U.S. Dep't of State, 2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Mali

MALI (Tier 2) The transition government of Mali does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so. The transition government demonstrated overall increasing efforts compared with the previous reporting period; therefore, Mali was upgraded to Tier 2. These efforts included adopting a new law that criminalized hereditary slavery and enhanced penalties for trafficking. The transition government investigated more trafficking cases and prosecuted significantly more alleged traffickers, including for hereditary slavery crimes.

The transition government identified and referred to services more trafficking victims. It trained more front-line officials on human trafficking in collaboration with civil society and established four regional anti-trafficking committees. However, the transition government did not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. The transition government’s efforts to identify and protect hereditary slavery victims, including from acts of violence and retribution, were inadequate.

Shelter and services for victims, especially male victims, remained insufficient and were primarily restricted to Bamako. The transition government lacked full control over large portions of its territory, particularly in the northern and central regions, limiting its ability to combat trafficking crimes, provide victims with services, and gather data. PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: Using the NRM for victim identification and referral to care, proactively screen for trafficking indicators among vulnerable populations, including children associated with armed groups, communities historically exploited in hereditary slavery, Cuban regime-affiliated workers, IDPs, and individuals in commercial sex, and refer all victims to services. Increase services available to all trafficking victims, including adults and victims outside of the capital, in coordination with civil society.

Vigorously investigate and prosecute cases of human trafficking, including hereditary slavery, and cases of unlawful recruitment or use of child soldiers, and seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, including complicit officials, which should involve significant prison terms. Continue efforts to prevent the unlawful recruitment or use of children by security forces and non-state armed groups, including by approving and implementing the prevention plan drafted with an international organization. Cease coordination with and support to non-state armed groups unlawfully recruiting or using child soldiers, including in combat or support roles. Train law enforcement officials on the anti-trafficking law and the new hereditary slavery law.

Train front-line actors, including law enforcement, security forces, judicial officials, social workers, and civil society, on the NRM and standard procedures to refer trafficking victims to services. Expand and strengthen reintegration programs for former child soldiers to include psycho-social care, family reintegration, education, and vocational training. Cease inappropriately detaining children for alleged association with armed groups and refer all children associated with armed groups to care per the 2013 inter-ministerial protocol. Institutionalize training for law enforcement and judicial actors on investigating and prosecuting trafficking crimes under the 2012 anti-trafficking law and on victim-centered investigative and prosecutorial techniques.

Empower the National Committee of Trafficking in Persons and Related Practices (CNCTLPA) to coordinate the transition government’s anti-trafficking response and implementation of the 2023-2027 NAP.

PROSECUTION

The transition government increased law enforcement efforts. Law 2012-023 Relating to the Combat against Trafficking in Persons and Similar Practices, as amended, criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking. The law prescribed penalties of five to 10 years’ imprisonment for trafficking crimes, except forced begging for which it prescribed lesser penalties of two to five years’ imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 to 2 million West African CFA francs (FCFA) ($850-$3,400). These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those for other grave crimes, such as rape.

Transition government officials and NGOs reported the law did not precisely define hereditary slavery and therefore could not be effectively implemented to prosecute trafficking cases involving hereditary slavery. In October 2024, the National Transition Council adopted the Combating Slavery and Similar Practices law, which criminalized all forms of slavery, including descent-based (hereditary) slavery, and related crimes. The law also established enhanced penalties for human trafficking. The transition government reported investigating 68 trafficking cases, including 30 hereditary slavery cases, compared with investigating 48 cases, including eight hereditary slavery cases, during the previous reporting period.

The transition government reported prosecuting 300 alleged traffickers, including 234 defendants for hereditary slavery-related crimes, and convicting three traffickers, including two traffickers for hereditary slavery crimes. The transition government did not report sentencing information. This was a significant increase compared with prosecuting 84 alleged traffickers, including 24 defendants for hereditary slavery crimes, and convicting four traffickers during the previous reporting period. The transition government prosecuted some hereditary slavery crimes as misdemeanors under discrimination, destruction of crops, or burglary statutes, which prescribed significantly lower penalties than those available under the anti-trafficking law.

