U.S. Dep't of State, 2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Indonesia

INDONESIA (Tier 2) The Government of Indonesia does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing efforts compared with the previous reporting period; therefore, Indonesia remained on Tier 2. These efforts included repatriating thousands of potential Indonesian trafficking victims exploited in overseas online scam operations; investigating six labor trafficking cases in the fishing sector and identifying 75 labor trafficking victims associated with the case. The government also convicted one complicit official in a high-profile labor trafficking case in the palm oil sector and issued a decree to prevent sexual violence through child-friendly education.

In December 2024, the government established a cyber directorate and a national unit for crimes against women and children within the Indonesian National Police (INP), which could be used to address trafficking cases. However, the government did not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. The government decreased investigations, referred significantly fewer trafficking victims to protective services and did not report how many victims it identified. The government did not proactively screen for trafficking among workers or effectively oversee or enforce labor regulations in high-risk industries, including the palm oil, fishing or fish processing, and extractive industries.

The government made limited efforts to investigate allegations of labor exploitation in Chinese government-affiliated industrial parks, and did not proactively screen for trafficking among Chinese workers in these sites. Corruption and official complicity in human trafficking continued to significantly impede anti-trafficking efforts. The government continued to lack a national SOP to identify trafficking victims in all sectors, which hindered proactive victim identification, especially of men and boys. Government shelters confiscated some victims’ passports and imposed severe restrictions on movement and employment such that most victims left the shelters and did not participate in cases against traffickers.

The 2007 anti-trafficking law did not prohibit all forms of trafficking, as it required a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute a child sex trafficking crime. PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: Increase efforts to vigorously investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes, and convict traffickers, including complicit officials. Amend the 2007 law to remove the required demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute child sex trafficking. Allow victims who reside in shelters freedom of movement, and the ability to work.

Develop – and disseminate widely – SOPs for proactive victim identification and train law enforcement, foreign affairs, marine, and labor officials on their use. Proactively screen for trafficking indicators among vulnerable groups, including workers in the fishing, palm oil, and extractive industries, and workers employed in Chinese government-affiliated industrial parks and enterprises. Increase resources for and proactively offer all victims, including men and boys, comprehensive services. Implement all labor laws and regulations and improve oversight of sectors at-risk for labor trafficking, including the fishing, palm oil, and extractive industries; increase efforts to monitor and prevent labor abuses in Chinese government-affiliated industrial parks and enterprises.

Increase efforts to effectively monitor labor recruitment agencies, including in the fishing sector and, through the 2022 regulation of the 2017 migrant worker law, develop and implement employer-paid orientations for Indonesian and migrant fishermen. Provide regular anti-trafficking training for judges, prosecutors, police, and social workers. Increase resources for the national anti-trafficking task force and improve its coordination across ministries and with the local task forces. Complete and enact an updated anti-trafficking NAP and ensure it is funded and implemented.

Develop and maintain a comprehensive and centralized database to accurately track and report the government’s anti-trafficking statistics, including victim identification and protection efforts. Improve information sharing and targeted anti-trafficking approaches among relevant government agencies, including at all levels of law enforcement. Increase awareness of trafficking trends and vulnerabilities among religious and local village leaders. Create a national protocol clarifying roles for prosecuting trafficking cases outside victims’ home provinces.

PROSECUTION

The government decreased law enforcement efforts. The 2007 law criminalized all forms of labor trafficking and some forms of sex trafficking and prescribed penalties of three to 15 years’ imprisonment, which were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. Inconsistent with international law, the 2007 law required a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute a child sex trafficking crime and therefore did not criminalize all forms of child sex trafficking. Judicial officials at the national and provincial level asserted the law implicitly established that force, fraud, or coercion were not required to constitute child sex trafficking, and that this therefore was not a barrier in successfully prosecuting and obtaining convictions in child sex trafficking cases.

Nevertheless, observers noted low awareness among local law enforcement and judicial officials of trafficking and relevant legislation impeded case detection and prosecutions. The government also prosecuted trafficking crimes under other laws, including the 2014 Child Protection Law and the 2017 Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers Law. Ineffective coordination among agencies and the lack of a centralized database hindered law enforcement anti-trafficking efforts and comprehensive data collection. Therefore, data reported was incomplete and likely duplicative.

