Robert H. Lande

Publications

• Antitrust Ideas that Progressives Should Resurrect: Conglomerate Merger Legislation, No-Fault Monopolization, and Merger Incipiency
  53 U. BALT. L. REV. (2024) · University of Baltimore Law Review · 2024
• Textualism as an Ally of Antitrust Enforcement: Examples from Merger and Monopolization Law
  2023 UTAH L. REV. (2023) · Utah Law Review · 2023
• The Sherman Act is a No-Fault Monopolization Statute: A Textualist Demonstration
  70 AM. U. L. REV. (2020) · American University Law Review · 2020

• A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice
  81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2349 (2013) · Fordham Law Review · 2013
• Toward an Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of Private Antitrust Enforcement
  36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1269 (2013) · Seattle University Law Review · 2013
• Should the Internet Exempt the Media Sector from the Antitrust Laws?
  65 FLA. L. REV. 1521 (2013) · Florida Law Review · 2013
• Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case for Private Antitrust Enforcement
  48 GA. L. REV. (2013) · Georgia Law Review · 2013
• Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays
  34 CARDOZO L. REV. 427 (2012) · Cardozo Law Review · 2012

• Benefits From Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases
  42 U. S. F. L. REV. (2008) · University of San Francisco Law Review · 2008
• The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency
  84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191 (2008) · Notre Dame Law Review · 2008
• Five Myths About Antitrust Damages
  40 U. S. F. L. REV. (2006) · University of San Francisco Law Review · 2006
• Should Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts?
  2006 UTAH L. REV. (2006) · Utah Law Review · 2006
• Should Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts?
  2006 UTAH L. REV. (2006) · Utah Law Review · 2006
• Why Antitrust Damage Levels Should Be Raised
  16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 329 (2004) · Loyola Consumer Law Review · 2004
• Professor Waller's Un-American Approach to Antitrust
  32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 137 (2000) · Loyola University Chicago Law Journal · 2000

• Proving the Obvious: The Antitrust Laws Were Passed to Protect Consumers (Not Just to Increase Efficiency)
  50 UC L.J. 959 (1999) · UC Law Journal · 1999
• Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged
  50 UC L.J. 871 (1999) · UC Law Journal · 1999
• Consumer Choice: The Practical Reason for Both Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law
  10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 44 (1998) · Loyola Consumer Law Review · 1998
• Anticonsumer Effects of Union Mergers: An Antitrust Solution
  46 DUKE L.J. 197 (1996) · Duke Law Journal · 1996
• Law & Economics Perspective on a Traditional Torts Case: Insights for Classroom and Courtroom, A
  57 MO. L. REV. (1992) · Missouri Law Review · 1992
• When Should States Challenge Mergers: A Proposed Federal/State Balance
  35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1047 (1990) · NYLS Law Review · 1990

• Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers
  77 CAL. L. REV. 777 (1989) · California Law Review · 1989
• Reducing Unions' Monopoly Power: Costs and Benefits
  28 J. L. & ECON. (1985) · Journal of Law and Economics · 1985
• Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement
  71 CAL. L. REV. 1580 (1983) · California Law Review · 1983
• Could a Merger Lead to Both a Monopoly and a Lower Price
  71 CAL. L. REV. 1697 (1983) · California Law Review · 1983
• Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged
  34 UC L.J. 65 (1982) · UC Law Journal · 1982