U.S. Dep't of State, 2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Brunei

BRUNEI (Tier 2 Watch List) The Government of Brunei does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so. The government made key achievements during the reporting period; therefore, Brunei was upgraded to Tier 2 Watch List. These achievements included increasing investigations and prosecuting one alleged labor trafficker; providing services to 27 potential and confirmed victims; coordinating with a foreign government to repatriate 13 potential trafficking victims transiting Brunei; training officials, in partnership with a foreign government, on investigating trafficking cases; and completing and implementing an updated NAP. Despite these achievements, the government did not convict any traffickers under its anti-trafficking law for the eighth consecutive year.

The government identified fewer victims compared with the previous reporting period. The government only formally identified victims when it pursued an associated prosecution under the trafficking law. The government did not consistently screen for trafficking among foreign nationals, including individuals in commercial sex, migrant workers, and during labor inspections. Due to inadequate screening and identification efforts among vulnerable populations, the government did not take effective measures to prevent the inappropriate penalization of potential victims solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked.

PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: Increase efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes under the 2019 Anti-Trafficking in Persons Order and seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, including complicit officials, which should involve significant prison terms for both sex and labor traffickers. Allow for victims to be formally identified and provided services independent of prosecution efforts against alleged traffickers. Ensure victims are not inappropriately penalized solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked, such as for immigration or commercial sex violations. Expand existing training of front-line officials on the use of established victim identification SOPs for the proactive identification of trafficking victims among vulnerable populations, including individuals in commercial sex, domestic workers, migrant workers, and individuals discriminated against on the basis of their sexual orientation or identity.

Allow shelter residents freedom of movement and possession of their travel documents. Expand training for investigators and prosecutors on building trafficking cases, including collecting evidence to corroborate victim testimony and to identify elements of trafficking among labor and immigration violations. Train judges on accurate and effective implementation of trafficking laws, including through understanding the many ways traffickers coerce victims. Increase efforts to enforce labor protections for foreign migrant workers in Brunei, and officially issue guidelines on the prohibition of recruitment agencies charging or receiving worker-funded fees and eliminate worker-paid recruitment fees.

Increase protection services to provide incentives for victims to participate in investigations and prosecutions. Allocate resources and develop the capacity to proactively screen for trafficking at Chinese government-affiliated worksites and on fishing vessels in Brunei’s exclusive economic zone. Establish and implement bilateral labor agreements with labor source countries including protections for foreign migrant workers and monitoring mechanisms for source country embassies. Utilize the victims’ fund to provide compensation to trafficking victims.

PROSECUTION

The government increased law enforcement efforts. The 2019 Anti-Trafficking in Persons Order criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of four to 30 years’ imprisonment and fines of between 10,000 and one million Brunei dollars (BND) ($7,337 and $733,676), which were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. The penal code also criminalized travel outside the country for commercial sex with children, prescribing a punishment of up to 10 years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both. The government also utilized Chapter 120 Section 5 of the Women and Girls Protection Act, which addresses “living on or trading in prostitution,” to prosecute potential sex trafficking crimes.

The act prescribed penalties of up to five years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to 20,000 BND ($14,674), which were significantly lower than those available under the trafficking law. Authorities referred 100 potential trafficking cases to the Human Trafficking Unit (HTU) for review and further investigation, compared with 123 cases referred during the previous reporting period. The government officially investigated 15 cases involving 27 suspects – five for sex trafficking, nine for labor trafficking, and one for an unspecified form of trafficking – compared with six cases during the previous reporting period. Authorities determined 12 cases lacked sufficient evidence of trafficking and proceeded with investigating non-trafficking related charges; one sex trafficking investigation and two labor trafficking investigations remained ongoing.

The government initiated the prosecution of one alleged labor trafficker, under the trafficking statute, compared with initiating one prosecution, for alleged sex trafficking, during the previous reporting period. Authorities continued previously initiated prosecutions of two alleged labor traffickers. For the eighth consecutive year, courts did not convict any traffickers under the trafficking statute. The government shared information with international law enforcement agencies.

