U.S. Dep't of State, 2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Iraq

IRAQ (Tier 2) The Government of Iraq does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing efforts compared with the previous reporting period; therefore, Iraq remained on Tier 2. These efforts included investigating more trafficking crimes, particularly forced begging, and convicting more traffickers. Law enforcement participated in international investigations, which resulted in the arrest of alleged traffickers.

The government trained officials on victim identification and referral to care. The government allocated resources to the Central Committee to Combat Human Trafficking (CCCHT) and regularly sought the input of survivors in its anti-trafficking efforts. However, the government did not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. The government prosecuted fewer suspected traffickers and identified fewer victims than the prior year.

The government did not report efforts to address official complicity, including reports of officials who previously allegedly exploited children with alleged affiliation to ISIS and their families in sex trafficking in exchange for civil documentation required to receive government services. Investigative judges retained the sole authority to formally identify and refer victims to care, limiting victim identification and protection efforts. Due to inconsistent screening among vulnerable populations, authorities did not take effective measures to prevent the inappropriate penalization of potential victims solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. The government lacked dedicated shelters for child trafficking victims and limited shelter access for some populations vulnerable to trafficking.

PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: Allow all relevant authorities, not solely investigative judges via a court order, to formally identify potential trafficking victims and refer them to care, including shelter. Ensure trafficking victims are not inappropriately penalized solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. Increase unhindered access to adequate protection services for all trafficking victims – including foreign victims and vulnerable groups – and their children, including shelter, counseling, medical care, legal aid, translation and interpretation services, reintegration services, employment training, and financial assistance. Address language in the revised Iraqi Personal Status Law which may restrict the government’s ability to protect victims of trafficking or punish traffickers.

Train officials on the use of established SOPs for the proactive identification of victims among vulnerable populations, including returnees repatriated from al-Hol. Increase efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes and seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, including complicit officials, which should involve significant prison terms, and report sentencing details. Consistently enforce strong regulations and oversight of labor recruitment companies, including by eliminating recruitment fees charged to migrant workers and holding fraudulent labor recruiters criminally accountable. Ensure a victim-centered and trauma-informed approach to victim identification and the provision of assistance for all victims regardless of participation in criminal proceedings or the prosecution of a trafficker.

Establish a legal framework, either by amending the law or through a ministerial declaration, for NGOs to operate shelters for victims, and provide financial resources, facilities, and trained personnel to such organizations. Amend the anti-trafficking law to ensure that a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion is not required to constitute a child sex trafficking offense, in accordance with the 2000 UN TIP Protocol.

PROSECUTION

The government increased anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. Iraq’s 2012 anti-trafficking law criminalized labor trafficking and some forms of sex trafficking. It prescribed penalties of up to 15 years’ imprisonment and a fine for trafficking offenses involving adult male victims, and up to life imprisonment and a fine for offenses involving adult females or child victims. These penalties were sufficiently stringent, and with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape.

Inconsistent with the definition of trafficking under international law, the anti-trafficking law required a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute a child sex trafficking offense and therefore did not criminalize all forms of child sex trafficking. The penal code criminalized “the prostitution of a child” and provided a penalty of up to 10 years’ imprisonment, which was sufficiently stringent, although not commensurate with the penalties prescribed for rape. The CCCHT continued drafting amendments to the 2012 law to remove the requirement of a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion in child sex trafficking crimes; the amendments remained pending approval by the Council of Representatives. Implementing regulations for the anti-trafficking law provided relevant member ministries of the CCCHT detailed roles and responsibilities.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) did not report whether it developed the regulatory and enforcement framework required to fully implement the 2012 Iraqi anti-trafficking law, which the Iraqi Kurdistan Region’s (IKR) regional parliament approved in 2018. In 2024, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) initiated investigations of 3,182 individuals in an unknown number of cases, including 523 alleged sex traffickers and 2,659 alleged labor traffickers, of which 2,291 were for forced begging. This was a significant increase compared with 1,698 individuals investigated in 2023. The government reported 410 trafficking investigations initiated in previous years remained ongoing.

