DHS OIG, OIG-17-28, Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2016 Drug Control Performance Summary Report (2017)

Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2016 Drug Control Performance Summary Report February 1, 2017 OIG-17-28 DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Fiscal Year 2016 Drug Control Performance Summary Report February 1, 2017 What We Found KPMG LLP (KPMG), under contract with the Department of Homeland Security OIG, issued an Independent Accountants’ Report on the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) FY 2016 Drug Control Performance Summary Report. CBP’s management prepared the Performance Summary Report and the related disclosures in accordance with the requirements of the ONDCP Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated January 18, 2013 (Circular). Based on its review, nothing came to KPMG’s attention that caused it to believe that CBP’s FY 2016 Performance Summary Report is not presented in conformity with the criteria in the ONDCP Circular. KPMG LLP did not make any recommendations as a result of its review.

Why We Did This Review The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires National Drug Control Program agencies to submit to the ONDCP Director, not later than February 1 of each year, a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during the previous fiscal year. The Office of Inspector General (OIG) is required to conduct a review of the report and provide a conclusion about the reliability of each assertion made in the report. For Further Information: Contact our Office of Public Affairs at (202) 254-4100, or email us at [email protected] www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-17-28 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov February l, 2017 MEMORANDUM FOR: Sean M. Mildrew FROM: SUBJECT: Chief Accountability Officer U.S. Customs and Border Protection John V. Kelly ,~_f ~ Deputy Inspector General Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2016 Drug Control Performance Summary Report Attached for your information is our final report, Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2016 Drug Control Performance Summary Report. U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) management prepared the Performance Summary Report and the related disclosures in accordance with the requirements of the Office of National Drug Control Policy's Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated January 18, 2013.

We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP (KPMG) to review CBP's Drug Control Performance Summary Report. KPMG is responsible for the attached Independent Accountants' Report, dated January 18, 2017, and the conclusions expressed in it. KPMG's report contains no recommendations. Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will provide copies of our report to congressional committees with oversight and appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security.

We will post the report on our website for public dissemination. Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Maureen Duddy, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits, at (617) 565-8723. Attachment www.oig.dhs.gov KPMG LLP Suite 12000 1801 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006 Independent Accountants’ Report Deputy Inspector General U.S. Department of Homeland Security: We have reviewed management’s assertion that the Performance Summary Report of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for the year ended September 30, 2016 was prepared in conformity with requirements of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Circular: Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated January 18, 2013 (the Circular). CBP management is responsible for the assertion.

Our review was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, which incorporate the attestation standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. A review is substantially less in scope than an examination, the objective of which is the expression of an opinion on management’s assertion. Accordingly, we do not express such an opinion. Based on our review, nothing came to our attention that caused us to believe that management’s assertion referred to above, is not fairly stated, in all material respects, in conformity with the requirements set forth in the Circular.

January 18, 2017 KPMG LLP is a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. U.S. Department of Homeland Security Washington, DC 20229 ~-~· ~~~~~s~~::;!~t~:n ~ <-iNo s'i.c; January 18, 2017 MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM: SUBJECT: Mr. John Kelly Deputy Inspector General U.S. Department of Homeland Security Sean M. Mildrew 1fl ' Chief Accountabil ty Office of Accoun ility fficer Management's Assertions for CBP's Performance Summary Report to ONDCP In compliance with the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting ofDrug Control Funding and Pe1formance Summary, dated January 18, 2013, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) submits its Performance Swnmary Report to ONDCP. The report contains the results of C BP' s Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 performance in support of the National Drug Control Strategy. CBP makes the following assertions: (I) Performance reporting system is appropriate and applied - CBP uses TECS, TOMIS, e3 and BPETS to capture performance information.

Data within these systems is accurately maintained and reliable, and properly applied to generate the most recent performance data available for the FY 2016 performance period; (2) Explanations for not meeting performance targets are reasonable - Performance targets in Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 were met for three of four measures and the explanation for not meeting one of the performance targets is reasonable; (3) Methodology to establish performance targets is reasonable and consistently applied ­ The methodology described for establi shing performance measure targets is based on professional judgment of subject matter experts with many years of experience in the fie ld. The methodology is reasonable given past performance and available resources. (4) Adequate performance measures exist for all significant drug control activities - CBP has established at least one performance measure for each Drug Control Decision Unit, which considers the intended purpose of the National Drug Control Program Activity. As noted in the OIG Report 17-09, DHS Drug lnlerdiclion Efforts Need Improvement , the performance measures reported for CBP's Drug Control Decision Un.its are not adequate.

