Clarence White v. Reiling Teder & Schrier, LLC
Ind. Ct. App.
Opinion
FILED
Mar 05 2026, 8:40 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Folabi Oshinubi, Denzel Lewis, and Clarence White,
Appellants-Plaintiffs
v.
Reiling Teder & Schrier, LLC,
Appellee-Defendant
March 5, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-CT-940
Appeal from the Tippecanoe Circuit Court
The Honorable Sean M. Persin, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
79C01-2102-CT-22
Opinion by Judge Mathias
Judges May and Felix concur.
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Mathias, Judge.
[1] Folabi Oshinubi, Denzel Lewis, and Clarence White (the “Tenants”) appeal the
trial court’s entry of summary judgment for Reiling Teder & Schrier, LLC
(“RTS”) on their complaints against RTS under the federal Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (the “FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692-1692p (2020). The
Tenants raise three issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as
whether the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment for RTS.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History1
[3] In August 2018, the Tenants began to live at a residence in West Lafayette they
had agreed to lease from Krys Szalasny (the “Landlord”). The Tenants paid a
security deposit in the amount of $1,850 and timely paid monthly rent
thereafter. As a condition of the lease, the residence was to be in “good
condition” upon the Tenants leaving the residence. In the late summer of 2019,
the Tenants surrendered the premises. The Landlord inspected the residence
and concluded that it was not in good condition. The Landlord allegedly spent
$30,354.49 to repair the residence.
1
The Tenants’ briefing on appeal relies on material stricken by the trial court. Compare, e.g., Appellants’ Br. at
6 (citing Appellants’ App. Vol. 4, p. 133) with Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, p. 11 (trial court order noting that it
had stricken the same). Likewise, the Tenants’ appendices contain material stricken by the trial court. See
Appellee’s Br. at 10 n.2. The Tenants do not challenge the trial court’s decisions to strike any materials, and
we therefore disregard their improper reliance on and inclusion of stricken materials.
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[4] In January 2020, the Landlord approached RTS about recovering his repair
costs from the Tenants. James Schrier, a partner at RTS, informed the Landlord
that RTS “would not file any claim for damages to a rental property unless
[RTS] received a copy of the letter sent to [the T]enants” known as the “45[-
]day letter,” i.e., the Landlord’s itemized damages to the Tenants in accordance
with Indiana Code section 32-31-3-12. Appellants’ App. Vol. 3, p. 162. The
Landlord “told [Schrier] that he had sent [that] letter to the [T]enants” and
“subsequently provided a copy of that letter” to RTS. Id. Accordingly, and
based on a “good faith belief that there would be evidentiary support for the
factual and legal contentions raised” by the Landlord, RTS agreed to represent
the Landlord. Id. However, in fact, the Landlord “had not . . . sent any
communication to the [T]enants related to the damage to the property or their
security deposit.” Id.
[5] In the course of representing the Landlord, RTS sent collection letters to each of
the Tenants. RTS further filed a complaint on behalf of the Landlord and
against the Tenants seeking to recover the Landlord’s alleged costs. The
Tenants, in turn, counterclaimed for a violation of Indiana Code section 32-31-
3-12.
[6] In January 2021, the Landlord testified in a deposition that he had not in fact
sent the Tenants the 45-day letter. There is no dispute that the Landlord’s
January 2021 deposition testimony was when RTS learned of that fact.
Thereafter, the Landlord agreed to dismiss his claims with prejudice and to pay
damages to the Tenants. See White v. Szalasny, 191 N.E.3d 260, 262 (Ind. Ct.
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App. 2022). The trial court also ordered the Landlord to pay the Tenants’
reasonable attorneys’ fees.
[7] Following the Landlord’s deposition testimony, in February 2021 each of the
Tenants filed a complaint against RTS under the FDCPA. The Tenants each
alleged that RTS had violated their rights under the FDCPA when RTS
attempted to collect a debt on behalf of the Landlord that was in fact not owed.
The trial court later consolidated the Tenants’ cases.
[8] In February 2024, RTS moved for summary judgment and argued that it was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Tenants’ complaints under
numerous theories. The Tenants did not timely respond to RTS’s motion for
summary judgment despite the trial court entering three continuances to allow
the Tenants to do so. Thereafter, the trial court entered summary judgment for
RTS, specifically identifying RTS’s theory that the Tenants lacked standing as
the basis for its order.