In 2024, the government reported investigating 843 trafficking cases – 355 for sex trafficking, six for labor trafficking in the fishing industry, and 482 for unspecified forms of trafficking – compared with investigating 1,061 trafficking cases in 2023. Cases of unspecified forms of trafficking involved migrant worker or child exploitation, some of which may have also involved labor or sex trafficking; the government did not report investigating any domestic labor trafficking cases other than the six cases in the fishing industry, despite allegations of exploitation in numerous high-risk industries. The government reported prosecuting 400 alleged traffickers in 2024 – 119 for sex trafficking, 52 for labor trafficking, and 229 for unspecified forms of exploitation, compared with prosecuting an unknown number of traffickers in 706 cases in 2023. The government did not provide any data regarding convictions of traffickers under the anti-trafficking law in 2024, compared with convicting an unknown number of traffickers in 435 cases in 2023.

The government did not provide sentencing data for convicted traffickers. Prosecutors were reportedly more likely to charge trafficking crimes under the 2017 migrant worker law because it had a lower evidentiary threshold. Notably, authorities reported investigating one case of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing involving an unknown number of traffickers and 75 trafficking victims; according to media reports, authorities prosecuted the vessel’s captain under a non-trafficking statute and courts sentenced him to five years imprisonment and a fine of approximately 2 billion rupiah ($130,293). Endemic corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes, particularly in the palm oil, fishing, and extractive industries, remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action during the year.

The government did not report investigating reports of Indonesian diplomatic personnel allegedly accepting bribes to facilitate labor trafficking; reports that authorities allegedly directly facilitated the abduction and transfer of a refugee and child victim of sexual abuse for alleged forced or fraudulent marriage; or reports alleging the director of a West Sumatra university, among others, orchestrated the fraudulent recruitment and exploitation of numerous students in labor trafficking via an internship program in Japan. The government continued the prosecution of an immigration official and initiated the prosecution of a civil servant and investigations into five university staff in three separate cases for facilitating the movement and exploitation of trafficking victims. In November 2024, courts sentenced a former regent to four years’ imprisonment under the anti-trafficking law for exploiting 665 trafficking victims on his palm oil plantation under the guise of a drug rehabilitation program; this exploitation resulted in the murder of six victims, including one case in which the regent’s son tortured a trafficking victim to death. As part of the same case, authorities only prosecuted 13 of 60 alleged traffickers implicated in the case.

The other 47 alleged traffickers, including numerous police and military officials, remained free and in their positions at the end of the reporting period; the government did not report investigating or prosecuting any of these officials. The Indonesian National Police’s (INP) Criminal Investigative Division was the lead agency for investigating trafficking crimes involving multiple jurisdictions; provincial and district-level police investigated all other trafficking cases. In 2025, the government established eight provincial cyber directorates and a special national unit for Crimes against Women and Children. Ineffective coordination among agencies and the lack of a centralized database hindered law enforcement anti-trafficking efforts and comprehensive data collection.

The Indonesian Attorney General’s Office was responsible for prosecuting trafficking crimes. The government, in partnership with NGOs, trained front-line officials, prosecutors, and judges on various anti-trafficking topics, including investigating and prosecuting trafficking cases and victim identification, as well as online child sexual exploitation. Officials reported police investigators lacked effective training and an understanding of the anti-trafficking law and how to build trafficking cases. Therefore, prosecutors were frequently forced to charge traffickers with lesser crimes or not at all.

Officials also reported some provincial police units, limited by budget constraints, investigated most trafficking cases as other crimes, which further hindered prosecutors from filing trafficking-related charges against alleged traffickers. Observers noted many investigators received limited or no guidance on the requirements to prosecute trafficking cases, and many were reluctant to conduct cross-border trafficking investigations or investigate cases in which the victim was exploited abroad. In cases of labor violations, including suspected labor trafficking, police and the Ministry of Indonesian Migrant Worker Protection (KP2MI) often pursued mediation in lieu of criminal investigation; observers reported authorities rarely criminally charged companies or employers for labor trafficking. The government cooperated with foreign governments on investigating and prosecuting trafficking crimes; notably, the government arrested and extradited a former official from the Philippines due to allegations of corruption and complicity in trafficking crimes associated with online scam operations.

