DHS OIG, OIG-14-117, U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Workload Staffing Model (2014)

Department of Homeland Security 2IÀFHRI,QVSHFWRU*HQHUDO U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Workload Staffing Model OIG-14-117 July 2014 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM: SUBJECT: Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov JUL 24 2014 John P. Wagner Acting Assistant Commissioner Office of Field Operations U.S. Customs and Border Protection Anne L. Richar Assistant Insp ds ector General for Audits U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Workload Staffing Model Attached for your information is our final report, U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Workload Staffing Model. We incorporated formal comments from U.S. Customs and Border Protection in the final report. The report contains three recommendations aimed at improving the Office of Field Operations’ Workload Staffing Model. Your office concurred with all recommendations.

As prescribed by the Department of Homeland Security Directive 077‐01, Follow‐Up and Resolutions for Office of Inspector General Report Recommendations, within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, please provide our office with a written response that includes your (1) agreement or disagreement, (2) corrective action plan, and (3) target completion date for each recommendation. Also, please include responsible parties and any other supporting documentation necessary to inform us about the current status of the recommendation. Based on information provided in your response to the draft report, we consider recommendation #1 unresolved and open. We consider recommendations #2 and #3 resolved and open.

Once your office has fully implemented the recommendations, please submit a formal closeout letter to us within 30 days so that we may close the recommendation(s). The memorandum should be accompanied by evidence of completion of agreed‐upon corrective actions and of the disposition of any monetary amounts. Please email a signed PDF copy of all responses and closeout requests to [email protected]. Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will provide copies of our report to appropriate congressional committees with oversight and appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security.

We will post the report on our website for public dissemination.

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Department of Homeland Security   Pleasecallmewithanyquestions,oryourstaffmaycontactJohnE.McCoyII,Deputy AssistantInspectorGeneralforAudits,at(202)254Ͳ4100.  Attachment   www.oig.dhs.gov  2 OIGͲ14Ͳ117 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security TableofContents  ExecutiveSummary.............................................................................................................1  Background........................................................................................................................2  ResultsofAudit...................................................................................................................5  OverviewofCBP’sWorkloadStaffingModel.........................................................5 DataReliabilityintheWorkloadStaffingModel....................................................7 InternalControlsovertheWorkloadStaffingModel.............................................9 NextPhaseoftheWorkloadStaffingModel........................................................10 