Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski

                   PRELIMINARY PRINT

             Volume 599 U. S. Part 1
                             Pages 736–761




       OFFICIAL REPORTS
                                    OF


   THE SUPREME COURT
                               June 23, 2023


Page Proof Pending Publication


                   REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
                           reporter of decisions




    NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
  the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
  of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,
  [email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors.
736                      OCTOBER TERM, 2022

                                  Syllabus


                 COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
                  the ninth circuit
      No. 22–105. Argued March 21, 2023—Decided June 23, 2023
Abraham Bielski fled a putative class action on behalf of Coinbase users
 alleging that Coinbase, an online currency platform, failed to replace
 funds fraudulently taken from the users' accounts. Because Coinbase's
 User Agreement provides for dispute resolution through binding arbi-
 tration, Coinbase fled a motion to compel arbitration. The District
 Court denied the motion. Coinbase then fled an interlocutory appeal
 to the Ninth Circuit under the Federal Arbitration Act, 

(a),
 which authorizes an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to
 compel arbitration. Coinbase also moved the District Court to stay its
 proceedings pending resolution of the interlocutory appeal. The Dis-
 trict Court denied Coinbase's stay motion, and the Ninth Circuit like-
 wise declined to stay the District Court's proceedings pending appeal.
Held: A district court must stay its proceedings while an interlocutory
Page        Proof
 appeal on the question of Pending                Publication
                            arbitrability is ongoing. Pp. 740–747.
   (a) Section 16(a) does not say whether district court proceedings must
  be stayed pending resolution of an interlocutory appeal. But Congress
  enacted the provision against a clear background principle prescribed
  by this Court's precedents: An appeal, including an interlocutory appeal,
  “divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case
  involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.,
  

, 58. The Griggs principle resolves this case. Because the
  question on appeal is whether the case belongs in arbitration or instead
  in the district court, the entire case is essentially “involved in the ap-
  peal,” 

, and Griggs dictates that the district court stay its pro-
  ceedings while the interlocutory appeal on arbitrability is ongoing.
  Most courts of appeals to address this question, as well as leading trea-
  tises, agree with that conclusion.
     The common practice of staying district court proceedings during the
  pendency of an interlocutory appeal taken under § 16(a) refects common
  sense. If the district court could move forward with pre-trial and trial
  proceedings while the appeal on arbitrability was ongoing, then many
  of the asserted benefts of arbitration (effciency, less expense, less intru-
  sive discovery, and the like) would be irretrievably lost—even if the
  court of appeals later concluded that the case actually had belonged in
  arbitration all along. Absent a stay, parties also could be forced to
                       Cite as: 

 (2023)                   737

                                 Syllabus

  settle to avoid the district court proceedings (including discovery and
  trial) that they contracted to avoid through arbitration. The Griggs
  rule avoids these detrimental results.
     Congress's longstanding practice reflects the Griggs rule. Given
  Griggs, when Congress wants to authorize an interlocutory appeal and
  to automatically stay the district court proceedings during that appeal,
  Congress ordinarily need not say anything about a stay. By contrast,
  when Congress wants to authorize an interlocutory appeal, but not to
  automatically stay district court proceedings pending that appeal, Con-
  gress typically says so. Since the creation of the modern courts of
  appeals system in 1891, Congress has enacted multiple statutory “non-
  stay” provisions. Pp. 740–744.
     (b) Bielski's arguments to overcome the Griggs principle are unper-
  suasive. First, the courts of appeals possess robust tools to prevent
  unwarranted delay and deter frivolous interlocutory appeals that an au-
  tomatic stay might otherwise encourage. Second, Congress included
  explicit stay requirements in two other statutory provisions for reasons
  particular to those statutes, not because Congress thought that an in-
  terlocutory appeal did not ordinarily stay district court proceedings.
  Third, the result here does not create a special, arbitration-preferring
  procedural rule, but simply subjects arbitrability appeals to the same
Page Proof Pending Publication
  stay principles that courts apply in other analogous contexts where an
  interlocutory appeal is authorized. Fourth, experience shows that ordi-
  nary discretionary stay factors would not adequately protect parties'
  rights to an interlocutory appellate determination of arbitrability. In
  any event, the background Griggs rule applies regardless of how often
  courts might otherwise grant stays under the ordinary discretionary
  stay factors. Fifth, while the Court has recognized that questions of
  arbitrability are severable from merits questions, the sole issue here is
  whether the district court's authority to consider a case is “involved in
  the appeal” when an appellate court considers the threshold question of
  arbitrability, Griggs, 

. The answer is yes. Pp. 744–747.
Reversed and remanded.

  Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Jackson, J., fled
a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., joined in full,
and in which Thomas, J., joined as to Parts II, III and IV, post, p. 747.

  Neal Kumar Katyal argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Jessica L. Ellsworth, Jo-Ann
Tamila Sagar, William E. Havemann, Nathaniel A. G. Ze-
738                  COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI

                          Opinion of the Court

linsky, Michael G. Rhodes, Kathleen Hartnett, Bethany
Lobo, and Adam M. Katz.
  Hassan A. Zavareei argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief for respondent Abraham Bielski were
Glenn E. Chappell, Spencer S. Hughes, Sabita J. Soneji,
Wesley M. Griffth, and Matthew D. Carlson. David J. Har-
ris, Jr., fled a brief for respondents David Suski et al.*
   Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court.
   When a federal district court denies a motion to compel
arbitration, the losing party has a statutory right to an inter-
locutory appeal. See 

(a). The sole question
here is whether the district court must stay its pre-trial and
trial proceedings while the interlocutory appeal is ongo-
ing. The answer is yes: The district court must stay its
proceedings.
                               I
   Coinbase operates an online platform on which users can
Page Proof Pending Publication
buy and sell cryptocurrencies and government-issued curren-
cies. When creating a Coinbase account, individuals agree
to the terms in Coinbase's User Agreement. As relevant