Three of the four measures were determined to be process­ Page2 based rather than outcome-based, and two of the four measures were found to not be sufficiently relevant to counterdrug activities. On September 26, 2016, ONDCP published a Supply Reduction Strategic Outcomes framework to provide a comprehensive and integrated perspective on strategic level changes across the spectrum of the drug supply train and associated impacts on society. Several DHS outcome-based performance measures are included in the framework, and the Department is working with ONDCP to ensure the right measures are in place to support assessment ofstrategic outcomes. As a follow-on activity, CBP will work with the Department on the development of new measures for fiscal year 201 8, as needed.

CBP did determine that the FY2016 performance measures for all significant drug control activities did not require material modification. If you have any questions or would like additional information, please contact me at (202) 344­ 3823, or a member of your staff may contact Mr. Henry Moak Director, Performance Management and Analysis Division, at (202) 344-2571. Attachments U.S. Department of Homeland Security U.S. Customs and Border Protection Performance Summary Report Fiscal Year 2016 The performance measures presented below directly link to the 2016 National Drug Control Strategy by evaluating U.S. Customs and Border Protection¶V (CBP) success in disrupting domestic drug trafficking. This Performance Summary Report contains the performance measures aligned to drug control decision units as required by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Circular: Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated January 18, 2013.

The drug control decision units are as follows: (1) Salaries and Expenses, (2) Air and Marine Interdiction, Operations, Maintenance, and Procurement and (3) Border Security Fence, Infrastructure and Technology. Drug Control Decision Unit ± Salaries and Expenses Performance Measure ± Amount of currency seized on exit from the United States. (1) Performance Measures 7KHSHUIRUPDQFHPHDVXUH³$PRXQWRIFXUUHQF\VHL]HGRQH[LWIURPWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´SURYLGHV the total dollar amount of all currency, in millions, seized during outbound inspection of exiting passengers and vehicles, both privately-owned and commercial. The scope of this measure includes all ports of entry on both the southwest and northern borders and all modes of WUDQVSRUWDWLRQ ODQGDLUDQGVHD 7KLVPHDVXUHDVVLVWVLQHYDOXDWLQJ&%3¶VVXFFHVVLQ disrupting domestic drug trafficking at the land border ports of entry, a key outcome for the FY 2016 National Drug Control Strategy1.

7KLVPHDVXUHLVWUDFNHGE\&%3¶V2IILFHRI)LHOG Operations (OFO). This measure is based upon the seizure-UHODWHGHQIRUFHPHQWRXWFRPHVRI&%3¶V2XWERXQG Enforcement Program, which provides an indicator of the success that CBP has in disrupting domestic drug trafficking at the land borders by stemming the flow of potential narcotics-related proceeds destined to criminal or transnational groups. The OFO conducts risk-based Outbound operations at land border ports of entry and international airports, enabling CBP to enforce U.S. laws and regulations applying to the Outbound arena, including but not limited to immigration and drug laws. The Outbound Enforcement ProgrDPLVSDUWRI&%3¶VHIIRUWWRHIIHFWLYHO\PRQLWRUDQGFRQWUROWKHIORZRI JRRGVDQGSHRSOHOHDYLQJWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV7KHJRDORI&%3¶V2XWERXQG(QIRUFHPHQWProgram is to keep the United States safe by preventing the illicit export of goods, ranging from firearms to components of weapons of mass destruction, by individuals seeking to circumvent U.S. export control laws.

This goal was developed in recognition of the fact that such goods could potentially fall into the hands of terrorists or criminal elements. The program also seeks to 1 The FY 2016 National Drug Control Strategy was developed by the Obama Administration and submitted to the Congress of the United States. 1 disrupt criminal elements and terrorist organizations by interdicting their proceeds and arresting members of their organizations. $QXPEHURISUHVLGHQWLDOVWUDWHJLHVLQFOXGLQJWKH3UHVLGHQW¶V1DWLRQDO([SRUW,QLWLDWLYHWKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V([SRUW&RQWURO5HIRUP,QLWLDWLYHWKH1DWLRQDO'UXJ&RQWURO6WUDWHJ\DQGWKH National Southwest Border Counter Narcotics Strategy, designate outbound enforcement as a crucial component on the war on drugs. The total currency seized upon exit from the United States in FY 2016 was $28.9 million, which was potentially destined for criminal organizations.