The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking crimes. The Royal Brunei Police Force (RBPF)’s HTU was the lead agency for trafficking investigations. The HTU and an interagency working group, referred to as a Trafficking in Persons Assessment Team, met on an ad-hoc basis to review referred suspected trafficking cases and determine whether the cases should be investigated as trafficking crimes. The interagency working group consisted of prosecutors, law enforcement, immigration, labor, customs, and intelligence community representatives; in 2025, the government added to the working group the Department of Community Development, which administered the victims’ shelter.

The HTU monitored daily police case reports from other RBPF units and participated in law enforcement actions to support investigating officers and screening efforts; however, HTU’s review of reports from other units to identify potential trafficking crimes relied upon the quality of the referring officer’s questioning and notes, and many non-HTU RBPF officers lacked training on trafficking. Inconsistent with the 2019 anti-trafficking law, investigators sometimes required proof of physical force, fraud, or coercion to initiate referrals as trafficking crimes. As a result, officials may not have investigated or prosecuted – as trafficking cases – cases in which the alleged traffickers used non-physical forms of coercion. Observers noted some officials lacked an understanding about the difference between trafficking crimes and labor disputes.

Government officials ascribed poor prosecutorial outcomes to high evidentiary standards of the trafficking statute, including the definition of exploitation under Brunei’s anti-trafficking law, despite the law’s consistency with the definition under international law. The government, in partnership with foreign governments, trained front-line officials and prosecutors on various trafficking topics. The government did not report training judiciary officials on approaches to domestic human trafficking cases. Observers reported a lack of understanding among government officials about trafficking indicators such as passport retention.

In addition, observers reported authorities did not investigate all alleged potential trafficking crimes and generally focused their efforts on crimes committed by foreign perpetrators rather than Bruneians.

PROTECTION

The government maintained efforts to identify and protect victims. The government identified three adult male labor trafficking victims, compared with identifying zero and 14 victims in the previous two reporting periods, respectively. The government utilized a two-stage identification process. Through this process, officials referred the cases of potential victims, who displayed indicators of trafficking during an initial screening, to the Trafficking in Persons Assessment Team, which conducted a review of the victim’s case and provided an assessment to the Attorney General’s Chambers (AGC).

If the AGC declined to prosecute a potential victim’s case under the trafficking law, the government did not formally identify these individuals as victims of trafficking. By making formal victim identification contingent on the existence of a prosecution under the trafficking law, the government likely failed to identify and appropriately protect many victims. The government provided potential victims with a range of services while the AGC decided whether or not to prosecute; however, if the AGC declined to pursue a trafficking prosecution, the government frequently then prosecuted these potential victims, potentially including some for crimes they were compelled to commit as a result of being trafficked. The government reported identifying at least 82 potential trafficking victims – 20 women and 62 men.

The government had SOPs for victim identification, referral, and protection, which officials used to screen potential trafficking cases. Officials reported HTU screened all migrant workers who left their employers under contract for trafficking indicators; however, the government did not report identifying any trafficking victims as a result of these screening efforts. Officials sometimes did not adequately implement the SOPs in cases involving individuals in commercial sex or workers who had left their employers. The government reported HTU jointly screened individuals in commercial sex for trafficking with the RBPF Vice Unit; however, the government did not report identifying any sex trafficking victims.

Due to insufficient screening for trafficking, especially among vulnerable migrant workers, the government did not take effective measures to prevent the inappropriate penalization of potential victims solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. Some officials lacked a victim-centered or trauma-informed approach to victim identification. Authorities have investigated potential trafficking victims for other crimes while their trafficking cases were adjudicated – officials claimed prosecutors did not factor unlawful acts victims may have committed as a direct result of being trafficked, such as commercial sex or immigration violations, into the decision on victim identification. The government placed announcements in newspapers and official websites seeking public assistance to trace migrant workers who left their employers under contract – potentially due to exploitation – referring to them as “runaway workers.” The government implemented a policy decision to cease using the term “runaway workers” in English-language media sources.