   *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Atlantic Legal
Foundation by Lawrence S. Ebner, John F. Querio, and Scott P. Dixler;
for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by
Mark A. Perry, Jennifer B. Dickey, and Elizabeth Milito; for the Civil
Justice Association of California by Fred J. Hiestand and Benjamin G.
Shatz; for the National Retail Federation by Andrew J. Pincus, Archis A.
Parasharami, and Kevin Ranlett; and for the Washington Legal Founda-
tion by Cory L. Andrews and John M. Masslon II. Sarah Elizabeth
Spencer fled a brief for the DRI Center for Law and Public Policy as
amicus curiae urging vacatur.
   Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the American
Association for Justice by Deepak Gupta, Matthew W. H. Wessler, Jennifer
Bennett, and Tad Thomas; for the Constitutional Accountability Center
by Elizabeth B. Wydra and Brianne J. Gorod; and for Public Justice by
Karla Gilbride.
   Jason D. Russell, Deborah R. White, Michael W. McTigue, Jr., Meredith
C. Slawe, and Lara A. Flath fled a brief for the Retail Litigation Center,
Inc., as amicus curiae.
                       Cite as: 

 (2023)                    739

                           Opinion of the Court

here, the User Agreement contains an arbitration provision,
which directs that disputes arising under the agreement be
resolved through binding arbitration.
   This case concerns a putative class action fled against
Coinbase in the U. S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California. Abraham Bielski sued on behalf of Coin-
base users who allege that Coinbase failed to replace funds
fraudulently taken from the users' accounts.
   The District Court denied Coinbase's motion to compel ar-
bitration. Coinbase then fled an interlocutory appeal to the
U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit under 

(a).1 Section 16(a) authorizes an interlocutory appeal
from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration.
   Coinbase also moved to stay District Court proceedings
pending resolution of the arbitrability issue on appeal. The
District Court declined to stay its proceedings. After re-
ceiving Coinbase's motion for a stay, the Ninth Circuit like-
Page Proof Pending Publication
wise declined to stay the District Court's proceedings. The
Ninth Circuit followed its precedent, under which an appeal
from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration does not
automatically stay district court proceedings. See Britton
v. Co-op Banking Group, 

, 1412 (1990). By
contrast, however, most other Courts of Appeals to address
the question have held that a district court must stay its
proceedings while the interlocutory appeal on the question
of arbitrability is ongoing. E. g., Bradford-Scott Data Corp.
v. Physician Computer Network, Inc., 

, 506
(CA7 1997).

  1
    As relevant, the text of § 16(a) provides:
  “An appeal may be taken from . . . an order . . .
  “(A) refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title,
  “(B) denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration
to proceed,
  “(C) denying an application under section 206 of this title to compel
arbitration,
  “(D) confrming or denying confrmation of an award or partial award, or
  “(E) modifying, correcting, or vacating an award.”
740               COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI

                      Opinion of the Court

  To resolve that disagreement among the Courts of Ap-
peals, we granted certiorari. 598 U. S. ––– (2022).

                              II
   The Federal Arbitration Act governs arbitration agree-
ments. In 1988, Congress passed and President Reagan
signed an amendment to the Act; the amendment is codifed
at 

(a). Under § 16(a), when a district court de-
nies a party's motion to compel arbitration, that party may
take an interlocutory appeal. Section 16(a) creates a rare
statutory exception to the usual rule that parties may not
appeal before fnal judgment. See Mohawk Industries, Inc.
v. Carpenter, 

, 108–109 (2009). Notably, Con-
gress provided for immediate interlocutory appeals of orders
denying—but not of orders granting—motions to compel
arbitration.
   The sole question before this Court is whether a district
Page Proof Pending Publication
court must stay its proceedings while the interlocutory ap-
peal on arbitrability is ongoing. The answer is yes.
   Section 16(a) does not say whether the district court pro-
ceedings must be stayed. But Congress enacted § 16(a)
against a clear background principle prescribed by this
Court's precedents: An appeal, including an interlocutory ap-
peal, “divests the district court of its control over those as-
pects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provi-
dent Consumer Discount Co., 

, 58 (1982). That
Griggs principle refects a longstanding tenet of American
procedure. See Hovey v. McDonald, 

, 157
(1883); see also Price v. Dunn, 587 U. S. –––, ––– (2019)
(Thomas, J., joined by Alito and Gorsuch, JJ., concurring
in denial of certiorari) (describing Griggs principle as “well
settled”); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic
Surgeons, 

, 379 (1985) (“In general, fling of a
notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals
and divests the district court of control over those aspects of
the case involved in the appeal”).
                       Cite as: 

 (2023)                    741

                           Opinion of the Court

   The Griggs principle resolves this case. Because the
question on appeal is whether the case belongs in arbitration
or instead in the district court, the entire case is essentially
“involved in the appeal.” 

. As Judge East-
erbrook cogently explained, when a party appeals the denial
of a motion to compel arbitration, whether “the litigation
may go forward in the district court is precisely what the
court of appeals must decide.” Bradford-Scott Data Corp.
v. Physician Computer Network, Inc., 

, 506
(CA7 1997). Stated otherwise, the question of whether “the
case should be litigated in the district court . . . is the mirror
image of the question presented on appeal.” 

.
Here, as elsewhere, it “makes no sense for trial to go forward
while the court of appeals cogitates on whether there should
be one.” Apostol v. Gallion, 

, 1338 (CA7
1989). In short, Griggs dictates that the district court must
stay its proceedings while the interlocutory appeal on arbi-
trability is ongoing.2
Page Proof Pending Publication
   Most courts of appeals to address the question in the
§ 16(a) context have reached that same conclusion. E. g.,
Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 

, 1253
(CA11 2004) (“[I]t makes little sense for the litigation to con-
tinue in the district court while the appeal is pending”).3
Leading treatises agree that a district court should stay its
proceedings while the interlocutory appeal on arbitrability is

  2
    Coinbase concedes that the district court may still proceed with mat-
ters that are not involved in the appeal, such as the awarding of costs and
attorney's fees. Brief for Petitioner 21; see also 16A C. Wright, A. Miller,
E. Cooper, & C. Struve, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3949.1, pp. 68–
69 (5th ed. 2019).
  3
    See also Levin v. Alms & Assoc., Inc., 

, 266 (CA4 2011);
Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 

, 215, n. 6 (CA3 2007);
McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 

, 1162–1163
(CA10 2005); Bombardier Corp. v. National R. Passenger Corporation,

, 252 (CADC 2003); Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician
Computer Network, Inc., 

, 505–507 (CA7 1997); but see, e. g.,
Weingarten Realty Investors v. Miller, 

, 907–910 (CA5 2011).
742                  COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI

