseeable. Riots and chaos would almost inevitably result. Thus, even if the purposes of the union are as stated, in the complaint, the potential for a dangerous situation exists, a situation which could not be brought under control.”

The District Court did not reject these beliefs as fanciful or erroneous. It, instead, noted that they were held “sincerely,” and were arguably correct. 409 F. Supp., at 942-943. Without a showing that these beliefs were unreasonable, it was error for the District Court to conclude that appellants needed to show more. In particular, the burden was not on appellants to show affirmatively that the Union would be “detrimental to proper penological objectives” or would constitute a “present danger to security and order.” Id., at 944A945. Rather, “[s]uch considerations are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S., at 827. The necessary and correct result of our deference to the informed discretion of prison administrators permits them, and not the courts, to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations in situations such as this.

The District Court, however, gave particular emphasis to what it viewed as appellants’ tolerance of membership by inmates in the Union as undermining appellants’ position. It viewed a system which permitted inmate “membership” but prohibited inmate-to-inmate solicitation (as well, it should be noted, as meetings, or other group activities) as bordering “on the irrational,” and felt that “[t]he defendants’ own hypothesis in this case is that the existence of the Union and membership in it are not dangerous, for otherwise they would surely have undertaken to forbid membership.” 409 F. Supp., at 944. This, however, considerably overstates what appellants’ concession as to pure membership entails. Appellants permitted membership because of the reasonable assumption that each individual prisoner could believe what he chose to believe, and that outside individuals should be able to communicate ideas and beliefs to individual inmates. Since a member qua member incurs no dues or obligations — a prisoner apparently may become a member simply by considering himself a member — this position simply reflects the concept that thought control, by means of prohibiting beliefs, would not only be undesirable but impossible.

But appellants never acquiesced in, or permitted, group activity of the Union in the nature of a functioning organization of the inmates within the prison, nor did the District Court find that they had. It is clearly not irrational to conclude that individuals may believe what they want, but that concerted group activity, or solicitation therefor, would pose additional and unwarranted problems and frictions in the operation of the State’s penal institutions. The ban on inmate solicitation and group meetings, therefore, was rationally related to the reasonable, indeed to the central, objectives of prison administration. Cf. Pell v. Procunier, supra, at 822.

C

The invocation of the First Amendment, whether the asserted rights are speech or associational, does not change this analysis. In a prison context, an inmate does not retain those First Amendment rights that are "inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Pell v. Procunier, supra, at 822. Prisons, it is obvious, differ in numerous respects from free society. They, to begin with, are populated, involuntarily, by people who have been found to have violated one or more of the criminal laws established by society for its orderly governance. In seeking a “mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives [of prisons] and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application,” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S., at 556, this Court has repeatedly recognized the need for major restrictions on a prisoner’s rights. See, e. g., id., at 561-562; Lanza v. New York, 370 U. S. 139, 143 (1962). These restrictions have applied as well where First Amendment values were implicated. See, e. g., Pell v. Procunier, supra; Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396 (1974); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976).

An examination of the potential restrictions on speech or association that have been imposed by the regulations under challenge, demonstrates that the restrictions imposed are reasonable, and are consistent with the inmates' status as prisoners and with the legitimate operational considerations of the institution. To begin with, First Amendment speech rights are barely implicated in this case. Mail rights are not themselves implicated; the only question respecting the mail is that of bulk mailings. The advantages of bulk mailings to inmates by the Union are those of cheaper rates and convenience. While the District Court relied on the cheaper bulk mailing rates in finding an equal protection violation, infra, at 133, it is clear that losing these cost advantages does not fundamentally implicate free speech values. Since other avenues of outside informational flow by the Union remain available, the prohibition on bulk mailing, reasonable in the absence of First Amendment considerations, remains reasonable. Cf. Pell v. Procunier, supra; Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U. S. 843 (1974).

