U.S. Dep't of State, 2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Thailand

THAILAND (Tier 2) The Government of Thailand does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing efforts compared with the previous reporting period; therefore, Thailand remained on Tier 2. These efforts included increasing the number of trafficking investigations, prosecutions, and convictions. The government collaborated with foreign governments to facilitate repatriations of foreign victims fleeing forced labor and forced criminality in online scam operations in neighboring countries, including by developing a consular guidance pamphlet to support trafficking victims recovered from these operations.

The government opened and operated a large facility specifically developed for trafficking victim identification and referrals. With input from civil society, the government consolidated two previously existing screening forms to promote consistency in victim identification by front-line officials across agencies and updated guidance to include indicators of forced criminality and child forced labor. However, the government did not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. Inconsistent interviewing practices during labor inspections and victim identification interviews left many trafficking victims unidentified and without care, especially those exploited in forced labor and forced criminality.

The government’s requirements by law that most foreign victims remain in shelters throughout legal proceedings against traffickers deterred many potential victims from reporting their exploitation or agreeing to participate as witnesses, undercutting law enforcement and overall protection efforts. Significant gaps in the government’s provision of services to victims persisted, particularly in rural provinces, and quality of services varied across the country. Corruption and official complicity continued to impede anti-trafficking efforts, including along borders with neighboring countries. PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: Proactively investigate and prosecute officials allegedly complicit in facilitating trafficking, and seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, which should involve significant prison terms.

Ensure full implementation of the NRM to identify and protect trafficking victims exploited in neighboring countries in forced labor and forced criminality in online scam operations arriving in or transiting Thailand; cease placing victims in immigration detention centers and ensure victims are not inappropriately penalized solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. Use victim-centered and trauma-informed approaches during multidisciplinary team (MDT) interviews and labor inspections and include NGO representation in MDTs as a standard practice to support these efforts. Enforce worker protections in the fishing industry and other commercial sectors, including electronic pay options and minimum age requirements. Increase awareness among relevant officials of trafficking indicators such as debt-based coercion, excessive overtime, confiscation of documents, and non-payment of wages.

Increase the use and availability of interpreters to assist victims, including in shelters. Train officials on and ensure effective implementation of Section 6/1 of the anti-trafficking law and identification of labor trafficking victims. Ensure government- and NGO-operated shelters provide victims with adequate trauma-informed and individualized care, such as legal assistance and psychological care, and implement consistent policies on victim services across all shelters. Ensure labor violations and migrant workers’ complaints that include indicators of forced labor are investigated for trafficking crimes, including by enforcing procedures for labor officials to refer potential cases of labor trafficking to MDTs and law enforcement.

Standardize and consistently implement freedom of movement policies across the country for victims, especially adults, to move freely in and out of shelters and access communication devices regularly. Inform the public – including migrants, stateless communities, and ethnic and religious minorities – on unscrupulous recruitment, transportation, and employment practices that increase trafficking risks, including in online scam operations and the fishing industry.

PROSECUTION

The government slightly increased law enforcement efforts. Section 6 of the 2008 anti-trafficking law, as amended, criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of four to 12 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 400,000 to 1.2 million baht ($11,650 to $34,960) for offenses involving an adult victim and six to 20 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 600,000 to 2 million baht ($17,480 to $58,260) for those involving a child victim. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. A 2019 amendment to the 2008 anti-trafficking law added a separate provision under section 6/1, specifically addressing “forced labor or services,” which prescribed penalties of six months’ to four years’ imprisonment, a fine of 50,000 to 400,000 baht ($1,460 to $11,650) per victim, or both.

This provision prescribed significantly lower penalties for labor trafficking crimes than those already available under the existing human trafficking provision of the law. In 2024, the government reported investigating 381 trafficking cases (316 sex trafficking, 27 forced labor, and 38 unspecified forms of exploitation), prosecuting 647 suspected traffickers (547 for sex trafficking, 94 for forced labor, and six for unspecified forms of exploitation), and convicting 360 traffickers (328 for sex trafficking, 24 for forced labor, and eight for unspecified forms of exploitation); this compares with investigating 312 trafficking cases, prosecuting 542 suspected traffickers, and convicting 211 traffickers in 2023. Courts sentenced 273 convicted traffickers in 2024, with 99 percent sentenced to two or more years’ imprisonment and 48 percent sentenced to 10 or more years’ imprisonment. Forty-three trafficking prosecutions initiated in previous years remained ongoing.