                          Opinion of the Court

ongoing. For example, Moore's treatise states that a “stay
in these circumstances” is “the sounder approach” and “is
consistent with the general [Griggs] principle that a district
court should not exercise jurisdiction over those aspects of
the case that are involved in the appeal.” 19 J. Moore,
D. Coquillette, G. Joseph, G. Vairo, & C. Varner, Moore's Fed-
eral Practice § 203.12[3][a] (3d ed. 2022). Similarly, the
Wright and Miller treatise endorses the automatic stay re-
quirement in arbitration cases. The treatise explains that a
“complete stay of district-court proceedings pending appeal
from a refusal to order arbitration is desirable” because
“[c]ontinued trial-court proceedings pending appeal could
lead to an entirely wasted trial if arbitration is ordered on
appeal.” 15B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 3914.17, p. 7 (2d ed., Supp. 2022).
In the Circuits that have considered the issue in the analo-
gous contexts of qualifed immunity and double jeopardy,
moreover, district courts likewise must automatically stay
Page Proof Pending Publication
their proceedings while the interlocutory appeal is ongoing.4
Similarly, as Bielski acknowledges, courts have held that the
Griggs principle applies to those aspects of the case involved
in a certifed interlocutory appeal under 

(b).5
   The common practice in § 16(a) cases, therefore, is for a
district court to stay its proceedings while the interlocutory
appeal on arbitrability is ongoing. That common practice

   4
     E. g., United States v. Montgomery, 

, 239–240 (CA4 2001)
(double jeopardy); United States v. LaMere, 

, 1108 (CA9
1991) (same); United States v. Grabinski, 

, 679 (CA8 1982)
(same); United States v. Dunbar, 

, 988–989 (CA5 1980) (en
banc) (same); Chuman v. Wright, 

, 105 (CA9 1992) (qualifed
immunity); Yates v. Cleveland, 

, 448–449 (CA6 1991) (same);
Apostol v. Gallion, 

, 1338 (CA7 1989) (same); Stewart v.
Donges, 

, 575–576 (CA10 1990) (both).
   5
     See Tr. of Oral Arg. 60–61; see also Green Leaf Nursery v. E. I. Du-
Pont De Nemours and Co., 

, 1309 (CA11 2003); Los Angeles
v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 

, 885–886 (CA9 2001); Dayton
Independent School Dist. v. U. S. Mineral Prods. Co., 

, 1063–
1064 (CA5 1990).
                   Cite as: 

 (2023)             743

                      Opinion of the Court

refects common sense. Absent an automatic stay of district
court proceedings, Congress's decision in § 16(a) to afford a
right to an interlocutory appeal would be largely nullifed.
If the district court could move forward with pre-trial and
trial proceedings while the appeal on arbitrability was ongo-
ing, then many of the asserted benefts of arbitration (eff-
ciency, less expense, less intrusive discovery, and the like)
would be irretrievably lost—even if the court of appeals later
concluded that the case actually had belonged in arbitration
all along. Absent a stay, parties also could be forced to set-
tle to avoid the district court proceedings (including discov-
ery and trial) that they contracted to avoid through arbitra-
tion. That potential for coercion is especially pronounced in
class actions, where the possibility of colossal liability can
lead to what Judge Friendly called “blackmail settlements.”
H. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 120 (1973).
   As Judge Easterbrook stated, continuation of proceedings
in the district court “largely defeats the point of the appeal.”
Page Proof Pending Publication
Bradford-Scott, 

. A right to interlocutory
appeal of the arbitrability issue without an automatic stay of
the district court proceedings is therefore like a lock without
a key, a bat without a ball, a computer without a keyboard—
in other words, not especially sensible.
   From the Judiciary's institutional perspective, moreover,
allowing a case to proceed simultaneously in the district
court and the court of appeals creates the possibility that
the district court will waste scarce judicial resources—which
could be devoted to other pressing criminal or civil mat-
ters—on a dispute that will ultimately head to arbitration
in any event. That scenario represents the “worst possible
outcome” for parties and the courts: litigating a dispute in
the district court only for the court of appeals to “reverse
and order the dispute arbitrated.” 

. The Griggs
rule avoids that detrimental result.
   Importantly, Congress's longstanding practice both re-
fects and reinforces the Griggs rule. When Congress wants
to authorize an interlocutory appeal and to automatically
744                   COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI

                            Opinion of the Court

stay the district court proceedings during that appeal, Con-
gress need not say anything about a stay. At least absent
contrary indications, the background Griggs principle al-
ready requires an automatic stay of district court proceed-
ings that relate to any aspect of the case involved in the
appeal. By contrast, when Congress wants to authorize an
interlocutory appeal, but not to automatically stay district
court proceedings pending that appeal, Congress typically
says so. Since the creation of the modern courts of appeals
system in 1891, Congress has enacted multiple statutory
“non-stay” provisions.6 Indeed, Congress enacted a “non-
stay” provision the day before enacting § 16(a) in 1988. See

 (“Neither the application for, nor the granting
of, an appeal . . . shall stay proceedings in the Court of Veter-
ans Appeals”).
   In short, the Griggs rule requires that a district court stay
its proceedings while the interlocutory appeal on the ques-
tion of arbitrability is ongoing.
Page Proof Pending Publication
                                      III
   To overcome the Griggs principle, Bielski advances fve
main arguments. None is persuasive.
   First, Bielski contends that an automatic stay would en-
courage frivolous appeals that would improperly delay dis-
trict court proceedings. To begin with, Bielski has not es-
tablished that frivolous appeals frequently occur in the
  6
    Act of Apr. 3, 1926, ch. 102, 44 Stat. 233–234; Act of Feb. 28, 1927,
ch. 228, 

; Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. 85–919, 

;
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, § 125, 

, 

(d)(3); Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 1558, 100 Stat. 2757–2758, 

(a)(2)(A); Veterans' Judicial Review Act, 

, as
amended, 

(b)(1); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Con-
sumer Protection Act of 2005, 

, 

(d)(2)(D);
Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, § 306,

, 

(e)(6); see also Judiciary Act of 1891, § 7, 

; Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 803, 31 Stat. 660–661; Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 23(f).
                   Cite as: 

