DHS OIG, OIG-17-70, -SR Lessons Learned from Prior Reports on CBP's SBI and Acquisitions Related to Securing our Border (2017)

Special Report: Lessons Learned from Prior Reports on CBP's SBI and Acquisitions Related to Securing our Border June 12, 2017 OIG-17-70-SR DHS OIG SPECIAL REPORT Lessons Learned from Prior Reports on CBP’s SBI and Acquisitions Related to Securing our Border  June 12, 2017 What We Found Why We Did This Special Report This is a Department of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General (DHS OIG), special report regarding the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) physical security of the southern border of the United States. This is the first in a series of reports about CBP’s physical security of the southern border. This report describes lessons learned from prior DHS-OIG, Government Accountability Office, and Department reports on CBP’s Secure Border Initiative (SBI), and other relevant CBP acquisitions related to securing our borders.  What We Recommend We made no recommendations. For Further Information: Contact our Office of Public Affairs at (202) 254-4100, or email us at [email protected]      CBP currently faces an aggressive implementation schedule to satisfy its requirements under the President’s Executive Order.

CBP is working on an acquisition plan while simultaneously preparing a solicitation for the design and build of a southern border wall. CBP must continue to be mindful of the lessons learned related to an aggressively scheduled acquisition in order to protect taxpayer dollars associated with the acquisition of the construction of a southern border wall. Prior reports (see Appendix A) found that CBP did not have defined and validated operational requirements resulting in unachievable performance. CBP also lacked a proper acquisition workforce that resulted in missteps, waste, and delays.

In addition, CBP did not have robust business processes and information systems needed to enable program offices to move forward expeditiously on the tasks of managing to program objectives. Although DHS has made much progress, it needs to continue toward a strong central authority and uniform policies and procedures. Most of DHS’s major acquisition programs continue to cost more than expected, take longer to deploy than planned, or deliver less capability than promised. Although its acquisition policy includes best practices, DHS sometimes approves moving forward with major acquisition programs without appropriate internal oversight. www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-17-70-SR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov June 12, 2017 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable General John F. Kelly Secretary Department of Homeland Security FROM: SUBJECT: John Roth Inspector General Special Report: Lessons Learned from Prior Reports on CBP’s SBI and Acquisitions Related to Securing our Border Attached is our final special report, Lessons Learned from Prior Reports on CBP’s SBI and Acquisitions Related to Securing our Border.

This report was conducted under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, Section 2-2, to provide leadership and coordination and recommend policies for activities designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of, and to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in, such programs and operations. This report describes lessons learned from prior DHS-OIG, Government Accountability Office, and Department reports on CBP’s Secure Border Initiative, and other relevant CBP acquisitions related to securing our borders. We made no recommendations in this report. We provided a draft report for your comments.

We received the Department’s response and also received technical comments from CBP. We have included the Department’s response as an appendix in this report and incorporated the CBP technical comments as appropriate. Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will provide copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees with oversight and appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post a version of the report on our website for public dissemination.

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact John V. Kelly, Deputy Inspector General, at (202) 254-4100. Attachment www.oig.dhs.gov OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Background On January 25, 2017, the President signed Executive Order No.13767 - Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements. The Executive Order directed executive departments and agencies to deploy all lawful means to secure the Nation’s southern border through the immediate construction of a physical wall, monitored and supported by adequate personnel so as to prevent illegal immigration, drug and human trafficking, and acts of terrorism. Subsequently, DHS Secretary John F. Kelly issued a memorandum implementing the President’s border security and immigration enforcement improvements policies.

Specifically, Secretary Kelly instructed U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to immediately begin planning, design, construction, and maintenance of a wall, along the land border with Mexico, utilizing appropriate materials and technology to most effectively achieve operational control of the border. According to the Department, CBP has taken immediate action in response to the Executive Order and has identified locations near El Paso, Texas; Tucson, Arizona; and El Centro, California; to build a wall where fencing is no longer effective. U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol) is currently conducting an operational assessment to identify priority areas for building a wall or similar physical barrier where none exists. Border Patrol’s operational assessment will address: x The current state of southern border security; x All geophysical and topographical aspects of the southern border; and x The availability of Federal and state resources necessary to achieve operational control of the southern border.

