Idaho Department of Employment v. Smith
U.S.
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Opinion
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT v. SMITH
Judges
- with whom Mr. Justice Marshall joins,
Petitioner challenges a ruling of the Idaho Supreme Court that the denial of unemployment benefits to otherwise eligible persons who attend school during the day violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Idaho Code § 72-1312 (a) (1973) states that “no person shall be deemed to be unemployed while he is attending a regular established school excluding night school . . . The Idaho Supreme Court held that this provision impermissibly discriminates between those unemployed persons who attend night school and those who attend school during the day and that petitioner could not constitutionally deny unemployment benefits to an otherwise eligible person such as respondent whose attendance at daytime classes would not interfere with employment in her usual occupation and did not affect her availability for full-time work. We grant the petition for certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Idaho Supreme Court.
The holding below misconstrues the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause in the field of social welfare and economics. This Court has consistently deferred to legislative determinations concerning the desirability of statutory classifications affecting the regulation of economic activity and the distribution of economic benefits. “If the classification has some 'reasonable basis/ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’ ” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485 (1970), quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78 (1911). See also Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307 (1976); Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 181 (1976); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972). The legislative classification at issue here passes this test. It was surely rational for the Idaho Legislature to conclude that daytime employment is far more plentiful than nighttime work and, consequently, that attending school during daytime hours imposes a greater restriction upon obtaining full-time employment than does attending school at night. In a world of limited resources, a State may legitimately extend unemployment benefits only to those who are willing to maximize their employment potential by not restricting their availability during the day by attending school. Moreover, the classification serves as a predictable and convenient means for distinguishing between those who are likely to be students primarily and part-time workers only secondarily and thus ineligible for unemployment compensation and those who are primarily full-time workers and students only secondarily without the necessity of making costly individual eligibility determinations which would deplete available resources. The fact that the classification is imperfect and that the availability of some students desiring full-time employment may not be substantially impaired by their attendance at daytime classes does not, under the cases cited supra, render the statute invalid under the United States Constitution.
Reversed.