 (2023)            745

                      Opinion of the Court

Circuits that have long applied the Griggs principle in arbi-
tration cases. Cf. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White
Sales, Inc., 586 U. S. –––, ––– (2019). Nor does Bielski argue
that Coinbase's appeal in this case is frivolous. Importantly,
moreover, the courts of appeals possess robust tools to pre-
vent unwarranted delay and deter frivolous interlocutory ap-
peals. For example, a party can ask the court of appeals to
summarily affrm, to expedite an interlocutory appeal, or to
dismiss the interlocutory appeal as frivolous. In addition,
nearly every circuit has developed a process by which a dis-
trict court itself may certify that an interlocutory appeal is
frivolous. Brief for Petitioner 51; see also Arthur Andersen
LLP v. Carlisle, 

, 629 (2009) (“Appellate courts
can streamline the disposition of meritless claims and even
authorize the district court's retention of ” a case “when an
appeal is certifed as frivolous”). Finally, a court of appeals
may impose sanctions where appropriate; the possibility of
Page Proof Pending Publication
sanctions also helps deter frivolous appeals. See Fed. Rule
App. Proc. 38; Arthur Andersen, 

.
   Second, Bielski contrasts § 16(a) with two other statutory
provisions that contain an explicit stay requirement—§ 3 of
the Federal Arbitration Act and § 1292(d)(4) of Title 28.
Bielski suggests that Congress would not have included
those explicit stay requirements in § 3 and § 1292(d)(4) unless
Congress thought that an interlocutory appeal did not ordi-
narily stay district court proceedings. Bielski is wrong.
   Section 3 of the Act provides for a stay of court proceed-
ings pending arbitration, not pending an appeal. That situ-
ation does not fall within the Griggs rule. No background
principle requires automatic stays of district court proceed-
ings pending arbitration. In order to automatically stay
court proceedings pending arbitration in those cases, Con-
gress therefore affrmatively codifed a stay requirement.
   As to § 1292(d)(4): When Congress added § 1292(d)(4)'s stay
requirement in 1988, the relevant subsection already con-
tained a provision, § 1292(d)(3), that expressly made stays of
746               COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI

                      Opinion of the Court

proceedings in certain courts discretionary rather than man-
datory. To avoid any misinterpretation of § 1292(d)(4) be-
cause of that preexisting language in § 1292(d)(3), Congress
specifed the right to an automatic stay pending appeal in
§ 1292(d)(4). That unusual circumstance does not diminish
the operation of the Griggs rule in the context of arbitrabil-
ity appeals.
   Third, Bielski contends that requiring an automatic stay
would create a special, arbitration-preferring procedural
rule. That is incorrect. In fact, Bielski's proposed ap-
proach would disfavor arbitration. Applying the Griggs
rule here simply subjects arbitrability appeals to the same
stay principles that courts apply in other analogous contexts
where an interlocutory appeal is authorized, including quali-
fed immunity and double jeopardy. Bielski further points
to forum selection clauses as an analogy. But unlike § 16(a)
arbitrability appeals, Congress has not created a right to an
interlocutory appeal for cases involving forum selection
Page Proof Pending Publication
clauses. So a stay in the forum selection context could be
required only in those cases where there is a certifed
§ 1292(b) interlocutory appeal of the forum selection issue.
   Fourth, Bielski suggests that there is no need for an auto-
matic stay because the ordinary discretionary stay factors
would adequately protect parties' rights to an interlocutory
appellate determination of arbitrability. To begin with, ex-
perience shows that Bielski is incorrect. District courts and
courts of appeals applying the usual four-factor standard for
a discretionary stay often deny stays in § 16(a) appeals
because courts applying that test often do not consider
litigation-related burdens (here, from the continued District
Court proceedings) to constitute irreparable harm. See
Nken v. Holder, 

, 434–435 (2009); FTC v. Stand-
ard Oil Co. of Cal., 

, 244 (1980) (“Mere litigation
expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not
constitute irreparable injury” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a (District Court in Biel-
ski stating that “[m]ere litigation expenses do not generally
                       Cite as: 

 (2023)                   747

                         Jackson, J., dissenting

constitute irreparable injury” for purposes of stay pending
appeal). In any event, the background Griggs rule applies
regardless of how often courts might otherwise grant stays
under the ordinary discretionary stay factors.
   Fifth, Bielski relies on this Court's statement that ques-
tions of arbitrability are “severable from the merits of the
underlying disputes.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital
v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 

, 21 (1983). But the
sole issue here is whether the district court's authority to
consider a case is “involved in the appeal” when an appel-
late court considers the threshold question of arbitrability.
Griggs, 

. The answer is yes, and Moses H.
Cone says nothing to the contrary.

                             *      *      *
   We conclude that, after Coinbase appealed from the denial
of its motion to compel arbitration, the District Court was
required to stay its proceedings. On remand, we anticipate
Page Proof Pending Publication
that the Ninth Circuit here, as we anticipate in § 16(a) ap-
peals more generally, will proceed with appropriate expedi-
tion when considering Coinbase's interlocutory appeal from
the denial of the motion to compel arbitration. We reverse
the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.7

                                                       It is so ordered.

  Justice Jackson, with whom Justice Sotomayor and
Justice Kagan join, and with whom Justice Thomas joins
as to Parts II, III, and IV, dissenting.
  When a federal court of appeals conducts interlocutory re-
view of a trial court order, the rest of the case remains at
the trial court level. Usually, the trial judge then makes a
particularized determination upon request, based on the
  7
   The Court's judgment today pertains to respondent Abraham Bielski.
The writ of certiorari as to respondents David Suski et al. is dismissed as
improvidently granted.
748               COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI

                     Jackson, J., dissenting

facts and circumstances of that case, as to whether the re-
maining part of the case should continue unabated or be
paused (stayed) pending appeal. This discretionary deci-
sionmaking promotes procedural fairness because it allows
for a balancing of all relevant interests. See Nken v.
Holder, 

, 434 (2009).
   Today, the Court departs from this traditional approach.
It holds that, with respect to an interlocutory appeal of a
trial court order denying arbitration, a trial court must al-
ways “stay its pre-trial and trial proceedings while the inter-
locutory appeal is ongoing.” Ante, at 738. In other words,
in this context, the Court sees ft to impose a mandatory
general stay of trial court proceedings.
   This mandatory-general-stay rule for interlocutory arbi-
trability appeals comes out of nowhere. No statute imposes
it. Nor does any decision of this Court. Yet today's major-
ity invents a new stay rule perpetually favoring one class of
litigants—defendants seeking arbitration. Those defend-
Page Proof Pending Publication
ants will now receive a stay even when, according to the
usual equitable analysis, there is no good reason for one.
And, in reaching this result, the Court concludes for the frst
time that an interlocutory appeal about one matter (arbitra-
bility) bars the district court from proceeding on another
(the merits). That logic has such signifcant implications for
federal litigation that the majority itself shies away from the
Pandora's box it may have opened.
   I see no basis here for wresting away the discretion tradi-
tionally entrusted to the judge closest to a case. I respect-
fully dissent.
                               I
   Congress did not impose the mandatory-general-stay rule
that the majority adopts today.
   Start with the governing statute. Congress addressed
the kind of interlocutory appeals at issue here in 9 U. S. C.
§ 16—the section of the Federal Arbitration Act it enacted
to govern “Appeals.” 