The Thai Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force investigated 76 cases of internet-facilitated child trafficking in 2024 (99 in 2023). In 2024, courts issued forfeiture orders for assets valued at approximately 56.09 million baht ($1,633,864.61) in trafficking cases litigated by the Anti-Money Laundering Office. The government operated specialized anti-trafficking divisions in the Bangkok Criminal Court, the Office of the Attorney General (OAG), the Department of Special Investigation (DSI), the Ministry of Social Development and Human Services (MSDHS), the Ministry of Labor (MOL), and the Royal Thai Police (RTP). Thai authorities continued to share information and evidence with foreign governments, including in four investigations that remained ongoing at the end of the reporting period.

The RTP met with law enforcement officials from China and Burma in Tak Province to reportedly improve cooperation on efforts to combat trafficking, including in online scam operations. The government consulted with six foreign governments to continue development of a Transnational Referral Mechanism (TRM) to improve law enforcement coordination and victim assistance across country borders; the TRM was not finalized or implemented by the end of the reporting period. NGOs assessed officials did not effectively identify labor trafficking cases; this stemmed in large part from a lack of understanding of forced labor among officials, corruption, and unclear and unfavorable judicial interpretations of the law governing these cases. Some observers reported officials often did not identify debt-based coercion, excessive overtime, or withholding of wages as indicators of labor trafficking and required signs of physical force and restraint to identify trafficking victims.

Law enforcement often used the results of victim identification interviews as the final determination of whether a trafficking case existed; observers reported these interviews were sometimes ineffective. In some provinces, local officials lacked the capacity to effectively investigate trafficking, and some officials were reluctant to identify cases out of fear it would negatively impact perceptions of Thailand; some provincial governments continued to set “zero tolerance” policies for trafficking, which contributed to a reluctance to investigate cases and identify victims. Prosecutors worked with NGOs to prepare victims to testify, courts allowed NGO lawyers to serve as co-plaintiffs in some cases to legally support victims, and government shelters enabled victims to participate in mock courts to prepare them for participation in proceedings against traffickers. The OAG’s Witness Assistance Service provided witness protection to 18 victims and witnesses before and during criminal proceedings; the government reported officials maintained confidentiality of victims’ identities during and after proceedings.

The government reported providing direct legal assistance to an additional 12 trafficking victims and funding to NGOs that supported 96 trafficking victims with legal assistance. Nonetheless, some NGOs reported little support from the government when navigating a difficult legal process to assist victims. Fear of detention and extended shelter stays, a lack of adequate services, and potential retaliation from traffickers made some victims reluctant to participate in prosecutions. While some judges deployed trauma-informed and victim-centered engagement in courtrooms, other judges and court officials lacked sufficient understanding of trauma-informed care, potentially leading to victim re-traumatization.

Trafficking victims could testify by video or from a private room to avoid engaging with their trafficker; however, observers reported judges offered these options less frequently to male victims, including child victims and victims in witness protection. The option to testify by video or from a private room was applied inconsistently across provinces. In collaboration with civil society, the trafficking division of the criminal court initiated development of training curriculum for all new trafficking court judges. NGOs reported the government frequently rotated police officers with experience working trafficking cases out of their positions and replaced them with inexperienced officers.

RTP officials in northern provinces reported inadequate resources and limited staff impacted the ability of officers to attend trainings and systemically implement the material learned. The government, often in collaboration with NGOs and international organizations, trained police, immigration officials, and labor officials on victim identification, labor trafficking, online investigative techniques, and forensic interviews. Thai law enforcement also cooperated with international counterparts on international child sex trafficking cases. In partnership with a foreign government donor, the government continued to coordinate oversight of a new facility to provide capacity building training for law enforcement officials and to improve regional cooperation in trafficking investigations.

In collaboration with NGOs, the OAG provided anti-trafficking trainings for prosecutors on the use of trauma-informed approaches. The government also held workshops with various agencies to increase interagency collaboration. The OAG’s trafficking litigation unit continued to use teams of prosecutors with experience working trafficking cases in each region to advise less experienced prosecutors and law enforcement. Despite the government conducting numerous trainings covering a variety of the topics for officials, observers noted varied and sometimes minimal tangible impact of trainings, suggesting many officials still lacked a sufficient understanding of trafficking indicators and effective anti-trafficking measures.

Corruption and official complicity in trafficking and related crimes perpetuated human trafficking and allowed traffickers to operate with impunity. This included corrupt immigration and local law enforcement officials facilitating trafficking by accepting bribes from brokers and smugglers along Thai borders and through international airports, transporting individuals across borders for illicit jobs, and bypassing visa and other immigration documentation protocols, which observers reported contributed to traffickers increasingly utilizing Thailand as a transit country to exploit victims in special economic zones (SEZs) and online scam operations in neighboring countries. A Deputy Prime Minister chaired the National Committee on Prevention of Official Complicity in Human Trafficking. DSI continued to operate the Complicit Officials in Human Trafficking Monitoring and Investigation Center, which monitored and investigated suspected complicit officials and utilized a database of public officials who worked on trafficking cases, allowing it to monitor the progress of cases.