This operational assessment aims to inform DHS’s strategy to obtain and maintain operational control of the southern border and is to be completed within 180 days of the announcement of the Executive Order. On March 17, 2017, CBP released two Requests for Proposal to award Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) Task Order contracts for the design and construction of wall prototypes with the capacity to issue future task orders for construction along the southwest border. The award amount for each IDIQ shall not exceed $300 million. The first Request for Proposal is for a solid concrete border wall, and the second is for an “Other Border Wall” incorporating a see-through capability to facilitate situational awareness.

CBP’s goal is to award a contract by June 12, 2017, and begin construction of four to six prototypes by July 21, 2017. www.oig.dhs.gov 2 OIG-17-70-SR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Parallel to the wall construction, CBP reports it will be examining the Concept of Operations for a wall system that includes resources, infrastructure, and technology for the entire southern border. CBP will ensure that the results of this examination are incorporated into relevant, ongoing and future requirement development efforts. CBP guards nearly 2,000 miles of U.S. land border with Mexico, deterring, detecting, and interdicting illegal entry of people and contraband into the United States while facilitating lawful travel and trade. Currently, there is 654 miles of fencing along the southwest border, consisting of 354 miles of pedestrian fence and 300 miles of vehicle fence.

See table 1 for a breakdown of southwest border fencing miles. Table 1: Southwest Border Fencing Miles Land Type Federal Private Tribal Total Primary Pedestrian Fence Miles 294 60 0 354 Primary Vehicle Fence Miles 298 0 2 300 Source: CBP Facilities Management and EngineeringDivision  Pedestrian fencing is mostly in urban areas of California, Arizona, and Texas. CBP also erected several miles of fence in the rural areas of the Arizona Yuma Sector. Most of the vehicle barriers along the southwest border are in rural areas where, according to CBP, pedestrian traffic is uncommon or easily detected.

These barriers are designed to deny vehicle entry while allowing pedestrians and animals to pass freely. According to CBP, segments that require maintenance or upgrade repairs such as breach and erosion issues are fixed as they are identified. DHS Acquisition Framework and Lessons Learned From Prior Reports on CBP’s Secure Border Initiative The Department will be making a significant investment to satisfy its requirements under the President’s Executive Order. The Department has historically had significant challenges with acquisitions but has taken steps to strengthen department-wide acquisition management, such as establishing an Acquisition Life Cycle Framework (Acquisition Framework) and creating the Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management in 2011.

DHS established the Acquisition Framework to assure consistent and efficient acquisition management, support, review, and approval throughout the www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-17-70-SR 3 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Department. The framework is designed to ensure that acquisitions are stable and well managed; that the program manager has the tools, resources, and flexibility to execute the acquisition; that the product meets user requirements; and that the acquisition complies with applicable statutes, regulations, and policies. As shown in figure 1, the Acquisition Framework is a 4-phase process that DHS uses to determine whether to proceed with an acquisition: 1. Need – identify the need that the acquisition will address; 2.

Analyze/Select – analyze the alternatives to satisfy the need and select the best option; 3. Obtain – develop, test, and evaluate the selected option and determine whether to approve production; and 4. Produce/Deploy/Support/Dispose – produce and deploy the selected option and support it throughout the operational life cycle. The DHS Acquisition Framework is structured to operate within a series of phases each leading to an Acquisition Decision Event (Decision Event), a predetermined point within an acquisition phase at which the acquisition will undergo a review prior to commencing the next phase.