 (amending the Federal
Arbitration Act, 

 et seq.). Section 16 provides
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 (2023)             749

                      Jackson, J., dissenting

that “[a]n appeal may be taken from” specifed orders and
decisions, and “an appeal may not be taken from” others.
The appeals that § 16 authorizes include interlocutory
appeals of orders denying requests for arbitration.
§§ 16(a)(1)(A)–(C).
   But nowhere did Congress provide that such an interlocu-
tory appeal automatically triggers a general stay of pre-trial
and trial proceedings. As the majority opinion admits, § 16
never even mentions a stay pending appeal. Ante, at 740.
   Even beyond that, related provisions confrm that Con-
gress imposed no mandatory general stay in § 16 appeals.
“Where Congress includes particular language in one section
of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act,
it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Nken,

 (alterations and internal quotation marks
omitted). Congress did that here—twice.
   First, Congress expressly mandated a general interlocu-
Page Proof Pending Publication
tory stay in another provision of the same 1988 law that
enacted § 16. See 

, 4670–4671. Like § 16,
that other provision—codifed at 

(d)(4)—au-
thorizes interlocutory appeals. See § 1292(d)(4)(A). But
unlike § 16, the text of that other provision specifes that,
upon an interlocutory appeal, “proceedings shall be . . .
stayed until the appeal has been decided.” § 1292(d)(4)(B).
This resembles the rule the majority adopts today for § 16
appeals. Yet Congress omitted it from § 16, while simulta-
neously imposing it in § 1292(d)(4).
   Second, Congress expressly mandated a general interlocu-
tory stay in another provision of the Federal Arbitration Act.
Section 3 pertains to a circumstance in which the trial court
is “satisfed” that an issue should be referred to arbitration.

. In such a case, the statute expressly provides
that the trial court “shall on application of one of the parties
stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been
had.” 

 (emphasis added). Again, the contrast with
§ 16 is stark. Congress specifed a mandatory general stay
750                  COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI

                         Jackson, J., dissenting

of trial court proceedings in § 3 (when the trial court deter-
mines that arbitration is warranted) but not § 16(a) (when the
court determines that arbitration is unwarranted).
  The majority opinion waves away these mandatory-
general-stay provisions by jerry-rigging explanations for
why Congress mandated those stays expressly without doing
so in § 16. Ante, at 745–746. But the point remains: Con-
gress focused on stays when crafting the 1988 law and the
Federal Arbitration Act. And when it intended to mandate
interlocutory stays, it said so expressly. Nothing stopped
Congress from doing so in § 16—yet it chose not to. This
underscores that § 16 does not mandate a stay.1

   1
     The majority's explanation for why Congress mandated a stay in 

(d)(4) also makes no sense. According to the majority, Con-
gress usually remains silent when it intends to mandate a stay. Ante,
at 743–744, 745–746. Congress expressly imposed a mandatory stay in
§ 1292(d)(4), the majority says, only because a pre-existing provision,
Page Proof Pending Publication
§ 1292(d)(3), would otherwise have made stays in § 1292(d)(4) appeals dis-
cretionary. Ante, at 745–746.
   But that last point holds no water. Paragraph (3) has no bearing on
paragraph (4), because these two provisions govern different kinds of
appeals.
   Specifcally, paragraph (3) governs certain appeals by permission, while
paragraph (4) governs a separate set of appeals as of right. Paragraph
(3) addresses events unique to permissive appeals: “Neither the applica-
tion for nor the granting of an appeal” stays trial court proceedings.
§ 1292(d)(3) (emphasis added). Paragraph (3) thus corresponds to para-
graphs (1) and (2), which authorize permissive appeals “if application is
made” and granted. §§ 1292(d)(1)–(2). Meanwhile, paragraph (4) sepa-
rately authorizes certain as-of-right appeals, § 1292(d)(4)(A), and it im-
poses mandatory stays in such appeals, § 1292(d)(4)(B). In an appeal as
of right under paragraph (4), paragraph (3) never kicks in, because there
is no “application for” or “granting of ” an appeal, § 1292(d)(3).
   Thus, the majority's story—that Congress needed express stay language
to avoid overlap with paragraph (3)—turns on a red herring. There is no
such overlap. Instead, only the more straightforward explanation re-
mains: Congress imposed a mandatory general stay in § 1292(d)(4)—but
not 9 U. S. C. § 16—because it intended such a stay under the former but
not the latter.
                   Cite as: 

 (2023)             751

                      Jackson, J., dissenting

   Given all this, it is no surprise that Congress's enactments
barely fgure into the majority opinion. The mandatory-
general-stay rule is so untethered from § 16 that the statu-
tory text has no role in the Court's reasoning.
   And when Congress's work fnally does take the stage near
the end of the Court's analysis, it plays a minor part. See
ante, at 743–744. The Court notes that other statutes ex-
pressly provide that appeals do not automatically stay dis-
trict court proceedings. Ante, at 744, and n. 6. From this,
the Court tries to draw an across-the-board inference that,
unless Congress expressly disavows the majority's
mandatory-general-stay rule, that rule applies.
   The Court's inference fails. The statutes that the major-
ity points to have nothing to do with arbitration or § 16 (un-
like the two provisions discussed above, which were enacted
in the same 1988 law as § 16 and codifed alongside § 16 in
the Federal Arbitration Act, respectively, supra, at 749).
Page Proof Pending Publication
   Moreover, and in any event, the majority's cited statutes
do not support the majority's mandatory-general-stay rule.
The majority invokes statutes that expressly preclude auto-
matic stays of all trial court proceedings. But if the major-
ity is correct that Congress intended the opposite when a
statute is silent, then stays of all trial court proceedings
would be required. Yet, the majority's own holding does not
go that far. See ante, at 741, n. 2. Instead, the majority
requires stays for some proceedings (those related to the
merits) but not others (those related to costs and fees),
ibid.—a line that appears nowhere in the majority's cited
statutes.
   At the end of the day, the best the majority can do is point
to a smattering of provisions that do not contain the rule
that the majority adopts. And those provisions do not even
relate to § 16 or the majority's rule (staying litigation gener-
ally but not proceedings on costs and fees). Neither those
statutes, nor any other, imposes on arbitrability appeals the
stay rule that the Court announces.
752               COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI

