AJAMI

                                                               Interim Decision #3405




                 In re Ali Hussein AJAMI, Respondent

                             File A43 468 532 - Detroit

                        Decided as amended July 13, 19991

                           U.S. Department of Justice
                    Executive Office for Immigration Review
                        Board of Immigration Appeals


   The offense of aggravated stalking pursuant to section 750.411i of the Michigan
Compiled Laws Annotated is a crime involving moral turpitude.

James J. Hoare, Esquire, Farmington Hills, Michigan, for respondent

Marsha Kay Nettles, Assistant District Counsel, for the Immigration and Naturalization
Service

Before:   Board Panel: HOLMES, GUENDELSBERGER, and JONES, Board Members.

HOLMES, Board Member:

ORDER:

     PER CURIAM. In a decision dated November 16, 1998, the
Immigration Judge found the respondent deportable under section
237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 

(a)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. II 1996), based on his conviction for a crime
involving moral turpitude, and ordered him removed from the United
States. The respondent has timely appealed. The request for oral argument
is denied. The appeal is dismissed.
     The respondent was admitted to the United States as a conditional
permanent resident in October 1995. On June 5, 1996, he was convicted
in Michigan of aggravated stalking, in violation of section 750.411i of the
Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated, for acts committed on three sepa-
rate occasions earlier that year. This aggravated stalking conviction was


    1
      On our own motion, we amend the April 20, 1999, order in this case. The amended order
makes editorial changes consistent with designating the case as a precedent.

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Interim Decision #3405


for a crime committed within 5 years after the respondent’s date of admis-
sion and for which a sentence of 1 year or longer could have been
imposed. See section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Act. On appeal, the respon-
dent argues, without any elaboration, that aggravated stalking is not a
crime involving moral turpitude.2
     We have observed that the definition of a crime involving moral turpi-
tude is nebulous. Moral turpitude refers generally to conduct which is inher-
ently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality
and the duties owed between persons or to society in general. See Matter of
Franklin, 

 (BIA 1994), aff’d, 

 (8th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 

 (1996); Matter of Short, 

 (BIA 1989); Matter of Danesh, 

 (BIA 1988);
Matter of Flores, 

 (BIA 1980). Moral turpitude has
been defined as an act which is per se morally reprehensible and intrinsi-
cally wrong or malum in se, so it is the nature of the act itself and not the
statutory prohibition of it which renders a crime one of moral turpitude.
Matter of P-, 

, 798 (BIA 1955). Among the tests to deter-
mine if a crime involves moral turpitude is whether the act is accompanied
by a vicious motive or a corrupt mind. See Matter of Perez-Contreras, 

 (BIA 1992); Matter of Serna, 

(BIA 1992); Matter of Flores, supra, at 227.
     In deciding whether a crime involves moral turpitude, we must first
examine the statute itself to determine whether the inherent nature of the
crime involves moral turpitude. See Matter of Short, supra; Matter of
Esfandiary, 

 (BIA 1979). If the statute defines a crime in
which moral turpitude necessarily inheres, then the conviction is for a crime
involving moral turpitude for immigration purposes, and our analysis ends.
Matter of Short, supra. However, if the statute contains some offenses
which involve moral turpitude and others which do not, it is to be treated as
a “divisible” statute, and we look to the record of conviction, meaning the
indictment, plea, verdict, and sentence, to determine the offense of which
the respondent was convicted. Id.; Matter of Esfandiary, supra; Matter of
Ghunaim, 

 (BIA 1975), modified on other grounds, Matter
of 

 Matter of Lopez, 

 (BIA 1971), modi-
fied on other grounds, Matter of 

      2
        Under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Act, an alien may be found deportable upon con-
viction for “a crime of stalking.” However, section 237(a)(2)(E)(i), which was added to the
Act by section 350(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996, Division C of 

 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-639, is not applicable
to this case because it only applies to “convictions, or violations of court orders, occurring
after [September 30, 1996.]” 

 § 350(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-640; see also id. § 305(a)(2),
110 Stat. at 3009-598 (redesignating former section 241 of the Act as section 237).

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     Because the Michigan statute contains several parts, some of which
may not include a crime involving moral turpitude, we look to the felony
information to determine the section of the statute under which the respon-
dent was convicted. This document reveals that he was convicted under that
part of the aggravated stalking statute which provides as follows:
   An individual who engages in stalking is guilty of aggravated stalking if the violation
   involves any of the following circumstances: . . . [t]he course of conduct includes the
   making of 1 or more credible threats against the victim, a member of the victim’s fam-
   ily, or another individual living in the victim’s household.

.411i(2)(c) (West 1996).3 Michigan law fur-
ther defines the following relevant terms:
    (a) “Course of conduct” means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of 2 or
   more separate noncontinuous acts, evidencing a continuity of purpose.

     (b) “Credible threat” means a threat to kill another individual or a threat to inflict
   physical injury upon another individual that is made in any manner or in any context
   that causes the individual hearing or receiving the threat to reasonably fear for his or
   her safety or the safety of another individual.

    (c) “Emotional distress” means significant mental suffering or distress that may, but
   does not necessarily require, medical or other professional treatment or counseling.

     (d) “Harassment” means conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but is not
   limited to, repeated or continuing unconsented contact, that would cause a reasonable
   individual to suffer emotional distress, and that actually causes the victim to suffer
   emotional distress. Harassment does not include constitutionally protected activity or
   conduct that serves a legitimate purpose.

     (e) “Stalking” means a willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing
   harassment of another individual that would cause a reasonable person to feel terror-
   ized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested, and that actually caus-
   es the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or
   molested.

.411i(1)(a)-(e).
    The Court of Appeals of Michigan noted that for stalking to be consid-
ered aggravated, as opposed to the lesser charge of misdemeanor stalking,



     3
      During the hearing, the respondent argued that he may have been unlawfully convict-
ed due to the service of a restraining order. However, neither the Immigration Judge nor this
Board can entertain a collateral attack on a judgment of conviction unless that judgment is
void on its face. Matter of C-, 

 (BIA 1992), and cases cited therein.
We note, however, that the respondent was not charged under the section of the statute
involving the violation of the order. See People v. White, 

 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1995).

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Interim Decision #3405


there must be “a credible threat to kill another or inflict physical injury
against the victim.” People v. White, 

 (Mich. Ct. App.
1995). It also noted that “the statute could not be applied to entirely inno-
cent conduct.” 

 Finally, the court noted that the Michigan legislature, in
passing the statute, was trying to prevent stalking because “‘[t]he threat of
violence, real or perceived, is almost always present in [stalking] cases;
tragically, it is far from unheard of for a pattern of stalking to end in the
stalker killing the stalked.’” 

 (quoting legislative history).
     We find that this respondent’s conviction for aggravated stalking under
the Michigan statute is a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude.
A violator of the statute must act willfully, must embark on a course of con-
duct, as opposed to a single act, and must cause another to feel great fear.

.411i(1)(e). Previous decisions by this
Board have found that threatening behavior can be an element of a crime
involving moral turpitude. See Matter of B-, 

 (BIA 1954)
(involving usury by intimidation and threats of bodily harm); Matter of C-,

 (BIA 1953) (involving threats to take property by force);
Matter of G-T-, 

 (BIA 1951) (involving the sending of
threatening letters with the intent to extort money); Matter of F-, 

 (C.O. 1948; BIA 1949) (involving the mailing of menacing letters
that demanded property and threatened violence to the recipient). We find
that the intentional transmission of threats is evidence of a vicious motive
or a corrupt mind. Accordingly, we agree with the Immigration Judge that
the respondent was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and is
therefore subject to removal.




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