The review is designed to ensure that needs are aligned with DHS’s strategic direction, and that upcoming phases are adequately planned.  Figure 1: 4-Phase Acquisition Life Cycle Framework Source: DHS Acquisition Management Instruction 102-01-001  www.oig.dhs.gov 4 OIG-17-70-SR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Prior to every decision event, components are required to submit acquisition documents to the Acquisition Review Board, the cross-component board in the Department composed of senior-level decision makers, for review, including: x Mission Needs Statement: Outlines specific functional capabilities required to accomplish the Department’s mission and objectives, along with deficiencies and gaps in these capabilities. x Capability Development Plan: Defines how critical knowledge to inform decisions will be obtained, defines the objectives, activities, schedule, and resources for the next phase. x Acquisition Plan: Provides a top-level strategy for future sustainment and support and a recommendation for the acquisition approach and types of acquisition. Each phase ends with a presentation to the Acquisition Review Board. The Acquisition Review Board determines whether a proposed acquisition meets the requirements of key phases in the Acquisition Framework and is able to proceed to the next phase and eventual full production and deployment. The Acquisition Review Process ensures appropriate implementation of the Acquisition Review Board’s decisions.

Strong and clear definitions of operational requirements appropriately focus and stabilize the direction of program plans. Contracts expedited too quickly without proper and meaningful reviews by knowledgeable and experienced DHS staff, in response to aggressive program deadline requirements, may result in higher costs, schedule delays, and failures to accomplish adequate technical or critical mission requirements. Need Phase At the time of our review, CBP was in the Need Phase of the Acquisition Framework for a physical wall to secure the southern border. The purpose of this phase is to ensure alignment of needs to strategic DHS direction along with adequate planning and resourcing for upcoming phases.

On March 20, 2017, the Acquisition Review Board granted permission to CBP to proceed to Decision Event 1, meaning to validate the need. CBP submitted to DHS’s Joint Requirements Council its Capability Analysis Report (capability analysis), which identified Impedance and Denial1 as one of  1“Impedance and Denial” refers to the capability to impede border incursions and deny the adversary's use of terrain (i.e., land, air, water) for advantage in conducting illegal activity and acts of terrorism. Additionally, Impedance enhances the U.S. Border Patrol's capability to execute its mission essential tasks by increasing adversary vanishing times and giving law enforcement capabilities more time to detect and respond. www.oig.dhs.gov 5 OIG-17-70-SR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security the master capabilities required for operational control of a safe and secure border. The DHS Joint Requirements Council approved the capabilities analysis but identified additional action items in order to graduate to the Obtain Phase of the acquisition process.

Specifically, the Joint Requirements Council requested CBP develop and submit a concept of operations that addresses the following: x Refine areas from the capability analysis and Mission Needs Statement, including robust description of the as-is capability, a quantification of the gap, measures of operational outcomes, and description of solution approach. x Identify: o A relationship of solution approach with other assets, systems, capabilities, and procedures, including those being addressed as part of the current Domain Awareness Land Surveillance efforts.2 o How CBP will use the capability in actual operations or business processes, including the ƒ Solution approaches outlined in Secretary Kelly's February 17, 2017 memo, and ƒ Patrol and access roads along the land border with Mexico to most effectively achieve operational control of the border. o How CBP would employ and support the solution approach to meet objectives and fill related capability gaps; and o How the solution approach would fulfill user requirements. To its credit, CBP is in the process of refining its capability needs by issuing its Requests for Proposal for the design and construction of wall prototypes. However, without a foundation of well-defined, validated operational requirements, acquisition programs flounder and often result in wasted effort, the inefficient use of resources, and a system or product that does not achieve the desired result. Prior reports identified that CBP did not have defined and validated operational requirements resulting in unachievable performance.  2Domain Awareness Land Surveillance refers to the ability to continuously detect, identify, classify, and track all border incursions (land, air, maritime, and subterranean) in targeted areas under all weather, terrain, vegetation, and light conditions for providing security-in- depth along the border area.  www.oig.dhs.gov 6 OIG-17-70-SR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security For instance, in our audit of the SBInet program in 2006,3 we reported that CBP bypassed existing required processes.

Key decisions about the scope of the program and the acquisition strategy were made without rigorous review, analysis, or transparency. As a result, CBP awarded a multimillion dollar contract without having laid the foundation to oversee and assess contractor performance and control cost and schedule.4 We also identified that although CBP made progress in recognizing the Border Patrol’s operational requirements for technology and tactical infrastructure, better documented and defined operational requirements for tactical infrastructure would ensure that border fence construction was linked to resource decisions and mission performance goals.5 CBP ultimately terminated SBInet in 2011 after expending about $1 billion. SBInet clearly illustrates that poorly defined and documented operational requirements, and failure to adequately plan, results in missed milestones and wasted resources. This further hampers adequate definition of customer needs in the contract solicitation.

