Benedetti v. Cimarex Energy Co.

Attorneys

• Jacob W. Biby, Martin, Jean & Jackson, Tulsa, OK, for Plaintiff/Petitioner.
• Toby M. McKinstry, Tomlinson, Rust, McKinstry, Grable P.C., Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendant/Respondent.
• ¶3 On March 25, 2016, the district court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss. After argument from the parties, the court asked for supplemental briefing on the issue of whether § 302(H) was a special law. On June 1, 2016, the district court granted Cimarex's motion to dismiss and found that § 302(H) was not an unconstitutional special law. The district court certified the decision for immediate interlocutory review pursuant to 12 O.S. 2011 § 952(b)(3), and Mr. Benedetti filed a Petition for Certiorari to Review the Certified Interlocutory Order.
• ¶4 We treated the district court's certification as the functional equivalent of an "express determination that there [was] no just reason for delay" under 12 O.S. 2011 § 994(A) and allowed the cause to proceed as an accelerated appeal pursuant to Rule 1.36 of the Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules. The appeal was assigned to the Court of Civil Appeals, Division II, which affirmed the district court's dismissal. Mr. Benedetti filed a Petition for Certiorari to review the January 23, 2017 opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, and we granted certiorari on April 10, 2017.
• For the purposes of extending the immunity of this section, any operator or owner of an oil or gas well or other operation for exploring for, drilling for, or producing oil or gas shall be deemed to be an intermediate or principal employer for services performed at a drill site or location with respect to injured or deceased workers whose immediate employer was hired by such operator or owner at the time of such injury.
• ¶7 The district court did not address whether any other provision of the Workers' Compensation Code absolved Cimarex of liability for Mr. Benedetti's injuries. The district court dismissed Cimarex relying only on § 302(H). However, COCA found that Cimarex was Mr. Benedetti's principal employer under 85 O.S. 2011 § 314. Section 314 provides:
• In order for another employer on the same job as the injured or deceased worker to qualify as an intermediate or principal employer, the work performed by the immediate employer must be directly associated with the day to day activity carried on by such other employer's trade, industry, or business, or it must be the type of work that would customarily be done in such other employer's trade, industry, or business.
• The only evidence submitted to the district court by either party was the "Master Service Agreement" between Schlumberger and Cimarex, which was attached to Cimarex's motion to dismiss. COCA treated Cimarex's motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment solely because Cimarex attached the agreement to its motion to dismiss. However, neither the parties nor the district court treated the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment. Mr. Benedetti was not given the opportunity to conduct discovery, and the agreement between Schlumberger and Cimarex, without more, does not establish that Cimarex was Mr. Benedetti's principal employer under § 314. On remand, the district court shall allow the parties to conduct discovery on the issue of whether Cimarex was Mr. Benedetti's principal employer at the time of Mr. Benedetti's injuries.