Recommendations...............................................................................................11 ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis.........................................................12  Appendixes  AppendixA:Objectives,Scope,andMethodology............................................14 AppendixB:ManagementCommentstotheDraftReport...............................16 AppendixC:CBPOFO’sFieldOfficesandPortsofEntry...................................18 AppendixD:ResourceOptimizationStrategy....................................................20 AppendixE:WSMTimelineofSignificantEvents..............................................21 AppendixF:WSMMethodologyforCalculatingCBPOsNeededataPOE........22 AppendixG:MajorContributorstoThisReport.................................................23 AppendixH:ReportDistribution.........................................................................24   www.oig.dhs.gov  OIGͲ14Ͳ117 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Abbreviations  CBP CBPO DHS FTE FY GAO IT IV&V OFO OIG POE TSA WSM   U.S.CustomsandBorderProtection CustomsandBorderProtectionOfficer DepartmentofHomelandSecurity fullͲtimeequivalent fiscalyear GovernmentAccountabilityOffice informationtechnology independentverificationandvalidation OfficeofFieldOperations OfficeofInspectorGeneral portofentry TransportationSecurityAdministration WorkloadStaffingModel   www.oig.dhs.gov  OIGͲ14Ͳ117 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security   ExecutiveSummary  U.S.CustomsandBorderProtection(CBP)isresponsibleforsecurityatandbetween portsofentryalongtheNation’ssea,air,andlandborders.Congresshasexpressed interestinhowCBPdeterminesstaffingatportsofentry.Inastatementaccompanying theDepartmentofHomelandSecurityAppropriationsAct,2012,CongressdirectedCBP toreportonitsallocationforfieldoperationsandupdatetheportsofentrystaffing model.Toimproveoperations,CBPdevelopedathreeͲprongedResourceOptimization Strategy.ThesecondprongofthestrategyistheWorkloadStaffingModel,whichCBP usestoidentifystaffingneedsforitsOfficeofFieldOperations’CBPOfficersatportsof entry.WeconductedthisaudittodeterminethereliabilityoftheWorkloadStaffing ModelinestablishingthenumberofCBPOfficersneededtofulfillmissionrequirements.  CBP’sWorkloadStaffingModelincludesasoundmethodologytodetermineitsstaffing needsforCBPOfficersandidentifystaffingshortages.However,theresultsofthemodel maynotbeaccuratebecauseCBPcannotensurethatthedataenteredintothemodelis reliable.CBPalsodoesnothaveadequateinternalcontrolsoverthemodel.Specifically, CBP’sOfficeofFieldOperationsdoesnot(1)catalog,track,andvalidatealldataand systemsusedinworkloadcalculations;(2)systematicallyapprovechangesandadditions totheWorkloadStaffingModel;and(3)havewrittenpoliciesandprocedureson developingandusingthemodel.InitsDecember2013StrategyandActionPlan (2014о2017),CBPacknowledgesconcernsaboutdatafromothersystemsusedinthe WorkloadStaffingModel.CBPhascontractedtoautomatethemodel,whichshould addresstheissuesweidentified.Toensurethattheautomatedmodelisaccurate, complete,andmeetsitsneeds,CBPshouldconductanindependentverificationand validationoftheupdatedmodel,aswellasthedataenteredintoit.  ImprovingdatareliabilityandstrengtheninginternalcontrolsovertheWorkloadStaffing ModelwouldhelpCBPensurethatitsbudgetrequestsaccuratelyreflectCBPOfficer staffingneeds.ItwouldalsohelpensurethatCBPisallocatingstaffingresources efficiently.Withconfidenceinthemodel’sreliabilityandaccuracy,Congresswillbeable tomakemoreinformeddecisionswhenconsideringappropriationsforadditionalCBP officers.  