                     Jackson, J., dissenting

                               II
   Unable to locate its rule in a statute, the majority opinion
pivots to “background principle[s].” Ante, at 740. But
there is no background mandatory-general-stay rule.
   To the contrary, the background rule is that courts have
case-by-case discretion regarding whether or not to issue a
stay. “[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the
power inherent in every court to control the disposition of
the causes on its docket.” Landis v. North American Co.,

, 254 (1936). That power is discretionary—it
“calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh com-
peting interests” in each particular case. 

 at 254–255.
One key to this discretionary-stay tradition is its “suppleness
of adaptation to varying conditions.” 

. A stay
“is not a matter of right” and cannot be imposed “refex-
ively.” Nken, 

 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Page Proof Pending Publication
   That has long been the default rule. A court's discretion
“to grant a stay pending review” is “frmly imbedded in our
judicial system, consonant with the historic procedures of
federal appellate courts.” 

 (internal quotation marks
omitted). It is “a power as old as the judicial system of the
nation.” 

 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 

(a) (All Writs Act, originally enacted in 1789,
1 Stat. 81–82).
   Signifcantly for present purposes, discretionary stays are
the default for interlocutory appeals in particular—and this
dates back to the frst federal interlocutory-appeal statute in
1891. Judiciary Act of 1891, § 7, 

; see 15A C.
Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Proce-
dure § 3906, p. 346 (3d ed. 2022). There, Congress estab-
lished that “proceedings . . . in the court below shall not
be stayed unless otherwise ordered by that court during
the pendency of such appeal.” § 7, 

 (emphasis
added).
   That statute cemented a background discretionary-stay
rule that governed even where Congress was silent—as this
                       Cite as: 

 (2023)                   753

                         Jackson, J., dissenting

Court has repeatedly recognized. Shortly after the 1891
Act, a case arose under conditions in which the Act was silent
about whether a stay should issue. In re Haberman Mfg.
Co., 

, 530 (1893) (fnding “no express provision”
on point). This Court applied the background rule: “[T]he
Circuit Court had a discretion to grant or refuse” a stay.

 Another case of statutory silence arose a few years
later. In re McKenzie, 

, 550–551 (1901).
Again, this Court reiterated federal courts' “inherent power
. . . to stay or supersede proceedings on appeal” from an
interlocutory order. 

. As this Court summarized
in yet another case, the rule is that the trial court has “au-
thority” during an interlocutory appeal “to take further pro-
ceedings in the cause, unless in its discretion it orders them
to be stayed, pending the appeal.” Smith v. Vulcan Iron
Works, 

, 525 (1897). That authority is “recog-
nized” by the 1891 Act but existed already as a traditional
matter, “often exercised by other courts of chancery.” 

Page Proof Pending Publication
   This was the background against which Congress enacted
§ 16. And—importantly—courts understood stays as discre-
tionary with respect to interlocutory appeals concerning ar-
bitrability. Before Congress enacted § 16, parties brought
interlocutory arbitrability appeals under other sources of ap-
pellate jurisdiction, and courts treated stays as discretionary,
not mandatory.2 Yet, according to the majority, Congress
sought to displace that common understanding when it
enacted § 16—without saying anything at all about stays
pending appeal.
   Even setting all that aside, the majority opinion's reliance
on a “background” rule, ante, at 740, still fails. The major-
ity has not shown that its own rule (the mandatory-general-

  2
   See, e. g., Pearce v. E. F. Hutton Group, Inc., 

, 829 (CADC
1987); Maxum Foundations, Inc. v. Salus Corp., 

, 977 (CA4
1985); Matterhorn, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 

, 630 (CA7 1984); Lum-
mus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refning Co., 

, 613–614 (CA1
1959) (per curiam); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 

,
211 (CA2 1956) (per curiam).
754               COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI

                     Jackson, J., dissenting

stay rule) existed as a background matter when Congress
enacted § 16 in 1988. Indeed, the majority opinion does not
identify a single case in which this Court imposed a manda-
tory general stay of pre-trial and trial proceedings pending
an interlocutory appeal. Not in an arbitration case. Not in
an analogous case about the proper adjudicatory forum for a
dispute. Not in any interlocutory appeal at all.

                              III
   Because neither the statute nor any background law states
that an interlocutory appeal over arbitrability triggers a
mandatory general stay of trial court proceedings, the ma-
jority opinion resorts to spinning such a rule from a single
sentence in Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 

 (1982) (per curiam). But Griggs expresses a far
narrower principle, and is thus insuffcient to support the
majority's mandatory-general-stay rule.
Page Proof Pending Publication
   Griggs stands for a modest proposition: Two courts should
avoid exercising control over the same order or judgment
simultaneously. The problem Griggs identifes is the “dan-
ger a district court and a court of appeals would be simulta-
neously analyzing the same judgment.” 

. The
cure Griggs prescribes is that “[t]he fling of a notice of ap-
peal . . . divests the district court of its control over those
aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” 

.
   And the reason is simple. Two courts simultaneously ana-
lyzing the same judgment could step on each other's toes.
It would interfere with the appellate court's review of an
order if the district court modifed that order mid-appeal.
Instead, an order should be reviewed by one court at a time.
   This notion of “one order, one reviewing court” is all that
was at issue in Griggs. Griggs concerned a party that tried
to appeal a judgment while the District Court was still con-
sidering whether to alter that same judgment. 

.
The Court held that the appeal needed to wait until after the
District Court's work on that judgment was done. 

 at
                   Cite as: 

 (2023)            755

                     Jackson, J., dissenting

60–61. This result, which followed from the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure, was necessary to “avoi[d]” the situa-
tion “in which district courts and courts of appeals would
both have had the power to modify the same judgment.”