PROTECTION

The government maintained efforts to identify and protect victims. The government lacked a comprehensive system to collect and did not report victim identification data; data reported was incomplete and likely duplicative. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) reported identifying 530 Indonesian trafficking victims exploited overseas in 2024, but the government did not report how many trafficking victims it identified domestically. The Witness and Victim Protection Agency (LPSK) received referrals for 209 trafficking victims and witnesses in 2024 (508 in 2023); it provided care, including shelter services, to these and other trafficking victims and witnesses identified during the previous reporting period.

The government did not report how many trafficking victim referrals the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) received from police, government ministries and agencies, international organizations, and NGOs in 2024 – compared with 1,359 trafficking victim referrals to MOSA in 2023. The government did not report how many instances of child exploitation, including trafficking, were identified by the National Commission for Indonesian Child Protection (KPAI), compared with 922 instances reported in 2023. The government also did not report how many child trafficking cases were identified by the Ministry of Women Empowerment and Child Protection (MOWECP), compared with 172 cases reported in 2023. In partnership with an international organization, authorities identified 75 labor trafficking victims – 57 Indonesian men and 18 Chinese men – aboard a fishing vessel in Indonesia’s waters; authorities identified these victims only after one year of consistent reporting and advocacy from civil society.

Police, central and regional service centers, and key government ministries used separate SOPs for victim identification and referral to care. The MFA utilized victim identification SOPs which were developed in partnership with the INP; these SOPs reportedly allowed MFA to better screen potential victims, including victims exploited in online scam operations. Observers expressed concern the lack of a national SOP and the placement of trafficking under the purview of local-level police and protection agencies, which generally focused on women and children, hindered the identification of rural and male trafficking victims, and victims from vulnerable communities. Some local governments partnered with civil society to screen potential victims.

Due to the lack of formal identification procedures and training among front-line officials, authorities likely inappropriately arrested, penalized, and deported trafficking victims for offenses committed as a direct result of being trafficked. The government’s heightened requirements for visits to palm oil plantations stymied NGO and international organization efforts to identify and support labor trafficking victims. The government, in partnership with NGOs, operated several shelters and service centers for victims of various crimes, including trafficking victims. However, the government did not report how many trafficking victims received assistance at these facilities in 2024.

The government did not report how many trafficking victims MOSA referred to government social centers or NGOs in 2024; this compared with referring 1,359 victims in 2023 – however, inconsistencies in MOSA’s reporting made it difficult to confirm the true number of victims referred to services in 2023. The government reported providing all victims access to shelter, social assistance, medical and psychological support, and vocational training. However, in practice, service centers and the quality of care victims received varied significantly based on geographic location and the local government’s budget. Furthermore, services were reportedly unavailable in some parts of the country.

The government coordinated assistance for victims of abuse, including trafficking victims, through Local Technical Implementation Units for Women and Child Protection, located in all 34 provinces and approximately 324 districts. LPSK operated an undisclosed number of shelters and safe houses for victims and witnesses to crimes who faced threats or intimidation, including trafficking victims. LPSK confiscated or otherwise retained some victims’ passports and imposed severe restrictions on movement and employment, reportedly for security reasons. MOSA operated 33 shelters which could assist victims of crimes, including trafficking.

Government-run shelters only admitted trafficking victims via a referral from other government agencies or NGOs. Observers reported shelters lacked adequate infrastructure and resources to cater to victims with disabilities, and few, if any, shelters were able to accommodate male trafficking victims. A general lack of adequate protection and reintegrative care, coupled with low awareness among village and local leaders, led to fishermen being exploited in labor trafficking. The government did not provide legal alternatives to the removal of foreign victims to countries where they may face hardship or retribution.

In 2024, MFA repatriated 3,570 Indonesian potential trafficking victims exploited overseas (798 in 2023), including 216 exploited in sex or labor trafficking, and 3,354 exploited in online scam operations. The government reported formally identifying as trafficking victims 314 of the 3,354 repatriated individuals from online scam operations. The MFA operated 76 temporary shelters in diplomatic missions for Indonesian nationals exploited abroad. The government operated three Seafarers Corners in Taiwan, South Africa, and Uruguay.

