Richard S. Markovits

Publications

• The General Theory of Second Best and Economic-Efficiency Analysis: The Theory, its Negative Corollaries, the Appropriate Response to it, and a Coda on the Economic Efficiency of Reducing Poverty and Income/Wealth Inequality
  49 AKRON L. REV. (2015) · Akron Law Review · 2015
• Background (Fixed-Cost) Avoidance-Choices, Foreground (Variable-Cost) Avoidance-Choices, and the Economically Efficient Approach for Courts to Take in Martine-Salvage Cases: A Positive Analysis and Related Critique of Landes and Posner's Classic Study
  59 BUFF. L. REV. 57 (2011) · Buffalo Law Review · 2011

• On the Relevance of Economic Efficiency Conclusions
  29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (2001) · Florida State University Law Review · 2001

• Legitimate Legal Argument and Internally-Right Answers to Legal-Rights Questions
  74 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 415 (1999) · Chicago-Kent Law Review · 1999
• You Cannot Be Serious: A Reply to Professors Balkin and Levinson
  74 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 559 (1999) · Chicago-Kent Law Review · 1999
• Taking Legal Argument Seriously: An Introduction
  74 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 317 (1999) · Chicago-Kent Law Review · 1999
• Second-Best Theory and the Obligations of Academics: A Reply to Professor Donohue
  73 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 267 (1997) · Chicago-Kent Law Review · 1997
• The Allocative Efficiency of Shifting from a Negligence System to a Strict-Liability Regime in our Highly-Pareto-Imperfect Economy: A Partial and Preliminary Third-Best-Allocative-Efficiency Analysis
  73 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 11 (1997) · Chicago-Kent Law Review · 1997
• Second-Best Theory and Law & Economics: An Introduction
  73 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 3 (1997) · Chicago-Kent Law Review · 1997
• Monopoly and the Allocative Inefficiency of First-Best-Allocatively-Efficient Tort Law in Our Worse-Than-Second-Best World: The Whys and Some Therefores
  46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 313 (1996) · Case Western Reserve Law Review · 1996
• The American Antitrust Laws on the Centennial of the Sherman Act: A Critique of the Statutes Themselves, Their Interpretation, and Their Operationalization
  38 BUFF. L. REV. 673 (1990) · Buffalo Law Review · 1990

• International Competition, Market Definition, and the Appropriate Way to Analyze the Legality of Horizontal Mergers under the Clayton Act: A Positive Analysis and Critique of Both the Traditional Market-Oriented Approach and the Jutice Department's Horizontal Merger Guidelines
  64 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 745 (1988) · Chicago-Kent Law Review · 1988
• Ayres on Markovits and Markets: A Reply
  64 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 873 (1988) · Chicago-Kent Law Review · 1988
• Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Determination of Legal Entitlements: A Reply to Professor Carlson
  8 CARDOZO L. REV. 75 (1986) · Cardozo Law Review · 1986
• The Functions, Allocative Efficiency, and Legality of Tie-Ins: A Comment
  28 J. L. & ECON. (1985) · Journal of Law and Economics · 1985
• Legal Analysis and the Economic Analysis of Allocative Efficiency: A Response to Professor Posner's Reply
  11 HOFSTRA L. REV. (1983) · Hofstra Law Review · 1983
• Legal Analysis and the Economic Analysis of Allocative Efficiency
  8 HOFSTRA L. REV. (1980) · Hofstra Law Review · 1980

• Monopolistic Competition, Second Best, and <em>The Antitrust Paradox</em>: A Review Article
  77 MICH. L. REV. 567 (1979) · Michigan Law Review · 1979
• The Distributive Impact, Allocative Efficiency, and Overall Desirability of Ideal Housing Codes: Some Theoretical Clarifications
  89 HARV. L. REV. 1815 (1976) · Harvard Law Review · 1976
• Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory Part II: Tie-ins, Leverage, and the American Antitrust Laws
  80 YALE L.J. 195 (1970) · Yale Law Journal · 1970

• Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory
  76 YALE L.J. 1397 (1967) · Yale Law Journal · 1967