U.S. Dep't of State, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Haiti

HAITI (Special Case) Haiti is a Special Case this year. During the reporting period, gangs controlled 80 percent of the capital city Port-au-Prince, which experienced increasing levels of violence that prevented government officials – as well as ordinary citizens – from moving freely inside and outside Port-au-Prince. Judges, prosecutors, and clerks went on strike, and many judges and police fled the country, affecting law enforcement and judicial capacity nationwide. In March 2024, gangs conducted an attack on two prisons, allowing approximately 3,700 inmates to escape and displacing around 15,000 other residents; the prime minister also was prevented from returning to the country from an overseas trip.

The judicial system was not functioning, there were no elected officials in the country, commercial flights were not flying in or out of the Port-au-Prince airport, many health care facilities were not operating, and the police’s sole focus was addressing the extreme gang violence. Government officials, international organizations (IOs), and advocacy groups reported gangs exploited women in sex trafficking and exploited children in their ranks for sex trafficking and labor trafficking, including by spying, surveilling, caring for hostages, operating checkpoints, and participating in attacks. Human rights groups and IOs reported in January 2024 that certain government officials may have been supplying weapons and financial resources to gangs who recruited and coerced children into gang activity. The increase in gang control, breakdown of basic infrastructure, and the government’s inability to provide fundamental services increased vulnerability to trafficking in the country and reduced government capacity to address it.

GOVERNMENT EFFORTS

The government in place for the majority of the reporting period made some notable law enforcement efforts to combat trafficking despite serious access and capacity limitations that worsened over time, but corruption and official complicity remained serious concerns. The 2014 Anti-Trafficking Law (No. CL/20140010) criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of seven to 15 years’ imprisonment and a fine ranging from 200,000 to 1.5 million Haitian gourdes (HTG) ($1,524 to $11,430), which were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. The law provided for increased penalties of up to life imprisonment when the victim was a child. In May 2023, the government issued an executive decree on money laundering, terrorism financing, and financing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the government reported this decree strengthened the 2014 Anti-Trafficking Law by classifying money derived from trafficking as money laundering.

The government initiated 24 investigations (one for sex trafficking under the Anti-Trafficking Law and 23 under child protection laws), compared with 39 investigations (seven under the Anti-Trafficking Law and 32 under child protection laws) in 2022. Authorities reopened the investigation against the former president of the Haitian Football Federation who was accused of sex trafficking between 2014 and 2020; a judge initially dismissed the case against the former president in 2021 because of a lack of evidence, although observers noted victim-witnesses most likely experienced intimidation. The government continued investigating two sex trafficking cases involving nine suspects and 27 cases of unspecified exploitation involving an unknown number of suspects from previous reporting periods; one of the new sex trafficking investigations was from a previous year but not previously reported. The government reported initiating prosecutions of five suspected sex traffickers under the Anti-Trafficking Law, re-opening prosecution on appeal of the former president of the Haitian Football Federation, and initiating prosecutions under child protection laws of 25 suspects for child rape that may have involved trafficking, compared with initiating new prosecutions of two suspects under the Anti-Trafficking Law and 32 suspects under child protection laws in 2022.

The judge cited the new money laundering decree in charging the five new sex trafficking suspects, who were part of an ongoing case; the main suspect charged in the previous reporting period remained in pre-trial detention. The government continued prosecuting nine suspected sex traffickers and four suspects for child rape that may have involved sex trafficking. Courts convicted five defendants under other laws, including statutory rape, child rape, and child smuggling, in cases that may have involved trafficking, compared with no convictions in either of the previous two reporting periods. Courts acquitted 12 suspects on charges of trafficking and child rape.

The government cooperated with a foreign government and an IO on one ongoing sex trafficking investigation. The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of current government employees complicit in human trafficking crimes; however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes – including high-profile cases – remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action and perpetuating impunity for trafficking crimes. Experts consistently alleged employees in the Ministry of Justice were complicit in human trafficking crimes and in cases that did not go to trial or result in conviction. Observers expressed concern about official interference in an ongoing case against a former government minister charged with child rape and sexual abuse that may have involved trafficking; a judge granted the former minister a provisional release on medical grounds in June 2023.