(2) Prior Years Performance Targets and Results Fiscal Year: FY 2012 $35.0M Target: $31.9M Actual: FY 2013 $30.0M $36.9M FY 2014 $30.0M $37.7M FY 2015 $30.0M $37.6M FY 2016 $30.0M $28.9M In FY 2016, CBP did not meet the target of $30.0M in currency seizures. Although CBP maintained its FY 2016 outbound enforcement effort at levels similar to FY 2015, there was a significant decrease in both the number of seizures, down nearly 22 percent, and the average dollar value of the amount seized per seizure, which dropped from approximately $49,000 in FY 2015 to under $34,000 in FY 2016. This drop was due in large part to a decrease in the number of large seizures over $100,000, which went from 30 in FY 2015 to 19 in FY 2016. This led to CBP missing its target for FY 2016 by approximately 4 percent.

CBP conducts risk-based outbound enforcement efforts and limited special operations set up in support of collaborative enforcement efforts with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), as well as with other law enforcement agencies though the Border Enforcement Security Task Force. (3) Current Year Performance Targets Fiscal Year: FY 2017 $30.0M Target: CBP will continue to conduct risk-based Outbound enforcement operations to identify and seize currency being transported out of the country illegally and work with these law enforcement agencies and both local and international partners to identify and disrupt outbound smuggling activities. Currently, CBP conducts limited Outbound enforcement operations based on the availability of CBP Officers and funding, examining only departing goods and travelers identified as high-risk based on CBP Officer assessment at the ports and/or automated systems alerts triggered by available data. On-going CBP efforts at risk-based outbound enforcement and conducting limited special operations will continue in FY 2017.

FY 2016 was the first year CBP missed the target since FY 2012. Missing the target by 4 percent was primarily caused by the overall decrease in large seizures and possibly influenced by the erratic frequency of such seizures, which vary significantly from month to month. As the decrease in large seizures in FY 2016 is 2 considered to be an unusual fluctuation in seizure activity, CBP will retain the target of $30.0M for FY 2017. CBP will consider revising the target downward in FY 2018 if the FY 2017 results more clearly establish a long-term downward trend.

(4) Quality of Performance Data The data underlying this measure is accurate, complete and unbiased. This measure is calculated from outbound seizure-related enforcement action data entered into Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS), a computer-based tool used to support CBP operations, by the CBP Officer at the time the violation occurred. On a monthly basis, the detailed transaction data for each Field Office is compiled and extracted from TECS into BorderStat, the CBP system of record for capturing and reporting all enforcement and operations statistical data across its operational components. The extracted data is then summarized within the Operations 0DQDJHPHQW5HSRUWPRGXOHLQ%RUGHU6WDW7KHPRQWKO\VXPPDU\GDWDLVUHYLHZHGE\2)2¶V Outbound Program Manager to verify accuracy and identify anomalies.

3 Drug Control Decision Unit ± Air and Marine Interdiction, Operations, Maintenance, and Procurement Performance Measure ± Percentage of Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) annual mission hour objective achieved.2 (1) Performance Measures This SHUIRUPDQFHPHWULFLVVSHFLILFWR&%3¶V$LUDQG0DULQH2SHUDWLRQVDQGWKHPHWULFLVSDUW of the Air and Marine Interdiction, Operations, Maintenance, and Procurement budget decision unit. Air and Marine Operations (AMO) conducts extended border operationVDVSDUWRI&%3¶V layered approach to homeland security. AMO deploys assets in the source and transit zones through coordinated liaison with other U.S. agencies and international partners. The National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP) sets the overarching operational architecture for organizations involved in interdicting illicit drugs in keeping with the goals and objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy.

AMO coordinates with the larger law enforcement and interdiction community through its partnership with JIATF-S. JIATF-S is the tasking coordinator and controller for counter-drug missions within the transit3 and source4 zones. JIATF-S submits its resource allocation requirements through the NICCP. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) responds to the requirements in a Statement of Intent. AMO typically supports JIATF-S requests with P-3 Airborne Early Warning and P-3 Long-Range Tracker aircraft, but has also supported JIATF-S with other aircraft, including its DHC-8 and C-12M fixed-wing aircraft, Black Hawk rotary-wing aircraft, and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS).