CBP’s missteps with SBInet’s planning should be a reminder of the importance of proper planning of major acquisitions and that acquisition controls should not be bypassed. Analyze and Select Phase The Analyze and Select Phase identifies and explores alternative ways to fill gaps in the Mission Needs Statement with mission effective, suitable, and affordable solutions. It also allows decision makers to select the optimal solution to effectively deliver required capability to users. This is accomplished with the completion of an Analysis of Alternatives.

The Analysis of Alternatives is an analytical comparison (from a high-level cost and performance perspective) of selected solution alternatives for fulfilling the specific capability need. The Analysis of Alternatives explores these alternatives with the goal of identifying the most promising approach to achieve user- required capabilities within practical performance, cost, schedule, and risk boundaries.  3 Secure Border Initiative Net (SBInet) is a component of the overall SBI effort intended to improve border control operations, deploying more infrastructure and personnel with modernized technology and tactics. 4 OIG-07-07, Risk Management Advisory for the SBInet Program Initiation, November 14, 2006 5 OIG-09-56, Progress in Addressing Secure Border Initiative Operational Requirements and Constructing the Southwest Border Fence, April 15, 2009  www.oig.dhs.gov 7 OIG-17-70-SR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security A full life cycle cost estimate is developed during this phase to support the preferred solution. The Acquisition Decision Authority approves the recommendation from the program for the best alternative that provides the required performance at acceptable cost, schedule, and risk.

As previously stated, the Acquisition Review Board approved CBP to progress to Decision Event 1 of the Acquisition Framework. In its approval memorandum, the Acquisition Review Board also granted CBP permission to develop a procurement solution that allows for the purchase and delivery of four to six wall prototypes and possible construction of a larger prototype in Yuma, Arizona, or San Diego, California, to support Alternatives Analysis and to refine its requirements. CBP reports the wall will be constructed and delivered in segments, as prioritized by CBP, and each segment, succeeding the prototype phase, will be assessed by the Acquisition Review Board to baseline the segment and determine affordability. The DHS Chief Acquisition Officer will be the Acquisition Decision Authority.

A limited Alternatives Analysis will be performed that will focus on the prioritization of segments and the technical solution that best supports each segment. Before program approval and identification of cost, schedule, and performance parameters (Decision Events 2A and 2B) each segment will also require: x Life Cycle Cost Estimate, x Acquisition Program Baseline, x Integrated Logistics Support Plan, x Certification of Funds memorandum, x Operational Requirements Document, and x Test and Evaluation Master Plan. These items are required before each segment delivery. Prior reports identified that CBP did not have a comprehensive plan for justifying its needs in a timely manner and at a reasonable cost.

These reports also identified that CBP did not have an overall strategy for managing its acquisitions along the southwest border. In 2011, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported CBP did not document the analysis justifying the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of border surveillance technologies proposed in the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (Plan). In addition, CBP’s life cycle cost estimate for the Plan did not sufficiently meet characteristics of a high-quality cost www.oig.dhs.gov 8 OIG-17-70-SR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security estimate, such as credibility, because it did not identify a level of confidence or quantify the impact of risks.6 We also reported in 2014, that CBP did not effectively plan employee housing in Ajo, Arizona, and made decisions that resulted in additional costs totaling $4.6 million. CBP spent about $680,000 per house and about $118,000 per mobile home for employee housing in Ajo, which was significantly more than the Ajo average home price of $86,500.CBP also offered to purchase land in Ajo, Arizona before evaluating the cultural, social, and environmental impact of housing construction as required by Federal law.

