Carter v. ARM Professional Services, Inc.

             NOTICE
                                      

                                                                                           NOTICE
 Decision filed 09/26/25. The
                                                                                This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be                NO. 5-25-0014                      Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
                                                                                not precedent except in the
 the filing of a Petition for                   IN THE                          limited circumstances allowed
 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                                                                under Rule 23(e)(1).
 the same.
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

ESLEY D. CARTER,                                )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellant,                      )     Champaign County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 24-SC-1158
                                                )
ARM PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC.,                )     Honorable
                                                )     Ronda D. Holliman,
      Defendant-Appellee.                       )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

          JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court.
          Justices Barberis and Sholar concurred in the judgment.

                                              ORDER

¶1        Held: Where, after plaintiff filed a small claims complaint, his motion for summary
                judgment was stricken for failure to obtain leave of court, and subsequent to a bench
                trial, a judgment was entered in favor of defendant, we affirm the decision to strike
                the motion and affirm the judgment in favor of defendant.

¶2        Plaintiff filed a small claims complaint against defendant, alleging violations of federal and

state statutes. After striking plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and conducting a bench trial,

the court rendered judgment in favor of defendant. Plaintiff appeals, contending that the court erred

in striking his motion for summary judgment and in its determination in favor of defendant

following the bench trial. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the judgment of the circuit

court in favor of defendant.




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¶3                                   I. BACKGROUND

¶4     On June 27, 2024, plaintiff Esley D. Carter filed a 14-page pro se small claims complaint

against defendant ARM Professional Services, LLC. The complaint was filed pursuant to the Fair

Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) (

 et seq. (2018)), the Collection Agency

Act (CAA) (205 ILCS 740/1 et seq. (West 2022)), and the “Illinois Invasion of Privacy Act under

Section 652B of the Restatement of Torts.” Defendant, a collection agency, had contacted plaintiff

via email in an attempt to recover a debt amounting to $2,487.19. Plaintiff contested the debt and

communicated with defendant through electronic mail, postal mail, and numerous telephone

conversations. The complaint asserted that plaintiff was never provided with an explanation of the

debt. He alleged that he was “unfairly and unnecessarily harassed” by defendant and claimed

damages for “invasion of privacy, emotional distress, loss of creditworthiness, money, time,

damage to credit profile, damage to personal reputation.” The plaintiff also alleged violations of

multiple provisions of the FDCPA, including claiming that defendant (1) failed to disclose the

correct amount requested within five days; (2) sought legal costs and utility charges without an

underlying basis; (3) “communicated the fraudulent” claimed amounts to credit bureaus; and

(4) used violence or criminal means to collect the debt. Plaintiff sought monetary compensation of

$1,000 for each violation, as well as actual damages. He similarly asserted that defendant violated

several sections of the CAA and sought, among other relief, injunctive relief, monetary damages

totaling $5,000, and punitive damages. Additionally, he claimed that defendant violated the

“Restatement (Second) of Torts 652B,” requesting both actual and punitive damages. On the same

date, plaintiff submitted a supplementary document containing 21 exhibits, including “audio” of

phone calls.




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¶5      Defendant was served on July 29, 2024, and on September 20, 2024, filed a pro se motion

to dismiss, which only argued “Motion to Dismiss as to no wrongdoing of FDCPA law.”

¶6      Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss defendant’s motion to dismiss on October 17, 2024. He

contended that defendant’s motion to dismiss should be dismissed on the grounds that it “failed to

state a claim upon which relief can be asserted.” He noted that defendant did not include any

defenses and only referenced the FDCPA claim, neglecting to address his other claims. He

requested that the motion to dismiss be dismissed with prejudice.

¶7      On October 17, 2024, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that he was

entitled to relief due to defendant’s failure to provide “any evidence, rules, or statutes” in support

of its defense.

¶8      On October 30, 2024, the parties appeared before the circuit court. Although no report of

proceedings has been made available for our review, a docket entry indicates that the court found

defendant’s motion to dismiss lacked a legal argument and was consequently denied. Plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment was stricken due to his failure to obtain leave of court prior to filing

the motion. The case was scheduled for a bench trial on November 11, 2024.