Authorities prosecuted 543 suspects, including 202 for sex trafficking and 341 for labor trafficking, of which 205 were for forced begging. This was a decrease compared with 1,270 prosecutions initiated in 2023. The government reported 151 prosecutions initiated in previous years remained ongoing. The government convicted 388 traffickers, including 197 sex traffickers and 191 labor traffickers; courts reportedly convicted 252 individuals under the 2012 anti-trafficking law and 136 individuals using other laws, such as the penal code and residency law, some in addition to the trafficking law.

This was an increase compared with 295 convictions in 2023. The government did not report sentencing data for convicted traffickers; however, the government reported sentences ranged from five years’ imprisonment to life sentence. It was possible law enforcement statistics provided by the government included crimes that went beyond the scope of the international definition of trafficking. KRG officials investigated 13 alleged trafficking cases (10 sex trafficking, two labor trafficking, and one unspecified form of trafficking) in 2024.

The KRG initiated one new labor trafficking prosecution and 33 prosecutions from 2023 remained ongoing. IKR courts convicted four traffickers (three sex trafficking and one labor trafficking), compared with eight convictions in 2023. The KRG did not provide sentencing data for convicted traffickers. The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking crimes; however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action during the year.

Reports indicated low-level police and administrative officers accepted bribes to ignore trafficking crimes. Observers reported some law enforcement officials allegedly facilitated child sex trafficking in prisons. An international organization previously reported officials exploited families – including children – allegedly associated with ISIS and following their release from detention in sex trafficking by coercing them to perform sex acts to obtain civil documentation required to receive governmental services. The MOI’s anti-trafficking directorate oversaw trafficking investigations and maintained 16 specialized police units, two in Baghdad and one in most provinces; the government allocated additional resources to the directorate in 2024.

The Iraqi judiciary appointed specialized investigative judges in all governorates; judges solely handled trafficking cases and were responsible for officially identifying and referring victims to care. Prosecutors reportedly pursued trafficking cases as lesser offenses, such as commercial sex crimes or labor code violations, instead of as human trafficking, resulting in lesser penalties not reflective of the seriousness of the crime. In the IKR, the KRG MOI’s Directorate for Combating Organized Crime (DCOC) maintained eight active anti-trafficking police units across all governates and independent administrations; however, observers reported these units lacked adequate resources and staffing. In the IKR, trafficking cases were initially heard in the Investigation Court, where a judge decided whether to refer the case to criminal, civil, or juvenile court.

Observers noted some judges did not refer trafficking cases for investigation due to lack of knowledge of the trafficking law. At times, victims without legal representation were unable to provide sufficient evidence that a trafficking crime occurred, so judges did not refer the case for further investigation and instead permanently or temporarily closed the case. The government, in partnership with NGOs, conducted anti-trafficking training for judges, law enforcement, prosecutors, CCCHT, border officials, healthcare staff, security, Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA), Supreme Judicial Council, Ministry of Justice, and diplomats on victim assistance, SOPs for victim identification, investigative techniques, and online trafficking. The government, in partnership with an international organization, developed and disseminated a training handbook to guide trafficking investigations.

The KRG published new SOPs for investigating and prosecuting cases and trained investigators on these. Law enforcement cooperated with authorities from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Syria and INTERPOL on trafficking investigations, which resulted in the arrest of alleged traffickers and the identification of victims. The KRG and Iraqi federal government continued to cooperate on investigations.

PROTECTION

The government maintained uneven victim protection efforts. The MOI reported identifying 223 trafficking victims in 2024, compared with 335 victims identified in 2023. Of the 223 victims identified, 106 were Iraqi sex trafficking victims (including 83 women, 22 girls, and one boy) and 117 were labor trafficking victims, including 48 forced begging victims. Foreign victims were from Ethiopia, Lebanon, Bangladesh, Uganda, Kenya, the Philippines, Pakistan, and other countries.

The KRG reported identifying 73 victims, including 25 adult female sex trafficking victims, 48 labor trafficking victims, including two forced begging victims (all foreign nationals) in 2024; this compared with 121 victims identified in 2023. The KRG did not identify any child trafficking victims in 2024, compared with 11 in 2023. The government implemented SOPs, including a screening questionnaire and indicators for high-risk groups, to identify and refer victims to care; however, observers reported officials’ use of the SOPs was inconsistent, particularly in rural areas. Observers reported social services and labor inspectors required more training on the SOPs to ensure adequate implementation at the local level.

