U.S. Dep't of State, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Burkina Faso
DOS
DOS
BURKINA FASO (Tier 2 Watch List) The transition government of Burkina Faso does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so. These efforts included increasing trafficking investigations and prosecutions and providing social services to vulnerable populations, including children associated with armed groups. Additionally, the Ministry of Solidarity, Humanitarian Action, National Reconciliation, Gender, and Family (Ministry of Solidarity) conducted an initiative to identify and refer to care vulnerable women and children experiencing homelessness or using the streets as a source of livelihood, including potential trafficking victims. However, the transition government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared with the previous reporting period.
The transition government did not report identifying or referring any trafficking victims to care, and inconsistent implementation of victim identification and referral SOPs hindered overall protection efforts. Although the transition government transferred children associated with armed groups, including potential trafficking victims, to protection actors during the reporting period, officials did not effectively screen this vulnerable population for trafficking indicators and likely inappropriately penalized some children for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. Courts issued fully or partially suspended sentences to 90 percent of convicted traffickers. The transition government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking crimes.
The transition government reportedly conscripted and sent notices to conscript journalists, activists, and political figures into the government-supported Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDPs), which may have involved forced labor, after they criticized the transition authorities. Weak case management and data collection hindered the transition government’s ability to track victim-related statistics. Shelter services, especially for adult victims, remained insufficient. Therefore Burkina Faso was downgraded to Tier 2 Watch List.
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: Prioritize screening and reintegration of children allegedly associated with armed groups; cease inappropriately penalizing victims solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. * Amend the handover protocol to ensure all children allegedly associated with armed groups are adequately screened for trafficking indicators and referred to protection actors in collaboration with international organizations. * Consistently implement SOPs for victim identification and referral to care and train front-line officials throughout the country on using SOPs to proactively identify victims, including among vulnerable populations, such as IDPs, labor migrants, children experiencing homelessness, children associated with non-state armed groups, government-affiliated Cuban workers, and women in commercial sex, and refer victims to protection services. * Cease the targeted conscription of public activists and critics of the transition government into the VDP. * Increase efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes, including those involving complicit officials, while respecting due process, and seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, which should involve significant prison terms as prescribed in the 2018 penal code. * Increase the quantity and quality of services available to all trafficking victims, including adults, in coordination with civil society. * Empower the national anti-trafficking committee to coordinate the transition government’s anti-trafficking response and implementation of its 2023-2025 NAP, including by providing financial and in-kind resources and convening regular meetings. * Increase nationwide trafficking data collection and sharing on law enforcement and victim identification efforts. * Institutionalize and expand anti-trafficking training for law enforcement, prosecutors, and the judiciary on investigating and prosecuting trafficking cases using the 2018 anti-trafficking law. * Increase oversight of labor recruitment agencies and hold fraudulent labor recruiters criminally accountable. * Increase public awareness campaigns on all forms of trafficking, including child forced begging and trafficking that does not involve movement, in collaboration with civil society.
The transition government maintained anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. Articles 511-1 to 511-5 of the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of five to 10 years’ imprisonment and fines of 1 million to 5 million West African CFA francs (FCFA) ($1,630-$8,130) for offenses involving a victim older than the age of 15, and 11 to 20 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 2 million to 10 million FCFA ($3,250-$16,260) for those involving a victim 15 years old or younger. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. Insecurity across the country hindered law enforcement and data collection efforts.
The transition government reported investigating at least 46 cases, compared with zero investigations during the previous year. The transition government reported prosecuting 57 alleged traffickers and convicting 39 traffickers for unspecified forms of trafficking; this included data collected from eight of Burkina Faso’s 27 districts from January 2023 through January 2024. This compared with prosecuting 31 alleged traffickers and convicting 22 traffickers for unspecified forms of trafficking in data collected from five districts in 2022. However, the transition government did not disaggregate the data between sex and labor trafficking.
Courts sentenced traffickers to between one and 21 years’ imprisonment with fines; however, 90 percent of convicted traffickers received fully or partially suspended prison sentences (including 20 traffickers who received fully suspended sentences), which did not serve to deter or adequately reflect the nature of the crime. The transition government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking crimes; however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action. Observers reported the transition government conscripted and sent notices to conscript at least 12 adults, including journalists, activists, and political figures, into the government-supported VDP forces, which may have involved forced labor, after they criticized the transition authorities. In December 2023, a court ruled the conscription notices of three individuals were not lawful because those individuals’ conscriptions were not for the purpose of national military operations and were rather for punishment; however, the transition authorities ignored this ruling.
The transition government did not report investigating or prosecuting any officials for alleged complicity in the unlawful recruitment or use of child soldiers verified in a previous reporting period. VDP forces reportedly abducted children to obtain intelligence on violent extremist groups. In July 2018, a federal court in New York entered a default judgment against a former Burkina Faso diplomat who was previously assigned to Burkina Faso’s Mission to the UN. The plaintiff (the diplomat’s former domestic worker) alleged, among other things, violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act and federal and state labor laws.