The Departmental Initiative against Trafficking and Child Trafficking (IDETTE) reported the practice of bribing judges or other judicial officials to evade sentencing for sexual exploitation, sexual abuse, and trafficking crimes was still a widespread phenomenon. The government did not take action on requests from several human rights organizations to investigate a public prosecutor who allegedly refused to consider testimony from women and child victims of sexual abuse; IDETTE’s 2023 annual report documented the prosecutor released six accused child rapists from prison, and media reported he attempted to release a seventh but was prevented from doing so. Observers noted that corruption at the prosecutor and investigative judge level led to gang members – some of whom may have committed trafficking crimes – being released immediately from prison when 80 to 85 percent of inmates were held for years in prolonged pre-trial detention. Observers also reported police and immigration officials were complicit in human trafficking crimes at the Haiti-Dominican Republic border; the Institute for Social Welfare and Research (IBESR) reported traffickers often avoided detection by crossing at unofficial points, noting official complicity and corruption greatly exacerbated the problem.

Observers reported allegations judicial officials in border jurisdictions sometimes took bribes to free detained suspected traffickers, which contributed to an environment in which traffickers largely operated with impunity. The National Committee for the Fight Against Human Trafficking (CNLTP), the government anti-trafficking committee, reported some judges did not explain why they did not process some cases, including a 2021 case involving suspected sexual abuse and child trafficking at an orphanage. Law enforcement officials did not use the anti-trafficking law to prosecute and convict the perpetrators of child domestic servitude ( restavek ) during the reporting period. IDETTE reported parents of child sex trafficking victims often negotiated a financial settlement between the police and the alleged perpetrators before authorities opened a full investigation or heard testimony from the child victim.

Widespread gang violence impeded police efforts to investigate trafficking crimes. While the CNLTP had cross-sectoral anti-trafficking task forces in all 10 geographical departments, it could not access areas controlled by gangs, including areas in Port-au-Prince, resulting in limited law enforcement action in many regions. Gangs periodically damaged cell towers and disrupted electricity grids, hindering authorities’ ability to store electronic data. Gang activity prohibited safe access to the courts, regularly postponing criminal hearings; a main Port-au-Prince court building remained unsuitable for use after a June 2022 gang attack, further hindering authorities’ ability to conduct investigations and hold hearings.

Judges also frequently refused to hold hearings for fear of gang reprisals and were unable to safely conduct investigations because of a lack of armored vehicles. From 2020 to 2023, 47 percent of magistrate judges left their positions, and from November 2023 to January 2024, judges, prosecutors, and clerks went on consecutive strikes, stalling certain investigations and other court proceedings; these circumstances contributed to a high judicial vacancy rate. In a January 2024 letter to the government, advisors to the Superior Council to the Judiciary noted several courts were no longer functioning because of the absence of judges whose terms of office had not been renewed, a lack of adequate resources, and insecurity. To reduce prison overcrowding and make more space for individuals charged with violent offenses – including gang violence and trafficking – the government planned to hold special pre-trial detention hearings in October 2023 to release individuals held on lengthy pre-trial detention for non-violent offenses, but strikes postponed this effort.

The Prison Authority reported there were approximately 12,000 detainees in prisons and jails and 83 percent were in pretrial detention. The committee initially planned to hold special pretrial detention hearings from October 2023 to January 2024 in all 18 judicial jurisdictions, but strikes suspended progress on this effort. The Haitian National Police (HNP) was responsible for law enforcement, including trafficking crimes. Law enforcement experienced a significant reduction in its workforce as police officers fled the country; media reported 3,000 police officers departed Haiti since 2022, the majority of whom anecdotally left on the U.S. government’s processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans, a humanitarian parole program that included Haitians as of January 2023.