Although the government reported screening these individuals for trafficking indicators, these announcements potentially caused victims to fear communicating with law enforcement officers and led to authorities penalizing unidentified victims for immigration offenses committed as a direct result of being trafficked. The government provided services to both identified and potential victims, including shelter, medical care, counseling, clothing, meals, and access to vocational training programs and recreational activities. The government reported offering these services to three trafficking victims during the reporting period. It also provided these services to 24 individuals initially identified as potential victims but whom the government ultimately prosecuted for crimes such as commercial sex and immigration violations.

The government operated two shelters, one for male and one for female trafficking victims. These shelters could each house 17 victims and could accommodate victims with physical disabilities. Victims were unable to leave the shelters at will; authorities required victims either be chaperoned or reachable via phone at all times. While the shelter was offered to all potential victims as a voluntary option, all 25 potential victims in shelters were required to stay after being identified as “flight risks” by the government; the government provided the victims’ identities to border exit checkpoints to prevent them from leaving the country.

The government placed child trafficking victims in a shelter for child victims of various crimes, where they could receive specialized care. The government provided work permits to identified and potential trafficking victims for the duration of the trafficking investigation and supported the victims in finding alternate employment. Several foreign embassies operated shelters that assisted their nationals who were trafficking victims or who had requested repatriation. The government did not provide victims with alternatives to speaking with law enforcement during investigations.

Brunei’s anti-trafficking law required female and child victims to provide testimony by video, and it permitted male victims to testify either in person or by video. The government allocated 100,000 BND ($73,368) to the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Fund that finances anti-trafficking activities and could be used to pay compensation to trafficking victims; the government has never reported disbursing these funds to victims. The government did not have legal alternatives to removal for victims who may face hardship or retribution upon returning to their home countries. The government conducted case-by-case collaborations with foreign embassies to support some foreign national trafficking victims; in one case, the government coordinated with a foreign mission to repatriate 13 foreign nationals transiting Brunei to a third country where traffickers may have exploited them in forced labor or forced criminality in online scam operations.

PREVENTION

The government increased efforts to prevent trafficking. The government’s interagency anti-trafficking committee, chaired by the Prime Minister’s Office’s Permanent Secretary of Security and Law, met quarterly, and its working group, which focused on cases, met monthly. The government completed and began implementing an updated anti-trafficking NAP for 2025-2029. The government, in partnership with foreign governments, conducted awareness campaigns through social media, press, public speeches, and presentation engagements targeting government officials, employers, and migrant workers.

Brunei’s 2004 Employment Agencies Order (EAO) mandated licensing and regulation of recruitment agents. The EAO prohibited agencies from charging recruitment fees unless government regulation provided otherwise; the government permitted agencies to charge up to a 2,000 BND ($1,467) recruitment fee for migrant workers and required employers to pay the fees. Observers noted recruitment fees could be higher than this cap, with employers shifting some portion of recruitment fees on the migrant workers. The Department of Labor (DOL) required migrant workers to sign their contracts in the presence of a labor official to prevent forgery, ensure compliance with the law, and enable the labor official to provide information to the worker on their rights and obligations.

The government provided sample migrant worker contracts and employment rights pamphlets in the primary languages of regional labor-sending countries; however, government-provided contracts were standardized and did not provide position descriptions or specific details based on the workers’ employment. Employment rights pamphlets focused on criminal penalties for immigration violations and included a hotline for reporting abuses. Officials reported workers were provided and retained a copy of their contract by DOL. In 2023, the government began implementing a phased minimum wage applicable first to workers in banking, finance, and technology sectors; the government reported domestic and construction workers – the majority of migrant workers in Brunei – would be included in this minimum wage policy in 2024, however this had not been implemented by the end of the reporting period.

For workers not under the minimum wage policy, salary payments were negotiated in individual contracts. The 2009 Employment Order did not require employers to provide a written record of contract terms to employees in some sectors, such as domestic workers and fishing crews. The government required migrant workers to receive approval from their employers before departing Brunei to avoid incurring a 600 BND ($440) exit fine. Observers reported this scheme left workers vulnerable to extortion or debt-based coercion by traffickers.