As a result of the 2003 Presidential Determination Regarding U.S. Assistance to the Government of Colombia Airbridge Denial Program, AMO began receiving funding in FY 2005 to support JIATF-S as part of its base budget. 7KHSHUIRUPDQFHPHDVXUH³3HUFHQWDJHRI-,$7)-S Annual Mission Hour Objective Achieved´ identifies the degree to which AMO meets its intended flight hours for JIATF-S in support of the National Drug Control Strategy, which is reported to DHS, ONDCP, and JIATF-S. (2) Prior Years Performance Targets and Results The Percentage of JIATF-S Annual Mission Hour Objective Achieved was initially introduced as a measure in FY 2011. Fiscal Year: FY 2012 100.0% Target: 100.0% Actual: FY 2013 100.0% 100.0% FY 2014 100.0% 100.0% FY 2015 100.0% 100.0% FY 2016 100.0% 100.0% 2 Actual results are presented on a binary basis, where 0 percent represents that the target was not met and 100 percent represents that the target was either met or exceeded. 3 The transit zone encompasses Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean.

4 The source zone includes the principal drug producing countries of Bolivia, Columbia, and Peru. 4 In its annual Statement of Intent, DHS responds to the requirements in the NICCP. The FY 2016 '+66WDWHPHQWRI,QWHQWLQFOXGHG&%3¶VREjective to provide 6,000 flight hours for detection and monitoring activities with aircraft in support of JIATF-S operations. AMO exceeded the goal of 6,000 hours for FY 2016, flying a total of 6,547.3 hours of which the primary driver was the P-3 (6,172.8 hours), other aircraft included the: UAS, the King Air B-350, DHC-8, UH60, and the AS350 (374.50 hours).

(3) Current Year Performance Targets Fiscal Year: FY 2017 Target: Provide 100 percent of the 5,730 hours of JIATF-S support budgeted for the transit zone. AMO submitted its input for the FY 2017 DHS Statement of Intent to the DHS Office of Policy, via the Tasking process. This input was based on current anticipated budgets, flight crew availability, and planning estimates involving maritime patrol aircraft flight hours in the transit zone. 7KH)<'+66WDWHPHQWRI,QWHQWLQFOXGHG&%3¶VREMHFWLYHWRSURYLGHIOLJKWKRXUVLQ the transit zone with its P-3 and UAS.

(4) Quality of Performance Data The data underlying this measure is accurate, complete and unbiased. AMO flight data is recorded using the Tasking, Operations, and Management Information System, which underwent a DHS verification and validation during FY 2016. The data from this system can be queried through any CBP computer with appropriate access. AMO ensures the data is complete and accurate through a quality assurance process, which includes annual reconciliation of data, and data entry error mitigation techniques established from the verification and validation assessment.

5 Drug Control Decision Unit ± Air and Marine Interdiction, Operations, Maintenance, and Procurement Performance Measure ± Percent of time TECS is available to end users. (1) Performance Measures This performance metric is for Automation Modernization, part of the Air and Marine Interdiction, Operations, Maintenance, and Procurement budget decision unit. The metric is PDQDJHGDQGPHDVXUHGE\&%3¶V2IILFHRI,QIRUPDWLRQ7HFKQRORJ\ 2,7 The measure, ³3HUFHQWRIWLPH7(&6LVDYDLODEOHWRHQGXVHUV´TXDQWLILHVWKHDYDLODELOLW\of the TECS service to all end-users based on a service level of 24/7 service. TECS is a CBP mission-critical law enforcement application system designed to identify individuals and businesses suspected of or involved in violation of Federal law.

TECS is also a communications system permitting message transmittal between the DHS law enforcement offices and other National, state, and local law enforcement agencies, access to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's National Crime Information Center and the National Law Enforcement Telecommunication Systems (NLETS). NLETS provides direct access to state motor vehicle departments. This measure assists in HYDOXDWLQJ&%3¶VVXFFHVVLQLPSURYLQJLQIRUPDWLRQV\VWHPVIRU$QDO\VLV$VVHVVPHQWDQG/RFDO Management, a key outcome for the National Drug Control Strategy. TECS availability is a collection of key performance indicators (KPI) gathered from off-the-shelf and custom monitoring tools.