The Specialized Judiciary Brigade (PJS) and Specialized Investigative Brigade investigated and prosecuted transnational trafficking cases. The Migrant Smuggling and Trafficking Brigade investigated illegal immigration and migrant smuggling, including potential trafficking cases, and referred cases to the PJS for further investigation. The Morals Brigade investigated crimes related to morality, including sex trafficking and cases involving children. These units lacked adequate resources and training and could not access portions of the country due to insecurity.

The transition government, in collaboration with international organizations and foreign donors, trained a significant number of judicial and law enforcement officials, community leaders, and journalists on human trafficking, including the anti-trafficking law and victim identification. Despite more trainings, observers reported limited understanding of the anti-trafficking law, and frequent turnover and transfer of officials continued to impede law enforcement action. Law enforcement’s system-wide lack of training, funding, and resources, including a lack of vehicles and equipment to investigate crimes, also continued to impede anti-trafficking efforts. Insufficient funding and personnel continued to limit the justice sector’s capacity and cause significant judicial delays, while insecurity limited court sessions to Bamako and some regional capitals.

The transition government did not report cooperating with foreign counterparts on law enforcement activities. The transition government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of transition government officials complicit in human trafficking crimes, including hereditary slavery, or past unlawful recruitment or use of child soldiers; however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action. Observers previously reported officials issued fraudulent documentation and accepted bribes to facilitate migrant smuggling; some officials reportedly sexually exploited refugees and migrants as “payment” of bribes. During the reporting period, the government coordinated with and supported the Mouvement pour le Salut de l’Azawad-Daoussahak (MSA-D), a non-state armed group that unlawfully recruited and used child soldiers.

PROTECTION

The transition government increased efforts to identify and protect trafficking victims. The transition government reported identifying and referring to services 102 child trafficking victims. This was an increase compared with identifying and referring to services 15 victims in the previous reporting period. An international organization identified and provided services to an additional 285 trafficking victims (including 227 sex trafficking victims, including 215 women and 12 girls, and 58 forced labor victims, including 37 men, one woman, 19 boys, and one girl).

The transition government reported identifying and referring to services 13 children unlawfully recruited and used by armed groups, including potential trafficking victims. As in past years, the transition government did not report proactively identifying any victims of hereditary slavery. Due to inadequate screening among vulnerable populations, the transition government did not take effective measures to prevent the inappropriate penalization of potential victims solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked, particularly for immigration violations. The transition government did not screen nearly 1,000 migrants arrested and detained following two migrant smuggling law enforcement operations.

In partnership with an international organization, the transition government continued developing a pilot database to track trafficking victim statistics and improve victim identification and referral to care. The transition government continued implementing and training front-line officials on its NRM with standard procedures to identify and refer to care trafficking victims, including hereditary slavery victims. The transition government worked closely with the Fodé and Yeguine Network for Action, a national network comprising NGOs, international organizations, and transition government ministries, including the Ministry for the Advancement of Women, Children, and the Family (MFFE), to refer trafficking victims to service providers. The transition government relied on NGOs to provide the majority of services for victims, largely funded by private and international donors, but provided some financial and in-kind government support.

An NGO reported the transition government provided 20 million FCFA francs ($31,949) for victim care, the same amount the government provided during the previous reporting period. NGOs provided shelter, psycho-social support, medical care, repatriation support, and reintegration assistance. An international organization and NGOs operated 13 transit centers for adult and child victims of crime, including trafficking; these included the country’s only specialized shelter for female adult trafficking victims in Bamako. Officials could refer victims to the MFFE’s general care facilities for services.

An international organization-operated transit center provided voluntary return and reintegration services to migrants in the capital. A foreign embassy also ran a transit center for its nationals that could accommodate up to 80 victims of crime, including trafficking. Local NGOs, with in-kind support from the transition government, screened and provided shelter services to victims of hereditary slavery. Shelters and services for victims, especially outside the capital, remained inadequate, and rising insecurity limited NGOs’ ability to provide services in northern and central Mali.

While some facilities offered specialized services for female victims, there were no such services for male victims. The transition government did not offer legal alternatives to removal to countries in which victims would face retribution or hardship; however, most identified victims were from ECOWAS member states and did not require special status to remain in Mali. Access to victim services was not conditioned on cooperation with law enforcement proceedings. The transition government did not have a victim-witness assistance program to support participation in investigations and prosecutions.