At times, unscrupulous employers extorted workers to grant approval to leave Brunei; in other cases, when employers refused to provide approval, retained workers’ passports, or disappeared, migrant workers were unable to leave Brunei without incurring an exit-fine or were detained and prosecuted for immigration violations. One foreign government alleged that 48 of its nationals working in construction experienced numerous trafficking indicators, including seven months of unpaid wages and involuntary passport retention – after investigating, DOL reportedly repatriated 10 workers with partial wages, while the 38 others were required to return to work and continued to not receive compensation or health insurance. The government operated a labor and trafficking hotline, and DOL had an online mechanism for workers to submit complaints; the government reported receiving one call, which resulted in an investigation. Although the government prohibited employers from withholding wages for more than seven days or retaining employees’ passports, foreign embassies continued to report their citizens experienced both practices.

The government reported labor inspectors screened for trafficking indicators during routine inspections of worksites; inspectors referred one potential trafficking victim to law enforcement. The government reported uncovering trafficking indicators during inspections, such as unauthorized deduction of workers’ wages, passport retention, failure to provide rest time or holiday, and not providing employment contracts. The government issued varying fines for some violations; however, observers noted that some employers deducted the costs of the fines from workers’ salaries. The government reported initiating one prosecution against an employer for passport retention, but it did not report taking criminal or administrative action for illegal recruitment fees.

The government maintained labor recruitment MOUs with two foreign governments. One foreign government reported its nationals hired under the labor recruitment MOU were less vulnerable to trafficking. The government continued negotiations on a labor MOU with a third foreign government, which has been pending since 2013. The government made efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts by publicizing the arrest of clients.

TRAFFICKING PROFILE: Trafficking affects all communities. This section summarizes government and civil society reporting on the nature and scope of trafficking over the past five years. Human traffickers exploit foreign victims in Brunei. Some traffickers who exploit migrants in Malaysia or Indonesia for sex or labor trafficking use Brunei as a transit country.

There are approximately 100,000 migrant workers in Brunei; however, the overall number of migrant workers, including unregistered workers, is potentially higher. Overall, reports indicate there are approximately 25,000 to 30,000 from Indonesia employed primarily as domestic workers and in service industries; approximately 23,000 from the Philippines employed as domestic workers, as well as in semi-skilled and skilled roles; approximately 10,000 to 15,000 from Malaysia, mostly in semi-skilled and skilled roles; and approximately 15,000 to 26,000 from Bangladesh working mainly in construction and agriculture. An unknown number of Chinese national workers are employed primarily in skilled and semi-skilled roles in the oil and gas sector. Men and women migrate to Brunei to work primarily in domestic service, retail, agriculture, and construction; migrant workers constitute a majority of all employees in these sectors.

Bruneian and foreign national traffickers may force some female foreigners who arrive in Brunei on tourist visas into sex trafficking. Traffickers may force some female migrant workers, including Thai and Vietnamese workers, into sex trafficking, often by fraudulently offering work in massage parlors or beauty salons. Previous reports indicated many migrant workers from Bangladesh and Indonesia incur large debts from recruiters in Brunei and their home countries, making them vulnerable to exploitative employers. Additionally, some recruiters demand thousands of dollars in recruitment fees but, upon workers’ arrival in Brunei, fail to find them jobs; these workers, most of whom have significant recruitment debts, are vulnerable to traffickers and often resort to “freelancing,” which is illegal in Brunei.

Traffickers exploit some migrant workers through involuntary servitude, debt-based coercion, contract switching, non-payment of wages, passport confiscation, physical abuse, or confinement. Although the government prohibited employers from withholding wages from their employees for more than seven days, some employers withhold wages to recoup labor broker or recruitment fees or to compel the continued service of workers. Some employers reportedly “sell” migrant workers whose visas have not yet expired to other contractors; in other cases, employers deceive workers about the nature of their employment in Brunei and force them to work illegally while extracting a monthly fee from the worker. Passport retention remains a widespread practice among employers or agencies.

Increasingly, traffickers recruit victims using social media applications. Chinese nationals may have faced abusive or exploitative labor conditions in Brunei at a Chinese state-affiliated project. Chinese- or Vietnamese-owned fishing vessels may exploit labor trafficking victims while conducting illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in Bruneian waters. Laws that discriminate against individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation or identity place some of those individuals at higher risk of extortion and psychological coercion, while already being disproportionately vulnerable to trafficking.

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