The tools monitor all components and sub-systems of three mission critical applications: Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, Traveler Primary Air Client, and U.S. Arrival. Synthetic transactions are performed on all three applications to simulate a user. The results of these transactions are measured against defined performance standards. Breaches of the performance standards are transmitted as alerts to the Technology Operations Center and the application development team for review and resolution.

TECS is deemed unavailable when all three applications are in a critical or unresponsive state simultaneously. Outages for systems maintenance are considered down time and affect TECS availability. (2) Prior Years Performance Targets and Results Fiscal Year: FY 2012 Target: Actual: 99.0% 99.9% FY 2013 99.0% 99.9% FY 2014 99.0% 99.9% FY 2015 99.0% 99.9% FY 2016 99.0% 99.9% TECS surpassed its goal this year with an availability of 99.9 percent. 6 (3) Current Year Performance Targets Fiscal Year: FY 2017 Target: 99.0% The target is established based on the KPIs for the three applications that comprise the TECS Availability metric.

Current trends and funding expectations point to a likelihood of achieving the FY 2017 target of 99.0 percent with no anticipated challenges to TECS system availability. This target is established via a negotiated contract with the TECS service provider. (4) Quality of Performance Data The data is accurate, complete, and unbiased. All data logged is reviewed for accuracy and comments are added by Computer Operations staff for the purpose of identifying discrepancies.

Each business day, OIT Subject Matter Experts meet at the Significant Outages and Incidents meeting to review the Chief Information Officer Outage Report which is generated for the OIT Assistant Commissioner and other senior CBP management staff. The Subject Matter Experts review incidents and validate the information reported. The OIT Assistant Commissioner and senior CBP management review the report. 7 Drug Control Decision Unit ± Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure and Technology Performance Measure ± Rate of Interdiction Effectiveness along the Southwest Border between the ports of entry.

(1) Performance Measures Since FY 2014, the United States Border Patrol (USBP) has focused on and measured improvement in its Interdiction Effectiveness Rate (IER) on the Southwest border. The IER is the percent of detected illegal entrants who were apprehended or turned back after illegally entering the U.S. between the Southwest Border ports of entry. The IER focuses on positive outcomes (apprehensions or turnbacks) of recent entrants made in the immediate border area. 7KLVPHDVXUHDVVLVWVLQHYDOXDWLQJ&%3¶VVXFFHVVLQGLVUXSWing domestic drug trafficking between the land border ports of entry, a key outcome for the National Drug Control Strategy.

Border Patrol agents (BPAs) detect and intercept any combination of threats that present themselves along the borders including: terrorists, weapons of terrorism, smuggling of narcotics and other contraband, and people who illegally enter the United States. The interdiction of people frequently coincides with the interdiction of drugs in the border environment; therefore, the IER can be associated with effectiveness in resolving all cross-border entries, including those involving persons transporting narcotics. Since introducing this measure in FY 2014, USBP has increased the IER from 76 percent at the end of FY 2013 to 82.7 percent at the end of FY 2016. The enforcement advantage gained from fencing, other infrastructure, and technology, such as sensors and cameras, allows agents to more effectively and efficiently detect, identify, and LQWHUFHSWWKUHDWV&%3¶VHQIRUFHPHQWSRVWure over the past several years since 9/11 has benefitted from a build-up in resources and capabilities, including manpower.

This improved enforcement posture has coincided with an overall decrease in apprehensions since 2005 and an improvement in the IER since it was tracked in FY 2013. During FY 2016, the USBP seized 1,294,052 pounds of marijuana along the Southwest border, an increase of 85,389 pounds seized in 2005 along the Southwest border. 7DUJHWVDQGUHVXOWVIRUWKH³5DWHRILQWHUGLFWLRQHIIHFWLYeness along the Southwest Border EHWZHHQSRUWVRIHQWU\´PHDVXUHLVEDVHGRQGDWDFROOHFWHGRQDSSUHKHQVLRQVWXUQEDFNVDQG gotaways, which together constitute entries. The formula used to calculate the IER is (Apprehensions + Turnbacks) / (Entries).