The HNP’s Central Directorate for Judicial Police (DCPJ) was responsible for investigations and referring cases to the judicial system. The DCPJ also oversaw the HNP-Brigade for the Protection of Minors (HNP-BPM), which investigated child trafficking cases and was the only law enforcement body with a specific anti-trafficking mandate. Government agencies and civil society organizations referred child victims’ cases to HNP-BPM for criminal investigation; however, HNP-BPM lacked sufficient resources to fulfill its duties. The Haitian Border Police (POLIFRONT) was responsible for ensuring secure border crossings and investigating transnational crimes, including cross-border trafficking.

POLIFRONT was present at the four official Haiti-Dominican Republic border crossing points but lacked resources to monitor other parts of the border where trafficking also occurred. Observers noted these units were comparatively well funded, in part because of support for the HNP from a foreign donor. In February 2024, the government signed an MOU with a foreign donor to create a Transnational Criminal Investigation Unit. The DCPJ submitted case files to the district magistrate, which assigned an investigative judge to the case; this judge decided which cases to prosecute.

HNP-BPM provided child trafficking case files to the judiciary for appointment of an investigative judge and eventual prosecution. Trafficking prosecutions began at the Court of First Instance, where a single judge heard the case. Civil society organizations and other observers reported trafficking was not a government-wide priority and specifically criticized the government for taking no legal action on children in restavek situations. An IO noted that while law enforcement leadership benefited from anti-trafficking trainings, officials did not pass down knowledge to subordinates and many law enforcement officials still lacked understanding to effectively investigate and prosecute cases.

The government and NGOs had limited to no systematic procedure for gathering, storing, and disaggregating data, citing a lack of funds, office space, computers, and electricity; in addition, not all departmental law enforcement units had the resources or consistent infrastructure to store data electronically or submit data to the CNLTP, which could not physically reach them due to insecurity. Observers noted the Superior Council to the Judiciary, which oversaw the judiciary and attorneys, lacked political will and oversight to adequately supervise or sufficiently sanction judicial actors and did not adequately prosecute trafficking cases. The outdated and overly complex existing penal codes also continued to delay prosecution of trafficking cases. Government and civil society experts reported the judicial system appeared incapable of delivering justice to trafficking victims, although external observers noted trafficking was not unique among crimes in this respect.

The government did not make efforts to counter tech-enabled trafficking, nor did it have specialized units trained in digital evidence collection. The government in place for part of the reporting period undertook some efforts to identify and assist victims while overall protection measures remained inadequate, especially because of difficulties accessing gang-controlled areas. POLIFRONT identified one confirmed adult female victim and six confirmed child victims all referred to care, compared with 11 adult female sex trafficking victims CNLTP identified who were all referred to care in the previous reporting period. Other statistics were not reliable.

The government reported identifying at least 59 child victims of rape or sexual abuse that may have involved trafficking, including 11 boys and 48 girls, of whom at least 26 child rape victims were referred to IBESR for care. The government identified 13 adult and 73 child victims of exploitation including potential trafficking crimes from October 2021 through December 2022. NGOs and IOs identified at least 131 additional victims of unspecified sexual exploitation that may have involved trafficking. The government reported the security situation limited its ability to be proactive in identifying victims, and POLIFRONT reported it depended on victims to self-report.

Observers noted trafficking victims often did not self-identify because of fears of stigmatization. CNLTP’s president reported that gang control of major access roads reduced the organization’s capacity to travel to other departments and assist with identification of and service provision for victims outside Port-au-Prince. IBESR, HNP-BPM, and other HNP units could not access many gang-controlled areas in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, with service provision for child victims limited or non-existent in certain neighborhoods. The government continued to use SOPs for victim identification, referral, and care; the SOPs were adequate tools and actively implemented by government and civil society, as observers noted.

