U.S. Dep't of State, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Cabo Verde
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CABO VERDE (Tier 2) The Government of Cabo Verde does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing efforts compared with the previous reporting period; therefore Cabo Verde remained on Tier 2. These efforts included passing a resolution to formalize the Observatory for Monitoring and Rapid Identification of Situations of Trafficking in Persons (the Observatory) and adopting a new anti-trafficking NAP. It opened a new emergency care center for vulnerable children, including potential trafficking victims.
However, the government did not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. The government did not consistently refer trafficking victims to services, and overall efforts to proactively screen vulnerable populations for trafficking indicators and identify victims remained inadequate. The government initiated fewer investigations. Inadequate anti-trafficking training, including of police and prosecutors responsible for handling trafficking cases, contributed to weak and inconsistent efforts to identify, investigate, and prosecute trafficking cases.
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: Finalize, implement, and train front-line officials, including law enforcement, judicial officials, labor inspectors, and service providers, on the trafficking in persons manual and SOPs. * Proactively screen vulnerable populations – including children referred to the Institute for Children and Adolescents (ICCA), women referred to Institute for Gender Equality and Equity (ICIEG) shelters, children in the labor force, children experiencing homelessness, individuals in commercial sex, and migrant and overseas workers (including People’s Republic of China [PRC], Cuban, and ECOWAS nationals) – for trafficking indicators and refer all identified trafficking victims to care. * Increase efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes and seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, which should involve significant prison terms. * Ensure all trafficking cases are prosecuted through the judicial system, without political interference, rather than resolving them through non-judicial means. * Train law enforcement and judicial officials on investigating and prosecuting cases using the anti-trafficking provision of the penal code, Article 271-A, and on specialized investigative and prosecutorial techniques, such as evidence collection and victim-centered interviewing; consider designating and training as anti-trafficking experts law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and magistrates in charge of investigating and prosecuting trafficking cases. * Increase nationwide trafficking data collection on law enforcement and victim identification efforts and develop a system to compile and share data among agencies. * Strengthen the Observatory’s capacity to coordinate the government’s anti-trafficking response and implement the anti-trafficking NAP, including by allocating dedicated resources. * Increase efforts to raise public awareness of human trafficking.
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Article 271-A of the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of four to 10 years’ imprisonment; these penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. The government’s capacity to collect anti-trafficking statistics and comprehensively report on law enforcement action was limited. Police and prosecutors initiated one investigation and continued eight investigations from previous reporting periods, compared with initiating four investigations and continuing six investigations during the previous reporting period.
The government prosecuted and convicted one sex trafficker under the anti-trafficking provision of the penal code. The court sentenced the trafficker to nine years’ imprisonment; the case remained pending before the appeals court. This compared with prosecuting and convicting one sex trafficker during the previous reporting period. The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees for complicity in human trafficking crimes.
During the previous reporting period, observers reported official corruption and complicity inhibited or interfered with the investigation and prosecution of a specific trafficking case and that some border police (DEF) solicited bribes to obtain residency documents or illegally facilitated migrants’ entry into the country. The government did not report cooperating with foreign counterparts on anti-trafficking law enforcement activities. Inadequate anti-trafficking training, including of police and prosecutors responsible for handling trafficking cases, insufficient resources, and significant and persistent court case backlogs resulted in weak and inconsistent efforts to identify, investigate, and prosecute trafficking cases. Officials conflated human trafficking with other crimes, such as sexual abuse and exploitation or “pimping.” Judges sometimes did not place alleged traffickers in custody during investigations or prosecutions, potentially allowing them to interfere in investigations or court proceedings, intimidate witnesses, or leave the country in the event the judge did not prohibit departure.
The government provided human rights training for new National Police (PN) officers, which included an anti-trafficking component. The government also provided anti-trafficking training to DEF officers. The attorney general’s office held a training session for prosecutors and judges on cybercrime, including its role in human trafficking, and digital evidence collection. However, it did not provide any specialized anti-trafficking training to justice system officials, and some judges continued to rely on more familiar laws pre-dating anti-trafficking penal code provisions to process trafficking cases.
Stakeholders reported law enforcement needed specialized training on investigative procedures, evidence collection, and interviewing potential victims. Judicial Police (PJ) presence was limited to the four islands with international airports and the most significant tourism activity, affecting the government’s ability to identify trafficking victims, investigate crimes, and collect comprehensive data. Despite improvements, information sharing among agencies remained inadequate; officials reported a need for additional coordination among the PJ, PN, and prosecutors as well as between law enforcement and victim protection actors. Government social service providers often resolved intrafamilial abuse and child labor cases, which could include child sex and labor trafficking, through non-judicial means.
The government maintained protection efforts. The government identified five trafficking victims (including one sex trafficking victim and four labor trafficking victims) and referred at least one victim to care, compared with identifying five trafficking victims and referring two victims to care during the previous reporting period. Civil society organizations identified and provided services to four victims. The government began modifying its SOPs on victim identification and referral to services in partnership with an international organization; the procedures were not in use during the reporting period.
Stakeholders reported the burden usually fell on trafficking victims to self-identify. Government social service providers did not screen individuals referred to government shelters for indicators of trafficking. Government and civil society contacts assessed underreporting and conflation of human trafficking with other crimes hindered victim identification efforts. The government’s ability to track victim-related statistics was limited.