The scope includes all areas of the Southwest border that are generally at or below the northern most checkpoint within a given area of responsibility. Apprehensions are defined as: a deportable subject who, after making an illegal entry, is taken into custody and receives a consequence. Gotaways are defined as: a subject who, after making an illegal entry, is not turned back or apprehended and is no longer being actively pursued by BPAs. Turnbacks are defined as: a subject who, after making an illegal entry into the US, returns to the country from which he/she entered, not resulting in an apprehension or gotaway.

8 (2) Prior Years Performance Targets and Results Fiscal Year: FY 2012 Target: Actual: None None FY 2013 None 76% FY 2014 77% 79.3% FY 2015 80% 81.0% FY 2016 81% 82.7% This performance measure was initially introduced as a DHS strategic measure in FY 2014. USBP met the IER target for FY 2016 with 82.7 percent, which is roughly a 1.7 percent increase from Fiscal Year 2015 IER of 81.0 percent. The baseline data collection during FY 2013 coincided with an effort on part of the USBP to standardize the methods across Southwest border sectors to record apprehensions, gotaways, and turnbacks, the three key factors in the formula for calculating the IER. (3) Current Year Performance Targets Fiscal Year: FY 2017 Target: 81% A combination of efforts under a risk-based strategy can influence an improvement in the IER.

Better intelligence and risk-based deployment of surveillance capabilities enhances situational awareness and aids in identifying potential or emerging threats. This allows for better informed and more agile responses at tactical and strategic levels. At the tactical level, field commanders can direct personnel and mobile technologies to respond to higher threat areas. At the strategic level, USBP can place increased focus on positioning assets according to changing threat levels.

The target was established based upon a review of historical data and anticipated trends. Risk along the Southwest Border is compounded as Border Patrol agents who, rather than patrolling the field are spending time processing apprehended aliens who self-surrender. Since resources are deployed to those areas deemed to be the highest risk and undocumented aliens are turning themselves in, the IER is able to reflect a higher capability to respond than our resources might otherwise allow. (4) Quality of Performance Data Apprehension, gotaway, and turnback data is captured by BPAs at the station level and entered into the following systems: x Apprehensions are entered into the e3 Processing (e3) system.

All data entered via e3 resides in the Enforcement Integrated Database (EID), the official system of record for this data, which is under the purview of the USBP Headquarters Statistics and Data Integrity (SDI) Unit. The physical database is owned and maintained by ICE. x Gotaways and turnbacks are entered into the CBP Enforcement Tracking System 1 (BPETS), which resides with the USBP. BPETS is under the purview of and is owned by the USBP Headquarters SDI Unit. Apprehension data is entered into e3 by BPAs at the station level as part of the standardized processing procedure.

BPAs use standard definitions for determining when to report a subject as 9 a gotaway or turnback. Some subjects can be observed directly as evading apprehension or turning back; others are acknowledged as gotaways or turnbacks after agents report evidence that indicate entries have occurred, such as foot sign, sensor activations, and interviews with apprehended subjects, camera views, communication between stations and sectors, and other information. Data input into the BPETS system occurs at the station level, and normally by a supervisor. The e3 Processing application and BPETS are used to document apprehension, gotaway, and turnback data.

Patrol Agents in Charge ensure all agents are aware of and utilize proper definitions for apprehensions, gotaways, and turnbacks at their respective stations and ensure accurate documentation of subjects. In addition to station level safeguards, the USBP Headquarters SDI Unit validates data integrity by utilizing various data quality reports. Data issues are corrected at the headquarters level or forwarded to the original inputting station for correction. All statistical information requested is routed through the USBP Headquarters SDI Unit to ensure accurate data analysis and output.

10 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Appendix A Report Distribution Department of Homeland Security Secretary Deputy Secretary Chief of Staff General Counsel Executive Secretary Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs U.S. Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Chief Financial Officer Audit Liaison Office of Management and Budget Chief, Homeland Security Branch DHS OIG Budget Examiner Congress Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees Office of National Drug Control Policy Associate Director for Management and Administration www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-17-28 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES To view this and any of our other reports, please visit our website at: www.oig.dhs.gov. For further information or questions, please contact Office of Inspector General Public Affairs at: [email protected]. Follow us on Twitter at: @dhsoig.

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