Commonwealth v. Tingle

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Roberts,

Appellant Gilbert Tingle was tried nonjury in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia and found guilty of second degree murder. Post-trial motions were denied and appellant was sentenced to six to fifteen years imprisonment. We reverse.

Appellant’s principal contention is that the suppression court erred in finding voluntary his confession. secured by the police after some twenty-one and a half hours of interrogation.

The challenged confession was secured by the police between appellant’s warrantless arrest and arraignment, a period of some twenty-one and a half hours. The circumstances surrounding appellant’s arrest and the lengthy delay before arraignment, as established by the Commonwealth’s own witnesses, are as follows: Appellant was arrested at approximately 11:45 A.M. on June 27,1971. He was immediately taken to the police station and handcuffed to a chair for the next twenty-one and a half hours. During that interim, spent in a “well-lit” room of modest dimensions, appellant was subjected to almost constant police interrogation. By the computation of the police appellant could have had no more than six hours of respite during this twenty-one and a half hour detention.

During the twenty-one and a half hour period of almost constant interrogation and surveillance only appellant’s most basic needs were satisfied. Access was provided to a lavatory and appellant received three sandwiches and coffee. A statement was actually given by appellant at 5:45 P.M. on June 27, but the police Were not satisfied with its contents and continued the interrogation. Finally, at 9:15 A.M. on June 28, a second statement, now challenged as involuntary, was secured from the appellant, and within minutes he was thereafter arraigned.

The issue presented is whether the twenty-one and a half hour delay between arrest and arraignment violates the clear mandate of Pa. R. Grim. P. 118: “When a defendant has been arrested without a warrant, he shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the proper issuing authority where a complaint shall be filed against him. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)

This Court recently held in Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 394, 290 A. 2d 417, 419 (1972), that “all evidence obtained during ‘unnecessary delay’ ” between arrest and arraignment is inadmissible “except that [evidence] which . . . has no reasonable relationship to the delay whatsoever(Emphasis added.) In so holding this Court noted that the purpose of Eule 118 is to insure that the defendant will be afforded “without unnecessary delay” after arrest those protections and rights embodied in Eule 119: “(a) At the preliminary arraignment, the issuing authority shall not question the defendant respecting the offense charged, but shall forthwith deliver a copy of the complaint to him. The issuing authority shall also inform the defendant: (1) Of his right to secure counsel of his choice and his right to assigned counsel in accordance with Eule 318; (2) Of his right to hare a preliminary hearing or, except as provided in these rules, to waive it; (3) If the offense is bailable, of the amount of bail demanded and the types acceptable as provided in these rules; and----” Pa. E. Grim. P. 119 (emphasis added).

This Court in Futch made it clear . . that failure to comply with Eule 118 does not ipso facto render inadmissible evidence obtained by tbe police during the ‘unnecessary delay’ and that it is incumbent upon defendant to show some prejudice from the delay.” Futch did not, and we do not here, establish a per se rule that all evidence obtained during an unnecessary delay be excluded. It is only upon the defendant’s showing of prejudice from the delay, i.e., a nexus between the delay and the challenged evidence that he is entitled to relief. In Futch, supra, the defendant waived counsel for a lineup after a twelve hour “unnecessary delay.” Noting that the waiver of counsel form signed by defendant was “misleading”, and the lineup itself of a “suggestive nature”, this Court held evidence from the lineup to be inadmissible at trial. Id. at 395, 290 A. 2d at 420.

Chief Justice, then Judge Burger, has offered the following guidelines for ascertaining “necessary delay” between arrest and arraignment: “ ‘Necessary delay can reasonably relate to time to administratively process an accused with booking, fingerprinting and other steps. ...’” Adams v. United States, 399 F. 2d 574, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (concurring opinion) (quoted in Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. at 392, 290 A. 2d at 418).

Notwithstanding, the fact that here the twenty-one and a half hour detention and delay before arraignment was not for “administrative reasons”, nor was it “directed to possible exculpation of the one arrested”, the Commonwealth still insists that the delay was “necessary.” Specifically the Commonwealth argues that since appellant was informed of his Miranda warnings after his arrest the police were under no obligation to comply with Rule 118’s mandate. Such a position is clearly contrary to Commonwealth v. Futch, supra, and the specific and mandatory language of Rule 118.

As we have previously noted, the very purpose of Rule 118 is to insure that “without unnecessary delay” after arrest, an accused is informed by an officer of the court of his right to counsel. The United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), was quite emphatic that the mere recitation of Miranda warnings did not obviate the duty of the police to promptly arraign an accused: “Our decision today does not indicate these rules [F. R. Crim. P. 5(a), which requires prompt arraignment] can be disregarded. When federal officials arrest an individual, they must as always comply with the dictates of the congressional legislation and cases thereunder. ...” 384 U.S. at 463, n.32, 86 S. Ct. at 1622 n.32.

We hold, as did the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, that merely because an accused has been informed of his Miranda warnings the police are not thereby free to “disregard” Rule 118. The record in this case clearly demonstrates that the twenty-one and a half hour delay between arrest and arraignment was unnecessary and thus violative of Rule 118 and Commonwealth v. Futch, supra.

Nor can it be seriously disputed that the challenged confession was “reasonably related” to the “unnecessary delay.” Id. at 394-96, 290 A. 2d at 419. By the police’s own admission the statement appellant gave some six hours after his arrest was not “satisfactory;” and the interrogation continued for another fifteen hours. We must conclude that the challenged statement here, as the evidence in Futch, supra, was “reasonably related” to the “unnecessary delay” and thus inadmissible.

The judgment of sentence is reversed and the record remanded for a new trial.

In view of our disposition we need not reach appellant’s other contention that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of second degree murder.

The Commonwealth does not argue, and the record would not support, the contention that the admission of this confession was “harmless error.”

Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 394, 290 A. 2d 417, 419-20 (1972). See also Hall, Kamisar, LaPave, Israel, Modem Criminal Procedure (3d ed.) pp. 466-67 for a discussion of tlie purposes of the similarly worded P. R. Crim. P. 5(a).

Rule 118, by its terms, applies only to warrantless arrests. Rule 116, which is applicable to arrests made pursuant to warrant, imposes the identical requirement (as found in Rule 118) that all arrestees be preliminarily arraigned “without unnecessary delay.”

“When a defendant has been arrested, with a warrant, within the county where the warrant of arrest was issued, he shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the issuing authority whose name appears upon the warrant for preliminary arraignment in a court case or trial in a summary case.” Pa. B. Orim. P. 116. (Emphasis added).

Thus, both Eules 116 and 118 contain the same post-arrest prohibition against “unnecessary delay” in preliminarily arraigning the defendant.

Futch, supra at 393, 290 A. 2d at 419 (citations omitted) (emphasis and footnote added).

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).

In Commonwealth v. Futch, supra, this Court noted the similarity between our Rule 118 and Federal Rule 5(a) and specifically adopted the federal approach of excluding evidence found to be the product of “unnecessary delay.” Our result as in Futch involving our Rule 118 is in complete harmony with the United States Supreme Court treatment of Federal Rule 5(a) in Miranda.