Jared v. Harmon

No. 43                     October 16, 2025                            381

             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
                   STATE OF OREGON

                       Greg JARED,
                  Respondent on Review,
                             v.
                     Katie HARMON
                    and all occupants,
                   Petitioner on Review.
         (CC 22LT13674) (CA A180239) (SC S071417)

   En Banc
   On review from the Court of Appeals.*
   Argued and submitted May 13, 2025.
   Elizabeth Lewis, Oregon Law Center, Portland, argued
the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review. Also
on the brief were Emily Rena-Dozier, Oregon Law Center,
Portland, and Charles Allen, Legal Aid Services of Oregon,
Portland.
   Nick R. Blanc, argued the cause for respondent on review.
   BUSHONG, J.
   The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part
and reversed in part. The judgment of the circuit court
is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
    Masih, J., concurred and filed an opinion, in which James,
J., joined.




______________
   * Appeal from Umatilla County Circuit Court, Jon S. Lieuallen, Judge. 

, 

 (2024).
382   Jared v. Harmon
Cite as 

 (2025)                                 383

        BUSHONG, J.
         This forceable entry and detainer (FED) action
requires us to address the interplay between two provisions
in the Oregon Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (ORLTA).
One provision requires landlords to maintain the rented
space in a habitable condition. The other provision requires
tenants to keep the premises clean and sanitary. Tenant lived
in a recreational vehicle (RV) and rented a space to park it on
landlord’s farm. The site did not have a system for sewage dis-
posal, and tenant connected the RV’s wastewater discharge
port to a pipe that dumped raw sewage onto the ground. After
the county health department cited landlord for the sewage
discharge, he notified tenant that he was terminating the
lease for cause and brought this FED action to evict her.
Tenant contended in response that any obligation that she
had to keep the area clean and sanitary depended on landlord
complying with his obligation to provide an appropriate sew-
age disposal system. Tenant also asserted two counterclaims,
seeking to recover damages for landlord’s failure to provide a
sewage disposal system and safe drinking water.
        The trial court ruled in landlord’s favor on his FED
claim and awarded him possession. The court also ruled
in landlord’s favor on tenant’s habitability counterclaims.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. Jared v.
Harmon, 

, 

 (2024). We allowed
review and now affirm the Court of Appeals decision in part
and reverse in part.
         As we will explain, landlord’s failure to provide a
sewage disposal system for the RV site violated his obliga-
tion under ORS 90.320 to maintain the rented space in a
habitable condition, but that violation did not mean that
tenant was free to dump raw sewage onto the ground. By
continuing to do so after she discovered the sewage problem,
tenant violated her obligation under ORS 90.325 to keep
the area clean and sanitary. That violation gave landlord
the right to terminate the tenancy and obtain possession
despite landlord’s habitability violation.
        As for tenant’s counterclaims, under the ORLTA, a
tenant may recover damages for habitability violations only
384                                                     Jared v. Harmon

if the tenant notifies the landlord about the condition caus-
ing the violation, unless the landlord already knew or rea-
sonably should have known about that condition. The trial
court erred in rejecting tenant’s first counterclaim, because
the evidence was undisputed that landlord knew that the
site did not have a sewage disposal system, and tenant
was therefore not required to notify landlord about that
condition. However, the trial court did not err in rejecting
tenant’s second counterclaim because there was no evidence
that tenant notified landlord or that he knew or reasonably
should have known that the water he made available to the
RV was unsafe for drinking.1
                          I. BACKGROUND
         Because landlord prevailed at trial, we review
the evidence presented in the light most favorable to him.
Bennett v. Farmers Ins. Co., 

, 

(2001). Tenant and landlord entered into a written rental
agreement that allowed tenant to park her RV on landlord’s
property for one year, in exchange for $400 per month rent.
The rental agreement was on a form that landlord had used
for other residential property and was not tailored for this
RV site. The form included checked boxes indicating both
that sewage would be “paid by landlord and included in
rent” and that sewage would be “paid by the tenant.”
         The rented space was on land zoned exclusively
for farm use. It was the only space for rent on the property
and was located near a “wellhouse” that provided access to
water and electricity for the RV site. The space did not have
a septic or other sewage disposal system. Tenant disposed
of sewage by connecting the RV’s wastewater discharge
port to a black pipe that emptied raw sewage onto ground
covered by underbrush, about 50 feet away from the RV
site. Landlord testified at trial that he did not tell tenant

    1
      As discussed more fully below, landlord contended at trial and on appeal
that the habitability requirements in ORS 90.320 do not apply to an RV site
pursuant to ORS 90.320(3). The trial court rejected tenant’s habitability coun-
terclaims on the grounds that tenant did not meet her burden of proof without
expressly addressing the ORS 90.320(3) issue. The Court of Appeals rejected
landlord’s argument that the habitability requirements do not apply to this RV
site under ORS 90.320(3), and as explained below, we agree with the Court of
Appeals on that issue.
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to connect the RV’s wastewater discharge port to that pipe,
and that tenant and her boyfriend “put that in” themselves.2
         Tenant testified that, on September 1, 2022, she dis-
covered that sewage from the RV was being discharged onto
the ground after the neighboring landowner had cleared the
underbrush away from the end of the pipe. Tenant called the
Umatilla County Health Department to complain. Tenant
testified that she did not use the black pipe after discov-
ering on September 1 that it discharged sewage onto the
ground, and that she instead stored wastewater from her
RV in a portable tank that she emptied at a friend’s nearby
RV park.3
         A county inspector testified that she visited the site
on September 15 and again on September 20. On her first
visit, she saw the pipe that was connected to the RV, but
she was unable to access the end of the pipe. On her sec-
ond visit, the inspector was able to see that raw sewage had
been discharged from the end of the pipe onto the ground.
The inspector then sent landlord a “Notice of Violation” of
OAR 340-071-0100 for discharging untreated sewage onto
the ground.4 The notice stated that the RV “must be self-
contained” and that its wastewater “must be dumped at
an approved disposal facility.” The notice specified three
actions that must be taken to “come into compliance”:
(1) Immediately cap the wastewater discharge port on the
RV, and cease all discharge of untreated sewage directly
onto the ground; (2) clean up the wastewater by applying
lime to the areas that had been contaminated with sewage
    2
      Tenant testified at trial that landlord told her to connect her RV’s waste-
water discharge port to a black pipe that landlord had provided, and that she
had “assumed” that the pipe was connected to a working sewage disposal system
until she later discovered that it was dumping raw sewage from the RV onto the
ground.
    3
      Tenant’s testimony was refuted by the testimony of the county inspector,
and, as explained below, the trial court’s ruling in landlord’s favor in effect found
the inspector’s testimony more credible.
    4
      The rule referenced in the “Notice of Violation” provides definitions for
wastewater treatment systems. It defines “wastewater” as “sewage,” OAR 340-
071-0100(174), and “sewage” as “water-carried human and animal wastes,” OAR
340-071-0100(140). The operative rule, OAR 340-071-0130(3), prohibits discharg-
ing untreated or partially treated wastewater “directly or indirectly onto the
ground surface,” stating that such a discharge “constitutes a public health haz-
ard and is prohibited.”
386                                                       Jared v. Harmon

