U.S. Dep't of State, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Tajikistan

TAJIKISTAN (Tier 2 Watch List) The Government of Tajikistan does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so. These efforts included increasing trafficking investigations, collaborating with a foreign government and international organizations in the repatriation of trafficking victims, and convicting traffickers for the first time in three years. However, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared with the previous reporting period. The government identified fewer victims, continued to refer a small proportion of victims identified to protection services, heavily relied on international organizations to provide victim services without adequate funding or in-kind assistance, and prosecuted fewer traffickers.

The government remained without comprehensive SOPs for victim identification and referral, contributing to inadequate victim identification efforts and potentially inappropriately penalizing sex trafficking victims for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. Despite allegations of possible official complicity in some localities, including forced labor by local officials in the cotton harvest, the government did not report any criminal investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government officials complicit in human trafficking crimes. Although the government publicized the ban on child labor in the cotton harvest in previous years, it did not do so for the second consecutive year, and observers reported allegations of officials mobilizing children. There was a lack of oversight in sectors vulnerable to forced labor, including construction, and the government continued to disproportionately focus on transnational trafficking crimes without taking adequate action to address internal trafficking crimes.

Therefore Tajikistan was downgraded to Tier 2 Watch List. PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: Adopt and implement SOPs to identify trafficking victims and refer them to care, train stakeholders, including law enforcement and labor inspectors on their use and proactively increase victim identification and screening, including of internal trafficking crimes (forced labor and sex trafficking), and ensure victims are not inappropriately penalized solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. * Increase the availability and quality of protection services – including short-term shelter, long-term housing, counseling, and medical care – for all trafficking victims, including by partnering with and allocating sufficient funding and/or in-kind support to civil society service providers. * Vigorously investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes and seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, including complicit officials, which should involve significant prison terms. * Strengthen training for law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges on anti-trafficking legislation and understanding human trafficking and take steps to disaggregate law enforcement data by form of trafficking. * Improve the collection of anti-trafficking law enforcement data, including by disaggregating data by type of exploitation (forced labor and sex trafficking) for investigations, prosecutions, and convictions. * Invite and grant independent observers full access to freely and independently monitor cotton cultivation and deliver an unfiltered report of the annual cotton harvest and increase oversight of provincial and local authorities’ seasonal labor recruitment processes to ensure no adults or children are subjected to forced labor in the cotton harvest and hold those in violation criminally accountable. * Strengthen the capacity of labor inspectors to identify forced labor victims, including by allowing unfettered access to construction sites, including projects from foreign-based companies, factories, and farms, including those participating in the cotton harvest, for unannounced inspections and increasing training on victim identifications and procedures, and report potential trafficking cases to the police. * Increase anti-trafficking training and guidance for government employees, including diplomatic personnel, law enforcement officers, border guards, and customs officials, to prevent their engagement in or facilitation of trafficking crimes and to increase their capacity to identify and assist victims domestically and abroad, including during repatriations and screening of refugees and asylum-seekers. * Implement a victim-witness assistance program and train law enforcement and judicial officials on a victim-centered approach for the treatment of victims and witnesses of trafficking crimes during investigations and court proceedings. * Increase awareness of predeparture and post-return support services available to Tajik migrant workers and strengthen the collection of statistics on labor migration trends. * Monitor private employment agencies for recruitment fees charged to workers and take steps to eliminate employee-paid fees.

PROSECUTION

The government made mixed law enforcement efforts. Article 130.1 and Article 167 of the criminal code criminalized labor trafficking and sex trafficking and prescribed penalties of five to eight years’ imprisonment, which were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. Article 167 defined child trafficking broadly to include illegal adoption without the purpose of exploitation; as such, it was difficult to ascertain how many cases investigated under Article 167 featured elements consistent with the international law definition of trafficking. The government did not maintain a centralized law enforcement data system on trafficking crimes, hindering the government’s ability to disaggregate national human trafficking statistics.

The government investigated 60 cases involving trafficking in 2023, compared with 11 cases involving trafficking in 2022. The government reported 23 prosecutions and convictions under various statutes (including Articles of the penal code not related to trafficking), compared with 29 prosecutions and no convictions in 2022. However, the government did not disaggregate the data by form of trafficking or penal code article; therefore, the government did not report how many of these involved trafficking crimes versus other crimes, such as migrant smuggling or illegal adoption without the purpose of exploitation. At least two traffickers were prosecuted and convicted (one under Article 130.1 and one under Article 167); while the government did not provide details regarding conviction and sentencing data, the media reported the government convicted a trafficker and sentenced her to more than eight years in prison for the sex trafficking of women from Tajikistan in Türkiye.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs has a specialized section within its Combating Organized Crime Directorate for combating trafficking, which continued to identify most trafficking cases in Tajikistan. The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking crimes; however, corruption and official complicity remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action. The government banned the practice of mobilizing schoolchildren and students for the cotton harvest several years ago; however, sources alleged authorities mobilized children for the harvest under the guise of “Hashar” (collective community work). Despite allegations of official complicity in child forced labor in the cotton harvest, authorities did not report opening investigations.