CBPconcurredwithallthreerecommendationsmade,whichwhenimplemented,should strengtheninternalcontrolsovertheWorkloadStaffingModelandimproveitsresults. www.oig.dhs.gov 1  OIGͲ14Ͳ117 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Background  CBPisresponsibleforsecurityatandbetweenportsofentry(POE)alongtheNation’s sea,air,andlandborders.Itsprioritymissionistopreventtheentryofterroristsand contraband,whilefacilitatinglawfultravel,trade,andimmigration.CBPcurrentlyhas about60,000employeesnationwideandoverseas,withmorethan$8.1billionfor salariesandexpenses.  CBP’sthreeuniformedlawenforcementdivisionsaretheOfficeofFieldOperations (OFO),OfficeofBorderPatrol,andOfficeofAirandMarine.Together,thesedivisions makeupthelargestlawenforcementworkforceintheFederalGovernment. Each divisionhasitsownmissionandworkenvironment.OFO’sCBPOfficers(CBPO)perform theirdutiesatthePOEs;BorderPatrolAgentsandAirandMarineOfficersoperate betweenthePOEs.  OFO’s20fieldofficessecuretheborderatthe328POEsnationwide.AppendixC containsamapshowingfieldofficelocationsandalistofallPOEs.In2014,OFO employed21,925CBPOswhomadeup37percentofCBP’sentireworkforce.Figure1 showsCBP’sworkforcecompositionasofMarch2014.  Figure1:CBPWorkforceCompositioninMarch2014 OtherPersonnel 19% AirandMarine Personnel 5% CBPOfficers 37% BorderPatrol Agents 35% Agricultural Specialists 4% Source:DepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)OfficeofInspectorGeneral(OIG)   www.oig.dhs.gov 2 OIGͲ14Ͳ117 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security CBPOsatPOEsdetectandpreventtheimportandexportofillicitmaterialandsearch itemssuchasmerchandise,agriculturalproducts,andcargocontainers.CBPOsalso examinethedocumentsofpeopleenteringorexitingtheUnitedStatesthroughPOEsto determinecitizenship;immigrationstatus;andwhetherindividualsmayenter,residein, ordepartfromtheUnitedStates.Thephotosinfigure2showexamplesofCBPOduties atPOEs.  Figure2:CBPOOfficersPerformingDutiesatLand,Sea,andAirPorts   Source:Flickr:CBPPhotography’sPhotostream  CongresshasexpressedinterestinhowCBPstaffsPOEs.Mostrecently,inastatement accompanyingtheDepartmentofHomelandSecurityAppropriationsAct,2012,Congress directedCBPtoreportonitsstaffingallocationforitsfieldoperationsandupdatethe POEstaffingmodel.Inresponse,CBPdevelopedathreeͲprongedResourceOptimization StrategyforimprovingPOEoperations.AppendixDcontainsmoreinformationonthis strategy.Ourauditfocusedonthesecondprong,theWorkloadStaffingModel(WSM), whichCBPusestoidentifyCBPOstaffingneedsatPOEs.TheWSMisnotusedto determinestaffinglevelsofBorderPatrolAgentsorAirandMarineOfficers.  www.oig.dhs.gov 3 OIGͲ14Ͳ117 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security AccordingtoCBP,itbegandevelopingtheWSM,anExcelspreadsheetͲbasedmodel,in 2006.ThecomponentfirstuseditinternallyfortargetͲsettingexercisesandadhoc staffinganalyses.CBPnowusestheWSMtoidentifyCBPOstaffingrequirements,taking intoaccountoperationaldatafromitsinformationtechnology(IT)systems,aswellas informationthatprogramofficesprovide.CBPalsousesWSMresultswhenseeking congressionalapproval,initsbudgetrequeststoincreaseuserfeesandhireadditional CBPOs.AccordingtoCBP,withadditionalCBPOs,aswellastechnologyimprovements andpartnerships,itisabletofullysupporttheidentifiedstaffingrequirements.  