and fencing off the area if necessary; and (3) report back to
the health department.
         On September 23—the day after landlord received
the notice from the county—landlord’s attorney sent tenant a
30-day eviction notice. The eviction notice stated that the ten-
ancy would be terminated for cause if tenant did not “cure”
the violation in the county health department’s notice—
which was attached to the eviction notice—by October 8.
         The county inspector returned to the property on
October 15 and saw that nothing had changed. The RV’s
wastewater discharge port was still connected to the black
pipe, allowing the RV to continue discharging raw sewage
onto the ground.5 There was no evidence that lime had been
applied to the contaminated area or that the area had been
fenced off.
         Landlord then filed this FED action to evict tenant
from the premises.6 In response to the complaint, tenant
denied that she had caused the sewage problem, alleged
as a defense that the sewage problem had been caused by
landlord’s failure to provide a sewage disposal system, and
asserted counterclaims for damages and injunctive relief.
In her first counterclaim, tenant alleged that landlord had
breached his obligation to provide a sewage disposal system
as required by ORS 90.320(1)(c)(C) to make the site habit-
able. In her second counterclaim, tenant alleged that land-
lord had breached his obligation to provide safe drinking
water, again as required by ORS 90.320(1)(c)(D) to make the
site habitable. The case proceeded to trial.
         At trial, landlord acknowledged that there never
was a sewage disposal system for the RV site. He testified
that a previous tenant had “carr[ied] the sewage off” site, and
he contended that it was tenant’s responsibility under ORS
    5
      Although tenant testified that she stopped using the black pipe after dis-
covering on September 1 that it dumped sewage from the RV onto the ground, she
offered no explanation as to why her RV was connected to the black pipe when the
county inspector visited the site on September 15, September 20, and October 15.
    6
      The eviction complaint form included a box that was checked indicating
that landlord was entitled to possession because of a 30-day notice of termination
without cause, but the notice that was attached to the complaint sought to termi-
nate the tenancy for cause. The parties and courts below all treated landlord’s
FED action as a “for cause” termination.
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90.325 to properly dispose of sewage from the RV. Landlord
relied primarily on the county inspector’s testimony to estab-
lish that tenant had violated ORS 90.325 by continuing to
dump raw sewage onto the ground. At the close of landlord’s
case, tenant moved for an involuntary dismissal of landlord’s
FED claim under ORCP 54 B(2) (in a case tried to the court, a
defendant can move for involuntary dismissal at the close of a
plaintiff’s case “on the ground that upon the facts and the law
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief”). Tenant contended
that landlord’s claim failed because any obligation that she
had under ORS 90.325 to keep the area clean and sanitary
was dependent upon landlord complying with his obligation
under ORS 90.320 to provide a working sewage disposal sys-
tem. The trial court denied tenant’s motion and, at the end
of trial, ruled in landlord’s favor on his claim for possession.
The court also ruled in landlord’s favor on tenant’s habitabil-
ity counterclaims, concluding that tenant had not “met [her]
burden” on those counterclaims. Tenant appealed.
         On appeal, tenant assigned error to the trial court’s
denial of her motion for involuntary dismissal of landlord’s
FED claim and rejection of her habitability counterclaims.
In response, landlord contended that he was not required
to provide a sewage disposal system for this RV site under
ORS 90.320(3). That provision states that the habitability
provisions in ORS 90.320, which “reasonably apply only to
a structure that is used as a home, residence or sleeping
place,” do not apply to a tenant-owned RV. Landlord con-
tended that sewage disposal was a habitability requirement
that reasonably applied “only to a structure” that is used
as a residence, and thus, that requirement did not apply to
tenant’s RV. Landlord further contended that, under ORS
90.360, he could not be liable on tenant’s counterclaims,
because tenant had failed to give him notice of the sewage
discharge and drinking water problems.
         A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court’s rulings. The court concluded that the habit-
ability exception for tenant-owned RVs in ORS 90.320(3) did
not relieve landlord of the obligation to provide an appropri-
ate sewage disposal system, but the court nonetheless held
that the trial court did not err in denying tenant’s motion
388                                         Jared v. Harmon

for involuntary dismissal of landlord’s FED claim. The court
explained that landlord’s violation of his duty to provide
sewage disposal “d[id] not excuse tenant of her duty under
ORS 90.325” to keep the area clean and sanitary. Jared, 334
Or App at 560.
         With respect to tenant’s habitability counterclaims,
the court noted that tenant’s “right to a remedy under ORS
90.360” depended on whether tenant had notified landlord
about the habitability problems, unless landlord already
knew or reasonably should have known about those problems.
Id. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in
rejecting the counterclaims, because (1) there was evidence to
support the conclusion that landlord was not aware that sew-
age from tenant’s RV was being discharged onto the ground
until he received notice from the county; and (2) there was
evidence to support the conclusion that tenant was aware of
the sewage discharge even before she received the eviction
notice, but she did not notify landlord and continued to dump
sewage from the RV onto the ground. Id. at 560-61.
         Judge Shorr dissented. The dissent concluded that
landlord did not establish a right to possession on his FED
claim, because he did not prove that tenant “had failed to
keep areas under her control free of filth nor that tenant
was responsible for causing the problem.” Id. at 562 (Shorr,
J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). The dissent further
opined that the trial court had erred in dismissing tenant’s
habitability counterclaims, because “it cannot be said” from
the evidence that landlord “neither knew nor reasonably
should have known of the condition that constituted the non-
compliance” with the habitability requirements, as required
by ORS 90.360(2) to preclude tenant from recovering dam-
ages. Id.
        We allowed tenant’s petition for review to address
the interplay between the rights and obligations that the
ORLTA places on landlords and tenants in this context.
                     II. DISCUSSION
         Resolving the issues presented on review requires
us to interpret the relevant provisions of the ORLTA, apply-
ing our traditional methodology focusing on text, context,
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and any legislative history that is helpful to our inquiry.
Jackson v. KA-3 Associates, LLC, 