[9] This appeal ensued.
Standard of Review
[10] The Tenants appeal the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for RTS. As
our Supreme Court has made clear:
[w]e review summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard as the trial court: “Drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of . . . the non-moving parties, summary judgment is
appropriate ‘if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
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party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Williams v.
Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009) (quoting T.R. 56(C)). “A
fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the
case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to
resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the
undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable
inferences.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
The initial burden is on the summary-judgment movant to
“demonstrate [ ] the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a
determinative issue,” at which point the burden shifts to the non-
movant to “come forward with contrary evidence” showing an
issue for the trier of fact. Id. at 761-62 (internal quotation marks
and substitution omitted). And “[a]lthough the non-moving party
has the burden on appeal of persuading us that the grant of
summary judgment was erroneous, we carefully assess the trial
court’s decision to ensure that he was not improperly denied his
day in court.” McSwane v. Bloomington Hosp. & Healthcare Sys., 916
N.E.2d 906, 909-10 (Ind. 2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014) (omission and some
alterations original to Hughley). Further, we are not bound by the trial court’s
explanation for its summary judgment ruling, and “we will affirm the trial
court’s ruling” on summary judgment “based on any theory supported by
record evidence.” Markey v. Estate of Markey, 38 N.E.3d 1003, 1006-07 (Ind.
2015).
Discussion and Decision
[11] The Tenants’ central argument on appeal is that both their complaints and the
properly designated deposition evidence demonstrated legally sufficient
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standing under the FDCPA, and, thus, the trial court’s entry of summary
judgment on that theory is erroneous. 2 See Appellants’ Br. at 10-18. But we
review summary judgment de novo, and the fact that the trial court found one
argued theory dispositive is not binding on our Court. See Markey, 38 N.E.3d at
1006-07.
[12] RTS’s theory of standing aside, we conclude that RTS made a prima facie
showing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the merits of the
Tenants’ FDCPA claims. The Tenants’ complaints alleged that RTS violated 15
U.S.C. §§ 1692d (harassment or abuse), 1692e (false or misleading
representations), and 1692f (unfair practices). The Tenants’ factual predicates
underlying those three alleged statutory violations were the same: RTS’s
representations to the Tenants on behalf of the Landlord for the Landlord’s
purported damages to the premises as well as his claim for corresponding
attorney’s fees, which claims were in fact legally nonactionable due to the
Landlord’s noncompliance with Indiana Code section 32-31-3-12.
2
The Tenants also assert that the trial court’s order on summary judgment amounted to impermissible
burden shifting to the summary judgment nonmovants. We need not consider that proposition given our de
novo standard of review. Further, the Tenants’ argument that the trial court erred when it entered summary
judgment against tenant Lewis specifically is a nonstarter. The Tenants contend that, because RTS’s
summary judgment brief was filed in the other two case numbers but not in Lewis’s, the entry of summary
judgment against him “deprived [him] of the right to notice and the opportunity to be heard” on RTS’s
arguments. Appellants’ Br. at 18. The Tenants raise this argument for the first time on appeal, and so it is
waived. See, e.g., Salahuddin v. State, 492 N.E.2d 292, 296 (Ind. 1986). Further, tenant Lewis was at all times a
participant in the summary judgment proceedings; he had not only notice but every opportunity the other
tenants had to respond to RTS’s arguments.
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[13] RTS argued to the trial court that the designated evidence, namely, Shrier’s
affidavit, demonstrated that RTS had acted with a good-faith belief that its
representations to the Tenants had an evidentiary foundation because the
Landlord had represented to RTS, both orally and in writing, that he had
provided the Tenants with the required 45-day later, and only after the
Landlord had made those representations to RTS did RTS proceed against the
Tenants. And only after RTS had proceeded against the Tenants did RTS learn
that the Landlord had falsely asserted to RTS that he had provided the Tenants
with the 45-day letter. Thus, RTS continued, its good-faith reliance on the
Landlord’s assertions prohibits the Tenants from holding RTS liable under the
FDCPA.