In doing so, CBP took a risk that, depending on the outcome of the evaluation, it might not be able to build on the land and would possibly have to sell or donate it.7 CBP also faced challenges such as land acquisition and environmental requirements which impeded fence construction progress.8 According to National Environmental Policy Act (42 USC 4321) and other laws involving extensive public and federal agency participation, CBP is required to conduct environmental impact assessments prior to constructing fencing and vehicle barriers unless these requirements are waived by the Secretary of Homeland Security. Environmental impact assessments determine the potential impacts on a range of issues, including geologic, biological, cultural resources, social and economic profiles, and land use of the area. Section 102(c) of The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, as amended, allows the Secretary to waive legal requirements in order to ensure the expeditious construction of barriers and roads. In his April 2017 testimony before the United States Senate, Secretary Kelly indicated that CBP is committed to proceeding in an environmentally sensitive manner to build a wall where it makes sense.

Environmental, geographical, cultural resources, social, and economic profiles along the border with Mexico could have a significant impact on the costs associated with securing the southwest border. CBP must be mindful that coordinating with other government agencies will require additional time and resources that could impede or delay fence construction progress. These factors make planning the most important phase in the acquisition process. The planning phase is when the efforts of all personnel responsible for an acquisition are coordinated and  6GAO-12-22, More Information on Plans and Costs Is Needed before Proceeding, November 4, 2011 7OIG-14-131, CBP Did Not Effectively Plan and Manage Employee Housing in Ajo, Arizona, October 6, 2014 8 OIG-09-56, Progress in Addressing Secure Border Initiative Operational Requirements and Constructing the Southwest Border Fence, April 15, 2009 www.oig.dhs.gov 9 OIG-17-70-SR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security integrated through a comprehensive plan for fulfilling the agency need in a timely manner and at a reasonable cost.

It also includes developing the overall strategy for managing the acquisition.  Obtain Phase The Obtain Phase develops, tests, and evaluates the preferred alternative selected to obtain the capability. The Acquisition Program Baseline is further refined by providing more detail on specific cost, schedule, and performance parameters. Prior reports have identified that DHS did not effectively manage, plan, and execute SBInet testing. SBInet was intended to cover the entire southwest border with an integrated set of fixed sensor towers.

Early in its design, SBInet gave little, if any, consideration to other technologies, as the presumption was that SBInet would handle all technology needs. In 2010, GAO reported that CBP’s test plans, cases, and procedures for component and system qualification tests were not defined in accordance with important elements of relevant guidance. GAO also noted that changes made to system qualification test cases and procedures appeared to be designed to pass the test instead of being designed to qualify the system.9 GAO also identified that CBP relaxed the stringency of performance capabilities to the point that system performance would have been deemed acceptable if it identified less than 50 percent of items of interest that cross the border, resulting in a system that was unlikely to live up to expectations.10 DHS had also not tested the individual system components to be deployed to the initial locations, even though the contractor initiated integration testing of these components with other system components and subsystems. Because of this issue, there was an increased risk that SBInet may not have performed as intended.11 Over time, DHS advised CBP to conduct an Analysis of Alternatives of SBInet.

As a result, CBP’s analysis identified that proven, commercially available systems could fill critical gaps in capability and that the original SBInet plans did not fill those gaps. CBP proposed diverting SBInet funding to a new border  9 GAO-10-158, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Testing and Performance Limitations That Place Key Technology Program at Risk, January 29, 2010 10 GAO-10-340, DHS Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed Investment in Key Technology Program, May 5, 2010 11GAO-08-1086, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment, September 22, 2008 10 www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-17-70-SR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security security technology plan for Arizona, and eventually the remainder of the border. In March 2014, GAO reported that CBP’s Test and Evaluation Master Plan12 only described testing to determine the Integrated Fixed Tower’s13 mission contribution but did not include testing operational effectiveness and suitability, which specifically identifies how effective and reliable a system is in meeting its operational requirements in its intended environment. Revising the Test and Evaluation Master Plan to include more robust testing to determine operational effectiveness and suitability could have better positioned CBP to evaluate Integrated Fixed Tower capabilities before moving to full production for the system.