, 

(2025) (citing State v. Gaines, 

, 

 (2009)). We review the interpretation of a statute for
legal error. State ex rel Torres-Lopez v. Fahrion, 

, 

 (2025). We begin with an overview of the
pertinent ORLTA provisions before turning to the specific
provisions in dispute.7
A.   Statutory Overview
         The ORLTA was enacted in 1973 “to clarify and
restate the rights and obligations of tenants and landlords.”
L & M Investment Co. v. Morrison, 

, 

 (1979). Under the ORLTA, the terms of a written rental
agreement generally govern the rights and obligations of the
parties, except as otherwise provided in the ORLTA or other
applicable law. See ORS 90.220(1) (“A landlord and a tenant
may include in a rental agreement terms and conditions not
prohibited by this chapter or other rule or law including * * *
provisions governing the rights and obligations of the par-
ties”). The ORLTA imposes general and specific obligations
on both landlords and tenants and provides remedies for
violating those obligations.
         One of the basic requirements imposed on landlords
is the obligation to maintain the rented space in a “habitable
condition.” ORS 90.320; Eddy v. Anderson, 

,

 (2020). The statute provides that a landlord
“shall at all times during the tenancy maintain the dwell-
ing unit in a habitable condition.” ORS 90.320(1). The habit-
ability requirements are stated in the negative. Rather than
specifying the attributes that the dwelling unit must have,
the habitability requirements specify the “attributes [that] a
dwelling unit must not substantially lack.” Jackson, 

. Among other things, a dwelling unit “shall be con-
sidered unhabitable” if it substantially lacks a “water sup-
ply approved under applicable law that is * * * [c]onnected
to a sewage disposal system approved under applicable
law.” ORS 90.320(1)(c)(C). The statute includes a limited
    7
      We cite to the current version of the ORLTA in this opinion. The 2021 ver-
sion that was in effect at the time of the events at issue in this case has been
amended since then, but none of those amendments are relevant to this case.
390                                                        Jared v. Harmon

exception, stating that the habitability requirements “that
reasonably apply only to a structure that is used as a home,
residence or sleeping place” do not apply to, among other
things, an RV that is owned by the tenant. ORS 90.320(3).
         ORS 90.360, formerly ORS 91.800, provides a tenant
with “two separate and independent remedies” to address
a landlord’s failure to comply with either the rental agree-
ment “or the landlord’s obligation to maintain the prem-
ises in a habitable condition.” Eddy, 

. First,
ORS 90.360(1)(a) allows a tenant to terminate a lease after
giving the landlord a written “fix or I leave” notice and an
opportunity to cure the violation. See Eddy, 

(summarizing provision).8 Second, ORS 90.360(2) allows a
tenant to “recover damages and obtain injunctive relief”
for the landlord’s noncompliance with habitability require-
ments. However, the tenant is not entitled to recover dam-
ages for the landlord’s failure to comply with habitability
requirements if the tenant does not notify the landlord of
the problem and the landlord “neither knew nor reasonably
should have known of the condition that constituted the non-
compliance.” ORS 90.360(2). Additionally, the tenant is not
entitled to terminate the rental agreement or recover dam-
ages “for a condition caused by the deliberate or negligent
act or omission of the tenant or other person on the premises
with the tenant’s permission or consent.” ORS 90.360(4).
         ORS 90.365 gives a tenant additional remedies if
the landlord “intentionally or negligently fails to supply any
essential service.” For a tenancy “consisting of rental space
for a * * * recreational vehicle owned by the tenant[,]” the
term “essential service” means “sewage disposal * * * and, if
required by applicable law, any drainage system” and “[a]ny
other service or habitability obligation imposed by the rental
agreement or ORS 90.730, the lack or violation of which * * *
makes the rented space unfit for occupancy.” ORS 90.100(15)
(b)(A) and (B).9
    8
      Under ORS 90.360(1), if the landlord’s habitability violation is a failure to
supply an essential service, the landlord must cure the violation within seven
days. The landlord has 30 days to cure all other violations.
    9
      ORS 90.730 lists a landlord’s obligations with respect to a manufactured
dwelling park or a marina. It is undisputed that landlord’s property in this
case was not a “manufactured dwelling park.” See ORS 90.100(28) (defining
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          Under ORS 90.365, a tenant’s remedies for a land-
lord’s failure to supply an essential service include the right
to procure the service and deduct the cost from the rent
(ORS 90.365(1)(a)); to recover damages based on upon the
diminution in the fair rental value of the dwelling unit (ORS
90.365(1)(b)); or to stop paying rent, procure substitute hous-
ing, and recover as damages the cost of substitute housing
in excess of the rent (ORS 90.365(1)(c)). However, a tenant’s
rights under ORS 90.365 “do not arise if the condition was
caused by the deliberate or negligent act or omission of the
tenant or a person on the premises with the tenant’s con-
sent.” ORS 90.365(6).
         The ORLTA also includes specific provisions that
address a tenant’s counterclaim in a landlord’s action for
possession or rent. ORS 90.370. As relevant here, ORS
90.370(1)(a) requires a tenant to prove that, before the land-
lord filed an FED action, the landlord “reasonably had or
should have had knowledge” of “facts that constitute the
tenant’s counterclaim.” The net effect is that a tenant has
an “implicit withholding remedy” that allows the tenant to
withhold rent if the landlord is not in compliance with the
habitability requirements, and, “if the landlord commences
an FED action, the tenant can counterclaim” for diminished
rental value damages. Eddy, 