Mechanisms existed in the SOPs to administer victim referrals equitably; however, there was no enforcement mechanism for this, and LGBTQI+ individuals may not have felt comfortable coming forward because of concerns about discrimination. Under the SOPs, POLIFRONT and civil society organizations referred adult trafficking victims to the National Office of Migration (ONM) and the CNLTP; the SOPs directed authorities to allow adult victims to decline services and not to detain victims in shelters. There was no government agency with overall responsibility for providing care for adult trafficking victims, although the law required the government provide protection, medical, legal, and psycho-social services to victims and create a government-regulated fund to assist victims. In practice, the government remained reliant on IOs and NGOs to provide most adult care.

The government spent four million HTG ($30,481) on victim assistance from fiscal year 2023 funding and allocated two million HTG ($15,240) for fiscal year 2024, half for psycho-social services and half for legal assistance. The anti-trafficking law stipulated money and other assets seized after conviction of trafficking suspects should fund services for trafficking victims and the CNLTP, however, there was no evidence this occurred. Observers noted the provision of legal services generally was dependent on the commitment and priorities of the departmental courts; victims rarely received legal support in one department, whereas HNP-BPM and IBESR successfully referred victims to legal services in another. Moreover, the government and NGOs reported quality of legal services depended on victims’ finances and ability to pay for lawyers.

The CNLTP signed an MOU with the National Council of Legal Assistance (CNAL), a government entity, and the lawyers of the Legal Assistance Office requiring all trafficking cases be referred to the CNAL for judicial follow-up, to allow lawyers to track cases and improve legal assistance for victims. An IO reported shelters available for adult survivors of gender-based violence (GBV) and other violence were open to trafficking victims, but there were few dedicated shelters for trafficking victims because of a lack of funding and inadequate identification. An LGBTQI+-focused NGO with funding from an IO provided short-term lodging and services to vulnerable LGBTQI+ individuals, survivors of GBV, undocumented migrants, and stateless persons of Haitian descent, some of whom may have been trafficking victims. NGOs along the border with the Dominican Republic could provide lodging and humanitarian assistance to potential adult victims among migrant populations.

ONM, with the support of an IO, provided initial psychological screenings, food, hygiene kits, and clothing to migrants considered vulnerable in NGO border shelters. Services were provided only to individuals who sought out such support at an IO’s border resource center; only a small fraction of Haitians documented at official and unofficial entry points sought assistance from this center. In November 2023, an international donor ceased distributing food to the IO, stopping the IO’s food provision to vulnerable migrants. The Office for the Protection of the Citizen (OPC), which attended to GBV survivors, maintained communication with smaller monitoring organizations located inside gang-controlled communes, allowing OPC to direct legal, medical, and humanitarian services to potential trafficking victims in these areas.

There were few shelter options on the border for male migrants, although male migrants made up 75 percent of returned migrants and were vulnerable to trafficking. POLIFRONT and civil society organizations referred confirmed and potential child trafficking victims to IBESR and HNP-BPM; HNP-BPM coordinated with CNLTP and IBESR to provide child victim services. IBESR funded all child trafficking victim services, and observers noted IBESR was the only government agency that regularly provided victim care services; however, IBESR reported their facilities had limited capacities and were overburdened. IBESR and HNP-BPM reported they transferred identified child victims to short-term secure shelter spaces shared with GBV victims where they received psychological services, educational services, food, and clothes.

ONM registered unaccompanied children who were deported from the Dominican Republic and transferred them to IBESR for care. All child potential and confirmed victims remained in a transitional facility for up to 90 days until placed with a family member, foster family, or a registered and accredited private orphanage. IBESR had specific protocols for assessing child victims’ needs, including determining appropriate accommodations. The CNLTP indicated the police provided victims physical security and IBESR assisted with family tracing and pre-return assessments before reintegration of children with their families.

Observers noted children in orphanages and foster care remained vulnerable to trafficking. The government required all privately run orphanages to be registered and accredited by the government, but in practice some were not. IBESR reported conditions at orphanages and foster care homes – typically operated by NGOs or religious communities – varied widely, and IBESR had inadequate oversight of them. IBESR reported insecurity limited its ability to enforce closures of orphanages and foster care homes not in compliance with the 2014 anti-trafficking law.