The government did not report repatriating any Indonesian trafficking victims exploited in the fishing industry, despite widespread reports of vulnerabilities and labor trafficking in the sector; the government last reported repatriating 589 Indonesian fishermen who experienced abuse or exploitation in 2020. Authorities arrested and deported without screening for trafficking 103 foreign nationals and potential victims involved in an online scam operation in Bali. LPSK did not report how many trafficking victims participated in investigations and prosecutions in 2024, compared with 62 trafficking victims in 2023 and 208 in 2022. INP reported approximately 3,979 trafficking victims participated in investigations in 2024, compared with 3,249 in 2023.

Although regulations permitted video or pre-recorded testimony for some female and child trafficking victims, some judges and prosecutors continued to require victims to testify in person. LPSK was tasked with providing assistance to victim-witnesses in trafficking cases; observers reported LPSK is underfunded, and subsequently, its support to victims was inconsistent. Many trafficking victims chose to not participate in prosecutions because authorities required them to remain in government shelters – where they lacked freedom of movement, travel documents, the ability to work, and consistent funding for meals and incidentals. In some cases, authorities did not track victims released from MOSA shelters, including for purposes of keeping the victims informed of the cases against traffickers and to gather their testimony.

Courts could order compensation and restitution in trafficking cases. Article 50 of the 2007 law permitted judges to substitute additional imprisonment for restitution if the trafficker did not have sufficient assets. Prosecutors reported foreign corporations and other traffickers could shield their assets, and many judges elected to order the additional imprisonment. Nevertheless, LPSK sought 7.5 billion rupiah ($4466,090) in restitution for 557 trafficking victims, compared with 11.4 billion rupiah ($709,523) requested for 389 victims in 2023.

Courts approved 2.9 billion rupiah ($180,493) for 99 victims and witnesses. Observers noted there were often jurisdictional variations to how often courts awarded restitution. Authorities reported victims could file civil suits against traffickers for damages and the government would provide legal support; however, in practice, this option was rarely, if ever, offered to victims. Labor courts could order defendants to pay compensation, and many labor trafficking victims, especially in fishing, pursued this option because of its speed and the greater likelihood of financial relief.

Labor courts, however, did not always award adequate relief; for example, during a previous reporting period, one forced labor victim in the fishing sector secured a compensation award for less than the amount of his unpaid wages, on top of costs incurred during the eight months he had pursued the case without government assistance. The government did not report whether labor courts referred any potential trafficking cases to police. ‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬ PREVENTION The government increased efforts to prevent trafficking, despite some ongoing gaps. The national anti-trafficking task force was co-chaired by the Coordinating Ministry of Political and Security Affairs and the Coordinating Ministry of Human Development and Culture, with INP as the Executive Chair. The government did not report the task force’s budget or how frequently the task force met, if at all.

The task force continued implementation of the 2020-2024 anti-trafficking NAP, which required each ministry and agency to allocate resources for and conduct anti-trafficking activities. The government reportedly continued drafting, but did not finalize, an updated 2025-2029 anti-trafficking NAP. Authorities reported 283 municipalities and districts, and every province except the six provinces in the Papua region, had local anti-trafficking task forces; however, observers noted many of these task forces existed only on paper, or otherwise lacked funding, effective coordination, or an understanding of trafficking. The government took some steps to finalize an action plan for the prevention of online child sexual exploitation and the provision of services to victims.

The Ministry of Women Empowerment and Child Protection was finalizing a roadmap and Presidential Decree for prevention and victim services, while the Ministry of Religious Affairs issued a decree in January 2025 to prevent sexual violence in Islamic boarding schools through child-friendly education. Separate government ministries, sometimes in partnership with survivors, conducted awareness campaigns through print and electronic media targeting vulnerable populations, including potential victims of online scam operations. The government conducted research to identify gaps in national efforts to combat trafficking. Several ministries and agencies, including MOWECP, MOSA, and KP2MI, continued to operate hotlines which could receive trafficking-related calls.