 (citing Napolski
v. Champney, 

, 

 (1983)).
         A tenant’s specific duties are set out in ORS 90.325.
As relevant here, ORS 90.325(1)(b) requires the tenant to
“[k]eep all areas of the premises under control of the tenant
in every part as clean, sanitary and free from all accumula-
tions of debris, filth, rubbish, garbage, rodents and vermin,
as the condition of the premises permits and to the extent
that the tenant is responsible for causing the problem.” The
statute further requires a tenant to “cooperate to a reason-
able extent in assisting the landlord in any reasonable effort
“manufactured dwelling” to include a “residential trailer”); ORS 90.100(29)
(defining “manufactured dwelling park” as “a place where four or more manufac-
tured dwellings are located, the primary purpose of which is to rent space or keep
space for rent to any person for a charge or fee”). Also, landlord’s property was not
a “recreational vehicle park.” See ORS 90.100(40) (referring to ORS 197.492 for
the definition of a “recreational vehicle park”; ORS 197.492(2)(a) (defining “rec-
reational vehicle park” as a place where two or more RVs are located within 500
feet of each other on a single lot, tract, or parcel of land).
392                                                       Jared v. Harmon

to remedy the problem,” ORS 90.325(1)(b), and to “[d]ispose
from the dwelling unit all ashes, garbage, rubbish and other
waste in a clean, safe and legal manner,” ORS 90.325(1)(c).
          The ORLTA includes specific remedies for landlords
if a tenant fails to comply with the tenant’s obligations under
ORS 90.325. As applicable here, ORS 90.392(1) provides:
“Except as provided in this chapter, after delivery of written
notice a landlord may terminate the rental agreement for
cause and take possession as provided in ORS 105.100 to
105.168, unless the tenant cures the violation as provided
in this section.” One of the specified “causes for termination”
is a “[m]aterial violation by the tenant under ORS 90.325.”
ORS 90.392(2)(b). However, the rental agreement does not
terminate if the tenant “cures the violation” by the date
specified in the notice, which must be at least 14 days after
delivery of notice of the violation. ORS 90.392(4)(a). If the
tenant does not cure the violation, “the rental agreement
terminates as provided in the notice.” ORS 90.392(4)(b). A
landlord may pursue any one or more of the remedies in the
ORLTA “simultaneously or sequentially,” and, in addition
to terminating the rental agreement under ORS 90.392,
the landlord may recover damages and obtain injunctive
relief for the tenant’s noncompliance with ORS 90.325. ORS
90.401(1) and (2).
          The ORLTA includes several definitions that help us
resolve this case. “Premises” is defined to mean “[a] dwelling
unit and the structure of which it is a part and facilities
and appurtenances therein” and the “[g]rounds, areas and
facilities held out for the use of tenants generally or the use
of which is promised to the tenant[.]” ORS 90.100(37)(a), (b).
With respect to a space rented for a “recreational vehicle,”
the term “dwelling unit” means “the space rented and not
the * * * recreational vehicle * * * itself.” ORS 90.100(14).10
And as noted above, “sewage disposal” for a rental space for
an RV owned by the tenant is expressly included in the defi-
nition of the term “essential service.” ORS 90.100(15)(b)(A).
     10
        “Recreational vehicle” has the meaning “given that term in ORS 174.101.”
ORS 90.100(39). ORS 174.101(3) defines “recreational vehicle” as “a vehicle with
or without motive power that is designed for use as temporary living quarters[.]”
It is undisputed that tenant lived in a “recreational vehicle” as defined in those
statutes.
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B.    Application to This Case
         As stated, this case involves the interplay between
landlord’s habitability obligations under ORS 90.320 and
tenant’s obligation under ORS 90.325 to keep the premises
sanitary and free from filth. This case addresses how those
respective obligations affect (1) landlord’s right to terminate
the rental agreement and evict tenant, and (2) tenant’s right
to recover damages. We begin with landlord’s FED claim to
evict tenant and obtain possession of the rented space.
      1. Landlord’s FED claim
        Landlord sought to evict tenant based on tenant’s
alleged violation of her obligation under ORS 90.325(1)(b) to
maintain the premises in a sanitary condition.11 That stat-
ute provides:
        “(1)   The tenant shall:
        “* * * * *
         “(b) Keep all areas of the premises under control of the
     tenant in every part as clean, sanitary, and free from all
     accumulations of debris, filth, rubbish, garbage, rodents
     and vermin, as the condition of the premises permits and
     to the extent that the tenant is responsible for causing the
     problem. The tenant shall cooperate to a reasonable extent
     in assisting the landlord in any reasonable effort to remedy
     the problem.”
(Emphases added).
         Tenant contends that any obligation that she had to
keep the premises clean and sanitary depended upon land-
lord’s compliance with his habitability obligation to supply
an appropriate sewage disposal system. Tenant further
contends that she did not violate ORS 90.325(1)(b), because
(1) the area where the sewage was dumped was not a part
of the premises that was under her control; (2) the “condi-
tion of the premises” did not “permit” her to avoid dumping
     11
        Because nonpayment of rent was not an issue in this case, any damages
that tenant could recover from landlord’s failure to provide essential services
or to maintain the premises in a habitable condition could not offset any rental
payments that were due and avoid eviction for nonpayment of rent. As a result,
the potential availability of a damages remedy does not affect whether landlord
is entitled to possession on his FED claim.
394                                                        Jared v. Harmon