Investigative judges remained the sole officials legally authorized to officially identify and refer trafficking victims to protection services via a court order. Victims could legally access services without cooperating with law enforcement; however, observers noted, in practice, victims were often expected to speak with law enforcement before referral. Although victims were not required to testify in court, their testimony was a prerequisite to initiate a criminal investigation. If victims did not provide testimony, or judges determined there was insufficient evidence, an individual could be denied status as a trafficking victim, which would then deny access to protection services.

In the IKR, front-line officials maintained a questionnaire and tools to identify and refer potential trafficking victims; however, observers noted authorities did not consistently or proactively screen for trafficking indicators among some vulnerable groups, including among returnees from al-Hol camp in northeastern Syria. Investigative judges in the IKR retained sole authority to refer victims to government-run shelters via a court order; observers reported limited victim identification or access to services services if judges did not officially recognize victims. Government shelters required a court order for victims to enter shelters; however, if a victim sought assistance directly from non-government run shelters, a court order was not required. Observers noted greater need for interpreters to conduct interviews in victims’ primary languages to improve victim identification.

The government referred 223 identified victims to care and provided healthcare, shelter, or legal assistance, compared to 137 referred to care in 2023. The government reported offering services to 37 victims who instead chose to be repatriated or to receive assistance through NGOs or foreign embassies. The KRG reported of 73 victims identified, it referred eight to an NGO-operated shelter but did not report if the remaining 65 were referred to or received services. An observer reported the provision of services to 94 victims without KRG support.

MOLSA operated a shelter in Baghdad that could accommodate 80 adult female victims and children of victims and a shelter in Baghdad for male victims that could accommodate 50 adult male trafficking victims, which provided services to 51 victims. The government also operated shelters in Diwaniyah and Kirkuk that could accommodate trafficking victims. Iraqi law prohibited NGOs from operating shelters in federal Iraq, although international organizations and NGOs could refer identified victims to government shelters. NGOs reported limited shelter availability in remote areas and for certain victim populations, including children, men, individuals who identify as lesbian, gay or bisexual, and foreign workers.

Given limited availability of services for male victims, the government sometimes held potential victims in detention facilities. In 2024, the government restricted shelter access, including for potential trafficking victims, by implementing policies that reportedly prohibited civil society from providing services to certain populations. Observers noted the need for specialized shelters for child trafficking victims, as officials typically placed child victims in orphanages, shelters for homeless persons, or detention. MOLSA allocated 1.1 billion Iraqi dinar (IQD) ($797,122) for government shelters and protections for victims of trafficking; of which, 250 million IQD ($190,985) was allocated to the MOLSA shelter in Baghdad, while provinces outside the capital allocated 150 million IQD ($114,591) annually for assistance to trafficking victims.

MOLSA – with the Ministry of Health – reported providing victims at the shelter with psycho-social services, legal support, reintegration services, vocational training, and medical care. Observers reported services generally improved in recent years; however, a lack of resources, staffing, technical capacity, training, and case management limited shelter staff’s ability to provide legal support and specialized psycho-social, trauma-informed, and medical care. Although the law entitled foreign trafficking victims to the same benefits as Iraqi victims, in practice, officials frequently referred foreign victims to an international organization for assistance, shelter, or repatriation, rather than providing services at government-run shelters. Advocates reported some victims, particularly those without legal status in Iraq or experiencing language barriers, had difficulty accessing government-run services.

Foreign victims reportedly relied on their embassies for support. The KRG operated five domestic violence shelters, which could provide some services to female trafficking victims; however, shelter space was limited. Officials required victims to obtain a court order to leave the shelters, which restricted their movement. The KRG did not report how many victims received services at these shelters.

The KRG continued to allow an NGO to operate the only trafficking shelter in the IKR. The shelter provided comprehensive case management and legal, health, and mental health services, could house up to 38 victims, and was almost always at capacity. Observers reported lack of adequate shelter for child victims in IKR; the KRG did not operate a specialized shelter for child victims of trafficking. The KRG signed a memorandum with an NGO to establish a shelter for women trafficking victims while their cases were pending; however, this was not yet operational.