¶9      On November 1, 2024, plaintiff filed a motion seeking a default judgment, “or in the

alternative ‘leave to discovery.’ ” He requested that a default judgment be issued due to

defendant’s failure to file an answer within the prescribed time frame, or, in the alternative, that

leave for discovery be granted.

¶ 10    On November 4, 2024, defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to sections 2-615 and

2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2022)). It maintained that

it had consistently adhered to all requisite procedures in its efforts to collect the debt. Additionally,




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defendant affirmed that it had responded to plaintiff’s request for itemization of the debt and denied

any violation of the statutes cited in plaintiff’s complaint.

¶ 11    On November 11, 2024, a bench trial was conducted. While no report of proceedings was

provided for our review, a docket entry for that date indicates that the circuit court struck

defendant’s motion to dismiss due to its filing without prior leave of court. The court observed that

it would proceed pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 286 (eff. Feb. 2, 2023). Witness

testimony was heard, numerous exhibits were admitted into evidence, closing arguments were

presented, and the case was taken under advisement with a scheduled ruling date of December 17,

2024.

¶ 12    On December 17, 2024, the circuit court orally issued a detailed ruling. It stated that it had

jurisdiction to adjudicate the federal claims of the FDCPA pursuant to 

(k) (2018)

and affirmed that plaintiff’s claims were within the one-year statute of limitations. Concerning the

plaintiff’s allegation that defendant violated the FDCPA, the court outlined the obligations of a

collector to verify the debt and to communicate this verification to the debtor. The court further

stated that defendant went “way beyond” those requirements in that it communicated with the

original creditor “to confirm the debt, asked additional questions. They went over documents. They

provided the plaintiff with additional documents, to the point where they ended up actually

reducing the amount of debt through that verification process.” The court observed that a creditor’s

obligation was solely to verify the debt and did not extend to an independent investigation of the

amount owed. It indicated that defendant verified the original debt and subsequently provided

additional documentation to plaintiff. The court determined that defendant did not act fraudulently

in reporting the debt amount to the credit bureaus, as they acted based on the information provided

to them. Moreover, it noted that defendant did not engage in harassment, having contacted plaintiff


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only once by phone and ceasing contact after plaintiff expressed a desire not to be contacted.

Conversely, plaintiff harassed defendant by making multiple calls and uttering threatening,

intimidating, and vulgar statements. The testimony of one of defendant’s witnesses, deemed highly

credible by the court, corroborated receipt of some of the threatening and vulgar calls made by

plaintiff. It was also established that the lease agreement signed by plaintiff authorized the amounts

claimed by defendant. Regarding plaintiff’s claim under the CAA, the court acknowledged that

this act does not permit private causes of action, thereby precluding consideration of this claim.

The court concluded that plaintiff “failed to prove a violation of the federal claims” and, as to the

state claims, found that there was no private right of action under that statute. The court rendered

judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff. Plaintiff timely filed a pro se notice of appeal.

¶ 13                                     II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14   On appeal, plaintiff contends that the circuit court erred in striking his motion for summary

judgment due to his failure to obtain prior leave of court. He asserts that section 2-1005(a) of the

Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1005(a) (West 2022)) and Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 56(b) (2018) permit him to file a motion for summary judgment at any time, and

accordingly requests that his motion be reinstated. Furthermore, he claims that the court failed to

apply the law regarding the FDCPA properly and did not hear his claims under the Restatement of

Torts. Additionally, he argues that the court erred in ruling in favor of defendant on the CAA claim,

as no private right of action exists under that statute. His final contention is that the court erred in

restricting him to presenting evidence solely concerning the CAA claim and subsequently ruling

against him on both the state and federal claims.

¶ 15   In response, defendant asserts that the circuit court ruled correctly, as the record confirms

their compliance with the FDCPA. It emphasizes that the CCA does not “create a private right of


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action.” It noted that plaintiff was able to present all of his evidence during the trial. It concludes

that the court’s ruling was supported by the record and the law, and requests that we affirm the

ruling in its favor.