To reach orphanages located in gang-controlled or inaccessible areas, IBESR distributed more than 100 questionnaires asking orphanages to self-report; the government accredited approximately 50 institutions via this method. Out of the 754 institutions known to be operating in the country, 179 were officially registered by the end of the reporting period. IBESR also identified 31 new foster families and conducted monthly visits to the existing 189 registered foster families despite security constraints. In January 2024, the government, in coordination with an IO, initiated a protocol including defined SOPs for protection and care of children removed from gang-controlled areas, sexually exploited by gang members, or coerced into forced labor and/or sex trafficking by gangs.

The protocol required authorities to refer all children arrested due to association with gang activity to IBESR for protection services; the government reported the protocol was specifically designed to ensure children were not inappropriately penalized solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. The protocol included the establishment of transit and rehabilitation centers for children formerly associated with gang activity or removed from areas under gang control; the transit centers would serve as temporary, secure lodging before children were transferred to accredited foster families. An NGO reported it provided educational assistance to approximately 2,000 children in situations of restavek . The government continued collaboration with an IO receiving funding from a foreign donor, NGOs, and other civil society organizations to safely repatriate and provide support to all Haitian migrants returned by air and sea.

Authorities worked with other countries’ maritime and airline services to receive and screen some returned Haitians for trafficking indicators and facilitated their reintegration with family members; however, the government did not report identifying any trafficking victims among this population. The government, supported by an IO, also screened and provided services to potential trafficking victims identified during migrant interdictions at sea. The government’s victim identification and protection SOPs included special considerations for screening foreign potential trafficking victims in the country, but the government did not report conducting any such screenings. Fewer than 200 Cuban medical personnel were active in Haiti, down from 700 in 2018.

The government did not provide contract terms or oversee contractual agreements between workers and the Cuban government, screen Cuban medical workers for trafficking indicators, or provide protection services for potential victims, despite recognized trafficking risks among this population and inclusion of medical personnel as another special screening category in the SOPs. Authorities did not require victims to participate in the investigation or prosecution of traffickers in order to access protection services. Three victims participated in investigations of suspected traffickers. Observers noted the government’s policy of returning child victims to their families made it difficult to locate witnesses to testify against the accused.

Victims had alternatives to speaking to law enforcement, but in one case, child victims were required to testify directly to the prosecutor, which IDETTE reported caused them psychological harm. There were no facilities for video deposition or child-friendly facilities during legal proceedings. The law did not explicitly prohibit remote testimony; however, a judge refused to allow a victim who resided abroad and could not return to the Haitian courtroom due to insecurity to testify virtually and instead labeled the victim as uncooperative. HNP-BPM previously reported it took steps to avoid the re-traumatization of child trafficking victims by offering to refer them to medical and psycho-social care after interventions.

HNP-BPM retained one social worker on staff, who served as an alternative to speaking to law enforcement. NGOs reported victim protections codified in the law were extensive and robust. For foreign victims, the law included provisions for voluntary repatriation, temporary residency during legal proceedings, and permanent residency if the country of origin could not ensure victims’ safety or well-being. The law also provided protections for victims from penalization for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked.

However, in previous reporting periods, the government may have penalized some victims during judicial proceedings. CNLTP reported it would coordinate safe lodging for victims participating in trafficking trials and keep their identity confidential except from entities providing protection. However, in practice, a lack of physical protection, especially in high profile cases, dissuaded victims from participating in public hearings. A government prosecutor reported courts provided security for victim-witnesses only when victims came physically to court, but protection was not guaranteed after testimony.