Also, it could have helped provide CBP with information on the extent to which the towers satisfy the Border Patrol’s user requirements and helped reduce potential program risks.14 Without strong and clear definitions of operational requirements related to a physical wall along 2,000 miles of border, CBP may not properly focus and stabilize the direction of the acquisition. Prior reports identified that CBP did not have defined and validated operational requirements resulting in unachievable performance. Failure to adequately plan may result in poorly defined and documented requirements, further hampering adequate definition and evaluation of needs. Produce/Deploy/Support/Dispose Phase  Based on successful completion of required documents, the Acquisition Decision Authority may authorize initiation of the Produce/Deploy/Support/Dispose Phase of the acquisition program at Decision Event 3.

This phase produces and maintains capabilities to meet the needs identified for the acquisition program. Prior reports have shown that although CBP has implemented many new programs to address border security issues, it has struggled to develop measures of effectiveness. CBP also has had trouble ensuring it has enough staff to adequately manage programs and contractors. If this struggle persists CBP could have challenges in adequately overseeing acquisitions, building  12 The Test and Evaluation Master Plan is important because it describes the strategy for conducting developmental and operational testing to evaluate a system’s technical performance, including its operational effectiveness and suitability.

13 The Integrated Fixed Tower consists of towers with, among other things, ground surveillance radars and surveillance cameras mounted on fixed towers. 14 GAO-14-368, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness, March 3, 2014 www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-17-70-SR 11 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security metrics into program planning and management, and collecting reliable and complete data for cost estimating and program performance. For example, in June 2009, we identified that CBP had not established adequate controls and effective oversight of contract workers responsible for providing SBI program support services. Contract personnel made up more than 50 percent of the SBI workforce, and CBP had not clearly distinguished between roles and responsibilities that were appropriate for contractors and those that must be performed by government employees.15 The low number of government personnel to oversee contractor activities increased the SBI program office’s risk that program cost and schedule could not be adequately managed.

Consequently, the SBI program office’s ability to ensure that both current and future program goals were accomplished was reduced. In our June 2010 report, we found that CBP program officials did not ensure that contractors maintained up-to-date information in the primary management tool designed to provide managers with advance information regarding potential cost overruns and program progress.16 Similarly, in October 2010, GAO reported that CBP did not ensure its contractor had effectively implemented earned value management. Earned value management is a proven management approach for understanding program status and identifying early warning signs of impending schedule delays and cost overruns. CBP regularly received incomplete and anomalous earned value management data from the SBInet prime contractor, which it had to rely on to measure progress and project the time and cost to complete the program.17 In our review of CBP’s use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems program we reported that CBP had not developed performance measures to prove the program was effective.

Although CBP anticipated increased apprehensions of illegal border crossers, a reduction in border surveillance costs, and improvement in the Border Patrol’s efficiency, the report found little or no evidence that CBP met those program expectations. The report concluded that CBP invested significant funds in a program that did not achieve the expected results, and could not demonstrate how much the program has improved border security.18  15 OIG-09-80, Better Oversight Needed of Support Services Contractors in Secure Border Initiative Programs, June 17, 2009 16 OIG-10-96, Controls Over SBInet Program Cost Schedule Could Be Improved, June 16, 2010 17 GAO-11-6, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Strengthen Management and Oversight of Its Prime Contractor October 18, 2010 18 OIG-15-17, U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Unmanned Aircraft System Program Does Not Achieve Intended Results or Recognize All Costs of Operations, December 24, 2014 www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-17-70-SR 12 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Because CBP lacks strong well-defined operational requirements and an overall strategy framework for securing the 2,000 miles of border, CBP may not properly focus and stabilize the direction of the acquisition.19 Conclusion Acquisition planning is one of the most important phases in the acquisition process. It is the process by which all efforts of all personnel responsible for an acquisition are coordinated and integrated through a comprehensive plan for fulfilling the agency need in a timely manner and at a reasonable cost. It also includes developing the overall strategy for managing the acquisition.

Failure to adequately plan may result in missed milestones and poorly defined and documented requirements. This further hampers adequate definition of customer needs in the contract solicitation. CBP currently faces an aggressive implementation schedule as it did with SBI and SBInet, though CBP officials we met with stated they understand the value of pre-solicitation activities. CBP is working on an acquisition plan while simultaneously preparing a solicitation for the design and build of a southern border wall.