The KRG facilitated the release of Yezidis held captive by ISIS, including trafficking victims, and reported it coordinated with NGOs and an international organization to provide psycho-social and protective services to victims. The federal government and KRG provided some protections to victims or witnesses participating in criminal justice proceedings. The government reported 42 identified victims voluntarily assisted law enforcement authorities during the investigation and prosecution of traffickers. The government reported providing victims with legal assistance and interpretation and translations services, as well as the option to testify via video, remote interviews, or written testimony; however, NGOs reported these measures were not always available.

The government allowed trafficking victims to work, move freely, and leave the country during trials, unless victims resided in government shelters, in which case a court order was required to leave the shelter. The government provided victim-witness protection as needed, such as secure housing, security, and confidentiality to ensure physical safety and privacy during proceedings; however, observers reported traffickers with societal influence sometimes threatened victims or judges, hindering protection efforts. In the IKR, courts did not provide interpretation services for foreign labor trafficking victims, and victims relied on NGOs to provide such services. Observers noted limited availability of interpreters for certain languages in the IKR and the need for trauma-informed interview practices during court proceedings.

Although employers were legally responsible for covering foreign workers’ recruitment fees under Iraq’s sponsorship system, some authorities penalized workers, including identified and unidentified trafficking victims, for failing to pay immigration fees. Observers continued to report that officials sometimes waived residency fines, but the decision-making process appeared arbitrary and dependent on the individual official. The MOI did not report how many victims received temporary residence permits, and the issuance of permits reportedly depended on whether victims participated in the criminal justice process. The KRG sometimes waived fines to which trafficking victims would otherwise be subject for working in the IKR without legal documentation; however, this process was informal and inconsistently applied.

In 2024, the KRG reportedly waived fines for 13 victims with support from an NGO and international organization. Observers reported difficulty waiving fees or renewing residency permits, as traffickers often confiscated victims’ identification documents, and some potential foreign victims could not leave the IKR without their passports or due to unpaid residency fees. Observers reported KRG authorities fined or detained potential trafficking victims for immigration violations in the IKR without screening for trafficking indicators or reportedly required some potential victims to have a local sponsor to be released. Iraq’s anti-trafficking law allowed the government to provide special residency status benefits to foreign trafficking victims; the MOI did not report providing this to any identified victims.

The KRG did not offer special residency status to victims. The Iraqi government and the KRG could provide foreign victims relief from deportation or offer legal alternatives to their removal to countries in which they could face hardship or retribution. The Iraqi government reportedly repatriated 51 victims, and an NGO reported the KRG repatriated 78 victims with funding from NGOs or foreign governments. Although victims could obtain restitution and compensation in federal Iraq, the government did not report issuing any to victims in 2024.

KRG authorities reportedly ordered a recruitment agency to pay restitution to four potential trafficking victims in 2024. In addition, five additional victims received restitution after legal proceedings against accused recruitment agencies in 2024. Due to inadequate screening, the government did not take appropriate measures to prevent the inappropriate penalization of potential labor trafficking victims solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked, including immigration violations, and deported or detained some unidentified victims. Previous reports indicated federal Iraqi and KRG authorities inappropriately detained and prosecuted, without legal representation, children allegedly affiliated with ISIS – some of whom were victims of forcible recruitment or use, forced and child marriage victims, and sex trafficking victims – and reportedly used abusive interrogation techniques and torture to obtain confessions.

The Iraqi government did not report screening these children as potential trafficking victims or referring them to protection services. Reports persisted that the government detained approximately 700 children for alleged association with armed groups, including ISIS. In 2024, the Iraqi government reported providing some protection or reintegration services to seven demobilized child soldiers affiliated with ISIS repatriated from Syria.

PREVENTION

The government maintained efforts to prevent human trafficking. The MOI continued to lead the CCCHT, which also included other federal ministries and three KRG representatives. The committee met eight times in 2024, while subcommittees met more frequently. The KRG’s anti-trafficking committee, led by the KRG Ministry of Interior (KMOI) and comprising 19 government ministries, met once as a whole committee, while the governates and independent administration subcommittees met 17 times.

The government finalized its 2023-2026 national strategy and monitored its progress. The federal government also finalized a 2025 NAP. The government allocated 250 million IQD ($190,985) to awareness campaigns, research, and the NAP and provided a new facility to the CCCHT. The government regularly sought the input of survivors in its anti-trafficking efforts and encouraged their participation in awareness raising activities.