Nor does the prohibition on inmate-to-inmate solicitation of membership trench untowardly on the inmates’ First Amendment speech rights. Solicitation of membership itself involves a good deal more than the simple expression of individual views as to the advantages or disadvantages of a union or its views; it is an invitation to collectively engage in a legitimately prohibited activity. If the prison officials are otherwise entitled to control organized union activity within the prison walls, the prohibition on solicitation for such activity is not then made impermissible on account of First Amendment considerations, for such a prohibition is then not only reasonable but necessary. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S., at 822.

First Amendment associational rights, while perhaps more directly implicated by the regulatory prohibitions, likewise must give way to the reasonable considerations of penal management. As already noted, numerous associational rights are necessarily curtailed by the realities of confinement. They may be curtailed whenever the institution’s officials, in the exercise of their informed discretion, reasonably conclude that such associations, whether through group meetings or otherwise, possess the likelihood of disruption to prison order or stability, or otherwise interfere with the legitimate penological objectives of the prison environment. As we noted in Pell v. Procunier, supra, at 823, “central to all other corrections goals is the institutional consideration of internal security within the corrections facilities themselves.”

Appellant prison officials concluded that the presence, perhaps even the objectives, of a prisoners’ labor union would be detrimental to order and security in the prisons, supra, at 127. It is enough to say that they have not been conclusively shown to be wrong in this view. The interest in preserving order and authority in the prisons is self-evident. Prison life, and relations between the inmates themselves and between the inmates and prison officials or staff, contain the ever-present potential for violent confrontation and conflagration. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S., at 561-562. Responsible prison officials must be permitted to take reasonable steps to forestall such a threat, and they must be permitted to act before the time when they can compile a dossier on the eve of a riot. The case of a prisoners’ union, where the focus is on the presentation of grievances to, and encouragement of adversary relations with, institution officials surely would rank high on anyone’s list of potential trouble spots. If the appellants’ views as to the possible detrimental effects of the organizational activities of the Union are reasonable, as we conclude they are, then the regulations are drafted no more broadly than they need be to meet the perceived threat — which stems directly from group meetings and group organizational activities of the Union. Cf. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S., at 412-416. When weighed against the First Amendment rights asserted, these institutional reasons are sufficiently weighty to prevail.

D

The District Court rested on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down appellants’ prohibition against the receipt and distribution of bulk mail from the Union as well as the prohibition of Union meetings among the inmates. It felt that this was a denial of equal protection because bulk mailing and meeting rights had been extended to the Jaycees, Alcoholics Anonymous, and the Boy Scouts. The court felt that just as outside the prison, a “government may not pick and choose depending upon its approval or disapproval of the message or purpose of the group,” 409 F. Supp., at 944, so, too, appellants could not choose among groups without first demonstrating that the activity proscribed is “detrimental to proper penological objectives, subversive to good discipline, or otherwise harmful.” Ibid.

This analysis is faulty for two reasons. The District Court erroneously treated this case as if the prison environment were essentially a “public forum.” We observed last Term in upholding a ban on political meetings at Fort Dix that a Government enclave such as a military base was not a public forum. Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976). We stated, id., at 838 n. 10:

“The fact that other civilian speakers and entertainers had sometimes been invited to appear at Fort Dix did not of itself serve to convert Fort Dix into a public forum or to confer upon political candidates a First or Fifth Amendment right to conduct their campaigns there. The decision of the military authorities that a civilian lecture on drug abuse, a religious service by a visiting preacher at the base chapel, or a rock musical concert would be supportive of the military mission of Fort Dix surely did not leave the authorities powerless thereafter to prevent any civilian from entering Fort Dix to speak on any subject whatever.”

A prison may be no more easily converted into a public forum than a military base. Thus appellants need only demonstrate a rational basis for their distinctions between organizational groups. Cf. City of Charlotte v. Firefighters, 426 U. S. 283 (1976). Here, appellants’ affidavits indicate exactly why Alcoholics Anonymous and the Jaycees have been allowed to operate within the prison. Both were seen as serving a rehabilitative purpose, working in harmony with the goals and desires of the prison administrators, and both had been determined not to pose any threat to the order or security of the institution. The affidavits indicate that the administrators’ view of the Union differed critically in both these respects.

