Claire A. Hill

Publications

• An Economic, Psychological, and Linguistic Explanation of (Some Reasons) Why Women Don’t Get a Fair Shake
  43 MINN. J. L. & INEQ. (2025) · Minnesota Journal of Law & Inequality · 2025
• Interview of Naomi Cahn, June Carbone & Nancy Levit
  43 MINN. J. L. & INEQ. (2025) · Minnesota Journal of Law & Inequality · 2025
• What Should Caremark Encompass?
  19 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 33 (2024) · Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law · 2024
• Reflections on Corporate Governance at Work
  99 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 269 (2024) · Chicago-Kent Law Review · 2024
• The Rhetoric and Reality of Shareholder Profit Maximization
  99 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 39 (2024) · Chicago-Kent Law Review · 2024
• Introduction Corporate Governance at Work
  99 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 3 (2024) · Chicago-Kent Law Review · 2024
• Bad Agent, Good Citizen?
  88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1631 (2020) · Fordham Law Review · 2020
• "Tone at the Top" and the Communication of Corporate Values: Lost in Translation?
  43 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 497 (2020) · Seattle University Law Review · 2020

• #MeToo and the Convergence of CSR and Profit Maximization
  69 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 895 (2019) · Case Western Reserve Law Review · 2019
• Cheap Sentiment
  81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67 (2018) · Law and Contemporary Problems · 2018
• An Identity Theory of the Short- and Long-Term Investor Debate
  41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 475 (2018) · Seattle University Law Review · 2018
• Repugnant Business Models: Preliminary Thoughts on a Research and Policy Agenda
  74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973 (2017) · Washington and Lee Law Review · 2017
• The Rhetoric of Negative Externalities
  39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 517 (2016) · Seattle University Law Review · 2016
• The Agency Cost Paradigm: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
  38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 561 (2015) · Seattle University Law Review · 2015
• The Motivating Force of a Bonus Pool, and Other Objections
  108 NW. U. L. REV. (2014) · Northwestern University Law Review · 2014
• Limits of Disclosure
  36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 599 (2013) · Seattle University Law Review · 2013
• Why Didn’t Subprime Investors Demand a (Much Larger) Lemons Premium?
  74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (2011) · Law and Contemporary Problems · 2011
• Of the Conditional Fee as a Response to Lawyers, Bankers and Loopholes
  1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. (2011) · American University Business Law Review · 2011
• Compromised Fiduciaries: Conflicts of Interest in Government and Business
  95 MINN. L. REV. 1637 (2011) · Minnesota Law Review · 2011
• Concepts, Categories, and Compliance in the Regulatory State
  94 MINN. L. REV. 1151 (2010) · Minnesota Law Review · 2010
• Berle’s Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability
  33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1173 (2010) · Seattle University Law Review · 2010
• Justification Norms Under Uncertainty: A Preliminary Inquiry
  Connecticut Insurance Law Journal · 2010

• Why Did Anyone Listen to the Rating Agencies After Enron?
  4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 283 (2009) · Journal of Business & Technology Law · 2009
• Self and Other: Cognitive Perspectives on Trust, Empathy and the Self - Introduction
  9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 637 (2008) · Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology · 2008
• The Rationality of Preference Construction (and the Irrationality of Rational Choice)
  9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 689 (2008) · Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology · 2008
• The Myth of Discovery: Review Essay of Barry Schwartz's The Paradox of Choice
  9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 743 (2008) · Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology · 2008
• Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty
  76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769 (2007) · Fordham Law Review · 2007
• Commentary: The Trajectory of Complex Business Contracting in Latin America
  83 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 179 (2007) · Chicago-Kent Law Review · 2007
• A Cognitive Theory of Trust
  84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1717 (2006) · Washington University Law Review · 2006
• Introduction
  80 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1043 (2005) · Chicago-Kent Law Review · 2005
• How Do German Contracts Do as Much with Fewer Words?
  79 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 889 (2004) · Chicago-Kent Law Review · 2004
• Regulating the Rating Agencies
  82 WASH. U. L. REV. 43 (2004) · Washington University Law Review · 2004
• Whole Business Securitization in Emerging Markets
  12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 521 (2002) · Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law · 2002
• The Future of Synthetic Securitization: A Comment on Bell & Dawson
  12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 563 (2002) · Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law · 2002
• A Comment on Language and Norms in Complex Business Contracting
  77 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 29 (2001) · Chicago-Kent Law Review · 2001
• Why Contracts Are Written in "Legalese"
  77 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 59 (2001) · Chicago-Kent Law Review · 2001
• Introduction: Theory Informs Business Practice: Introduction
  77 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 3 (2001) · Chicago-Kent Law Review · 2001

• How Investors React To Political Risk
  8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 283 (1998) · Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law · 1998
• Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons
  74 WASH. U. L. REV. 1061 (1996) · Washington University Law Review · 1996