¶ 16    Plaintiff initially contends that the circuit court erred in striking his motion for summary

judgment for his failure to obtain leave of court. He maintains that he is entitled to file a motion

for summary judgment at any time. We disagree. Plaintiff filed his complaint as a small claims

matter and is consequently subject to the rules governing such cases. Illinois Supreme Court Rule

287 states that “[e]xcept as provided in sections 2-619 and 2-1001 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

no motion shall be filed in small claims cases, without prior leave of court.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 287(b)

(eff. Aug. 1, 1992). Motions for summary judgment are governed by section 2-1005 of the Code

of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2022)) and thus do not fall within the exception

specified in the rule. “[W]here a statute lists the thing or things to which it refers, the inference is

that all omissions are exclusions, even in the absence of limiting language.” McHenry County

Defenders, Inc. v. City of Harvard, 

 (2008). Consequently, as motions for

summary judgment are not included in the specified list, prior leave of court must be obtained

before filing such motions. Plaintiff did not request leave of court prior to submitting his motion

for summary judgment, and the circuit court did not err in striking the motion accordingly.

¶ 17    The remaining three arguments presented by plaintiff on appeal concern the decision

rendered by the circuit court following a bench trial that occurred on November 11, 2024. Although

a report of proceedings detailing the court’s announcement of its decision was provided, one for

the bench trial was not. “It is well established that, on appeal, the party claiming error has the

burden of showing any irregularities that would justify reversal.” In re Linda B., 

 (citing Flynn v. Vancil, 

 (1968)). For this court to adequately review claims


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of error, plaintiff, as the appellant, was required to file either a report of proceedings from the

hearing or a bystander’s report, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 321 (eff. Oct 1, 2021) and

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 323 (eff. July 1, 2017). “It is the responsibility of every appellant to

provide a complete record on appeal.” King v. Find-A-Way Shipping, LLC, 

 (citing Abbey Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Brown, 

(1977)). While pro se litigants are held to a lesser standard in complying with appeal rules, they

are still “required to meet a minimum threshold in providing the court with an adequate record to

review the issues raised on appeal.” 

 (citing Rock Island County v. Boalbey, 

 (1993)). Generally, “[t]o determine whether the [circuit] court made the error which

appellant is claiming, a court of review must have before it the record of the proceedings where

the error was allegedly made.” Id. ¶ 31. When the appellate record is inadequate, the reviewing

court will presume that the circuit court’s order was consistent with recognized legal principles

and had a sufficient factual basis. Id. ¶ 30. “[A]ny doubt arising from an incomplete record will be

resolved against the appellant.” Id. (citing Foutch v. O’Bryant, 

 (1984)).

¶ 18   Illinois Supreme Court Rule 323 (eff. July 1, 2017) outlines the contents and preparation

of a report of proceedings, providing three different ways a report of proceedings can be properly

submitted. “[A]n acceptable report of proceedings must necessarily comply with Rules 323(a) and

323(b), a conventional report of proceedings, Rule 323(c), a bystander’s report or Rule 323(d), an

agreed statement of facts. No other method or device is permitted or acceptable.” People v. Bruhn,

 (1977). Here, the record on appeal does not contain any of these. “An

issue relating to a [circuit] court’s factual findings and basis for its legal conclusions obviously

cannot be reviewed absent a report or record of the proceeding.” Corral v. Mervis Industries, Inc.,

 (2005). The December 17, 2024, report of proceedings from the circuit court’s


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oral recitation does not provide us with all the details of the bench trial, which plaintiff has issues

with. Because the record before us lacks reports of proceedings and is incomplete, we cannot

conduct a “meaningful appellate review” of plaintiff’s contentions. See Amos Financial, LLC v.

Szydlowski, 

. Without an adequate record, we must presume that

the circuit court’s December 17, 2024, ruling had a sufficient factual basis and conformed with the

law. 

 Consequently, based on the record before us, we must affirm the circuit court’s finding in

favor of defendant. See Foutch, 

.

¶ 19                                  III. CONCLUSION

¶ 20   Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s finding in favor of defendant.



¶ 21   Affirmed.




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