 (emphasis added).
   Properly understood and applied here, Griggs divests the
district court of control over only a narrow slice of the case.
The interlocutory appeal addresses an order declining to
compel arbitration. Griggs merely prevents the district
court from modifying that order—i. e., Griggs prevents the
district judge from revisiting whether to compel arbitration
while the appeal is pending. Griggs does not stop the dis-
trict court from proceeding on matters other than
arbitrability.
   The majority opinion, however, transmogrifes Griggs into
a sweeping stay of “pre-trial and trial proceedings” on not
just arbitrability, but also the merits. Ante, at 738. Ac-
Page Proof Pending Publication
cording to the majority, if the question on appeal is “whether
the litigation may go forward in the district court,” then the
district court loses control over “the entire case.” Ante, at
741 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted).
   That rule far surpasses the statement in Griggs—the sole
statement on which the majority relies—that a district court
loses “control over those aspects of the case involved in the
appeal.” 

; ante, at 740. Only the arbitrabil-
ity order is on appeal, not the merits. And those matters
are distinct. As this Court recognized (before Congress
enacted § 16), “arbitrability” is “easily severable from the
merits of the underlying disputes.” Moses H. Cone Memo-
rial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 

, 21 (1983).
   The majority cannot justify why it treats these “easily sev-
erable” matters as intertwined in an arbitrability appeal.
“[T]he question on appeal,” as the majority opinion correctly
identifes, is “whether the case belongs in arbitration.”
Ante, at 741. But the questions remaining before the dis-
trict court are different: whether the claims have merit,
756                   COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI

                          Jackson, J., dissenting

whether the parties are entitled to the discovery they seek,
and so on. Proceedings on those questions would not inter-
fere with the appellate court's review of the arbitrability
order. Those proceedings, in other words, do not implicate
the Griggs principle, which addresses the “danger a district
court and a court of appeals would be simultaneously analyz-
ing the same judgment.” 

.
   The Court today expands Griggs beyond what the Con-
gress that enacted § 16 could have foreseen, let alone silently
incorporated. Indeed, the majority can identify no other
time this Court wielded Griggs to mandate a stay of all mer-
its proceedings just because a distinct procedural question
was on appeal.
   In fact, the majority's supercharged version of Griggs con-
tradicts its own account of Congress's intent. Consider the
statutes that the majority points to as models of how Con-
gress would reject a mandatory-general-stay rule. Ante, at
743–744, and n. 6; see supra, at 750–751. Under those stat-
Page Proof Pending Publication
utes, the majority says, Congress intends that an interlocu-
tory appeal does “not . . . automatically stay district court
proceedings.” Ante, at 744. Yet, the majority also seem-
ingly accepts that under those statutes, “the Griggs principle
applies.” Ante, at 742. And per “the Griggs principle” as
the majority sees it, in some cases an interlocutory appeal
does automatically stay district court proceedings. Ante, at
741–742. So a mandatory general stay is thus both prohib-
ited (by the statutory text) and required (by the majority's
view of Griggs).3 As this contradiction underscores, the ma-
   3
     This contradiction arises, for example, under 

(b), one
of the statutes that the majority cites as prohibiting mandatory general
stays. See ante, at 744, n. 6 (citing Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. 85–919, 

 (codifed at § 1292(b))). Section 1292(b) authorizes permissive
interlocutory appeals from a wide range of orders involving “controlling
question[s] of law”—including rulings on arbitrability. Arbitrability ap-
peals under § 1292(b) were commonplace when Congress enacted 

 in 1988. See, e. g., Danford v. Schwabacher, 

, 457 (CA9
1973) (“Since 1958 interlocutory arbitration orders have been reviewable
                       Cite as: 

 (2023)                    757

                          Jackson, J., dissenting

jority's holding is untethered from any statute and any exist-
ing conception of Griggs.
                              IV
   To justify its new mandatory-general-stay rule, the major-
ity ultimately rests on its assessment of what is “sensible.”
Ante, at 742–743. But even the majority's policy concerns
do not support its rule.
   The dispute here turns on a subset of cases—those in
which a stay is not warranted under the usual discretionary
standard. See Nken, 

. All agree that an
interlocutory appeal should trigger a stay if that standard is
met. But the majority goes further and requires a stay in
all cases. Indeed, the majority mandates a stay even if
none of the traditional stay prerequisites are present: likeli-
hood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, favorable
balance of equities, and alignment with the public interest.
See 

Page Proof Pending Publication
   The majority offers no good reason for that result. The
majority says that an automatic stay protects the party seek-
ing arbitration and conserves resources in case the dispute
“ultimately head[s] to arbitration” after appeal. Ante, at
743. But the concern fades if that scenario is unrealistic—
i. e., if the party seeking arbitration is unlikely to succeed
on appeal.
   The majority's concern is even weaker when a stay would
harm the opposing party and the public interest much more
than it would protect the party seeking arbitration. Take,
for example, a case in which crucial evidence would be lost
if discovery is delayed. Say a witness is on her deathbed.
Under the majority's rule, if an interlocutory arbitrability
appeal under § 16(a) is pending, discovery must be stayed

in accordance with the procedures prescribed by 

(b)”).
And in a § 1292(b) arbitrability appeal, the majority's reading of § 1292(b)
would prohibit a mandatory general stay, while the majority's view of
Griggs would require one.
758               COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI

                     Jackson, J., dissenting

and the evidence must be lost. That is apparently so even
if the parties agree they wish to proceed with discovery.
   The majority's rule also prevents courts from crafting
case-specifc solutions to balance all the interests at stake.
Under the traditional discretionary-stay rule, for instance, a
judge could allow the parties to conduct only the forms of
discovery that would also be permitted in arbitration. That
would save time and leave nobody worse off even if, as the
majority fears, the dispute ultimately heads to arbitration.
But this kind of equitable resolution, which the court and the
parties might consider “sensible,” ante, at 743, is forbidden
under the majority's mandatory-general-stay rule.
   In addition, for each of the majority's concerns favoring a
mandatory stay, there are countervailing considerations.
The majority professes interest in “effciency.” Ibid. But
forcing district court proceedings to a halt—for months or
years while the appeal runs its course—is itself ineffcient.
Page Proof Pending Publication
The majority also fears losing other “asserted benefts of ar-
bitration” without a stay. Ibid. But with a stay, the party
opposing arbitration loses the benefts of immediate litiga-
tion. A plaintiff's request for injunctive protection against
imminent harm, for example, goes unanswered under the ma-
jority's rule. Similarly, while the majority laments settle-
ment pressure on parties seeking arbitration, ibid., the rule
it announces imposes settlement pressure in the opposite di-
rection. With justice delayed while the case is on hold, par-
ties “could be forced to settle,” ibid., because they do not
wish—or cannot afford—to leave their claims in limbo. In-
congruously, the majority inficts these burdens on the party
that won the arbitrability issue before the district court (the
party opposing arbitration).
   In categorically resolving these conficts in favor of the
pro-arbitration party, the majority's analysis comes down to
this: Because the pro-arbitration party gets an interlocutory
appeal, it should also get an automatic stay. Ibid.; see L.
Numeroff, If You Give a Mouse a Cookie (1985). But Con-
                       Cite as: 