In 2024, KP2MI’s hotline and complaint system received 1,500 complaints from Indonesia workers overseas; it assessed 24 of the calls were suspected trafficking cases and 956 had trafficking indicators, such as illegal recruitment and false documentation. This is compared with receiving 707 complaints, 28 of which were suspected trafficking cases, in 2023. KP2MI did not report referring the cases to law enforcement. The government maintained two hotlines for reporting violence against children, including online child sexual exploitation, though access was reportedly limited in remote areas.

The government also cooperated with an international NGO’s cyber reporting hotline to investigate of 395 alleged cases of child sexual exploitation, including potential cases of child sex trafficking, in 2024. The 2017 migrant worker law mandated provincial governments – instead of private companies – oversee pre-departure vocational training and placement of migrant workers. The government did not report provincial governments’ efforts to implement this mandate. Although 2020 and 2022 implementing regulations of the 2017 migrant worker law defined and exempted Indonesian migrant workers in informal and domestic sectors from placement fees, including fees for flights, visas, passports, job training, and accommodation, many workers still reported paying these fees; this policy excluded migrant seafarers.

The government maintained several policies and practices which increased migrant workers’ vulnerability to traffickers. A 2020 implementing regulation of the 2017 migrant worker law required married migrant workers to obtain permission from their spouse to work abroad. The government confiscated the passports of Indonesians repatriated from situations of trafficking abroad. A separate policy banned the placement of Indonesian migrant workers in 21 Middle Eastern and North African nations.

Although the government assessed these policies protected vulnerable workers, the UN, international organizations, and NGOs continued to argue they instead increased the likelihood workers would move outside of regular migration channels, heightening their vulnerability to trafficking. Authorities announced plans for a labor MOU with the Government of Saudi Arabia, lifting the placement ban of Indonesian workers in Saudi Arabia. The MOU reportedly would guarantee minimum salaries and require employment contracts among other protections. The MOU had not been signed nor implemented by the end of the reporting period.

The government had MOUs with 11 countries in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions for the recruitment, placement, and protection of Indonesian migrant workers. The government did not effectively oversee or implement labor regulations in the palm oil, fishing or fish processing, or extractive industries, such as nickel mining or refining. These concerns were particularly pronounced in Chinese state-affiliated worksites or industrial parks. The government did not report how many labor inspections it conducted in 2024, compared with 14,458 pre-announced labor inspections of formal sector workplaces in 2023.

The Ministry of Manpower (MOM) did not have sufficient staff or resources to fully inspect all formal sector workplaces, and it did not report conducting any inspections of the informal sector. Observers noted insufficient staff and inadequate resources hindered effective labor inspections on palm oil plantations, particularly those in remote locations. The government reportedly encouraged palm oil plantations to voluntarily join a sustainable certification program, but did not report taking further efforts to regulate or monitor labor conditions in the plantations. The government did not effectively implement labor regulations for the fishing sector.

Significant budgetary cuts to the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries in 2025 hindered the government’s ability to monitor and regulate the fishing industry or oversee or interdict IUU fishing in its waters – a practice which frequently involved labor trafficking. Observers reported indications of trafficking, including debt-based coercion, deception, intimidation, threats, document retention, withholding of wages, and physical abuse among fishers across numerous recruitment agencies in both the international and domestic fishing sectors. Civil society groups noted many Indonesian and migrant fishermen were unaware of their rights and responsibilities, and were often unprepared for work in the absence of standardized, employer-paid pre-departure and post-arrival orientation and training. Regulation No. 22 of 2022, as required by the 2017 migrant worker law, required the provision of pre-departure orientation to Indonesian migrant workers in fishing, including information on labor rights and safety at sea; however, it did not apply to domestic fishermen, provide for post-return training on fishermen’s rights, or specify whether the government or employers should fund and provide the orientation.