In October 2019, the court awarded the plaintiff approximately $784,000. The judgment remains unpaid, and the transition government did not report taking any action to hold the diplomat accountable for the fifth consecutive year. Child protection units, comprised of law enforcement and social workers in offices throughout the country, were in charge of identifying and supporting vulnerable children, including child trafficking victims. The judicial academy’s curriculum for prosecutors and judges included an anti-trafficking component.
However, the transition government did not report providing any specialized anti-trafficking training to law enforcement. The transition government did not report collaborating with any foreign counterparts on law enforcement activities.
The transition government decreased protection efforts. Weak case management and data collection hindered the transition government’s ability to track victim-related statistics. The transition government did not report identifying or referring any trafficking victims to services in 2022, the most recent year available for government statistics. This compared with the transition government identifying and referring 1,532 trafficking victims to services in 2021.
Authorities and front-line responders had trafficking victim identification and referral SOPs; however, implementation was inconsistent across regions. The transition government had a case management guide for law enforcement and social service providers to facilitate the uniform referral of child trafficking victims to care. Officials continued to coordinate with an international organization to screen for trafficking indicators among refugees and IDPs but did not report identifying any potential victims among these populations. The Ministry of Solidarity conducted an initiative to identify and refer to care vulnerable women and children experiencing homelessness or using the streets as a source of livelihood, which may have included trafficking victims; the ministry provided the women with vocational training and livelihood support.
The Ministry of Solidarity operated 34 reception centers for child crime victims, including trafficking victims; the centers provided limited services, including psycho-social, medical, and short-term shelter support, before reintegrating or transferring children to foster families. Two of the centers in Ouagadougou operated 24-hour shelters, provided food and medical assistance, and could accommodate long-term stays for both adults and children. It also operated 85 centers for vulnerable children providing daytime services. It did not report how many trafficking victims, if any, the centers provided services to.
An international organization, in collaboration with the transition government, opened a transit center for migrants providing food, legal, vocational, and psycho-social services. The transition government operated two emergency integrated support centers for female victims of violence, including sex trafficking, and a victim support fund; in at least one case, officials referred trafficking victims to one of the centers. The transition government relied heavily on local NGOs and international organizations to provide victim services without financial or in-kind support. Shelter services for adult trafficking victims were severely limited, especially outside of the capital.
Long-term care for all victims remained inadequate, and service providers lacked funding and resources to support victim services and reintegration. The lack of support subsequently heightened vulnerability to re-trafficking. The transition government worked with international organizations and foreign donors to implement its humanitarian response plan, providing shelter, food, and essential supplies to millions of vulnerable people in conflict-affected areas, including potential trafficking victims. Access to victim services was not conditioned on cooperation with law enforcement proceedings.
The 2018 penal code contained provisions to support victims’ participation in investigations and prosecutions, including allowing victims to testify in closed sessions, excusing victims from appearing at hearings, offering legal assistance to victim-witnesses, and allowing social workers to accompany child victims. However, the transition government did not report utilizing these provisions. The law allowed victims to obtain restitution, but the transition government did not report pursuing restitution in any cases. Victims could file civil suits against the traffickers; however, no victims reportedly used this provision, and many victims were not aware of this option.
Foreign victims who faced hardship or retribution in their country of origin could apply for asylum, but authorities did not report granting asylum to any trafficking victims. Due to inconsistent screening of vulnerable populations, officials likely inappropriately detained and prosecuted unidentified trafficking victims. During the previous reporting period, the transition government and an international organization signed a protocol on the treatment of children detained by security forces for alleged association with armed groups; the protocol mandated defense forces transfer the children to social services or to the specialized juvenile justice courts within three days of identification. The transition government did not report the number of children transferred to protection actors; however, authorities had reportedly transferred more than 300 children to protection actors over the past several years.
Under the protocol, officials transferred younger children to foster families and Ministry of Solidarity social services centers; officials transferred older children to the children’s section of the maximum security prison. Ministry of Justice officials asserted the handover protocol did not prevent the transition government from prosecuting children for terrorism under the criminal code. Additionally, the protocol did not apply to children detained prior to the signing of the protocol. Consequently, authorities continued inappropriately detaining and prosecuting children as young as 14 years old for alleged association with armed groups, including potential trafficking victims.
The transition government prosecuted 11 children charged with association with a terrorist organization, illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, and firearms training. The court convicted eight children and sentenced them to between two and 11 years’ imprisonment; it acquitted three children and placed them in a juvenile rehabilitation center. At least 12 additional children remained in detention awaiting trial. The transition government did not report what measures, if any, were taken to screen these children for trafficking indicators.
Authorities held the detained children in a high-security prison separately from adult detainees and allowed international organizations and NGOs access to provide specialized care, including education and legal services. In some cases, authorities held detainees, including children allegedly associated with violent extremist groups, without charge or trial for longer periods than the maximum sentence for the alleged offense. Authorities have detained some boys for years; when they reached the age of 18, authorities transferred them to the adults’ prison section. Detainees, including children allegedly associated with violent extremist groups, faced harsh conditions, including inadequate food and water, and poor ventilation, lighting, and medical care.