Officials previously reported law enforcement lacked facilities to conduct interviews that allowed for separation between victims and alleged perpetrators; however, victims could provide written testimony as an alternative to speaking with law enforcement. NGOs provided legal assistance to trafficking victims without transition government support. Victims could file civil suits against their traffickers; however, no victims reportedly used this provision, and many victims were not aware of this option. The law allowed victims to obtain restitution, but the transition government did not report pursuing restitution in any cases.

Authorities continued following the government’s 2013 inter-ministerial child soldier handover protocol; under the protocol, the Malian armed forces (FAMa) transferred children associated with armed groups to the National Directorate for the Promotion and Protection of Children, which screened the children for trafficking indicators and referred them to services in collaboration with an international organization. The handover protocol required authorities to immediately transfer children identified within Bamako; outside the capital, authorities must notify child protection actors within 24 hours and transfer the children within 48 hours. However, observers reported authorities continued to inappropriately detain some children for alleged association with armed groups for longer periods in violation of the protocol.

PREVENTION

The transition government slightly increased efforts to prevent trafficking. The CNCTLPA, chaired by the MOJ, led the transition government’s anti-trafficking response and convened regularly. The CNCTLPA established regional anti-trafficking committees in Koulijoro, Bougounii, Sikasso, and Segou. The transition government continued to implement the 2023-2027 NAP to combat trafficking in persons.

However, it maintained limited dedicated staff to work on trafficking, which impeded its efforts to consistently coordinate anti-trafficking activities. The transition government allocated 260 million FCFA ($415,335) for the CNCTLPA’s activities, including the NAP’s implementation, anti-trafficking trainings, and support for NGOs. This was the same amount allocated to the CNCTLPA during the previous reporting period. The transition government, in partnership with NGOs, held awareness-raising campaigns and trainings for civil society members and community leaders.

However, it did not report implementing any public awareness campaigns on child forced begging or hereditary slavery, nor did it regulate Quranic schools to prevent child forced begging or abuse. The Ministry of Defense previously issued an edict banning children from all deployed military camps. The transition government reported utilizing a two-week process to vet military recruits, which included inspecting documents such as birth certificates, national identification cards, and high school diplomas to ensure individuals were at least 18 years old. For the fourth consecutive year, the government did not report finalizing its draft child soldiers prevention plan that included measures to sensitize transition government officials and signatory armed groups and increase coordination on child soldiers issues.

The transition government did not make efforts to address fraudulent recruitment of Malians abroad, nor did it prohibit worker-paid recruitment fees. Labor inspectors lacked sufficient capacity and resources to regulate the informal sector, where most cases of forced labor occurred. The National Unit to Fight Against Child Labor, chaired by the Ministry of Labor, coordinated transition government efforts to combat child labor and had dedicated child labor inspectors who received anti-trafficking training; it did not report if inspectors identified any trafficking victims or children engaged in child labor. The police operated a hotline for crimes against women and children, including human trafficking; however, it did not report receiving any trafficking calls.

The transition government did not report making any efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The transition government did not report providing anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel. TRAFFICKING PROFILE: Trafficking affects all communities. This section summarizes government and civil society reporting on the nature and scope of trafficking over the past five years.

Human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Mali, and traffickers exploit victims from Mali abroad. Traffickers exploit boys from Mali and neighboring West African countries in forced labor in agriculture – especially rice, cotton, dry cereal, and corn cultivation – domestic work, transportation, begging, and the informal commercial sector. Traffickers exploit boys and girls in forced labor in informal artisanal gold mines, particularly in Gao and Kidal; third parties sometimes “financed” transportation to mining sites, requiring them to work for an unspecified time to pay off the debt. In 2020, the government estimated more than 45,000 children worked in artisanal gold mines in Mali.

Criminal networks exploit migrants in forced labor in gold mining. Corrupt Quranic teachers exploit boys from Mali and neighboring countries, including Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, and Senegal, in forced begging or other forms of forced labor; corrupt Quranic teachers also exploit Malian boys in forced begging in neighboring countries. Traffickers exploit Malian children in forced labor on cocoa farms in Cote d’Ivoire. Some parents and relatives coerce girls into forced marriages, with younger girls receiving a higher “bride price” (money paid to the girl’s family by the husband‘s family).