An international organization previously noted the government, in practice, continued to lack mechanisms to monitor recruitment agencies registered before 2022, and MOM and the Ministry of Transportation lacked an agreement clarifying inspection and enforcement mandates. An NGO noted labor and welfare inspections of fishing vessels were largely ineffective, in part due to a lack of communication between inspection agencies under the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries; additionally, an NGO reported labor officials routinely failed to interview or screen fishermen for indicators of abuse or trafficking during inspections. Due to overlapping government mandates, many fishermen were unaware of how to report labor abuses. In 2023, the government lifted the ban on Indonesian fishermen working aboard China-flagged vessels, vessels operated by state-owned companies, and Republic of Korea (ROK)- and Taiwan-flagged vessels operating outside of their Exclusive Economic Zones.

One NGO noted the lack of a national centralized database of licensed staffing agencies in the fishing sector stymied government accountability and worker protection efforts. Government regulations exempt employers in certain sectors – including small and medium enterprises and textile manufacturing – from minimum wage requirements, increasing the workers’ risk to debt-based coercion. The government did not effectively oversee or implement labor regulations in mining or mineral refining industries, including in Chinese state-affiliated industrial projects, often functioning under the Chinese government’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The government did not report updates to an investigation involving allegations that Indonesian workers at a Chinese national-owned nickel mining company faced poor working conditions.

Significant budgetary cuts to the Ministry of Environment hindered the government’s ability to inspect or regulate the mining industry; unscrupulous employers, including Chinese state-affiliated firms and Indonesian employers, reportedly benefitted from the reduced oversight. NGOs and labor unions alleged official complicity hampered authorities’ oversight of Chinese state-affiliated industrial plants; government officials reportedly threatened civil society to prevent the reporting of exploitation in Chinese government-affiliated projects. The government reported limited efforts to prevent trafficking or investigate labor abuses among Chinese state-affiliated industrial plants and worksites, and observers reported government safety inspectors faced difficulties in accessing Chinese state-affiliated industrial plants; in one case, authorities were only able to inspect safety practices from a facility’s entrance while flanked by company-hired private security. The government made limited efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex.

It made efforts to reduce the demand for extraterritorial commercial child sexual exploitation and abuse by coordinating with foreign governments to deny entry to known child sex offenders. TRAFFICKING PROFILE: Trafficking affects all communities. This section summarizes government and civil society reporting on the nature and scope of trafficking over the past five years. Human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Indonesia and traffickers exploit Indonesians abroad.

Within Indonesia, traffickers exploit adults and children in fishing, fish processing, construction, mining, and manufacturing; and on palm oil and other plantations. Government estimates indicate at least one million children worked in Indonesia in 2023, including approximately 282,000 in agriculture and 166,000 in manufacturing; however, this number is likely substantially higher. Traffickers subject children to forced criminality in the illegal drug trade. Early marriage practices push many rural and impoverished children into employment as new primary household earners, including pushing many into labor migration channels known for deceptive recruitment practices, debt bondage, and other forced labor indicators.

Traffickers exploit women and girls in forced labor in domestic work. Sex traffickers often use debt or offers of employment in restaurants, factories, or domestic service to coerce and deceive women and girls into commercial sex, notably in Batam, Jakarta, and North Sulawesi and in facilities such as spas, hotels, bars, and karaoke establishments. Family members or friends are often complicit in the exploitation of young women from North Sulawesi. Traffickers also exploit women and girls in sex trafficking near mining operations in Central Sulawesi, Maluku, and Jambi as well as in the Papua region, and near Chinese government-affiliated industrial parks in Central Sulawesi.

Traffickers increasingly use online platforms to recruit children for sex trafficking and adult men for labor trafficking. Traffickers increasingly exploit victims’ data and AI-generated sexual content to coerce victims; traffickers also use GPS and location tracking applications to control victims. According to an international organization, up to 30 percent of individuals in commercial sex in Indonesia are child sex trafficking victims. Extraterritorial child sexual exploitation and abuse is prevalent in the Riau Islands bordering Singapore.

Bali is a destination for Indonesian and foreign perpetrators of extraterritorial child sexual exploitation and abuse. The government tacitly accepted a religious practice whereby Middle Eastern tourists come to Indonesia, particularly Puncak district in Bogor, and pay more than $700 for a “contract marriage,” usually lasting up to one week, that allows them to have extramarital sex with girls as young as nine without violating Islamic law. Religious extremist groups, in their fight against government forces, operating within and outside Indonesia recruit and use Indonesian children as child soldiers in combat and support roles as porters, cooks, informants, and propaganda distributers. Indonesians whose homes or livelihoods were destroyed by natural disasters, the approximately four million children the government deems “neglected,” and approximately 16,000 children experiencing homelessness are vulnerable to trafficking.