Prior reports noted the government mobilized some citizens to perform public works – including state employees, as part of provincial authorities’ efforts to increase participation in the annual cotton harvest – and children and young adults to perform at state-led events, which may have included instances of forced labor. Private companies reportedly used “subbotnik ” (a Soviet-era volunteering tradition) to get their employees to work overtime without pay. The government allegedly used coercive practices to enlist young men into the military, such as cutting off electricity for their families, closing down mosques, and threatening expulsion from universities. The government provided some in-kind support for human trafficking trainings for officials organized by international organizations and foreign donors.

The government-sponsored national training center continued to provide anti-trafficking training to incoming police cadets as part of their curriculum. Despite a few training efforts, there were no institutionalized anti-trafficking trainings, the government continued to disproportionately focus on transnational trafficking crimes and did not take adequate action to address internal trafficking crime. The government did not allocate a separate budget for law enforcement as part of the implementation of the anti-trafficking law or the NAP.

PROTECTION

The government decreased protection efforts. Authorities identified 47 victims (42 women sex trafficking victims and five unspecified trafficking victims – three men and two women), compared with 90 victims during the previous reporting period. The government referred 11 sex trafficking victims (one man and 10 women) to civil society for protection services, compared with 16 trafficking victims referred during the previous reporting period. All the victims referred by the government received services from civil society organizations without government support.

To minimize the risk of re-traumatization, authorities most often refer victims to NGOs for services right after identification. A civil society organization reported identifying and assisting eight victims (five women sex trafficking victims and three women forced labor victims). The government continued to use an NRM that included formal written procedures outlining screening for victim identification and referral, but these were generally insufficient to guide interagency anti-trafficking work. The government did not have comprehensive SOPs for victim identification to supplement the NRM.

The government developed SOPs for victim identification and referral, in collaboration with an international organization, which were pending approval at the end of the reporting period; however, the government previously reported developing SOPs in collaboration with an international organization that were never adopted. Absent standardized and promulgated victim identification procedures, roles and responsibilities among key stakeholder ministries remained unclear, inhibiting effective victim identification, especially among vulnerable populations. In practice, observers noted official victim status designation required a complex application procedure that may have prevented some victims from accessing care. Gaps remained in the implementation of victim protection law; law enforcement agencies did not develop procedures to grant legal status to victims, necessitating some victims to pay for legal and medical services otherwise provided by the government.

The Ministry of Health (MoH) managed the National Trafficking in Persons Center, the government’s only shelter with specialized care for trafficking victims, which also assisted victims of domestic violence. The shelter provided food, psychological care, and some medical assistance. The shelter assisted 25 victims (one woman and 24 men) compared with 16 in the previous reporting period. Due to the lack of trust in government institutions, inadequate conditions in the shelter, and discrimination from victims of other crimes, trafficking victims were less likely to reach out to the shelter for help.

The government placed child victims in reception centers under the Ministry of Interior Affairs and returned some to their families. Funding for victim services and training for shelter staff was extremely limited and the government heavily relied on civil society organizations for victim assistance without sufficient funding or in-kind support, including for legal services. The government reported allocating 926,905 Somoni ($84,800) for the shelter under the MoH to further improve the provision of social services to trafficking victims and 527,362 Somoni ($48,250) for anti-trafficking NGOs that provided assistance to victims of crime, including trafficking, compared with 824,400 Somoni ($75,425) for the shelter in 2022. The government reported allocating 2.1 million Somoni ($192,130) to a state institution offering services to girl trafficking victims, the same amount as in 2022.

It was previously reported victims often relied on funds from extended family to finance their return flights, given a lack of government funding for repatriations of trafficking victims. The government funded several NGOrun shelters for victims of domestic violence, which could also assist trafficking victims. Civil society noted a lack of shelters for trafficking victims outside Dushanbe and a lack of options for long-term support. Some women sex trafficking victims were reluctant to seek protection services because of social norms that stigmatized women victims of sexual exploitation.

Despite provisions in the 2014 law outlining security measures for trafficking victims, confidentiality of personal information was not always guaranteed. The government did not provide protection for victim-witnesses or their advocates; victims were referred to international organizations for legal assistance when they cooperated with law enforcement during investigations. The 2014 law called for the establishment of a victim compensation fund, which had not yet been established. Foreign victims who agreed to cooperate with law enforcement could request temporary residency, subject to a one-year extension upon completion of criminal proceedings; the government did not report issuing such status.