[14] RTS cited legal authority in support of that position. Appellants’ App. Vol. 3,
pp. 164-65, 183-84. Among other authorities, RTS directed the trial court to the
following language from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit:
[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 11 authorizes sanctions when
attorneys advance “legal contentions” that are not “warranted by
existing law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Just because a court
ultimately disagrees with the attorney’s argument doesn’t mean it
was “[un]warranted by existing law” at the time it was made. See
Snow Ingredients, Inc. v. SnoWizard, Inc., 833 F.3d 512, 528-29 (5th
Cir. 2016); see also 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur Miller,
Federal Practice & Procedure § 1334 (4th ed. 2019). The question
instead is whether the legal contention was objectively baseless at
the time it was made, making it “legally indefensible,”
SnoWizard, 833 F.3d at 529, or “groundless in law,” Brubaker v.
City of Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363, 1385 (4th Cir. 1991).
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We have borrowed from Rule 11 before when considering
assertions of fact made in litigation under the [FDCPA]. It’s not a
violation of the [FDCPA] to file a collection lawsuit without
presently possessing means to prove a debt exists, we held,
because Rule 11 requires only that factual contentions “are likely
to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
further investigation or discovery.” Harvey v. Great Seneca Fin.
Corp., 453 F.3d 324, 333 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(b)(3)); see Lee v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone LLP, 601 F.3d 654,
658 (6th Cir. 2010) (overturning jury verdict that an attorney’s
factual assertion in a garnishment action violated the [FDCPA],
because the attorney had conducted a reasonable investigation at
the time the assertion was made).
Van Hoven v. Buckles & Buckles, P.L.C., 947 F.3d 889, 895-96 (6th Cir. 2020)
(second alteration and emphasis original to Van Hoven). RTS reiterates those
factual and legal positions on appeal as well. See Appellee’s Br. at 40-41.
[15] We need not divine the precise parameters of the FDCPA to resolve the instant
dispute. RTS designated evidence and cited legal precedent for its good-faith
theory of relief. And the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Van Hoven is at least broadly
in line with the text of the FDCPA itself. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c); 3 see also
Abdollahzadeh v. Mandarich Law Grp., LLP, 922 F.3d 810, 815-17 (7th Cir. 2019).
3
Section 1692k(c) provides:
A debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought under [the FDCPA] if the debt
collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and
resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably
adapted to avoid any such error.
See also Abdollahzadeh v. Mandarich Law Grp., LLP, 922 F.3d 810, 815-17 (7th Cir. 2019) (affirming the trial
court’s entry of summary judgment for the debt collector under section 1692k(c)).
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[16] Thus, RTS’s summary judgment materials established a prima facie case on the
facts and law that it was entitled to summary judgment. The burden thus shifted
to the Tenants to establish a genuine issue of material fact, or to identify
relevant legal authority, that precluded the entry of summary judgment, but the
Tenants failed to respond to RTS’s contentions in the trial court. Further, the
Tenants also failed to address RTS’s good-faith theory in their lead brief to our
Court. Cf. Madison Cnty. Bank & Trust Co. v. Kreegar, 514 N.E.2d 279, 281 (Ind.
1987) (“While a reviewing court also accepts the facts alleged by the
nonmoving party [on summary judgment], the burden to show reversible error
on appeal is on the appellant. We indulge all reasonable presumptions in favor
of the trial court.”).
[17] However, in the Tenants’ Reply Brief, they argue that our Court has rejected
the “Good-Faith Litigation/Rule 11” theory. Reply Br. at 12 (bold font
omitted). Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tenants’ assertion in their
Reply Brief is properly before us, they are incorrect. In support of their
proposition, they cite only our Court’s opinion in Mercer Belanger Professional
Corporation v. Gaeta, but our Court’s opinion in that case says nothing about the
good-faith rule articulated in Van Hoven (or elsewhere) as being an incorrect
understanding of the FDCPA. 241 N.E.3d 1159, 1170 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024),
trans. denied. Thus, the Tenants have not demonstrated a genuine issue of
material fact, or legal authority, that precludes the entry of summary judgment
for RTS.
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[18] For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment
for RTS.
[19] Affirmed.
May, J., and Felix, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS
Duran L. Keller
Keller Law
Lafayette, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Crystal G. Rowe
Jacob W. Zigenfus
Kightlinger & Gray, LLP
New Albany, Indiana
Nicholas W. Levi
Kightlinger & Gray, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
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