Government failure to prevent companies from encroaching on Indigenous communities’ land, sometimes in collusion with the military and local police, contributes to displacement that leaves some ethnic minorities vulnerable to trafficking. Observers note high level corruption facilitates illegal mining and logging; both sectors frequently include indicators of trafficking among workers and exacerbate existing vulnerabilities to trafficking faced by rural and Indigenous communities. Widespread social stigma and discrimination against individuals based on their sexual orientation or identity and persons living with HIV/AIDS complicates their access to formal sector employment, creating a risk of trafficking through unsafe informal sector employment. Persons with disabilities frequently experience discrimination and are vulnerable to exploitation by traffickers.

Some estimates indicate 77,000 Papuans are currently displaced by ongoing separatist violence in Indonesia’s Papua region; these internally displaced persons are more vulnerable to exploitation and trafficking. Corruption and official complicity undermine anti-trafficking efforts. Civil society alleged some law enforcement officials and politicians organized law enforcement actions on entertainment venues to extort financial kickbacks from adults in commercial sex, including potential sex trafficking victims. Corrupt officials reportedly facilitate the issuance of false documents, accept bribes to allow brokers to transport undocumented migrants across borders, protect venues where sex trafficking occurs, engage in witness intimidation, and intentionally practice weak oversight to insulate recruitment agencies from liability.

NGOs and international organizations alleged both official complicity and corruption occurred on palm oil plantations, noting some regents run “prisons” with labor trafficking victims on the plantations. An NGO reported Chinese national-owned industries perpetrated systematic labor abuses against Chinese national workers, including wage manipulations, passport confiscation, intimidation, physical abuse, and debt-based coercion. Endemic corruption among officials creates trafficking vulnerabilities in the travel, hospitality, and labor recruitment industries. Observers noted labor trafficking pervades nickel smelters.

Chinese state-owned or affiliated companies control over half of Indonesia’s nickel production and refining, and employ hundreds of thousands of Chinese and Indonesian workers. Reports assert widespread labor trafficking indicators in these sites, including passport confiscation, wage garnishing and withholding, forced overtime, and physical beatings. In a 2022 survey of 333 Chinese workers in Indonesia, 73 percent had invalid work permits, 23 percent reported they could not leave their workplaces, and at least seven workers had died at worksites without explanation. In 2025, observers continued to report traffickers increasingly exploit Rohingya refugees claiming asylum in Indonesia, especially women and girls, including by abducting refugees from refugee shelters.

Local authorities likely facilitated the abduction and exploitation of trafficking victims among refugee communities. Traffickers use unscrupulous recruitment agents and sub-agents, retention of identity documents, and threats of violence to keep migrants in forced labor. Indonesian migrant workers often assume debts which both Indonesian and overseas recruitment agents exploit to coerce and retain their labor. Labor traffickers exploit many Indonesians through force or debt-based coercion in Asia (particularly China, ROK, and Singapore) and the Middle East (particularly Saudi Arabia) in domestic work, factories, construction, and manufacturing; on Malaysian palm oil plantations; and on fishing vessels.

Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and countries in the Middle East host many Indonesian domestic workers who are not fully protected under local labor laws and experience trafficking indicators, including excessive working hours, lack of formal contracts, physical abuse, and unpaid wages; many of these workers come from the province of East Nusa Tenggara. The government estimates more than two million of the six to eight million Indonesians working abroad – many of whom are women in domestic work – are undocumented or have expired visas, increasing their vulnerability to exploitation. Some Indonesian nationals who participate in Japan’s “Technical Intern Training Program” are vulnerable to forced labor. In 2022, reports emerged of traffickers exploiting some Indonesian migrant workers in agriculture in the United Kingdom; some workers had up to £5,000 GBP ($6,274) in debts for one season of work, and some earned less than £300 GBP ($376) per week due to no minimum guaranteed hours and substantial deductions for transportation, visas, and language training.