sewage onto the ground, because landlord did not provide a
sewage disposal system, as he was required to do; and (3)
landlord—not tenant—was therefore “responsible for caus-
ing the problem” by failing to provide for a sewage disposal
system for the RV site.
          In response, landlord contends—relying on the brief
he filed in the Court of Appeals—that he was not required to
provide a sewage disposal system for this RV site under the
exception to the habitability requirements in ORS 90.320(3).
As we will explain, we agree with the Court of Appeals that
ORS 90.320(3) did not relieve landlord of his obligation to
supply a sewage disposal system for this RV site. That does
not mean that tenant prevails on the FED claim, because
we also agree with the Court of Appeals that landlord’s hab-
itability violation did not excuse tenant’s obligation under
ORS 90.325 to refrain from dumping raw sewage from the
RV onto the ground, and that tenant’s violation allowed
landlord to terminate the tenancy for cause.
         We begin with landlord’s contention that ORS
90.320(3) relieved him of the obligation to provide a sewage
disposal system, as required by ORS 90.320(1)(c)(C) to make
the site habitable. Under ORS 90.320(3), the habitability
requirements in ORS 90.320(1) “that reasonably apply only
to a structure” that is used as a residence do not apply to an
RV that is owned by the tenant. Landlord contends that the
habitability obligation to provide an appropriate sewage dis-
posal system is a requirement “that reasonably applies only
to a structure” that is used as a residence and, thus, does not
apply to this RV site. We disagree, because multiple statutory
provisions make clear that providing appropriate sewage dis-
posal is an obligation that also applies to tenant-owned RVs.
        Some habitability requirements listed in ORS
90.320(1) reasonably apply to only to a structure used as a
residence, but sewage disposal is not one of them.12 Sewage
    12
        See e.g., ORS 90.320(1)(a) (waterproofing and weather protection of “roof
and exterior walls, including windows and doors”); ORS 90.320(1)(b) (plumbing
facilities that conform to applicable law); ORS 90.320(1)(d) (adequate heating
facilities); ORS 90.320(1)(h) (floors, walls, ceilings, and stairways maintained in
good repair); ORS 90.320(1)(j), (k) (working smoke alarms and carbon monoxide
alarms); ORS 90.320(1)(l) (working locks for doors and latches for windows); ORS
90.320(1)(m) (air conditioning or other cooling system).
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disposal is an “essential service” that a landlord must supply
to an RV space that holds a tenant-owned RV. ORS 90.100
(15)(b)(A). Thus, the obligation to provide an appropriate
sewage disposal system is not an obligation that reasonably
applies only to a structure that is used as a residence.
         Landlord contends that ORS 90.100(15)(b)(A) is a
definitional provision that does not give rise to any obliga-
tion on landlord’s part, but that argument ignores the fact
that both ORS 90.360(1) and 90.365(1) give tenants the right
to certain remedies if a landlord fails to supply an “essential
service.”13 The fact that those statutes give a tenant reme-
dies for a landlord’s failure to supply an essential service
means that landlords are obligated to provide those ser-
vices. The obligation is implicit in the tenant’s right to a
remedy. Otherwise, the statutory remedy—and the defini-
tion of “essential service” to specifically include sewage dis-
posal for an RV site—would be meaningless.
         In addition, ORS 197.493(1)(b)(C) provides that
state and local governments may not prohibit locating RVs
in an RV park if they are lawfully connected to a sewage dis-
posal system.14 That confirms that a connection to a sewage
disposal system is something that can be provided to an RV
space and is not something that reasonably applies only to a
structure. Because a sewage disposal system is not a habit-
ability requirement that reasonably applies only to a “struc-
ture” under Oregon law, the exception in ORS 90.320(3) does
not apply.

     13
        A landlord’s failure to supply an “essential service” is a habitability vio-
lation under ORS 90.320(1). The exception to the habitability requirements pro-
vided in ORS 90.320(3) would, if applicable here, preclude tenant from a rem-
edy under ORS 90.360(1) and 90.365(1), because remedies are available under
both provisions only if the landlord’s failure to supply an essential service vio-
lates ORS 90.320. But, as explained in this opinion, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that the exception in ORS 90.320(3) does not apply here.
     14
        As noted above, an RV park is a parcel of land holding two or more RVs.
ORS 197.492(2)(a). Aside from the ORLTA provisions discussed in this opinion,
the legislature has not specifically addressed the sewage disposal and other hab-
itability requirements that apply to a single RV site. Given the prevalence of
people using RVs as their residence and the need for them to locate their RVs
lawfully, the legislature could authorize private landowners to allow a single RV
to park on their land without providing a sewage disposal system if RV owners
dispose of their sewage at an appropriate sewage disposal facility. The existing
ORLTA provisions that apply to RV sites do not provide that authorization.
396                                                       Jared v. Harmon

         Turning to tenant’s contentions, we do not agree
that a tenant’s obligations under ORS 90.325 are contingent
on a landlord’s compliance with the habitability require-
ments in ORS 90.320. Tenant suggests that the text, con-
text, and legislative history of those provisions show that
the legislature intended to make a landlord’s compliance
with the habitability requirements of ORS 90.320 a “condi-
tion precedent” to a tenant’s obligations under ORS 90.325.
We disagree.
         The text of ORS 90.320 provides that a landlord’s
obligations to maintain the premises in a habitable condi-
tion apply “at all times” during the tenancy, while a tenant’s
obligations under ORS 90.325 are more limited and qual-
ified, as tenant points out. But that does not mean that a
landlord’s compliance with the habitability requirements
is a condition precedent to a tenant’s obligations, or that
those respective obligations are otherwise connected. It just
means that the respective obligations of landlords and ten-
ants under the ORLTA are different.
        The context confirms that a tenant’s compliance
with ORS 90.325 was not intended to be dependent on a
landlord’s compliance with ORS 90.320. The legislature
expressly made other provisions of the ORLTA conditioned
on each other; for example, we have recognized that, under
ORS 90.250, a tenant’s obligation to pay rent is “reciprocal”
to and thus dependent upon a landlord’s obligation to main-
tain rental properties in a habitable condition. Napolski v.
Champney, 

, 

 (1983).15 But
the legislature did not make a tenant’s compliance with
ORS 90.325 contingent on a landlord’s compliance with ORS
90.320.
         In addition, as discussed above, a tenant’s remedies
under ORS 90.360 are subject to establishing the landlord’s
failure to comply with one or more of the habitability require-
ments in ORS 90.320. And, if the landlord’s habitability vio-
lation is a failure to supply an essential service, the ORLTA
gives tenants additional remedies under ORS 90.365. The
availability of those statutory remedies is directly connected
   15
      ORS 90.250 provides in pertinent part: “A rental agreement * * * may not
permit the receipt of rent free of the obligation to comply with ORS 90.320(1)[.]”
Cite as 

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to a landlord’s violation of the habitability requirements in
ORS 90.320. But nothing in the ORLTA makes a tenant’s
duty to comply with ORS 90.325 dependent on the landlord’s
compliance with those habitability requirements. Instead,
the provisions simply describe the respective, independent
obligations of landlords and tenants.
         The legislative history does not suggest that those
obligations were intended to be interdependent. The stat-
ute establishing a landlord’s habitability obligations, which
is now codified as ORS 90.320, was enacted as part of the
bill that created the ORLTA, Senate Bill (SB) 159 (1973).
Jackson, 

 (citing Or Laws 1973, ch 559, § 14).16
SB 159 also established the tenant’s obligations that are
now codified as ORS 90.325. Or Laws 1973, ch 559, § 15.17
Nothing in the legislative history of SB 159 suggests that
a tenant’s compliance with their obligations was intended
to be dependent upon a landlord first complying with their
habitability obligations, unless the landlord’s failure pre-
vents a tenant from complying as a factual matter.
          The ORLTA was modeled on the Uniform Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act (1972) (URLTA). Jackson, 

. As we explained in Jackson, the habitability provi-
sions in the bill as originally introduced “mirrored URLTA
section 2.104.” 