Those conclusions are not unreasonable. Prison administrators may surely conclude that the Jaycees and Alcoholics Anonymous differ in fundamental respects from appellee Union, a group with no past to speak of, and with the avowed intent to pursue an adversary relationship with the prison officials. Indeed, it would be enough to distinguish the Union from Alcoholics Anonymous to note that the chartered purpose of the Union, apparently pursued in the prison, was illegal under North Carolina law.

Since a prison is most emphatically not a “public forum,” these reasonable beliefs of appellants are sufficient, cf. Greer v. Spock, supra; City of Charlotte v. Firefighters, supra. The District Court’s further requirement of a demonstrable showing that the Union was in fact harmful is inconsistent with the deference federal courts should pay to the informed discretion of prison officials. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S., at 405. It is precisely in matters such as this, the decision as to which of many groups should be allowed to operate within the prison walls, where, confronted with claims based on the Equal Protection Clause, the courts should allow the prison administrators the full latitude of discretion, unless it can be firmly stated that the two groups are sp similar that discretion has been abused. That is surely not the case here. There is nothing in the Constitution which requires prison officials to treat all inmate groups alike where differentiation is necessary to avoid an imminent threat of institutional disruption or violence. The regulations of appellants challenged in the District Court offended neither the First nor the Fourteenth Amendment, and the judgment of that court holding to the contrary is

Reversed.

These are the corporation purposes listed in the Articles of Incorporation issued by the Secretary of State of North Carolina. Collective bargaining for inmates with respect to pay, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of incarceration is illegal under N. C. Gen. Stat. §95-98 (1975).

Other allegations were contained in the complaint, respecting the opening of outgoing prison mail and the interference with visitation rights of certain paralegals. These specific allegations are not before us, and we will not deal with them further.

Appellants were enjoined as follows:

“(1) Inmates and all other persons shall be permitted to solicit and invite other inmates to join the plaintiff Union orally or by written or printed communication; provided, however, that access to inmates by outsiders solely for the purpose of soliciting membership may be denied except that inmate members of the Union may become entitled to be visited by free persons who are engaged with them in legitimate Union projects to the same extent that other members of free society are admitted for like purposes.

“(2) Free persons otherwise entitled to visitation with inmates, be they attorneys, paralegals, friends, relatives, etc. shall not be denied access to such visitation by reason of their association or affiliation with the Union.

“(3) The Union shall be accorded the privilege of bulk mailing to the extent that such a privilege is accorded other organizations.

“(4) The Union and its inmate members shall be accorded the privilege of holding meetings under such limitations and control as are neutrally applied to all inmate organizations, and to the extent that other meetings of prisoners are permitted.”

The District Court observed that “it is clear beyond argument that no association of prisoners may operate as a true labor union . . . .” It concluded that “it [is] of no legal significance that the charter purports, to authorize more than can lawfully be accomplished.” 409 F. Supp. 937, 940 n. 1. But, whether or not illegal activity was actually actively pursued by the Union, it is clear that its announced purpose to engage in collective bargaining is a factor which prison officials may legitimately consider in determining whether the Union is likely to be a disruptive influence, or otherwise detrimental to the effective administration of the North Carolina prison system.

The District Court did hold that there was “not one scintilla of evidence to suggest that the Union has been utilized to disrupt the operation of the penal institutions.” Id., at 944. This historical finding, however, does not state that appellants’ fears as to future disruptions are groundless; there, the court indicated the opposite: “On conflicting expert opinion evidence we are left with no firm conviction that an association of inmates is necessarily good or bad .. . .” Id., at 943.

The State has not hampered the ability of prison inmates to communicate their grievances to correctional officials. In banning Union solicitation or organization, appellants have merely affected one of several ways in which inmates may voice their complaints to, and seek relief, from prison officials. There exists an inmate grievance procedure through which correctional officials are informed about complaints concerning prison conditions, and through which remedial action may be secured. See Affidavit of Director Edwards, App. 127. With this presumably effective path available for the transmission of grievances, the fact that the Union’s grievance procedures might be more “desirable” does not convert the prohibitory regulations into unconstitutional acts. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 413 (1974); cf. Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 847 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).