In prior years, there were reports for-profit universities in Taiwan aggressively recruited Indonesians and placed them into exploitative labor under the guise of educational opportunities. Increasingly, unregistered Taiwan universities lured Indonesian students to Taiwan with fake internships and forced the students to work in the local economy; fake internship trafficking schemes targeting Indonesian students were also reported in Japan, Australia, Germany, and New Zealand. Traffickers recruit Indonesian women and girls for ostensibly legitimate employment abroad and exploit them in sex and labor trafficking, primarily in Malaysia, Taiwan, the Middle East, and Timor-Leste.‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬ Reports indicated traffickers exploited tens or hundreds of thousands of Indonesian nationals in labor and sex trafficking in online scam operations in Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and the Philippines; at least 80,000 Indonesian nationals are reportedly illegally in Cambodia alone – the majority of whom are likely exploited in online scam operations. This trend accelerated in 2022 as reports grew of foreign traffickers, including Chinese nationals, and Indonesian agents fraudulently recruiting Indonesian nationals for nonexistent jobs in neighboring countries.

Traffickers use social media to promise the individuals, many of whom are often moderately to highly educated, legitimate work in the information technology sector but, upon arrival, traffickers confiscate their passports and exploit them in labor or sex trafficking in online scam operations using debt-based coercion, threats, physical force, and false imprisonment. As of 2024, the government reported traffickers have exploited more than 3,700 Indonesian nationals in online scam operations; civil society advocates suggest the true number of Indonesian national trafficking victims exploited in online scam operations is significantly larger and likely in the tens of thousands. Traffickers may exploit Indonesian and foreign national victims in online scam operations in Indonesia. In 2023, the government collaborated with a foreign government to investigate and close an online scam operation in Batam, Riau Islands Province.

The fishing industry remains among the most highly exploitative industries in Indonesia; traffickers exploit Indonesian victims within Indonesia’s domestic fishing fleet and overseas, particularly in Papua New Guinea, and in the distant water fishing fleets of China, ROK, and Taiwan. Some traffickers target Indonesian fishermen from Java, including impoverished farm workers, fraudulently recruit them with promises of high salaries and good working conditions, provide illicit travel documents, and make them sign contracts so hard to break that experts call them “slavery contracts.” In Indonesian waters and elsewhere, some senior vessel crewmembers force fishermen to engage in illegal practices, making them vulnerable to penalization. Some senior vessel crewmembers on China-, ROK-, Vanuatu-, Taiwan-, Thailand-, Malaysia-, Italy-, United Kingdom-, and Philippines-flagged and/or owned fishing vessels operating in Indonesian, Thai, Sri Lankan, Mauritian, Namibian, and Indian waters subject Indonesian fishermen to forced labor. Many Indonesian fishermen work aboard vessels in China’s, Taiwan’s, and ROK’s secluded distant water fleets, impeding their ability to report abuse and exploitation.

Recruitment agencies in Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand similarly lure fishermen with promises of high wages but then charge fees, curtail deposits, assign them fake identity documents and labor permits, and force them to fish for long hours on vessels that operate under complex multinational flagging and ownership arrangements and sometimes do not return to shore for months or years at a time, which permit abusive senior crewmembers to exploit workers with impunity. Fishermen on these vessels have reported low or unpaid salaries; coercive tactics such as contract discrepancies, document retention, restricted communication and movement, poor living and working conditions; physical violence; and severe physical and sexual abuse. In a survey of 35 fishermen on Indonesian-flagged vessels, 71 percent reported they did not have possession of their identity documents, and more than 88 percent reported substantial salary deductions and irregular wages – indicators of forced labor. Indonesian fishermen have reported persistent physical violence, 20-hour shifts, and lack of food on China-flagged fishing vessels.

Some China-, ROK-, and Taiwan-flagged vessels keep Indonesian workers after completion of their contracts until the company secures replacement workers. Senior crewmembers routinely deny Indonesian fishermen access to medical care, forcing some crewmembers to conduct self-surgery for injuries incurred while fishing. On This Page search > < INDONESIA (Tier 2) PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: PROSECUTION PROTECTION PREVENTION TRAFFICKING PROFILE: Tags Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Human Trafficking Indonesia Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons Reports