The government reported initiating investigations of three officials accused of complicity in trafficking crimes in 2024 and continuing investigations into seven officials from previous reporting periods; this compared with new investigations of 20 officials in 2023. The courts did not report convicting or sentencing any complicit officials in 2024. The government did not report the status of prosecutions initiated in February 2023 of 107 immigration officials charged with illegal issuance of visas to Chinese nationals potentially associated with online scam operations involved in forced criminality in neighboring countries.

PROTECTION

The government slightly increased efforts to identify and protect victims. The government identified 644 victims (278 sex trafficking victims, 358 labor trafficking victims, and eight victims of unspecified forms of exploitation) compared with 640 victims identified in 2023. Reporting numbers for sex trafficking victims may include victims of non-trafficking sexual exploitation and other sex-related crimes. Authorities identified 206 migrant labor trafficking victims exploited in Thailand in 2024, compared with 105 migrant labor trafficking victims identified in 2023.

The government reported providing services to all 644 victims (compared with 640 victims in 2023), including through the provision of shelter, reintegration support, legal assistance, financial assistance, and other support; 417 victims received assistance in government shelters, 17 victims resided in NGO-run government-registered shelters, and 80 victims – the vast majority of whom were Thai – received services outside shelters. The government continued to implement the NRM, which guided officials to place potential victims in a temporary shelter where they could access basic services for up to 15 days before undergoing identification interviews by MDTs. The government facilitated a subcommittee of its NRM Committee that supported oversight of victim services assistance and access to compensation. MDTs, comprising representatives from government agencies and NGOs, interviewed potential victims to formally identify trafficking victims and refer them to services.

Formal identification by MDTs was necessary for victims to obtain a legal right to the full range of services available to trafficking victims, including access to the government’s trafficking shelters. After formal identification by MDTs, the government provided victims who consented to participate in legal proceedings against traffickers with services or allowed victims an additional 30 days to decide if they wished to participate in legal proceedings. Both civil society actors and government officials reported long processing times within the NRM, leading some potential and confirmed trafficking victims to opt out of the NRM process; this left some victims without services and unable to support trafficking prosecutions. Delays further dissuaded foreign victims from going through the NRM so they could return home sooner, even if it meant facing deportation.

The law permitted foreign trafficking victims and witnesses to stay and work in Thailand for up to two years upon the completion of legal proceedings against traffickers; the government did not report extending this benefit to any victims. Observers noted Thai authorities in some rural and border towns experienced resource limitations that prevented them from screening and referring all potential victims under the NRM. In response to the proliferation of online scam operations in neighboring countries, the government collaborated with an international organization and foreign embassies to develop consular guidance on victim identification and referral procedures to support migrant workers and foreign victims in Thailand; the guidance was finalized but not yet implemented by the end of the reporting period. In February 2025, ethnic armed organization security forces in Burma released approximately 7,000 individuals from scam compounds located along the Thai border, including victims of forced criminality in online scam operations.

The government repatriated approximately 6,258 foreign victims throughout Thailand in coordination with and at the expense of their home countries’ embassies or civil society. Due to resource constraints and the number of individuals waiting to cross the border into Thailand to return to their home countries, Thai authorities were unable to fully implement the NRM to identify trafficking victims and adopted an abbreviated SOP that prioritized rapid repatriation. Observers noted the expedited process often grouped individuals by nationality and authorities often designated whole groups as either trafficking victims or perpetrators. This inhibited the identification of some victims and their referral to services.

In September 2024, the government opened a new victim identification and referral center in Don Mueang District, Bangkok, to serve potential victims during the NRM reflection period. The center included victim-friendly interviewing spaces, medical facilities, and a recreation area, with capacity for 120 potential victims. The government identified facilities in all 77 provinces that could operate as victim identification centers, where potential victims could receive services during their reflection periods; in 2024, a total of 16 such centers assisted 192 potential victims, a significant decrease compared with 759 victims in 2023. The government, in collaboration with civil society organizations, trained officials from relevant agencies on the NRM.