 During the 1973 legislative session,
landlord advocates expressed concerns that the wording of
URLTA section 2.104 was overbroad and vague. 

.
In response, the legislature amended the habitability pro-
vision to “add specificity and clarity regarding the scope
of a landlord’s habitability obligations.” 

. But the
bill as introduced and as ultimately enacted did not make a
tenant’s obligations dependent upon a landlord’s compliance
with its habitability obligations.
     16
        The legislature amended ORS 90.320, formerly ORS 91.770, in 1989 to add
a provision that specifically required landlords to provide a water supply that
is “[m]aintained so as to provide safe drinking water[.]” Or Laws 1989, ch 506,
§ 8. The legislature added subsection (3) to ORS 90.320 in 1995. Or Laws 1995,
ch 559, § 15.
     17
        The legislature amended ORS 90.325(1)(b) in 1999 to include keeping the
premises free from “rodents and vermin” as the condition of the premises per-
mits. That amendment also added the phrase “and to the extent that the tenant
is responsible for causing the problem” at the end of ORS 90.325(1)(b). Or Laws
1999, ch 603, § 20
398                                                  Jared v. Harmon

         That conclusion is supported by the URLTA provi-
sions that correspond to the respective obligations of land-
lords and tenants in the ORLTA. The ORLTA provision
that became ORS 90.325 was patterned after URLTA sec-
tion 3.101.18 Nothing in the URLTA suggests that a tenant’s
obligations under section 3.101 depended upon a landlord’s
compliance with their habitability obligations under section
2.104. The official commentary to those provisions states
that they simply set out the respective obligations of land-
lords and tenants without suggesting that the landlord’s
obligations are a condition precedent to the tenant’s obli-
gations or making the tenant’s obligation depend upon the
landlord’s compliance. For example, the official commentary
to URLTA section 2.104 states:
  “Generally, duties of repair and maintenance of the dwell-
  ing unit and the premises are imposed upon the landlord
  by this section. Major repairs, even access, to essential sys-
  tems outside the dwelling unit are beyond the capacity of
  the tenant. Conversely, duties of cleanliness and proper use
  within the dwelling unit are appropriately fixed upon the
  tenant (see Sections 3.101 and 3.102).”
Commissioners’ Commentary to URLTA § 2.104.
         The comment to URLTA section 3.101 states: “This
section, the converse of Section 2.104, establishes minimum
duties of tenants consistent with public standards of health
and safety.” Commissioners’ Commentary to URLTA § 3.101.
         Thus, the two provisions were designed to be the
converse of each other, not dependent upon each other.
Nothing in those URLTA provisions suggests that a tenant’s
obligation to keep the premises clean and sanitary would
apply only if the landlord first complied with their habit-
ability obligations. We conclude that a tenant’s obligation
  18
    URLTA section 3.101 provides in pertinent part:
      “A tenant shall:
      “(1) Comply with all obligations primarily imposed upon tenants by
  applicable provisions of building and housing codes materially affecting
  health and safety;
      “(2) Keep that part of the premises that he occupies and uses as clean
  and safe as the condition of the premises permit;
      “(3) Dispose from his dwelling unit all ashes, garbage, rubbish, and
  other waste in a clean and safe manner[.]”
Cite as 

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to comply with ORS 90.325 is not dependent upon a land-
lord’s compliance with the habitability requirements in ORS
90.320. 19
          We also disagree with tenant that, as a factual mat-
ter, this location did not preclude her from dumping sewage
from the RV onto the ground. Although the evidence at trial
established that sewage from the RV was discharged onto
the ground about 50 feet away from the space that tenant
had rented—and thus outside the area under tenant’s con-
trol—the RV itself was under tenant’s control. Therefore, it
was entirely within tenant’s control to disconnect the pipe
and cap the wastewater discharge port on her RV to avoid
dumping raw sewage onto the ground. Indeed, tenant tes-
tified that she had done that. Although tenant had some
remedies for landlord’s failure to provide a sewage disposal
system—an essential service for the RV site—that “condi-
tion of the premises” did not prevent tenant from capping
the discharge port on the RV and transporting sewage off-
site to an appropriate disposal facility. Thus, the condition
of the premises “permit[ted]”—within the meaning of ORS
90.325(1)(b)—tenant to take those actions to stop dumping
raw sewage onto the ground.
         As for responsibility for causing the problem—a
factual issue—the trial court, by ruling in landlord’s favor,
in effect, found that tenant was responsible for causing the
problem. There is evidence in the record to support that
finding. For example, tenant acknowledged that she could
have capped the wastewater discharge port on her RV,
stored the sewage in a portable tank, and emptied the tank
at an approved disposal facility. Tenant testified that that is
what she did after she discovered the sewage disposal prob-
lem on September 1. But that testimony was refuted by the
county inspector’s testimony that, when she inspected the
site on three separate occasions after September 1, the RV’s
wastewater discharge port was connected to the pipe that
discharged raw sewage onto the ground. By ruling in land-
lord’s favor, the trial court in effect found that the county
    19
       There may be instances where, as a factual matter, a landlord’s failure to
comply with a habitability requirement prevents a tenant from complying with
one or more of the obligations in ORS 90.325, but the trial court did not make that
factual finding in this case, and nothing in the record compels such a finding.
400                                         Jared v. Harmon