The federal government and KRG, with civil society, conducted awareness campaigns primarily for government officials, foreign workers, diplomats, students, and the public. The government funded research on trafficking risks to Iraqis abroad. The MOI continued to operate a 24-hour anti-trafficking hotline and maintained a public email address to receive trafficking tips; the government reported calls led to 51 referrals of potential trafficking victims to care in 2024. The hotline was only available in Arabic, which limited its accessibility for foreign trafficking victims and Kurdish speakers.

The KRG did not have a hotline to report trafficking, but the DCOC police’s phone number was publicly available, and one NGO operated a general service line for victims of trafficking. The Iraqi government and the KRG maintained an online visa system to track migrant workers and their sponsoring companies to prevent labor abuses, including labor trafficking. Observers reported challenges in monitoring the informal sector. The KRG reported challenges tracking migrant workers hired by employers and companies that used fake or fraudulent registrations and by agents, sponsoring foreign labor visas before hiring the workers to third party companies for profit.

However, the KRG continued to require such entities to submit a deposit to KMOI to be used for any fines incurred for non-compliance with labor laws. Although the KRG prohibited “pre-payment employment,” recruitment agencies were able to deduct a percentage of workers’ first paychecks as a service fee for facilitating employment. Observers noted the KRG MOLSA’s regulation on foreign labor conflicted with the IKR’s 2018 anti-trafficking law, particularly for workers who may be potential trafficking victims and could be punished for lacking legal status under the foreign worker regulations in the IKR. The KRG drafted amendments to its labor law that reportedly included provisions to improve protection of Iraqi and foreign workers; the law remained pending approval by the IKR parliament.

A separate revision on regulations governing migrant workers and oversight on recruitment agencies remained under review for the second consecutive year. The government regulated labor recruitment and placement of foreign workers through MOI’s Residency Office and MOLSA. Migrant workers could not change employers prior to completing two years of work with a sponsor except in documented cases abuse. However, even in cases where an employee had a legitimate complaint, recruitment agents reportedly relocated the employee to a new employer, and authorities rarely held the abusive employer accountable.

Frequently, agencies the government blacklisted reportedly changed names then continued to operate, and in cases when the government punished an employer for labor abuse, it was common for officials to penalize a single perpetrator, rather than the agency. The MOI and MOLSA maintained a joint committee to conduct inspections for unlicensed recruitment agencies in an effort to provide additional oversight and accountability; however, the government did not report whether any agencies were closed as a result of such inspections in 2024. The government provided anti-trafficking training to labor inspectors in federal Iraq; however, observers reported insufficient resources allocated to the labor inspectorate hindered efforts to identify potential labor trafficking cases. The KRG reportedly closed 172 companies due to labor rights violations or forced labor in 2024 and, with an NGO, trained inspectors on victim identification.

Despite these efforts, observers reported the KRG failed to hold some recruitment agencies accountable for fraudulent recruitment. The federal government and the KRG reported they made efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts by monitoring or blocking websites for commercial sex acts and conducting awareness campaigns, including on the penalties for purchasing commercial sex or forcing a child into an early marriage for the purpose of commercial sex. In 2025, the government passed a revised Personal Status Law, which allowed the marriage of girls of certain faiths younger than the age of 15 and legalized extrajudicial marriage; observers expressed concern these changes may increase girls’ vulnerability to trafficking and impede the government’s ability to remediate incidents of forced marriage involving human trafficking. Iraqi law prohibited compulsory or voluntary recruitment of any person younger than age 18 into the governmental armed forces, including governmental paramilitary forces, militia groups, or other armed groups.

The government previously developed an action plan in coordination with an international organization to address the recruitment and use of children by the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in armed conflict but did not report whether the plan had been implemented. TRAFFICKING PROFILE: Trafficking affects all communities. This section summarizes government and civil society reporting on the nature and scope of trafficking over the past five years. Human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Iraq, and traffickers exploit victims from Iraq abroad.

As of January 2025, one million Iraqis remain displaced across Iraq with approximately 112,000 IDPs living in 20 formal camp locations in the IKR, while no formal IDP camps remain in federal Iraq. Iraq also hosts nearly 340,000 refugees and asylum seekers, most of whom live in the IKR. Refugees and IDPs face heightened risk of forced labor and sex trafficking due to their economic and social vulnerability, lack of security and protections, lack of civil documentation, and alleged affiliation with extremist groups. Women and girls in IDP camps whose family members have alleged ties to ISIS may continue to be exposed to a complex system of potential sexual exploitation, sex trafficking, and abuse by security and military officials.