The law allowed prosecutors to pursue cases even if victims withdrew their complaints or refused to cooperate with an investigation or prosecution. Judges could mandate compensation for related crimes under Haiti’s civil code without a separate civil process, but there were no awards of restitution or compensation. CNLTP, sometimes in cooperation with an IO, extensively trained Haitian government officials and medical providers on the Anti-Trafficking Law; international conventions and legal frameworks; victim identification, including for forced labor in the workplace and children in situations of restavek ; and victim protection, including in orphanages. The government reported spending 4.2 million HTG ($32,354) on training, the first time it had ever reported this data.

The government in place for the majority of the reporting period made efforts to prevent trafficking. The appointed members of the CNLTP included representatives from nine agencies, two “counselors” from civil society organizations, and one representative from the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman. The CNLTP reported it was able to meet regularly despite security limitations and that it made progress on developing regional subcommittees and working groups; one working group, consisting of representatives from IBESR, the Ministry on the Status and Rights of Women, and OPC, began to meet regularly to review new victim cases. The government continued to fund the current NAP, providing 40 million HTG ($304,808) in fiscal year 2023 and allocating 50 million HTG ($381,010) for fiscal year 2024; the CNLTP had not received the allotment.

The CNLTP reported it had sufficient funding to carry out its operations; however, observers noted the government did not provide adequate funding for victim assistance or criminal investigations and prosecutions. The CNLTP spent 25.3 million HTG ($192,791) on awareness materials, external and internal trainings, capacity building for the CNLTP, and updating the 2023-2028 NAP, for which it hired a third-party consultant. The government continued to lack a national, centralized database, with POLIFRONT, IBESR, CNLTP, and HNP-BPM each maintaining separate databases; observers noted the government could not disaggregate data by time period or crime. The CNLTP agreed to, but had not yet signed, an MOU with a university to begin research on trafficking trends and prevention.

In December 2023, the CNLTP president engaged with radio audiences to amplify anti-trafficking messages outside the capital. The CNLTP began designing awareness-raising materials in French and Haitian Creole, including leaflets, banners, and calendars. Two government hotlines could be used to report child trafficking cases. IBESR had a daytime emergency child protection hotline for reports of any form of child exploitation, including situations of restavek ; IBESR did not report identifying any child victims through the hotline, compared with identifying 17 in 2022.

HNP-BPM also ran a 24/7 hotline but did not report identifying any victims through the hotline. A general HNP hotline also was available to report trafficking crimes against adults, but HNP also did not report identifying any victims as a result of hotline calls. In addition, two IOs ran hotlines but did not report identifying any victims through them. The government required IBESR authorization for children to travel outside the country’s borders.

Despite limited capacity, IBESR reported ensuring all Haitian children departing Haiti by commercial or charter plane possessed valid travel documentation and were under the care of a parent or guardian with parental consent; IBESR refused permission to five orphanages who could not provide justification for travel. The prime minister placed new restrictions on charter flights to Nicaragua to reduce the risk of trafficking among Haitian migrants who used Managua as a transit point enroute to the southwest U.S. border, but the government had not opened a promised criminal investigation into smuggling groups that may have participated in trafficking. An IO supported ONM in screening all returned Haitians at the Port-au-Prince airport and Cap-Haitien seaport and airport; authorities did not identify any trafficking victims among these returned migrants. However, more than 96 percent of returned Haitians crossed (or were deported at) the Haiti-Dominican Republic land border, and migrant reception actors could serve only 4 percent of total border returns.

The continued dysfunction of the civil registry system and weak consular capacity to provide identification documentation left many Haitians who remained in the Dominican Republic at risk of remaining undocumented, subject to deportation, and vulnerable to trafficking. As of December 2023, the government had registered 5,734,314 citizens older than 18 and issued 5,044,718 ID cards under a biometric ID card program begun during a previous reporting period, an increase of 7,541 and 456,859 respectively since January 2023. In June 2023, the Office of National Identification (ONI) launched a national identification program, with the support of an IO and a foreign donor, that aimed to strengthen ONI’s technical capacity, establish a new distribution system for the biometric ID cards, implement a public awareness campaign to educate citizens on their right to identification, and eventually distribute more than two million identification cards, primarily for adults. With support from two foreign donors and an NGO, ONI opened special registration and issuance centers to provide a safe environment for the LGBTQI+ community to obtain the new ID card.