inspector’s testimony was more credible than tenant’s testi-
mony on that point.
         In some respects, landlord and tenant were both
responsible for causing the sewage problem. Landlord was
responsible because he did not provide an essential ser-
vice—an appropriate sewage disposal system—for the site.
Tenant was responsible because she did not cap the waste-
water discharge port on her RV and continued to dump raw
sewage onto the ground. Again, the ORLTA gave tenant
some options to address landlord’s failure, but continuing
to dump raw sewage onto the ground was not one of them.
As discussed above, under ORS 90.325(1)(c), tenant was
required to dispose of waste from the RV in a clean, safe,
and legal manner. Under ORS 90.360(4) and 90.365(6), a
condition caused by the deliberate or negligent act or omis-
sion of the tenant eliminates the remedies that would other-
wise be available to the tenant. Thus, tenant was not free to
continue dumping raw sewage onto the ground.
          The fact that the black pipe emptied onto the ground
50 feet away from the RV does not mean that tenant had no
obligation under ORS 90.325 to keep that area clean and
sanitary. As noted above, “premises” is defined to include
areas appurtenant to the dwelling unit and other grounds
and areas made available to the tenant. ORS 90.100(37).
Although a tenant does not have an affirmative obligation
to keep those appurtenant areas clean and sanitary from
waste deposited by others, a tenant does have an obligation
to refrain from depositing the tenant’s own waste onto those
appurtenant areas. See ORS 90.325(1)(c) (requiring tenant
to “[d]ispose from the dwelling unit all ashes, garbage, rub-
bish and other waste in a clean, safe and legal manner”).
        Accordingly, we conclude that, by not capping the
RV’s wastewater discharge port and continuing to dump
raw sewage onto the ground after she discovered the prob-
lem, tenant violated her obligation under ORS 90.325(1)(b)
to keep the premises clean and sanitary. Therefore, under
ORS 90.392, landlord was entitled to terminate the rental
agreement for cause and obtain possession of the premises,
unless tenant cured the violation.
Cite as 

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        Although tenant testified that she stopped using
the black pipe after she discovered that it was discharging
sewage from the RV onto the ground, tenant does not con-
tend that she cured the sewage disposal problem. If tenant
had capped the wastewater discharge port and disposed of
the RV’s sewage in a clean, safe, and lawful manner, that
would have cured the part of the violation specified in the
eviction notice that was under tenant’s control, thereby
defeating landlord’s FED claim. But, because tenant did not
take those actions and continued to use the black pipe to
discharge sewage from her RV onto the ground in violation
of her obligation under ORS 90.325, landlord was entitled
to terminate the rental agreement and obtain possession of
the rented space.
         That does not mean that tenant had no recourse.
Tenant could have capped the discharge port, stored the
sewage in a storage tank, and then transported it for dis-
posal at an appropriate sewage disposal facility, as stated in
the county’s notice. Because sewage disposal is an “essential
service” for an RV site, if tenant had taken those actions,
she could have deducted the costs she incurred for sewage
disposal from her rent. ORS 90.365(1)(a). Or she could have
recovered damages equal to the reduction in rental value
of the RV site caused by landlord’s failure to provide that
essential service. ORS 90.365(1)(b). In addition, tenant may
have had remedies under ORS 90.360 because landlord’s
failure to provide an appropriate sewage disposal system for
the RV site was a habitability violation under ORS 90.320.20
But the availability of those remedies did not relieve tenant
of her obligation under ORS 90.325 to cap the wastewater
discharge port on her RV and stop discharging raw sewage
onto the ground.
         Accordingly, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that the trial court did not err in denying tenant’s motion
for involuntary dismissal of landlord’s FED claim. We turn
to tenant’s habitability counterclaims.
    20
       As the concurring opinion points out, the availability of remedies that
require expenditures by a tenant may not be meaningful to tenants who live
in an RV and do not have the financial resources to incur those expenses at the
outset, even if the tenant is able to recover those costs from the landlord. 

 (Masih, J., concurring).
402                                              Jared v. 

. Tenant’s habitability counterclaims
         As noted above, ORS 90.360(2) allows a tenant,
among other remedies, to recover damages for a landlord’s
failure to comply with their obligation under ORS 90.320
to maintain the premises in a habitable condition. Tenant’s
first counterclaim alleged that landlord had failed to provide
a water supply that is connected to an appropriate sewage
disposal system as required by ORS 90.320(1)(c)(C). Tenant’s
second counterclaim alleged that landlord had failed to pro-
vide a water supply that was “[m]aintained so as to provide
safe drinking water” as required by ORS 90.320(1)(c)(D).
         Tenant sought to recover damages for those vio-
lations under ORS 90.360(2). Landlord contended at trial
that a damage remedy was not available under that statute
because tenant had failed to notify landlord about the sew-
age discharge and drinking water problems, as required by
ORS 90.360(2). The relevant text of that statute provides as
follows:
       “(2) Except as provided in this chapter, the tenant may
   recover damages * * * for any noncompliance by the land-
   lord with * * * ORS 90.320 * * *. The tenant shall not be enti-
   tled to recover damages for a landlord noncompliance with
   ORS 90.320 * * * if the landlord neither knew nor reasonably
   should have known of the condition that caused the noncom-
   pliance and:
       “(a) The tenant knew or reasonably should have known
   of the condition and failed to give actual notice to the land-
   lord in a reasonable time prior to the occurrence of the * * *
   diminution in rental value or other tenant loss resulting
   from the noncompliance; or
      “(b) The condition was caused after the tenancy began
   by the deliberate or negligent act or omission of someone
   other than the landlord or a person acting on behalf of the
   landlord.”
(Emphasis added).
        Here, landlord testified at trial that he knew all
along that the rented space did not have any sewage dis-
posal system. Landlord’s failure to provide an appropriate
sewage disposal system was “the condition that caused the
Cite as 