Government-funded agencies provided emergency services, shelter, and psycho-social care to vulnerable populations and female and child victims of crime, including potential trafficking victims. Law enforcement and first responders could refer child victims to ICCA, adult female victims to ICIEG or NGOs, and foreign victims to the High Authority for Migration (AAI) or an international organization. ICCA operated a national network to assist child victims of crime, including with referral to care and legal support, and operated centers on eight of Cabo Verde’s nine inhabited islands; three centers, including one new center opened during the reporting period, were located on three islands and provided 24-hour emergency care. ICIEG operated five women’s shelters on four islands.
AAI operated four centers on four islands, providing daytime social services to migrants. Access to victim services was not conditioned on cooperation with law enforcement proceedings. The government provided some victim-witness assistance to support victim participation in the criminal justice process, but authorities noted it was difficult to provide meaningful assistance to victims because of social stigma and a lack of privacy among the small communities. Law enforcement interviewed child trafficking victims in collaboration with psychologists and the child’s parents, as appropriate.
Adult and child victims could provide written or video testimony; the government did not report how many victims, if any, utilized this option. The government continued to support an NGO project seeking to enhance the justice system’s capacity to support child victims of sexual abuse, including trafficking. As part of this project, the NGO, in collaboration with the government, launched two dedicated hearing rooms to record child victims’ testimony using trauma-informed procedures for use in court cases; the NGO, with the government’s support, also trained judicial officials on procedures for using the rooms. The law provided for restitution, but courts did not award restitution.
In addition, victims could file civil suits against traffickers, but no victims reportedly did so, in part because of a lack of awareness of this option. Cabo Verdean law provided legal alternatives to the removal of foreign victims to countries where they may face hardship or retribution, and authorities granted these protections in at least one case; in 2023, a government-affiliated Cuban surgeon, who may have been forced to work in Cabo Verde by the Cuban government, received protection from Cabo Verdean authorities after he refused to return to Cuba when his mission in the country ended and was granted temporary residency. Due to inconsistent application of victim identification procedures and limited screening of vulnerable populations, some victims may have remained unidentified in the law enforcement system.
The government increased prevention efforts. The Observatory, led by the Ministry of Justice, coordinated the government’s efforts to combat human trafficking and included officials from the PN; PJ; ICCA; ICIEG; Ministry of Family, Inclusion, and Social Development; other government institutions; and civil society organizations. The government adopted a resolution formalizing the Observatory and its mandate. The Observatory met once in 2023, compared with six meetings in 2022.
The government adopted a new 2023-2026 anti-trafficking NAP. The government did not report allocating any funding for anti-trafficking efforts, compared with 7 million escudos ($70,175) allocated in the previous year. The government, in partnership with international organizations, hosted a roundtable for World Day Against Trafficking in Persons and held a training for government officials on labor migration and ethical recruitment. It also conducted public campaigns and trainings focused on child labor and sexual abuse, which included some anti-trafficking components.
The government did not provide anti-trafficking training to labor inspectors. The labor inspectorate (IGT) screened for labor violations and referred potential criminal cases to PJ and cases involving children to ICCA; however, IGT did not report identifying any potential trafficking cases. Eighteen labor inspectors monitored all nine inhabited islands. Officials reported migrant workers and children working in the informal sector were especially vulnerable to trafficking; however, inspectors did not have the mandate or capacity to inspect the informal sector.
ICCA operated a hotline to report violence against children, including trafficking. The government did not report training hotline workers to differentiate trafficking from similar crimes, and ICCA did not report identifying any trafficking victims from hotline calls. The government made some efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts that equated to child sex trafficking, but it did not make efforts to reduce demand for other forms of commercial sex. ICCA and an international organization supported an Ethics Code of Conduct for Tourism, which included provisions to counter extraterritorial sexual exploitation and abuse, and periodically distributed the code to hospitality businesses on Sal and Boa Vista islands.
The government did not provide anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel. TRAFFICKING PROFILE: As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Cabo Verde, and, to a lesser extent, traffickers exploit victims from Cabo Verde abroad. Traffickers, often distant relatives, exploit children in labor trafficking in agriculture and domestic servitude through informal foster care. Cabo Verdean children engaged in begging, domestic work, street vending, car washing, construction, garbage picking, fishing, and agriculture are vulnerable to trafficking; children used in illicit activities, including drug trafficking, are also vulnerable to human trafficking.
Traffickers exploit Cabo Verdean and foreign national girls, and to a lesser extent boys, in sex trafficking in tourist areas. According to an NGO study, in some cases, parents encourage girls as young as 14 years old to engage in commercial sex with older Cabo Verdean men or tourists for financial gain or marriage; traffickers use this as an opportunity to exploit girls in child sex trafficking. Hotel employees and taxi drivers facilitate tourists’ participation in commercial sex and encourage demand for it. Some female sex tourists encourage Cabo Verdean men to emigrate and subsequently exploit them in debt bondage.
Children living in impoverished neighborhoods with minimal government services are also vulnerable to trafficking, especially sex trafficking. Organized trafficking networks exploit West African women, including from Nigeria and Senegal, in sex trafficking. Traffickers exploit West African migrants in labor trafficking, including in the hotel industry, construction, agriculture, domestic servitude, private security, clubs, and restaurants. West African migrants transit the archipelago en route to exploitative situations in Europe.
Organized networks of PRC national-owned shops operating in Cabo Verde exploit PRC national workers in labor trafficking. Cuban overseas workers, including medical professionals, working in Cabo Verde may have been forced to work by the Cuban government. In 2023, a government-affiliated Cuban surgeon, who may have been forced to work in Cabo Verde by the Cuban government, received temporary residency from Cabo Verde authorities; he remained in Cabo Verde at the end of the reporting period and allegedly feared punishment from the Cuban government if he returned to Cuba. Traffickers may force Cabo Verdean and Brazilian women to transport drugs between the two countries.
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