The government reported that a lack of funding in the budget to expand the biometric ID program to those older than the age of 13 left children vulnerable to trafficking. Although the labor code required recruiters to obtain a license and prohibited charging recruitment fees, the government did not effectively regulate foreign labor recruiters, prevent fraudulent recruiting, report whether migrants could switch jobs, or have plans to raise awareness of risks for potential migrant laborers. Although the government trained labor inspectors on proactive victim identification, it lacked a clear strategy for conducting labor inspections and had insufficient staff and resources to inspect a sufficient number of worksites for labor trafficking indicators, particularly in the informal sector. Inspectors reported some women working in factories feared loss of employment if they were to accuse their employers of sexual abuse or forced labor.

The government previously reported IBESR staff and labor inspectors did not receive adequate training on child labor issues. The lack of a minimum age for domestic work and exceptions in the laws governing child labor hindered investigations and prosecutions of child domestic servitude. The government did not report or publish data on child work, child labor, or the worst forms of child labor. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.

The law required resorts, restaurants, and bars to report any suspected incidents to IBESR and HNP-BPM of extraterritorial child sexual commercial exploitation and abuse, including cases of children in a hotel without their parents, but the government did not receive any reports. Haitian law did not prohibit Haitian nationals from engaging in such activity abroad. TRAFFICKING PROFILE: As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Haiti, and traffickers exploit victims from Haiti abroad. Haitians, especially children in gang-controlled areas and situations of child domestic servitude ( restavek ), and adults and children in irregular status in the Dominican Republic – along with stateless Dominicans of Haitian descent, who were at risk of deportation – continue to be highly vulnerable to trafficking.

In 2023, the CNLTP estimated three million Haitians were at risk of trafficking. By the end of 2023, gangs had a presence in 80 percent of the Port-au-Prince area, which severely limited safe mobility. In December 2023, an IO counted a total of 313,901 IDPs in the country, 55 percent of them children. IBESR and NGO contacts reported in 2024 that children living in gang-controlled neighborhoods and forcibly coerced to participate in gang activity remain at risk of being violently targeted by other community members who seek to retaliate against children associated with gangs.

The government lacked control of areas where gangs are in charge, reducing law enforcement action and increasing risks for potential victims. Gang members may use social media for recruitment. Most of Haiti’s trafficking cases involve children in forced labor and sex trafficking in child domestic servitude ( restavek ) situations , in which children are often physically abused, receive no payment for services, and have significantly lower school enrollment rates. An NGO observed the number of IDPs fleeing violence in Port-au-Prince to more rural departments increased children’s risks to forced domestic work and sexual exploitation in the restavek system.

In 2022, an NGO estimated that of those children in restavek situations, two-thirds are girls, mostly victims of sex trafficking, and one-third are boys, mostly victims of labor trafficking. In 2021, NGOs estimated between 150,000 and 300,000 children worked in restavek . In 2022, a foreign donor-funded NGO study of 530 Haitians reported that 5.6 percent reported having a child in a situation of restavek , and among vulnerable families, a third had sent their child away in a situation of restavek and more than two-thirds had sent a child to an orphanage. Many children, and a majority of the boys, flee or are cast out of these situations and begin to live and/or work on the street, facing further risk of re-trafficking.

The number of children in this situation likely increased during the pandemic. “Orphanage entrepreneurs” operate unlicensed orphanages that exploit children in trafficking. In June 2023, media reported 30,000 children were in orphanages. Approximately 80 percent of children in orphanages have at least one living parent, who may place children in an institution deemed more likely to be able to care for them, and almost all have other family members.