Civil society reported that officials did not consistently apply trafficking indicators and a trauma-informed approach to accurately identify trafficking victims, especially in provincial areas and where language interpretation resources were inadequate, although they noted some progress compared with previous years. Some officials lacked an understanding of trafficking indicators, particularly in the context of forced labor and forced criminality, and the government did not allocate sufficient resources to ensure its effective implementation throughout the country or provide sufficient training to labor inspectors on it. With input from civil society, the government consolidated and streamlined two separate SOPs for victim identification, updated the trafficking indicators to include forced criminality and child forced labor, and piloted the resulting new form in four provinces. The government implemented SOPs for the identification of labor trafficking victims according to the 2019 forced labor amendment of the trafficking law (section 6/1).

The government reported conducting more than 22,563 initial screenings and identified 644 potential victims in 2024, all of whom entered the NRM process; officials referred potential victims to MDTs for formal identification interviews, in accordance with the SOPs. MSDHS reported developing an electronic database to track victim screening and identification nationwide but did not implement it during the reporting period. Some officials lacked an understanding of trafficking and did not effectively implement identification procedures consistently throughout the country. Some officials incorrectly concluded if individuals originally consented to come to Thailand to work, including via outside legal migration channels or knowingly or unknowingly taking illicit jobs, they could not be trafficking victims.

The government required immigration officials be present for MDT interviews involving migrants, reportedly deterring some from recounting their experiences, fearing deportation or detention. There were reports that authorities discouraged MDTs from changing their assessments after a second victim interview. While MDTs confirmed trafficking victims, MDT personnel – which typically included local police officers and provincial MSDHS staff, and sometimes local labor officials – at times lacked sufficient experience with trafficking victims. To address gaps in victim identification among provincial level officials, the government continued to send teams to support less experienced MDTs in the identification process; this was not a standard practice across all regions.

Labor inspectors and members of the Royal Thai Navy screened migrant workers for trafficking during inspections, including during inspections of fishing vessels. However, due to inconsistent and ineffective interviewing practices during inspections, many labor trafficking victims remained unidentified. Observers also reported labor inspectors did not understand their role included identifying trafficking victims. NGOs reported assisting trafficking victims on fishing vessels that underwent inspections but whom authorities did not identify as victims.

The law only protected victims from prosecution for unlawful immigration and commercial sex acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked; due to incomplete implementation of victim identification procedures, the government did not take effective measures to prevent the inappropriate penalization of potential trafficking victims solely for immigration violations and other unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. Officials did not consistently screen undocumented migrants for trafficking, particularly those fleeing armed conflict in Burma, those in immigration detention centers, or those fleeing online scam operations in neighboring countries, which left many unidentified victims detained and without services. Some undocumented foreign victims likely did not report their exploitation to authorities due to fear of arrest and deportation. Some officials lacked understanding of forced labor in online scam operations and stated those exploited could not be trafficking victims, despite widespread reports indicating most individuals recruited for these operations faced conditions indicative of forced labor.

The government collaborated with at least 23 foreign governments to facilitate repatriations of foreign victims fleeing exploitation in online scam operations in neighboring countries – primarily in Burma. In March 2025, the RTP and Thai embassies worked to facilitate the repatriation of 119 Thai nationals who escaped or were released from online scam operations in Cambodia, ultimately charging 100 of them with fraud and similar offenses. Thai authorities publicly committed to identifying and protecting trafficking victims within the group and bringing criminal charges only against non-victims; however, due to the lack of clear and consistent standards for victim identification in the forced criminality context, the government did not take effective measures to prevent the inappropriate penalization of potential trafficking victims solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. In February 2025, the government forcibly returned 40 Uyghur men to China, where Uyghurs have faced significant risks of state-sponsored forced labor.

The government continued to refer victims formally identified by MDTs to government- and NGO-operated shelters where they had access to counseling, legal assistance, medical care, civil compensation, financial aid, witness protection, education or vocational trainings, and employment opportunities. The MSDHS operated 77 short-stay shelters and nine long-term regional trafficking shelters for victims, including four dedicated to men and families, four for women and girls, and one for boys. The government typically only permitted foreign victims who held a valid visa or work permit at the time of their formal identification to stay outside government shelters during legal proceedings against traffickers. Shelters continued to partner with companies to provide victims with opportunities to work outside shelters; MSDHS partnered with 27 businesses in 2024 (13 in 2023) to provide job opportunities to 16 adult survivors of trafficking seeking employment.

MSDHS trafficking shelters did not allow some victims, including adults and those with temporary stay permits, to leave without permission, which authorities determined on a case-by-case basis; only victims who received permission to work outside shelters could leave the shelter on a regular basis for work. In addition, shelter staff sometimes restricted victims’ access to personal cell phones, particularly at the beginning of shelter stays, and sometimes required victims obtain permission to make personal phone calls. MSDHS implemented standards of care for trafficking shelters, which incorporated input from survivors of trafficking in the previous reporting period. In practice, MSDHS implemented different policies for different shelters and among different populations regarding victims’ communication and freedom of movement.