The complaint alleged only that the bulk mail prohibition denied the Union equal protection of the laws:

“The refusal by Defendants to allow the Prisoners’ Union Newsletter to arrive in bundles for distribution, while allowing the Jaycee Newsletter to arrive in the same manner violates Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws.”

The District Court, likewise, dealt with the bulk mail question only in terms of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 409 F. Supp., at 944.

The ban on bulk mailing by the Union does not extend to individual mailings to individual inmates. In his affidavit, Director Edwards stated: “They are permitted to receive publications sent to them directly, but they are prohibited from receiving packets of material from unions or any other source for redistribution. This is in accordance with the Department’s policy requiring publication [s] mailed to inmates to be sent directly from the publisher. A serious security problem would result if inmates could receive packets of material and then redistribute them as they see fit. It would be impossible for the Department to inspect every magazine, every book, etc., to insure that no contraband had been placed inside the publication. The exception in regard to Jaycees is based on the recognized fact that the Jaycees are substantial citizens from the free community who are most unlikely to attempt to smuggle contraband into the union or disseminate propaganda subversive of the legitimate purposes of the prison system.” App. 129.

See also N. C. Department of Correction Guidebook, Commissioner’s Administrative Directives — Publications Received by Inmates, App. 138-139. As the State has disavowed any intention of interfering with correspondence between outsiders and individual inmates in which Union matters are discussed, we do not have to discuss questions of the First Amendment right of inmates, or outsiders, see Procunier v. Martinez, supra, at 408-409, in the context of a total prohibition on the communication of information about the Union. The District Court apparently thought that solicitation by means of correspondence is prohibited, even if the general discussion of Union affairs is not, 409 F. Supp., at 941. The Union does not press this point here, and it is not alleged in its complaint, but, clearly, if the appellants are permitted to prohibit solicitation activities, they may prohibit solicitation activities by means which use the mails.

The informed discretion of prison officials that there is potential danger may be sufficient for limiting rights even though this showing might be “unimpressive if . . . submitted as justification for governmental restriction of personal communication among members of the general public.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 825 (1974).

Director Edwards listed the objectives for which the Jaycees had been allowed within the North Carolina prison system, namely the “productive association [of inmates] with stable community representatives and the accomplishment of service projects to the community . . . .” When these objectives cease, “the functions of the organization and its opportunities to assemble as an organization would also cease.” Affidavit of Director Edwards, App. 125. With respect to Alcoholics Anonymous, he stated, id., at 126:

“The objectives of the Alcoholics Anonymous Program are to provide therapeutic support, insight, and an opportunity for productive sharing of experiences among those who have encountered the deteriorative effects of alcoholism. Alcoholics Anonymous is structured on a peer pressure basis which begins while the individual client is confined and is intended to have carry over effects into Alcoholic Anonymous groups in the free community.”

With respect to Alcoholics Anonymous and the Jaycees, Director Edwards stated, ibid.:

“The goals and the objectives of [both] the Alcoholics Anonymous and the Jayeee Program were presented to correctional staff as meaningful courses of action with positive goals relative to the productive restoration of offenders to active, lawful participation in the community. The goals of both organizations [were] scrutinized, evaluated, and approved. Operational guidelines have been drawn up in each instance following approval to certify that the primary objective of the correctional system — to maintain order and security — would not be abridged by the operation of these programs within the confines of prison units.”

Opposed to these articulated reasons for allowing these groups is his statement with respect to the Union, ibid.:

“The Division of Prisons was unable to validate a substantive rehabilitation purpose or associative purpose in the design of the organization. To accept the organizational objectives of a prisoner’s union would be to approve an organization whose design and purpose would compromise the order and security of the correctional system.”

See also supra, at 127.

See n. 1, supra. It was acknowledged at oral argument that the Union newsletter has since reiterated the Union’s goal, as stated in the charter, and that the newsletter has contained authorization cards whereby the inmate could “authorize the agents or representatives of said Union to represent me and to act as a collective bargaining agent in all matters pertaining to rates of pay, hours of employment and all other terms and conditions of incarceration.” Record 25. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 31, 34r-35.