 (2023)                   759

                         Jackson, J., dissenting

gress was entitled to give one without the other. And the
right to interlocutory appeal is valuable on its own. It is,
as the majority explains, “a rare statutory exception to the
usual rule that parties may not appeal before fnal judg-
ment.” Ante, at 740. Even without a stay, if the interlocu-
tory appeal succeeds, the pro-arbitration party gets its wish
and the dispute goes to arbitration.
   Perhaps for those reasons, real-life parties do not agree
with the majority that an interlocutory arbitrability appeal
is pointless without an automatic stay. No stay was issued
in this case, for example, yet Coinbase still pursued its inter-
locutory appeal. Nor did other parties stop bringing inter-
locutory arbitrability appeals in the Circuits that had inter-
preted § 16 to impose no automatic stay.4
   Yet this Court steps in to give the pro-arbitration party
the additional right to an automatic stay that Congress with-
held. Now, any defendant that devises a non-frivolous argu-
ment for arbitration can not only appeal, but also press pause
Page Proof Pending Publication
on the case—leaving plaintiffs to suffer harm, lose evidence,
and bleed dry their patience and funding in the meantime.
To confer that power on a class of litigants, based on blanket
judgments resolving competing policy concerns, is Con-
gress's domain, not ours. And where Congress is silent, the
   4
     For over a decade, the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have all held
that a § 16(a) appeal triggers no mandatory general stay. Motorola
Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 

, 53–54 (CA2 2004); Britton v. Co-op
Banking Group, 

, 1412 (CA9 1990); Weingarten Realty In-
vestors v. Miller, 

, 907–910 (CA5 2011). And those Circuits
face no shortage of interlocutory § 16(a) appeals. See, e. g., Palacios v.
Alifne Dining, Inc., 

 (CA2, Mar. 13, 2023); Laurel v.
Cintas Corp., 

 (CA9, Mar. 6, 2023); NATS, Inc. v. Radia-
tion Shield Technologies, Inc., 

 (CA2, Mar. 9, 2023); Hill
v. Xerox Bus. Servs., LLC, 

 (CA9 2023); Johnson v. Walmart
Inc., 

 (CA9 2023); Noble Capital Fund Mgmt., LLC v. US
Capital Global Inv. Mgmt., LLC, 

 (CA5 2022); Forby v. One
Technologies, LP, 

 (CA5 2021); Soliman v. Subway Franchi-
see Adv. Fund Trust, Ltd., 

 (CA2 2021); Polyfow, LLC v.
Specialty RTP, LLC, 

 (CA5 2021).
760               COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI

                     Jackson, J., dissenting

job of managing particular litigation, in light of the concrete
circumstances presented, belongs to the judge closest to a
case.
                              V
   The Court today ventures down an uncharted path—and
that way lies madness. Never before had this Court man-
dated a general stay simply because an interlocutory appeal
poses the question “whether the litigation may go forward in
the district court.” Ante, at 741 (internal quotation marks
omitted). And a wide array of appeals seemingly fts that
bill.
   Indeed, any appeal over the proper forum for a dispute
would arguably raise the same question. After all, “an arbi-
tration agreement is `a specialized kind of forum-selection
clause.' ” Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 596 U. S.
–––, ––– (2022) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 

, 519 (1974)). If arbitration appeals require stays of
Page Proof Pending Publication
all pre-trial and trial proceedings, why not all appeals about
forum-selection agreements? And why not appeals over
non-contractual disputes over the proper adjudicator, like
venue, personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, federal-
court jurisdiction, and abstention?
   For that matter, “virtually every right that could be en-
forced appropriately by pretrial dismissal might loosely be
described as conferring a `right not to stand trial.' ” Digital
Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 

, 873
(1994). “Such motions can be made in virtually every case.”

 Does every interlocutory appeal concerning a case-
dispositive issue now trigger a mandatory general stay of
trial court proceedings?
   Taken that broadly, the mandatory-general-stay rule the
Court adopts today would upend federal litigation as we
know it. Aware that any interlocutory appeal on a disposi-
tive issue grinds the plaintiff's case to a halt, defendants
would presumably pursue that tactic at every opportunity.
This would occur, for example, in interlocutory appeals avail-
                   Cite as: 

 (2023)           761

                     Jackson, J., dissenting

able as of right under 

(a)(1) from orders
granting preliminary injunctions. Any defense lawyer
worth her salt would invoke the right to take that appeal
and throw up some objection—to venue, jurisdiction, or a
dispositive element of the merits—to trigger a mandatory
stay. For plaintiffs, then, every preliminary-injunction mo-
tion becomes a trap: Even if the motion is granted, the de-
fendant can take that opportunity to stop the trial court pro-
ceedings in their tracks.
   Facing these destabilizing consequences, the majority
stops short of following its own reasoning to that ominous
conclusion. Today's holding reaches only arbitration appeals
under § 16(a). Ante, at 738, 744. And it might well be that
the concerns motivating today's mandatory-general-stay rule
do not extend beyond arbitration. So the majority will not
commit, for example, to concluding that appeals over non-
arbitration forum-selection clauses warrant the same manda-
tory stay. Ante, at 746.
Page Proof Pending Publication
   I agree with that hesitation—even one step further down
this path is much too far. The mandatory-general-stay rule
that the Court manufactures is unmoored from Congress's
commands and this Court's precedent. And the windfall
that the Court gives to defendants seeking arbitration, pre-
ferencing their interests over all others, is entirely unwar-
ranted. The Court now mandates that result no matter how
unjust that outcome is, according to traditional equitable
standards, in a given case. This endeavor is unfounded, un-
wise, and—most fundamentally—not our role.
                           Reporter’s Note

  The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
Page Proof Pending Publication
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:

None