Officials previously said these measures were taken to ensure victims’ safety and to prevent re-victimization; however, requiring victims to remain in shelters longer than necessary, combined with restrictions on movement and communication during shelter stays, may have contributed to some victims’ re-traumatization and inhibited their ability to earn an income. The government reported permitting victims to choose whether to stay at a government-run or one of the three government-registered NGO shelters; victims often preferred to stay at the NGO shelters over government-operated shelters in part because of greater freedom of movement and communication access. Victims using the NGO shelters could still obtain compensation from the government’s anti-trafficking fund. Civil society noted some shelter directors partnered effectively with local NGOs to offer shelter residents a variety of on-site services and activities, and shelter staff increasingly adhered to trauma-informed principles in their care – including those in Chiang Rai, Pathum Thani, Pattaya, and Nonthaburi – while noting that such considerations varied widely across different locations.

Observers reported victims residing in shelters experienced improved freedom of movement compared with prior years. Some shelters permitted residents to call friends and family regularly, and civil society noted increased efforts during the current reporting period; however, these practices varied by location. The required shelter stays continued to deter foreign victims from cooperating with law enforcement, with some preferring to be deported to their home countries instead. One government shelter housed adult men and child trafficking victims in the same facility, some shelters did not separate trafficking victims of different sexes due to reported limitations on space, and female victims were held in facilities with all male staff, all of which contributed to safety risks.

Some NGO-operated non-trafficking shelters, such as registered children’s homes, reported facing challenges accepting formally-identified trafficking victims even though they were well-equipped to serve them. MSDHS shelters employed inconsistent policies and provision of care to victims. Government shelters often lacked adequate numbers of psychologists and staff trained on trauma-informed care, inhibiting victims from obtaining psycho-social support, and in some cases, would refer victims to local hospitals for mental health support. The MSDHS reported all shelters had the capacity to provide temporary accommodations to victims vulnerable on the basis of their sexual orientation and/or identity, and one shelter could provide long-term accommodations; however, the long-term shelter did not provide separate bedrooms and restroom facilities for these victims.

MSDHS did not equip its shelters to provide adequate accommodations for victims with disabilities. Although MSDHS had previously reported working with the National Interpreter Association to increase the number of interpreters available to assist shelters, an ongoing lack of interpreters weakened shelter capacity to provide services to victims. Shelter staff arranged for interpreters when they or other government officials needed to question residents – for example, in connection with a court proceeding – but interpreter services were otherwise not available. Non-Thai-speaking residents, therefore, did not have any consistent means to raise questions or concerns with staff, potentially impacting their access to receiving appropriate support.

NGOs reported interpreters who participated in victim identification interviews lacked training in trafficking cases. In 2024, the government provided 2.72 million baht ($2.1 million) to 88 trafficking victims from its anti-trafficking fund (compared with 2.67 million baht ($77,774) in 2023). Victims were reportedly eligible to receive payment from the fund regardless of whether they were staying in a shelter or their trafficker failed to pay any damages or restitution. NGOs reported the process for victims to access this fund was complex, preventing some victims from obtaining necessary monetary support.

The government operated an online platform for victims to submit requests for compensation from the trafficking fund. The law obligated prosecutors to file restitution claims when a victim expressed intention to make a claim. The Human Trafficking Criminal Procedures Act allowed judges to award compensation or restitution to victims, including in the absence of a victim request for these funds. The law allowed the government to use assets seized from traffickers as financial remedies for victims; OAG reported prosecutors seized assets valued at 19.9 million baht ($579,670) in 2024 for restitution purposes.

The government reported courts ordered 117.4 million baht ($3.4 million) in restitution for victims across 136 cases, compared with 43.7 million baht ($1.3 million) in 2023.

PREVENTION

The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. The Prime Minister chaired the National Anti-Human Trafficking Committee and the Coordinating and Monitoring of Anti-Trafficking in Persons Performance Committee. While the National Committee did not report conducting any meetings, the government reported that the NRM Subcommittee of the National Committee conducted initiatives for judges, prosecutors, provincial officials, and others during the reporting period. In 2024, the government reported allocating approximately 328.7 million baht ($9.6 million) to combatting human trafficking generally, including prevention activities.

Government agencies conducted numerous anti-trafficking awareness and prevention campaigns, including through awareness trainings aimed to prevent child sex trafficking and online child sexual exploitation. Some awareness campaigns highlighted the risks of forced criminality in online scam operations through fraudulent recruitment and jobs advertisements. The government sought input from trafficking survivors during the reporting period. The government did not report any updates to a draft law reported in a previous period seeking to increase regulations on NGOs in Thailand that would, if enacted, negatively impact NGOs’ ability to conduct anti-trafficking work in Thailand.