CBP must continue to be mindful of the lessons learned about an aggressively scheduled acquisition in order to protect taxpayer dollars associated with the acquisition of the construction of a southern border wall. OIG Analysis of Management Comments We obtained written comments on a draft of this report from the Director of the Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office. We have included a copy of the comments in their entirety in appendix C. In its comments, DHS concurred with our conclusion and stated it believes that based on the lessons it learned from SBInet, DHS is better positioned to face the challenges in satisfying the requirements of Executive Order 13767.   19 OIG-17-39, CBP’s Border Security Efforts – An Analysis of Southwest Border Security Between the Ports of Entry, February 27, 2017 www.oig.dhs.gov 13 OIG-17-70-SR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Scope and Methodology On January 25, 2017, the President signed Executive Order No.13767 - Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements directing executive departments and agencies to deploy all lawful means to secure the Nation’s southern border through the immediate construction of a physical wall, monitored and supported by adequate personnel so as to prevent illegal immigration, drug and human trafficking, and acts of terrorism. Due to the impact on the Department and CBP, the objective of this review was to identify lessons learned from prior Office of Inspector General (OIG), GAO, and Department reports on CBP’s Secure Border Initiative that began in 2005 and ended in 2011.

We also reviewed other relevant CBP acquisition audit reports related to securing our borders. To accomplish our objective, we reviewed the Secretary’s February 20, 2017 memorandum – Implementing the President's Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements Policies. We reviewed prior OIG, GAO, and Department reports on CBP’s Secure Border Initiative. We also reviewed other relevant CBP acquisition audit reports related to securing our borders.

Additionally, to identify lessons learned we reviewed Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute’s SBInet Analysis of Alternatives Report. We also contacted the Department’s Joint Requirements Council and the Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management to formulate an understanding on where CBP was in the Acquisition Life Cycle Framework. This is the first in a series of reports about CBP’s physical security of the southern border. This report was conducted under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, Section 2-2, to provide leadership and coordination and recommend policies for activities designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of, and to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in, such programs and operations.

Our review focused on identifying Acquisition Life Cycle challenges identified through prior DHS OIG and GAO reports and internal DHS documents associated with constructing a physical barrier along the southern border. The work performed in this review does not constitute an audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The Office of Audits major contributors to this report are: Maureen Duddy, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits; Carolyn Hicks, Acquisitions Director; Paul Exarchos, Audit Manager; Jeff Mun, Auditor-in-charge; Corneliu Buzesan, Program Analyst, Steffanie Moore, Program Analyst, Roger Thoet, Auditor; Ellen Gallagher, Communications Analyst; and Frank Lucas, Independent Referencer. www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-17-70-SR 14 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Appendix A Prior DHS OIG Reports on CBP’s Secure Border Initiative, and Other Relevant CBP Acquisitions Related to Securing our Borders: DHS OIG reports can be found under the “Reports” tab at http://www.oig.dhs.gov/ x Risk Management Advisory for the SBInet Program Initiation (OIG-07-07, November 2006), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_07- 07_Nov06.pdf x Progress in Addressing Secure Border Initiative Operational Requirements and Constructing the Southwest Border Fence (OIG-09-56, April 2009), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_09-56_Apr09.pdf x Better Oversight Needed of Support Services Contractors in Secure Border Initiative Programs (OIG-09-80, June 2009), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_09-80_Jun09.pdf x CBP's Construction of Border Patrol Facilities and Acquisition of Vehicles (OIG-09-91, July 2009), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_09-91_Jul09.pdf x Controls Over SBInet Program Cost Schedule Could Be Improved (OIG-10- 96, June 2010), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_10- 96_Jun10.pdf x U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Management of the Purchase and Storage of Steel in Support of the Secure Border Initiative (OIG-12-05, November 2011), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_12- 05_Nov11.pdf x CBP's Strategy to Address Illicit Cross-Border Tunnels (OIG-12-132, September 2012), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12- 132_Sep12.pdf x CBP Did Not Effectively Plan and Manage Employee Housing in Ajo, Arizona (OIG-14-131, October 2014), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2014/OIG_14-131_Oct14.pdf www.oig.dhs.gov 15 OIG-17-70-SR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security x U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Unmanned Aircraft System Program Does Not Achieve Intended Results or Recognize All Costs of Operations (OIG-15-17, December 2014), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2015/OIG_15-17_Dec14.pdf x CBP’s Border Security Efforts – An Analysis of Southwest Border Security Between the Ports of Entry (OIG-17-39, February 2017), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2017/OIG-17-39-Feb17.pdf Prior GAO Reports on CBP’s Secure Border Initiative and Other Relevant CBP Acquisitions Related to Securing our Borders: x Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment (GAO-08-1086, September 2008), http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/281239.pdf x Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed (GAO-09-896, September 2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/294982.pdf x Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Testing and Performance Limitations That Place Key Technology Program at Risk (GAO-10-158, January 2010), http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/300562.pdf x Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed Investment in Key Technology Program (GAO-10-340, May 2010), http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/304036.pdf x Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Strengthen Management and Oversight of Its Prime Contractor (GAO-11-6, October 2010), http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/311431.pdf x Secure Border Initiative: Controls over Contractor Payments for the Technology Component Need Improvement (GAO-11-68, May 2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/318871.pdf x Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and Costs Is Needed before Proceeding (GAO-12-22, November 2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/586102.pdf www.oig.dhs.gov 16 OIG-17-70-SR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security x Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness (GAO-14-368, March 2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/661297.pdf www.oig.dhs.gov 17 OIG-17-70-SR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Appendix B Timeline of Prior Reports GAO-08-1086 SBInet program may not me et mission ne eds or perform as intended. GAO-09-896 Border Patrol continue d to rely on existing technology due to de ployment delays.