These girls may subsequently be subjected to domestic servitude or sex trafficking; 54 percent of girls in Mali are married before the age of 18, and 16 percent are married before the age of 15. Media and NGOs report unscrupulous actors, including Russian officials and illicit recruiters, fraudulently recruited women ages 18-22 from Africa – including Mali – South Asia, and South America for vocational training programs and subsequently placed them in military drone production sites. Media report workers at these sites are subjected to hazardous conditions, surveillance, hour and wage violations, contract switching, and worker-paid recruitment fees, all of which are indicators of human trafficking. Perpetrators exploit some members of Mali’s Black Tuareg community to slavery practices rooted in traditional relationships of hereditary servitude.

Hereditary slavery is most prevalent in Kayes and the central and northern regions of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal. An international organization report estimated there are 300,000 victims of hereditary slavery in Mali, and others estimate up to 35 percent of the population in Timbuktu could be enslaved. Former “slaveholders” and community members frequently tortured and attacked victims of hereditary slavery and formerly enslaved persons. In previous years, complicit local officials reportedly interfered in hereditary slavery cases.

Traffickers exploit men and boys, primarily of Songhai ethnicity, in a long-standing practice of debt bondage in the salt mines of Taoudeni in northern Mali. Traffickers exploit adult victims in forced labor in the agricultural sector, artisanal gold mining, and domestic work. Traffickers recruit women and girls from other West African countries, particularly Nigeria, with promises of jobs as waitresses in Bamako or beauty parlors in Europe or the United States but instead exploit them in sex trafficking throughout Mali, especially in small mining communities. An NGO report attributed some of the increased demand for sex trafficking in mining communities to cultural and religious beliefs, correlating sex with increased chances of finding gold, and it also noted corruption schemes involving complicit officials and community authorities perpetuating trafficking.

Migrants and refugees transiting Mali to Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, and sometimes Europe are vulnerable to trafficking. There may be North Korean nationals working in Mali, perhaps under exploitative working conditions and may be forced labor victims. More than 350,000 IDPs are vulnerable to trafficking. Terrorist organizations and armed groups continue to unlawfully recruit or use children, mostly boys, as combatants, spies, laborers, and in other capacities.

Some of these groups use girls in combat, support roles, and for sexual exploitation, including sexual slavery through forced marriages to members of these armed groups. Children and young adults who are homeless are vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist organizations. Armed groups and terrorist groups reportedly force some communities to choose between providing child soldiers or providing material support, including money, livestock, and food. According to an international organization, insecurity, school closures, and deteriorating socioeconomic conditions contribute to child trafficking, forced labor, and forced recruitment by armed groups in Mali.

In November 2024, an international organization reported at least 1,792 schools remained closed in Mali, affecting nearly 537,000 students, which increases vulnerability to trafficking and recruitment by armed groups. “Talibes” (children in informal Quranic schools) are also vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups. An international organization reported armed groups exploit children in forced labor in gold mines and extort adults operating in the mines via a “tax” to finance their activities. During the reporting period, the government coordinated with and supported MSA-D, a non-state armed group that unlawfully recruited and used child soldiers.

In past years, Malian security forces cooperated with signatory armed groups, including the Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA), a pro-Malian state militia, that unlawfully recruited and used children, sometimes through force, fraud, or coercion. Both factions of the armed group Platform, of which GATIA is a member, and Coordination of Movements of Azawad (CMA) have UN action plans to prevent the unlawful recruitment or use of child soldiers. However, both GATIA and CMA reportedly continue to recruit or use children. In previous reporting periods, FAMa, the Gendarmerie, and the police unlawfully recruited and used children, including children younger than the age of 15.

An NGO reported there were approximately 100 Cuban regime-affiliated workers in Mali. The Cuban regime may have forced Cuban regime-affiliated professionals in Mali to work. On This Page search > < MALI (Tier 2) PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: PROSECUTION PROTECTION PREVENTION TRAFFICKING PROFILE: Tags Bureau of African Affairs Human Trafficking Mali Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons Reports