MSDHS operated a mobile application for trafficking victims and witnesses to report exploitation and request protective services, including interpretation, and it provided information on the rights of trafficking victims in seven languages. MSDHS and MOL operated hotlines with operators fluent in 19 foreign languages. In 2024, the MSDHS received 167 reports related to possible trafficking cases (109 via its hotline, 28 via social media platforms, and 30 through reports made to MSDHS officials in-person), which were referred to relevant agencies for investigation and identification (compared with 71 cases received by the hotline in 2023); officials identified 97 trafficking victims as a result of these inquiries. The law permitted recruitment agencies to charge recruitment fees to Thai nationals seeking overseas employment.

Fees charged by unscrupulous recruitment agencies made workers vulnerable to debt-based coercion. In 2024, MOL investigated 152 recruitment agencies and brought civil actions against 284 individuals suspected to have engaged in illegal practices. MOL also investigated and brought civil actions in connection with 33 cases of unauthorized job advertising, while the RTP made 72 arrests related to the posting of false or deceptive job advertisements online. Authorities reported denying 250 Thai nationals permission to depart Thailand for illegal and potentially exploitative work abroad, then provided them with counseling on human trafficking risk.

The government maintained bilateral MOUs with neighboring countries to recruit migrant workers to Thailand. Authorities continued to implement revised migrant worker recruitment measures developed by a working group in the previous reporting period. The complicated nature of the government’s migrant worker registration programs, including the MOU process, often resulted in workers’ and employers’ reliance on brokers who charged fees to workers, in addition to fees charged by the government, or used informal channels to bring workers to Thailand, thereby increasing their vulnerability to debt-based coercion. The government enacted resolutions to enable workers to stay in the country after their initial registration expired and to provide work permits to unregistered workers already in the country, but the registration process was costly and difficult to navigate and thus exposed migrant workers to risks similar to those associated with the MOU process.

The 2018 Royal Ordinance on Management of Migrant Workers required employers to provide workers a copy of their employment contracts and to cover some costs, such as recruitment fees and transportation costs, and it prohibited employers from deducting more than 10 percent of workers’ monthly salaries for personal expenses and retaining travel or other personal documents. The law prescribed penalties of fines ranging from 10,000 to 100,000 baht ($291 to $2,910) and up to six months’ imprisonment for employers. Despite inspecting 321 migrant recruitment agencies, the government did not find any in violation of laws or regulations. MOL reported fining 560 employers a total of 1.76 million baht ($51,270), with no terms of imprisonment, for employment violations under the law in the previous reporting period.

The MOL reported conducting inspections at 1,409 business establishments categorized as at-risk of child labor and forced labor and initiated prosecutions against five establishments for Labor Protection Act violations. The law did not prohibit employers and recruiters from charging migrant workers with some costs related to their recruitment, such as expenses for passports, medical checks, and work permits; NGOs reported authorities did not adequately define and enforce the regulations on recruitment fees, and therefore recruitment agencies and brokers still required workers to pay some recruitment fees and transportation costs. The ordinance enabled employers to retain workers’ documents if they obtained their consent and if the employer provided access to the documents; however, observers reported because enforcement was lacking and workers were often unaware of their rights, some unscrupulous employers retained workers’ documents as a means of compelling them to work. According to NGOs, inadequate regulation of brokers and recruitment agencies contributed to practices that facilitated trafficking.

Although government regulations permitted exploited migrant workers to change employers, some policies restricted their ability to do so in practice and sometimes resulted in workers incurring additional fees when they did change employers. The Labor Protection Act excluded seasonal agricultural from benefits and protections, which heightened their risk of being trafficked. Labor laws prevented migrant workers from forming labor unions, which, according to civil society organizations, further contributed to these workers’ vulnerability to forced labor and labor trafficking. The Ministerial Regulations on the Protection of Labor in the Marine Fisheries required employers to provide a contract in a language migrant fishermen could understand, maintain a record of payments to workers, afford at least 10 hours of rest per day, and provide sufficient meals and drinking water to fishermen on vessels.

Regulations also required employers to pay workers’ salaries at least once per month through electronic deposits and to share catch profits. However, concerns remained that some workers still were required to work more than the proscribed limit, were still paid in cash, were unable to access their funds because of a lack of cash machines near some ports, or were not sufficiently trained on how to use the payment system, and vessel owners, captains, or brokers withheld workers’ bank cards and security codes. A lack of clear guidance from authorities to measure work and rest hours for workers aboard fishing vessels heightened their risk of trafficking. Draft legislation proposing changes that would weaken worker protections in the fishing industry – including exceptions to minimum age requirements and the removal of enhanced penalties for child labor and forced labor violations in seafood processing – remained under consideration in Parliament.