Infiscalyear(FY)2013,CBPusedtheWSMtodevelopitsbaselinestaffingneeds,taking intoconsiderationuseofovertimeandstreamliningofprocesses.Inthatfiscalyear,CBP projectedashortageof3,811CBPOsthrough2014;itsoughttofill1,600ofthe positionsthroughappropriationsandthebalancethroughincreaseduserfees.CBP includedthisidentifiedshortageinitsFY2014budgetrequest.TheConsolidated AppropriationsAct,2014(PublicLaw113о76)givesCBPabout$165.7millionthrough September30,2015,tohire,train,andequipnewCBPOs.  InitsFY2015budgetproposal,CBPincludedarequesttoincreasecertainuserfees.1 Specifically,CBPplanstousetheestimated$332millionincreasetohireupto2,000 moreCBPOs.CBPreportsthattheseadditionalofficers,alongwiththe2,000newCBPOs fundedintheConsolidatedAppropriationsAct,2014,wouldbringthetotaltoahistoric highof25,775officers.  InSeptember2013,CBPissuedacontracttoRTRTechnologies,LLC,toreplacethe existingExcelspreadsheetͲbasedWSMwithanautomatedsystemreferredtoas WSM2.0.CBPexpectsthatthisautomationwilladdressWSM’sinternalcontrolissues weidentified.AppendixEprovidesatimelineofsignificantWSMevents.  1CBPhasproposedincreasingtheImmigrationUserFeeandeliminatinganexceptionforcertainsea passengerswhopayareducedfeeundercurrentlaw.CBPhasalsoproposedincreasingfeesunderthe ConsolidatedOmnibusBudgetReconciliationActof1985,aswellasExpressConsignmentCarrierFacilities userfees. www.oig.dhs.gov 4 OIGͲ14Ͳ117 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security ResultsofAudit  CBPhasdevelopedaWSMthatincludesasoundmethodologytodetermineitsCBPO staffingneeds.However,theresultsoftheWSMmaynotbeaccuratebecauseCBP cannotensurethatthedataenteredintothemodelisreliable.CBPalsodoesnothave adequateinternalcontrolsovertheWSM.Specifically,CBPOFOdoesnot(1)catalog, track,andvalidatealldataandsystemsusedinworkloadcalculations;(2)systematically approvechangesandadditionstotheWSM;and(3)havewrittenpoliciesand proceduresondevelopingandusingthemodel.InitsDecember2013Strategyand ActionPlan(2014о2017),CBPacknowledgesconcernsaboutdatafromothersystems usedintheWSM.CBPhascontractedtoautomatetheWSM,whichshouldaddressthe issuesweidentified.Toensurethattheautomatedmodelisaccurate,complete,and meetsitsneeds,CBPshouldconsiderconductinganindependentverificationand validation(IV&V)oftheupdatedmodel,aswellasthedataenteredintoit.Improving datareliabilityandstrengtheninginternalcontrolsovertheWSMwouldhelpCBP ensurethatitsbudgetrequestsaccuratelyreflectCBPOstaffingneedsandthatitis allocatingstaffingresourcesefficiently.Withconfidenceinthemodel’sreliabilityand accuracy,Congresswillbeabletomakemoreinformeddecisionswhenconsidering appropriationsforadditionalCBPOs.   OverviewofCBP’sWorkloadStaffingModel  CBPhasamodelandmethodologytohelpdeterminetheoptimalnumberof CBPOsneededtofulfillitsmissionatall328POEs.However,thedatafrommore than25ITsystemsusedincalculationsmaynotbereliable,whichcallsinto questionpredictedstaffingneedsandshortages.  TocalculatethenumberofCBPOsneededatPOEs,theWSMincorporatesfive components:  1. Volume–allkeyCBPOactivitiesateachPOE,suchasinspectionsand seizuresofgoods,fromthepreviousfiscalyear.  2. Processingtime–theaverageamountoftimeittakesaCBPOto completeeachactivity,suchasaninspection.  3.

Availablehours–theamountoftimeCBPestimatesthatCBPOsare availableeachyeartoperforminspectionsandotherPOEͲspecificduties. CBPestimatesthatCBPOsareavailableforsuchduties1,182outof2,080 www.oig.dhs.gov 5 OIGͲ14Ͳ117 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security hours,or57percentofthetime;CBPOleave,training,andassorted administrativedutiesaccountfortheremaininghours.  4. Percentagefactorincreasesоtimespentonactivitiesthatarenot countabletransactions,suchassupervisionandworkinginspecial dedicatedteams.  