In previous years, there were reports of intimidation and threats faced by civil society organizations assisting trafficking victims, which affected their ability to provide protection services. The law did not link other benefits to victims’ participation in trials, and protection services were to be available regardless of legal status or prior consent to participate in criminal justice proceedings. Courts required victims to appear in person, often with the trafficker present, during court proceedings. Authorities may have detained and penalized some unidentified trafficking victims solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked and may have deported some as part of operations to combat irregular migration because of a lack of formal identification procedures; limited knowledge on trafficking among law enforcement; ubiquity of petty corruption in law enforcement and judicial systems; and the stigmatization, discrimination, and harassment by law enforcement of women sex trafficking victims and the LGBTQI+ community that inhibited victims from reporting crimes.

Civil society previously highlighted the high turnover rate in law enforcement as a challenge, as many officers left their positions once they were trained on trafficking. It was previously reported officials sometimes temporarily detained sex trafficking victims with traffickers but later released and referred them to protective care. Law enforcement officers did not attempt to identify sex trafficking victims proactively during law enforcement operations on businesses suspected of engaging in commercial sex nor in sectors known for forced labor. In collaboration with an international organization and the Governments of Burma and Thailand, the government assisted and repatriated three citizens of Tajikistan who were victims of forced criminality in online scams.

PREVENTION

The government maintained inadequate efforts to prevent trafficking. The Inter-Ministerial Commission on Combatting Trafficking in Persons, led by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, coordinated anti-trafficking efforts and met once. The government did not allocate funding but devoted in-kind support to implement activities within its 2022-2024 NAP. Observers reported multiple NAP activities remained unfulfilled due to limited funding for its implementation, for which the government relied mostly on international organizations.

Observers noted some officials were not aware of key planned activities in the NAP, including the adoption of SOPs for victim identification and referral, hindering overall efforts. The government adopted national strategies on migration and on human rights, which had activities devoted to combating trafficking; however, it was unclear if they aligned with the NAP. With support from an international organization, the government operated a 24-hour hotline for potential victims, which did not result in any victim identifications for a fourth consecutive year; according to observers, government disinterest and limited capacity stymied its effective operation. The government collaborated with civil society for awareness-raising activities, including by providing in-kind support.

Despite allegations of forced labor in the cotton harvest, the government did not conduct any awareness campaigns. Observers reported there was limited awareness of internal forced labor and sex trafficking within Tajikistan. The government reported conducting periodical inspections of the cotton harvest; however, it did not identify any cases of forced labor or child labor. Observers previously noted insufficient staff, frequent use of inspection moratoriums, and low fines made it difficult to ensure compliance with Tajikistan’s labor laws.

Authorities previously reported 60 qualified inspectors had authority to carry out 2,000 inspections annually throughout the country, and 50 percent were in Dushanbe. The government reported conducting 2,727 inspections and uncovered an unspecified number of violations related to child labor; all violators were issued administrative penalties. Observers reported officials had no oversight of working conditions in construction projects affiliated with People’s Republic of China (PRC)-based companies, where locals and PRC laborers work, which increased vulnerabilities to forced labor. The government required entities engaged in worker recruitment for employment abroad to have a license from migration authorities, with penalties for violations; however, the government did not report monitoring these entities or investigating firms suspected of trafficking.

The MOL, in collaboration with international organizations, operated predeparture counseling centers in different regions to conduct anti-trafficking awareness raising and pre-departure orientation, offering labor migrants assistance before leaving the country and in diversifying geographical options for work abroad. However, with limited data collection, lack of interagency coordination, and insufficient cooperation with destination country counterparts continuing to constrain effective prevention measures among vulnerable labor migrants, most Tajik migrant workers were not aware of available support services. The government distributed awareness material on safe migration for labor migrants. The government continued to support returning migrants with employment assistance, vocational training, financial services, and paid public works.

In 2023, the government repatriated 104 citizens of Tajikistan from Syria (31 women, 40 boys, and 33 girls) but did not report if it conducted screening for trafficking indicators; however, the government reported referring them to services. The government did not report anti-trafficking training for its diplomatic personnel. The government made no efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. TRAFFICKING PROFILE: As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit victims from Tajikistan abroad and, to a lesser extent, traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims within Tajikistan.

Extensive economic migration exposes Tajik men, women, and children to the risk of human trafficking, which is exacerbated by high levels of poverty. Labor traffickers exploit Tajik men and women in the service, agriculture, and construction sectors primarily in Russia, the United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan, Latvia, and Saudi Arabia, as well as in other neighboring Central Asian countries, Türkiye, and Afghanistan. Labor traffickers exploit men in agriculture, construction, and at markets in Tajikistan. Citizens of Tajikistan are subjected to forced criminality in online scam operations in Burma.

