Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co.

U.S.

Court: Supreme Court of the United States

Citations: 358 U.S. 272, 3 L. Ed. 2d 292, 79 S. Ct. 266, 1959 U.S. LEXIS 1750, SCDB 1958-030

Decision Date: 1/12/1959

Docket Number: No. 52

Jurisdiction: U.S.

Bluebook Citation: Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U.S. 272, 3 L. Ed. 2d 292, 79 S. Ct. 266, 1959 U.S. LEXIS 1750, SCDB 1958-030 (1959)

More Cases: U.S. decisions from 1959

HAHN v. ROSS ISLAND SAND & GRAVEL CO.

Judges

  • The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
  • whom Mr. Justice Harlan joins, dissenting.

Attorneys

  • Dwight L. Schwab argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Herbert C. Hardy.
  • Ray H. Lafky, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for the State of Oregon, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. With him on the brief was Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General.
  • Arno H. Denecke argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Robert T. Mautz.
majority Per Curiam.

By its terms, the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act does not apply “if recovery for the disability or death through workmen’s compensation proceedings may . . . validly be provided by State law.” § 3, 44 Stat. 1426, 33 U. S. C. § 903 (a) (emphasis supplied). In Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U. S. 249, we recognized that in some cases it was impossible to predict in advance of trial whether a worker’s injury occurred in an operation which, although maritime in nature, was so “local” as to allow state compensation laws validly to apply under the limitations of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205. As to cases within this “twilight zone,” Davis, in effect, gave an injured waterfront employee an election to recover compensation under either the Longshoremen’s Act or the Workmen’s Compensation Law of the State in which the injury occurred. It seems plain enough that petitioner’s injury occurred in the “twilight zone,” and that recovery for it “through workmen’s compensation proceedings,” could have been, and in fact was, validly “provided by State law” — the Oregon Workmen’s Compensation Act. Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 656.002-656.990. Therefore, the Longshoremen’s Act did not bar petitioner’s claim under state law. But since his employer had elected to reject them the automatic compensation provisions of the Oregon Workmen’s Compensation Act did not apply to the claim. Section 656.024 of that law provides, however, that when an employer has elected to reject the Act’s automatic compensation provisions his injured employee may maintain in the courts a negligence action for damages. Of course, the employee could not do this if the case were not within the “twilight zone,” for then the Longshoremen’s Act would provide the exclusive remedy. Since this case is within the “twilight zone,” it follows from what we held in Davis that nothing in the Longshoremen’s Act or the United States Constitution prevents recovery.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Supreme Court of Oregon for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

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