5. Coveragefactorsоfactorsthatareindependentofvolume,suchas infrastructureandlayoutofthePOE.Forexample,aPOEexitpoint requiresdedicatedstaffingregardlessofusagerates.  Figure3showshowCBPusesthesefiveelementsintheWSMmethodologyto calculatethenumberofCBPOsneededataPOE.AppendixFcontainsadditional detailsontheWSMcalculation.  Figure3:WSMMethodologyforCalculatingCBPOsataPOE   CBPOsNeeded=VolumexProcessingTime +  PercentageFactors +  CoverageFactors AvailableHours  Source:DHSOIGanalysisofCBPdata  CBPcalculatestheoptimumnumberofCBPOsneededtoaccomplishthework. Thisincludesotherfactors,suchas,useofovertime,streamliningprocesses, increasedvolume,andplannedfacilityexpansionsandinformationfromsubject matterexperts.ThedifferencebetweentheoptimumnumberofCBPOsand currentCBPOsdetermineCBPOstaffingshortages.InApril2013,CBPreportedto Congressthatitwouldhaveashortageof3,811CBPOsthroughFY2014.Figure4 showshowCBParrivedatthisnumber.    www.oig.dhs.gov 6 OIGͲ14Ͳ117 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security  Figure4:CBPͲprovidedWSMResultsforFYs2013о2014               Source:CBP  Duringoureightsitevisits,weobservedCBPOsandsupervisoryCBPOs,whoare lawenforcementofficers,performingworknormallydonebythosewhoarenot lawenforcementofficers.Thesetasksincludedtimekeeping,scheduling,taking inventory,andmaintainingfleets.AccordingtoCBP,CBPOsperformingthese typesofadministrativedutiescontributedtotheshortageofCBPOsinFYs2013 and2014.AccordingtoanOctober2013CBPdraftreport,CBPOsdedicatea significantamountoftimetosupportingduties,suchasadministrativeand operationaltasks.2Thereportalsoincludedrecommendationstoreducethe CBPOs’administrativeburdenandalleviatestaffshortages.  DataReliabilityintheWorkloadStaffingModel  CBPcannotensurethatthedataintheWSMisreliableandaccurate.Over180 dataelementsfortheWSMoriginatefrommorethan25CBPITsystems.OFO didnotidentifyallthesystemsfromwhichthesedataelementsoriginate.Many ofthesesystemschanneldatatointermediatesystems,suchasOperations ManagementReportingandBorderStat.OFOstaffmembersobtainmostofthe datausedfortheWSMfromthetwointermediatesystems.Theinformationis thenpulledbyOFOandmanuallyenteredintoWSMExcelspreadsheets.    2Administrativetasksconsistofactivitiessuchasbudgeting,humanresources,trainingcoordination,and propertymanagement.Conversely,operationalsupporttasksaredefinedasthoseactivitiesthat “directly”supporttheexecutionofinspectionalorlawenforcementfunctions.   www.oig.dhs.gov 7 OIGͲ14Ͳ117 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security AlthoughOFOpersonneltakemeasurestomaintaintheintegrityofthedata received,theydonotvalidatetheinformationpulledintothesesystemsfor reliabilityandaccuracy.AccordingtoOFO,itisnotnecessarytovalidatethedata becauseitisobtainedfromofficialCBPITsystems.Figure5showshowdata flowsfromCBPfieldofficesandPOEstotheWSMspreadsheets.  Figure5:DataFlowforCBP’sWSM(AsofApril2014)   Source:OIGanalysesofCBPprovideddata  Inresponsetoourinquiriesaboutdatareliability,theCBPOfficeofInformation Technologygaveusdocumentationindicatingthatthedatasystemsmetthe securityrequirementsoftheFederalInformationSecurityManagementActof 2002.However,reviewsconductedunderthisactcertifythatsystemsare secure,notthatthedataisreliable.  InNovember2010,LMI,agovernmentcontractingfirm,evaluatedtheWSM,and inJanuary2012,theDHSProgramAnalysisandEvaluationOfficeevaluated WSM.3NeitherevaluationassessedthereliabilityofthedatainWSM.   