The transition government maintained minimal efforts to prevent trafficking. The government’s anti-trafficking coordination committee did not meet or conduct activities for the fourth consecutive year. The Ministry of Solidarity oversaw the transition government’s anti-trafficking efforts and implementation of its 2023-2025 anti-trafficking NAP. The national coordination committee on the worst forms of child labor, including child trafficking, continued to implement its 2019-2023 national strategy.
The transition government made some efforts to raise awareness of human trafficking, including supporting an anti-trafficking training for community stakeholders and hosting an event for World Day Against Trafficking in Persons. Local child protection networks comprised of community leaders, protection actors, and civil society groups coordinated local prevention and outreach efforts. The transition government did not report efforts to raise public awareness of child forced begging, nor did it regulate Quranic schools to prevent child forced begging or abuse. The Ministry of Solidarity operated hotlines to report child abuse and gender-based violence, including potential trafficking cases, but it did not report identifying any trafficking victims from hotline calls.
The transition government developed a new child labor curriculum that included an anti-trafficking component for the labor inspectorate training academy. The Ministry of Labor continued deploying a mobile application to help inspectors screen for and collect data on child labor. However, labor inspectors did not receive anti-trafficking training, did not report identifying any trafficking victims, and could not access all regions of the country due to insecurity. The transition government did not report regulating labor recruitment, and it did not take steps to prevent the fraudulent recruitment and exploitation of Burkinabe nationals abroad.
An international organization, with some government support, continued issuing identity documents to vulnerable populations, including refugees. The transition government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The transition government did not provide anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel. The transition government provided human rights briefings, including a component on human trafficking, to its troops prior to their deployment as peacekeepers.
However, although not explicitly reported as human trafficking, there were two open cases of alleged sexual exploitation with trafficking indicators by Burkinabe peacekeepers deployed to the UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2021. The UN substantiated the allegations, but the transition government had not reported the accountability measures taken, if any, by the end of the reporting period. TRAFFICKING PROFILE: As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Burkina Faso, and traffickers exploit victims from Burkina Faso abroad. Traffickers exploit Burkinabe children and children from other West African countries in forced labor in agriculture, artisanal gold panning and washing, street vending, and domestic servitude.
Tens of thousands of children working in artisanal mining sites are vulnerable to trafficking. In previous years, some corrupt officials allegedly exerted pressure over police and the judiciary to drop labor trafficking cases, especially in the mining sector. Unscrupulous Quranic teachers force or coerce students, called talibes, to beg in the streets sometimes with parents’ knowledge. Traffickers transport Burkinabe children – including children who experienced homelessness – to Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Senegal, and Niger for forced labor in artisanal mining, begging, and cocoa production, as well as sex trafficking.
Traffickers exploit girls in sex trafficking in Ouagadougou and in mining towns. Insecurity, poverty, and a lack of required identity documents impede children’s access to education, increasing vulnerability to trafficking. There are more than two million IDPs in Burkina Faso, more than half of which are children. Forcibly displaced persons migrating from rural areas to urban centers, and to neighboring countries, are vulnerable to forced labor and sex trafficking.
Local officials involved in a humanitarian food assistance program reportedly exploited female IDPs in sex trafficking between October 2020 and May 2021. In 2022, observers verified Burkina Faso’s defense and security forces recruited and used 10 boys in unspecified roles in 2021. Violent extremist groups exploit women and children, including IDPs, in forced labor and sex trafficking, and reportedly coerce individuals to carry out attacks and otherwise act as accomplices. Violent extremist groups continue to recruit and use child soldiers, and observers reported instances of child soldier recruitment continued increasing.
School closures and regional and economic instability increase children’s vulnerability to trafficking and recruitment by armed groups. Armed groups leverage economic vulnerability to recruit children, sometimes with familial support, by promising large sums of money and gifting motorcycles. Armed groups also target talibes due to the boys’ lack of economic alternatives. Migrant smuggling networks facilitated sex trafficking in gold mining sites and brothels in cities and border regions.
Traffickers recruit women for ostensibly legitimate employment in the Middle East and – to a lesser extent – Europe and subsequently exploit them in sex trafficking and domestic servitude. Traffickers fraudulently recruit Nigerian women and girls for employment in shops and salons and instead exploit them in sex trafficking in mining regions, often through the use of debt bondage. Traffickers fraudulently recruit women from other West African countries for employment and subsequently exploit them in forced labor in restaurants or domestic servitude. Government-affiliated Cuban workers, including medical professionals, working in Burkina Faso may have been forced to work by the Cuban government.
On This Page search > < BURKINA FASO (Tier 2 Watch List) PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: PROSECUTION PROTECTION PREVENTION TRAFFICKING PROFILE: Tags Bureau of African Affairs Burkina Faso Human Trafficking Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons Reports
Ask CiteLaw's AI Navigator anything about this agency guidance, verify citations, and research related authorities. Sign up for CiteLaw free today to get started.