 (2025)                                 403

noncompliance” with the habitability requirement in ORS
90.320(1)(c)(C), not the actual discharge of sewage from the
RV onto the ground. Because landlord already knew that
the RV site did not have an appropriate sewage disposal sys-
tem—thus making the space unhabitable—tenant was not
required to notify landlord of that condition. It follows that
tenant was entitled to recover damages on her first counter-
claim under ORS 90.360(2) for landlord’s failure to comply
with that habitability requirement. The trial court erred in
ruling in landlord’s favor on that counterclaim.
        We reach the opposite conclusion regarding tenant’s
second counterclaim. Tenant testified at trial that the water
supplied by the wellhouse was “bad” from the outset of her
tenancy. She testified that she bought bottled water for
drinking and used the water from the wellhouse only for
showering and doing her laundry. There was no evidence
in the record that tenant ever notified landlord about a
problem with the drinking water, nor is there any evidence
that landlord knew or reasonably should have known that
the water from the wellhouse was not safe for drinking.
Accordingly, the evidence at trial supported the trial court’s
conclusion that tenant had failed to meet her burden to
establish a right to recover damages under ORS 90.360(2)
on her second counterclaim.
                    III.   CONCLUSION
         The trial court did not err in denying tenant’s
motion for involuntary dismissal of landlord’s FED claim
and rejecting tenant’s second habitability counterclaim, but
it erred in ruling in landlord’s favor on tenant’s first habit-
ability counterclaim.
         The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in
part and reversed in part. The judgment of the circuit court
is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
        MASIH, J.
       As explained in the majority opinion, this action
under the Oregon Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
(ORLTA) requires us to address the interplay between the
404                                         Jared v. Harmon

obligations of a landlord under ORS 90.320 to maintain a
RV rental space in a “habitable condition” and the duties of a
tenant under ORS 90.325(1)(b) to keep all areas of the prem-
ises under the tenant’s control as clean and sanitary “as the
condition of the premises permits and to the extent that the
tenant is responsible for causing the problem.” Landlord
filed this forcible entry and detainer (FED) action to evict
tenant from the rented RV space after tenant continued dis-
charging untreated sewage from her RV onto the ground in
violation of a notice issued by the Umatilla County Health
Department to stop such discharge. Tenant denied that she
had caused the sewage problem, alleged as a defense that
the sewage problem had been caused by landlord’s failure
to provide a sewage disposal system, and asserted counter-
claims for damages and injunctive relief.
         I agree with the majority opinion that landlord’s
failure to provide a sewage disposal system for the rented
RV space violated his obligation under ORS 90.320(1)(c)
(C) to maintain the rented space in a habitable condition.
And I agree with the majority opinion that the trial court
erred in rejecting tenant’s counterclaim for violation of ORS
90.320, because the evidence was undisputed that landlord
knew that the RV space he had rented to tenant did not
have a sewage disposal system, so tenant was not required
to notify landlord about that condition to pursue her remedy
under ORS 90.360(2) (permitting recovery of damages for
violation of ORS 90.320 unless “landlord neither knew nor
reasonably should have known of condition”). I also agree
with the majority opinion that the trial court did not err
in rejecting tenant’s additional counterclaim because there
was no evidence that tenant notified landlord or that he
knew or reasonably should have known that the water he
made available to the RV was unsafe for drinking. I write
separately solely to address the majority opinion’s conclu-
sion and reasoning as to landlord’s FED claim.
         The majority opinion concludes that landlord’s habit-
ability violation—the failure to provide the essential service
of a connection to a sewage disposal system—did not mean
that tenant was free to dump raw sewage onto the ground
and that, by continuing to do so after she was on notice that
Cite as 

 (2025)                                                     405

the site had no sewage disposal system, tenant violated her
obligation under ORS 90.325(1)(b) to keep the area clean and
sanitary. In support of that conclusion, the majority opinion
relies, in part, on testimony at trial that tenant had the abil-
ity to store wastewater from her RV in a portable tank and to
empty it at a friend’s nearby RV park1 but failed to do so and,
in part, on tenant’s failure to pursue the legal remedies avail-
able to tenants under ORS 90.365 for the failure of a land-
lord to provide essential services. Those remedies include the
right to procure reasonable amounts of the service and deduct
the cost from the rent (ORS 90.365(1)(a)); to “[r]ecover dam-
ages based upon the diminution in the fair rental value of
the dwelling unit” (ORS 90.365(1)(b)); or to stop paying rent,
procure substitute housing during the period of the landlord’s
noncompliance, and recover as damages the cost of substitute
housing in excess of the rent (ORS 90.365(1)(c)).2 According
to the majority opinion, when faced with the lack of a con-
nection to a sewage disposal system, tenant’s options were
essentially to store her raw sewage to dispose of off-premises
and to pursue those legal remedies or to terminate the rental
agreement as provided in ORS 90.360.
         However, not every tenant will have the reasonable
ability, whether due to financial or other circumstances, to
pursue any of those remedies. And in my view, the ORLTA
does not require a tenant to do so as part of their duties.
See ORS 90.325 (listing tenant duties). In this case, even
after notice from the county health department, landlord
provided tenant no options on the premises to dispose of the
waste in a clean and sanitary manner.
       A tenant’s duty under ORS 90.325(1)(b) to keep the
premises in their control clean and sanitary is qualified

    1
      Tenant testified that this is exactly what she began doing after she learned
that the black pipe to which she had connected her RV did not connect to a sew-
age disposal system. However, as the majority opinion explains, tenant offered
no explanation as to why her RV was still connected to the black pipe, allowing
the RV to continue discharging raw sewage onto the ground, when the county
inspector returned to the site after that date.
    2
      In addition to the remedies available to tenants under ORS 90.365(1), any
failure of the landlord to “supply any essential service, the lack of which poses an
imminent and serious threat to the tenant’s health, safety, or property,” may also
permit the tenant to terminate the rental agreement within 48 hours of notifying
the landlord, if not remedied. ORS 90.365(2).
406                                         Jared v. Harmon

by the following: (1) “as the condition of the premises per-
mits,” and (2) “to the extent that the tenant is responsible
for causing the problem.” Accordingly, in situations such
as these, the question of who “caused” the premises to be
unsanitary is an issue of fact that must be resolved. I agree
with the majority that, in this case, the record could be
read to suggest that the trial court engaged in that factual
inquiry, and it could be reasonably read to support the trial
court’s implicit finding that the problem was caused jointly
by landlord and tenant. Recognizing that the conclusion of
this case is somewhat dependent on its facts, the majority
opinion acknowledges that “[t]here may be instances where,
as a factual matter, a landlord’s failure to comply with a
habitability requirements prevents a tenant from complying
with one or more of the obligations in ORS 90.325, but the
trial court did not make that factual finding in this case and
nothing in the record compels such a finding.” 

n 19. I appreciate that acknowledgment and concur in the
majority based solely on the unique facts of this case.
        James, J., joins in this concurring opinion.