MOL worked with NGOs to provide services, including receiving complaints of labor violations, assisting workers in changing employers, and updating workers’ registration documents, at 30 migrant worker assistance centers. MOL conducted inspections at high-risk workplaces and found 1,278 violations of labor laws. Observers reported labor inspectors were sometimes deterred from completing inspections when companies had influential owners and inspectors minimally interacted with workers, often because of language barriers, which prevented them from identifying indicators of trafficking. The government operated inspection centers at ports to verify whether fishing vessels were operating legally; authorities reported identifying labor violations on 15 vessels but did not report identifying any victims.

Some officials reportedly did not follow existing procedures, and at-port labor inspections continued to be inconsistent and ineffective at identifying potential cases of forced labor on fishing vessels, often because of a lack of victim-centered interview practices. Observers indicated some vessel owners and other workplaces received advance warning of labor inspections; observers also noted an insufficient number of interpreters available to assist workers during inspections, and employers, including vessel captains, were present during inspections, deterring workers from reporting their exploitation to authorities. Despite including guidance in the Port-in Port-out (PIPO) inspection manual on handling reports of missing fishermen, in practice, at-port inspection centers did not universally apply a standardized procedure for referring cases of fishermen who went missing at sea, including identifying indicators of trafficking on the vessels in which they went missing. The government did not report conducting at-sea inspections of fishing vessels but did inspect 9,348 fishing vessels docked at PIPO centers; authorities did not identify trafficking victims or pursue any trafficking charges.

At-sea inspections did not include sufficient checks for labor violations or consistently have interpreters available for interviewing foreign crewmembers. The government has never reported identifying trafficking victims as a result of labor inspections of fishing vessels. The government made some efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts, including conducting arrests and investigations of individuals involved in child commercial sexual exploitation and trafficking (130 individuals arrested in 2024, compared with 197 individuals arrested in 2023). National and provincial law enforcement, child protection, and tourism authorities partnered with civil society and the private sector to develop a pilot project for the prevention of child exploitation in tourism in Phang Nga province; the project remained ongoing by the end of the reporting period.

The government did not report providing training on human trafficking to Thai diplomats or Thai peacekeepers deployed overseas. In February 2025, Thai authorities cut electricity, internet, and fuel exports to five areas along the Burma-Thailand border known to supply some scam centers and strengthened border security in Mae Sot; these actions potentially increased operating costs for these compounds and contributed to increased pressure on compound operators in Burma that led to the release of some trafficking victims. However, civil society reported scam compounds continued to operate and expand in the area following these actions. TRAFFICKING PROFILE: Trafficking affects all communities.

This section summarizes government and civil society reporting on the nature and scope of trafficking over the past five years. Human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Thailand, and traffickers exploit Thai victims abroad. In Thailand, labor and sex traffickers exploit women, men, individuals vulnerable on the basis of their sexual orientation or identity, and children from Thailand, other Southeast Asian countries, Sri Lanka, Russia, Uzbekistan, and increasingly some Northern African and Sub-Saharan African countries, including Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Members of ethnic minorities, highland persons, and stateless persons in Thailand experience instances of abuse indicative of trafficking.

Traffickers exploit children, particularly boys, in sex and labor trafficking in religious and spiritual institutions. Children from Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, and Laos are increasingly victims of sex trafficking in brothels, massage parlors, bars, karaoke lounges, hotels, and private residences. Traffickers induce Thai children to perform sex acts through videos and photos on the Internet, sometimes by blackmailing victims with explicit images. Children are lured by traffickers into commercial sex through the Internet, chat and dating applications, and other social networking platforms.

Thai authorities and civil society increasingly report cases of children engaging in “peer-to-peer trafficking”, where members of an online group market commercial sex services on behalf of themselves and others, including self-generated child sexual abuse material (CSAM). Children residing in orphanages and group homes are at risk of trafficking. Children increasingly fleeing armed conflict and violence in neighboring countries are at increased risk of exploitation in sex trafficking and in dangerous and illegal labor situations, particularly in border provinces and areas where seasonal and informal work is common. Approximately 140,979 Thai children of legal working age – 15 to 18 years old – are involved in child labor, including in agriculture, auto repair and other service trades, construction, manufacturing, and in the hospitality industry, and were at risk of forced labor.