GAO-10-158 Ne w syste m de fects incre ased faste r than the number of de fects that we re fixe d. GAO-10-340 DHS did not know whethe r its planne d inve stment of SBInet would produce mission value . GAO-11-6 DHS did not effectively monitor SBInet contractor's progress in meeting cost and schedule e xpectations. GAO-11-68 CBP's de sign of controls for SBInet contractor payme nts were not effe ctive. GAO-12-22 CBP did not have the information ne ede d to support and implement its Plan.

GAO-14-368 CBP did not de velop an inte grate d master sche dule for the Plan in accordance with best practice s. EO13767 Signe d www.oig.dhs.gov 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 18 SBInet Launch OIG-07-07 CBP bypassed Key De cisions due to SBInet's aggre ssive schedule . OIG-09-56 Progre ss made but ne ed bette r de fined operational require ments for tactical infrastructure. OIG-09-80 CBP relied on contractors (due to aggressive schedule), but provided inadequate ove rsight. OIG-09-91 CBP did not ade quate ly plan the design and construction of its Border Patrol facilities.

OIG-10-96 Info in management tool was not up-to-date re garding cost overrun or program progress. SBInet cancelled OIG-12-05 CBP did not effectively manage the purchase and storage of stee l in support of SBI. OIG-12-132 PMO must address mission needs of both CBP and HSI to disrupt cross-border threats. OIG-14-131 CBP did not effe ctively plan and manage e mployee housing in Ajo, AZ resulting in additional costs.

OIG-15-17 CBP did not adequately plan the re source s ne eded to support its unmanne d aircraft. OIG-17-39 CBP face s program management challe nges in planning and ove rall e fficiency. OIG-17-70-SR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Appendix C Management Comments to the Draft Report www.oig.dhs.gov 19 OIG-17-70-SR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security www.oig.dhs.gov 20 OIG-17-70-SR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Appendix D Report Distribution Department of Homeland Security Secretary Deputy Secretary Chief of Staff Deputy Chiefs of Staff General Counsel Executive Secretary Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs CBP Audit Liaison Office of Management and Budget Chief, Homeland Security Branch DHS OIG Budget Examiner Congress Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees www.oig.dhs.gov 21 OIG-17-70-SR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES To view this and any of our other reports, please visit our website at: www.oig.dhs.gov. For further information or questions, please contact Office of Inspector General Public Affairs at: [email protected].

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