According to an international organization, most domestic trafficking cases involved women and girls in sex trafficking or domestic servitude. Sex traffickers exploit women and children from Tajikistan most commonly in Türkiye, the UAE, and Russia; but also in Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, Georgia, India, and Afghanistan; and within Tajikistan. Traffickers primarily recruit through job offers via friends, neighbors, or illegal employment agencies. Reports indicate labor migration from Tajikistan decreased in 2023 compared with 2022, including migration to Russia.

More than one million citizens of Tajikistan seek employment annually in Russia. According to international organizations, Tajiks in Russia are primarily employed in construction, agriculture, domestic work, and transportation; thousands of men, women, and children among them are vulnerable to forced labor, and some were subjected to forced labor. Migrants from Tajikistan, particularly inmates in Russian prisons and those that are undocumented, are vulnerable to forced recruitment to fight in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine or recruited with the promise of Russian citizenship. Nationals from Tajikistan employed by Russian companies operating in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory have reportedly experienced situations that featured corollary forced labor indicators.

Women traveling with their husbands abroad are also reportedly at elevated risk of sex trafficking and other forms of exploitation. Some Tajik migrants have been seeking alternatives to Russia as destinations for labor migration, but Russia continues to be the overwhelmingly primary destination. Due to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, many migrants were forced to leave Russia because of job loss resulting from economic disruptions, reduced income, fluctuations in the Russian ruble’s exchange rate, and conscription into military service. Citizens of Tajikistan traveling to the United States undocumented, through multiple countries, including in Latin America and Europe, may become vulnerable to trafficking.

Some men that traveled to conflict zones in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan to fight alongside or seek employment in armed groups brought their families with them, at times under deception. Tajik women and children living in these conflict zones may be at risk of trafficking, including at refugee camps in Syria. Tajik children in these camps are at risk of recruitment by armed groups. Tajik migrants may have been lured to fighting in Syria by having their debt cleared in Russia.

Some children of Tajik ISIS combatants in Iraq and Syria are reportedly trained for deployment in combatant roles. Traffickers transport Tajik women and girls to Afghanistan and force them into marriages featuring elements of sex trafficking and forced domestic service, including through debt-based coercion. Traffickers exploit Tajik children in sex trafficking and forced labor, including forced begging and forced criminality, in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Experts have pointed to the significant gaps in social protections putting rural women at a higher risk of trafficking in Tajikistan; they face discrimination and limited access to education and employment, with the majority working in the informal sector.

Widows of male migrants, divorced women, the families of migrant workers remaining in Tajikistan, and female victims of domestic violence are also at a higher risk of trafficking. Stateless individuals, mostly in rural areas, face vulnerabilities to trafficking because of their status; according to an international organization, 72 percent of those living without official documentation are women. Tajik citizens in areas affected by border clashes with the Kyrgyz Republic are vulnerable to trafficking because of their displacement. Children separated from their families during international or internal migration are at an increasingly high risk of sex trafficking.

Tajik children and adults may have been subjected to forced labor in agriculture, mainly during Tajikistan’s cotton harvest, and in dried fruit production. Observers have previously reported several cases involving sex trafficking of children in nightclubs and private homes. Some boys, particularly from economically disadvantaged rural communities, are vulnerable to kidnapping by government personnel for the purpose of forcible conscription into military service as part of annual “oblava” recruitment sweeps. The government reportedly uses coercive methods to recruit young men into the military.

The government reportedly subjects some citizens to participate in public works. Tajik nationals employed by PRC-based companies engaged in local construction projects experience wage irregularities, threats of termination, and other labor rights violations that may be indicative of forced labor. Some Afghan and Bangladeshi citizens are victims of forced labor in Tajikistan, including in the construction industry. Afghan refugees and asylum-seekers are vulnerable because of corruption and limitations to their freedom of movement within Tajikistan.

According to an international organization, there are 10,000 refugees and asylum-seekers in Tajikistan, mostly Afghans. The process to obtain refugee status often involved paying excessive bribes, increasing vulnerabilities to trafficking; many face the risk of deportation, even with official refugee status. Tajik nationals may be vulnerable to forced labor in illegal “artisanal” coal mines located near formalized commercial mining operations. LGBTQI+ individuals are vulnerable to trafficking because of blackmailing by police and widespread discrimination jeopardizing their employment and access to justice, compounding their vulnerability to family-brokered forced marriages that may feature corollary sex trafficking or forced labor indicators.

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