Many of these children are not in school, many work in hazardous conditions with long and irregular working hours, and most are at risk of trafficking. Some brokers or parents force children from Thailand, Cambodia, and Burma to sell flowers or other items on the streets, to beg, or to work in domestic service in urban areas. Some elderly persons and persons with disabilities from Cambodia are forced to beg in Thailand. Traffickers subject Thai nationals to forced labor and sex trafficking in countries in North America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

Traffickers subject some Thai men and women to forced labor in Israel’s agricultural sector, imposing long working hours, disallowing breaks or rest days, withholding passports, and preventing victims from changing employers through limitations on work permits. More than 100,000 Thais work in the Republic of Korea, where traffickers subject Thai men and women to forced labor and sex trafficking, including forcing victims who owe debts to entertainment establishment owners or loan sharks into commercial sex. Traffickers exploit Thais in forced labor for berry picking in Sweden and Finland. Traffickers often use Thailand as a transit country for online scam operations located primarily in Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

Traffickers recruit individuals from more than 70 countries with fraudulent promises of high paying jobs in Thailand, then transport them to neighboring countries where these operations are located, where criminal syndicates compel these victims to facilitate illegal online gambling schemes, crypto investment schemes, and romance scams, often through physical and sexual violence. Thai victims are also exploited in these scam operations in Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Thai children are at risk of forced labor in SEZs where criminal activity is widespread. Smugglers, brokers, employers, and others exploit Thai and migrant workers in labor trafficking in commercial fishing and related industries, the poultry industry, manufacturing, construction, garment, agriculture, domestic work, and street begging.

NGOs previously reported indicators of forced labor in the production of ethanol, sugar cane, palm oil, and rubber. Burmese nationals are increasingly vulnerable to human trafficking crimes in Thailand. Ongoing armed conflict, economic hardship, and the enforcement of Burma’s conscription law increased the number of civilians migrating to Thailand, thereby also increasing their vulnerabilities to trafficking. These migrants, as well as migrant workers from other countries seeking employment in Thailand, are at risk to trafficking in Thailand.

This increased migration coincides with an increase of informal and illegal broker networks operating between Thailand and Burma, which recruit migrants for work in various sectors, including in garment factories and on fishing vessels. Many workers pay fees to brokers, recruitment agencies, and others before and after they arrive in Thailand. Observers reported migrant workers were more likely to trust local brokers than government officials. Traffickers often use debt-based coercion, deceptive recruitment practices, retention of identity documents and bank cards, illegal wage deductions, physical violence, and other means to subject victims to forced labor.

Employers confiscate workers’ identity documents to compel workers to remain in their jobs, often in addition to paying less than the minimum wage and failing to provide workers a day off. Workers in the seafood processing and fishing sectors increasingly faced forced overtime because of an increasing demand for shelf-stable seafood, as well as unsafe working conditions. Vessel owners, brokers, and senior vessel crew subject Thai, Burmese, Cambodian, Vietnamese, and Indonesian men and boys to forced labor on Thai and foreign-owned fishing boats. Some are paid little or irregularly, sometimes as infrequently as once a year, incur debts from brokers and employers, work as much as 18 to 20 hours per day for seven days a week, and are not provided adequate food, water, or medical supplies.

Some boat captains threaten, beat, and drug fishermen to work longer and sell fishermen drugs as a means to generate additional debt. Fishing vessel owners confiscate the identity documents of fishermen without their consent. Some trafficking victims in the fishing sector have difficulty returning home because of isolated workplaces, unpaid wages, and a lack of legitimate identity documents or safe means to travel. Employers in fishing and seafood processing often made confusing wage deductions for documentation fees, advances, and other charges, making it difficult for workers to account for their wages accurately; in some cases, employers withheld workers’ bank cards, denying them access to their earnings.

Corruption continues to undermine anti-trafficking efforts. Some government officials are directly complicit in trafficking crimes, including through accepting bribes or loans from business owners and brothels that exploit victims. Corrupt immigration officials facilitate trafficking by accepting bribes from brokers and smugglers along Thai borders and at international airports. Observers reported this contributed to the significant and increasing trend of traffickers utilizing Thailand as a transit country to exploit victims in SEZs and online scam operations in neighboring countries.

Credible reports indicate some corrupt officials protect brothels, other commercial sex venues, factory owners, agriculture business owners, and fishing vessel owners from law enforcement actions, inspections, and prosecutions and collude with traffickers. Some government officials profit from bribes and direct involvement in extortion from and exploitation of migrants. On This Page search > < THAILAND (Tier 2) PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: PROSECUTION PROTECTION PREVENTION TRAFFICKING PROFILE: Tags Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Human Trafficking Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons Reports Thailand