Criminal gangs reportedly exploit women in sex trafficking, including Syrian women and girls at pilgrimage sites. Human trafficking networks reportedly exploit victims in forced begging. Observers continue to report an increase in the use of children 8-15 years old by criminal gangs to distribute narcotics. Traffickers reportedly force children, including IDP children, to work in chemical factories in the IKR and shops in Sinjar.

Following the closure of IDP camps, NGOs report IDPs experience greater challenges obtaining civil documentation and secondary displacement, which exacerbates this population’s already high risk of trafficking. An international organization previously reported tens of thousands of IDP children lacked civil documentation, particularly those formerly in areas under ISIS control, and could not access basic services. Some officials reportedly exploit families allegedly associated with ISIS – including children – in sex trafficking following their release from detention; in 2024, an international organization reported officials coerce family members of formally detained children into performing sex acts in order to obtain security clearances or access civil documentation required to receive governmental services. Observers noted traffickers often exploit IDP Iraqi children, as well as Syrian refugee children, between the ages of 10-18, in forced labor in street-selling, hospitality, and domestic servitude.

Yezidi women and girls, including IDPs, previously exploited in forced labor and sex trafficking by ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria, remain highly vulnerable to various forms of exploitation, including re-trafficking. Reports estimate several hundred Yezidis remain in displacement camps in northeastern Syria, while others remain in detention facilities and off-camp locations; some of these Yezidis remain trapped in exploitive conditions, including trafficking. Individuals, including children, repatriated from northeastern Syria remain extremely vulnerable to trafficking. Children remain vulnerable to forcible recruitment or use by multiple armed groups operating in Iraq, including ISIS, tribal forces, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and non-PMF Iran-aligned militia groups.

The last credible report of child soldier recruitment or use by the PMF was in 2020. The PKK and the People’s Defense Units previously recruited and used child soldiers. Previous reports indicate ISIS abducted and forcibly recruited and used children in combat and support roles, including as human shields, informants, bomb makers, executioners, and suicide bombers; some of these children were as young as eight years old and some were children with intellectual disabilities. Observers reported individuals who identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual in the IKR and federal Iraq are at risk of sex trafficking.

Traditional practices, including “fasliya” – the exchange of family members to settle tribal disputes – and forced child marriages, place women and girls at increased risk of trafficking. Women and girls are also exploited in sex trafficking through “temporary” marriages. Observers note Saudis and Kuwaitis exploit children in sex trafficking during hunting trips in areas inhabited by nomadic tribesmen. Observers previously alleged some traffickers operated massage centers in five-star hotels.

Massage parlors, coffee shops, bars, and nightclubs remain common locations for sex trafficking. Women from Iraq, Iran, and Syria, as well as migrant workers, are particularly at risk of sex trafficking. Traffickers use social media to recruit victims. Traffickers subject foreign nationals from Asia and Africa to forced labor in construction and agriculture and as security guards, cleaners, handymen, and domestic workers in Iraq.

In IKR, traffickers exploit migrant workers, especially in domestic servitude, or in hotels, spas, bars, restaurants, construction, or agriculture. Traffickers may exploit victims in mines and quarries, and formerly imprisoned individuals are vulnerable to forced labor. Observers note an increasing number of Ghanaian, Indonesian, and Nigerian domestic workers identified as trafficking victims. NGOs report some employers and recruitment agents exploit foreign nationals by withholding their salaries, confiscating passports, and subjecting them to substandard living conditions through threats of deportation or arrest.

Traffickers fraudulently recruit some foreign migrants for work in other countries but subsequently force or coerce them into working in federal Iraq and the IKR. Migrants in the IKR reportedly receive harsher treatment than local employees by their employers, including physical and emotional abuse, and continue to be vulnerable to nonpayment or under-payment of wages and food deprivation – all indictors of trafficking. Traffickers exploit Iraqi victims abroad, including in Europe. On This Page search > < IRAQ (Tier 2) PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: PROSECUTION PROTECTION PREVENTION TRAFFICKING PROFILE: Tags Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Human Trafficking Iraq Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons Reports