Damico v. California
U.S.
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Cites 2 statutes
- Civil action for deprivation of rights
- Civil rights and elective franchise
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Opinion
DAMICO et al. v. CALIFORNIA et al.
Attorneys
- George F. Duke for appellants.
- Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, and Richard L. Mayers and Elizabeth Palmer, Deputy Attorneys General, for appellees.
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
Appellants, welfare claimants under California Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 11250, 11254, and regulation C-161.20 thereunder, sought damages, a declaratory judgment of unconstitutionality, and temporary and permanent injunctive relief in this suit under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, 28 U. S. C. § 1343. Their complaint alleges that the statute and regulation are discriminatory and that the appellees, in administering them and in applying them to appellants, deprived appellants of equal rights secured by the United States Constitution. The three-judge District Court dismissed the complaint solely because “it appear [ed] to the Court that all of the plaintiffs [had] failed to exhaust adequate administrative remedies.” This was error. In McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668, noting that one of the purposes underlying the Civil Rights Act was “to provide a remedy in the federal courts supplementary to any remedy any State might have,” id., at 672, we held that “relief under the Civil Rights Act may not be defeated because relief was not first sought under state law which provided [an administrative] remedy,” id., at 671. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 180-183. We intimate no view upon the merits of appellants’ allegations nor upon the other grounds not passed upon by the District Court.
The judgment of the District Court for the Northern District of California is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.