The risks to migrants remain high, including from migrant smugglers who exploit migrant women in commercial sex to repay alleged debts. In September 2023, the Dominican Republic closed land and air borders with Haiti, officially suspending flights between the two countries and halting cross-border land migration. Although the Dominican government lifted the suspension on flights to and from Haiti in October 2023, migration at official land border crossings remains prohibited, leading more Haitians to attempt crossing at unofficial border points where there are no Haitian police or other protective presence, leaving these migrants more vulnerable to trafficking. From September to December 2023, more than 100,000 Haitians returned voluntarily, and as of March 2024, the Dominican Republic carried out more than 106,000 deportations since the border closure with an estimated 30 percent occurring at unofficial border crossings.

Transgender Haitian migrants continue to cross into the Dominican Republic but face greater danger of trafficking because they now lack access to an NGO who helped them obtain documentation. Almost 15,000 migrants were repatriated from the United States to Haiti by air, with the highest concentration in May 2022. The number of Haitian terrestrial migrants moving through South and Central America, originating most often from Brazil and Chile, decreased as the other countries improved policies to deter undocumented Haitian migration on these routes and offered alternatives for regular migration pathways. Although 2,187 Haitians attempted maritime migration routes in January 2023, maritime migration flow declined to fewer than 500 migrants in January 2024 with the introduction of new legal pathways, such as the U.S. humanitarian parole program.

Haitian maritime migrants are disproportionately impoverished and highly vulnerable to migrant smugglers and traffickers, who charge migrants exorbitant fees for passage to Florida, the Turks and Caicos Islands, or Puerto Rico across Cuban, Bahamian, Dominican, and international waters, often under false pretenses to exploit them. According to IO psychologists present on site during the previous reporting period, many returned migrants report experiencing some form of trafficking or fraudulent exploitation scheme either while traversing South and Central America or in boarding a migrant vessel departing from Haiti. Common forms of cross-border trafficking of Haitians, often involving fraudulent recruitment, include forced labor in the Dominican construction, service, and agricultural industries and sex trafficking in the Dominican tourism industry. Haitian adults and children also are at risk of fraudulent labor recruitment and forced labor in other Caribbean countries, South America, and the United States.

Cuban medical workers have had a continuous presence in the country since 1998 and may have been forced to work by the Cuban government; Haitians were eligible for educational grants and clinical training in Cuba in exchange for the medical workers. Female foreign nationals, especially citizens of the Dominican Republic and Venezuela, are at risk for sex and labor trafficking in Haiti; traffickers use social media to recruit and exploit victims. In previous years with greater numbers of tourists, victims engaged in commercial sex typically were identified in upscale neighborhoods and resort areas that catered to foreigners. According to NGOs, international child sexual commercial exploitation and abuse also previously occurred in Haiti, primarily by citizens from the United States, Canada, and Europe; most tourism stopped because of gang violence.

Girls are vulnerable to trafficking through the practice of “bride-buying,” in which men pay between $100 to $200 to the families of girls as young as 14. Traffickers target Haitian children working in construction, agriculture, fisheries, begging, and street vending; children and adults who are stateless or at risk of becoming stateless; and LGBTQI+ youth experiencing homelessness and stigmatized by their families and society. The temporary closure of schools (including during the pandemic), pressure due to economic difficulties, and increasing insecurity exacerbated vulnerability. A 2022 NGO study concluded that the implementation of the 2014 anti-trafficking law was inadequate and offered several key recommendations, including to train judges and police officers; strengthen the operational capacity of CNLTP by funding it as legally mandated; make legal progress on key cases; investigate cases; and raise public awareness about trafficking.

A December 2020 survey found that many Haitians lacked basic knowledge about human trafficking and the resources available to get help; 71 percent of respondents were unable to differentiate between human trafficking and GBV, only 18 percent knew of a phone number to report a suspected trafficking crime, and just 3 percent had heard of the CNLTP. On This Page search > < HAITI (Special Case) GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TRAFFICKING PROFILE: Tags Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs Haiti Human Trafficking Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons Reports