3EvaluationofU.S.CustomsandBorderProtectionWorkloadStaffingModel,November2010andAn EvaluationofCustomandBorderProtection’sWorkloadStaffingModel,January2012 www.oig.dhs.gov 8 OIGͲ14Ͳ117  OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security InthecurrentWSM,staffmembersmanuallyenterdataintoExcelspreadsheets. Becausedataentriesarelinkedtodatainothercellsonseparatepages, unintentionallychangingtheinformationinonecellcanresultinerrors throughouttheWSM.  Atthetimeofouraudit,thecontractor,RTRTechnologies,LLC,wasduplicating theWSM.Thecontractorwastransferringdatafromspreadsheetsand developingadatabase.Therefore,wedeterminedthat,basedonavailable informationatthattime,testingdatareliabilityoftheintermediatesystems withoutidentificationofthesourcedatawouldproduceinaccuratefindings.CBP andthecontractorindicatedtheywereeliminatingduplicationandunuseddata fieldsfromthespreadsheets.After6months,thecontractorwasstillcataloging allWSMdatasources.Completingthistaskshouldfacilitatefuturereliability testing. InternalControlsovertheWorkloadStaffingModel  CBPhasinsufficientinternalcontrolsovertheWSM.OneOFOemployeeis responsibleformaintainingandusingthemodel,andCBPmanagementhasnot developedformalWSMpoliciesandprocedures.Withoutsufficientcontrolsand soundpoliciesandprocedures,CBPmanagementmaynotbeabletorelyonthe resultsoftheWSMtomakekeymanagementdecisionsandbudgetrequestsfor CBPOstaffing.  InSeptember2013,CBPissuedacontracttoRTRTechnologies,LLC,toreplace theexistingExcelspreadsheetͲbasedWSMwithanautomatedsystemreferred toasWSM2.0.CBPexpectsthatthisautomationwilladdressWSM’sinternal controlissuesweidentified.  SegregationofDutiesandOversight  Currently,twoOFOemployees,supportedbyonecontractor,haveWSM responsibilities.Oneoftheemployeesgathersandmanuallyentersdataintothe model,makeschangesandupdates,analyzesdata,anddraftsreportsonresults. AccordingtotheGovernmentAccountabilityOffice(GAO),segregationof duties—dividingdutiesandresponsibilitiesamongdifferentpeople—isakey internalcontrolforreducingtheriskoferrororfraud.4Whenanorganizationis unabletoseparatedutiesadequately,itshoulddevelopoversightandapproval procedurestomitigaterisk.  4GAOStandardsforInternalControlsintheFederalGovernment(GAO/AIMDͲ00Ͳ21.3.1) www.oig.dhs.gov 9 OIGͲ14Ͳ117 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security  TheWSMalsoresidesonarestricted,butshared,drivethatCBPhasnotfully protectedagainstintentionalorunintentionaltamperingbyunauthorizedusers. TheWSMExcelspreadsheetsarenotpasswordprotectedandformulacellsare notlockedtopreventediting.CBPriskscompromisingtheintegrityoftheWSM withoutsafeguardstopreventtampering,misuse,orotherincidents.  PoliciesandProcedures  CBPdoesnothaveapprovedwrittenpoliciesandprocedurestofurtherdevelop andusetheWSM.Instead,theOFOemployeewithdayͲtoͲdayresponsibilityfor themodelmaintainsinformalnotesonchanges,updates,andimprovementsto theWSM.AccordingtoGAOstandards,internalcontrolsneedtobeclearly documented.Withoutformallyapprovedanddocumentedpoliciesand proceduresfortheWSM,CBPcannotensureadequateoversightoraccurate results.  NextPhaseoftheWorkloadStaffingModel  InSeptember2013,CBPcontractedwithRTRTechnologies,LLC,todevelopan automatedsystemcalledWSM2.0.CBPseeksamoreuserͲfriendlysystemthat caninterfacewithexistingCBPsystems,allowautomateddatacaptureand verification,andimproveanalysisandmodeling.AutomatingtheWSMwillalso allowCBPtoeasilyupdateorchangethemodel’smethodology.  Underthetermsofthecontract,RTRTechnologiesistoensurethatWSM2.0:  x Documentscurrentpracticesforanalysisandreporting; x Cataloguesandvalidatesdatainputs; x Capturesdataaccurately;and x FullyautomatesandintegratesthemodelthroughoutOFOtoensure segregationofdutiesandtransparency.  Toensurethenewmodelisvalid,accurate,complete,andmeetsitsneeds,CBP shouldconductanIV&VoftheWSMthatincludessourcedata.InanIV&V,an independentthirdpartycertifiesthatasoftwaresystemsatisfiesrequirements andcanfunctionasintended.Throughoutgovernmentandindustry,IV&Vsare recognizedasabestpractice.Inaddition,accordingtotheDepartmentof HomelandSecurityAcquisitionManual,officialsshouldaddresstheneedforan IV&VcontractorwhenplanningtoacquireanITsystem.  www.oig.dhs.gov 10 OIGͲ14Ͳ117 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security EnsuringthatWSM2.0functionsasintendedwouldmakeitmoreusefulforCBP andcongressionaldecisionmakersinallocatingresourcesandensuringthatOFO hasthestaffnecessarytofulfillitsmission.Inaddition,ifanindependentthird partyperformsanIV&V,otherofficesinCBPandotherDHScomponentscould potentiallyuseCBP’sWSMtodevelopstaffingmodels.  Conclusion  CBPusedtheWSMtosupportitsFY2014budgetrequesttofundanadditional 1,600CBPOs.Withoutreliabledataandstronginternalcontrols,however,CBP andCongressmaynothavehadaccurateinformationfromtheWSMtomake soundstaffingandfundingdecisions.CBPrisksoverstaffingPOEs,whichcould leadtoinefficiencyandwasteorunderstaffing,whichcouldleadtosecurity breachesandeconomiclosses. Recommendations  WerecommendthattheActingAssistantCommissionerofU.S.Customsand BorderProtection’sOfficeofFieldOperations:  Recommendation#1:  EstablishwrittenproceduresfordevelopingandusingtheWSM.Include procedurestocatalogue,track,andvalidatealldatasources. Recommendation#2:  DevelopasystematicprocesstoapprovechangesandadditionstotheWSMand periodicallyevaluatetoensureWSMinputsandassumptionsarecurrentand valid.  Recommendation#3:  ConductanindependentverificationandvalidationofWSM2.0,afterits completion,toensurethatitsatisfiesCBP’srequirementsandfunctionsasCBP intended.   www.oig.dhs.gov 11 OIGͲ14Ͳ117 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis  CBPOFOprovidedcommentstothedraftreportandconcurredwithallthreeofour recommendations.Asummaryoftheresponsesandouranalysisfollows.Wehave includedacopyofthemanagementcommentsintheirentiretyinappendixB.  ResponsetoRecommendation#1:CBPOFOconcurredwiththerecommendation.OFO reportedthatithascontractedwithRTRTechnologies,LLC,tocapturetheprocessmap oftheWSMarchitecture,catalogueandtrackalldatasources,andprograman automaticvalidationprocessforWSMdata.Wherefeasible,thecontractorwillalso developanautomateddatacaptureprocess.Theestimatedcompletiondateis December31,2014. OIGAnalysis:OFO’sresponsetothisrecommendationdoesnotfullyaddresstheintent oftherecommendation.Althoughthecontractor’sactionsarenecessaryandwillassist indevelopingWSMprocedures,theresponsedoesnotaddressOFO’seffortstodevelop andimplementapprovedwrittenproceduresfortheWSM.Therecommendationis unresolvedandwillremainopenuntilCBPprovidesapprovedwrittenprocedures. ResponsetoRecommendation#2:CBPOFOconcurredwiththerecommendation. AccordingtoOFO,achangecontrolboardmanagesandmakesdecisionsonproposed changestotheinterimversionoftheWSM.OFOwillhaveachangecontrolboardfor thefullyautomatedWSM2.0.OFOwillalsoimplementprocedurestoapproveall changestoassumptionsandalgorithmsthatsignificantlyimpacttheautomatedmodel. TheestimatedcompletiondateisDecember31,2014. OIGAnalysis:OFO’sresponsemeetstheintentofthisrecommendation.The recommendationisresolvedandopen.WewillclosethisrecommendationwhenOFO completesthenecessaryactionsandsubmitsadetailedsummaryofactionstakento establishthereviewandapprovalprocess. ResponsetoRecommendation#3:CBPOFOconcurredwiththerecommendation. AccordingtoOFO,RTRTechnologies,LLC,hasimplementedaframeworktosupport necessarydocumentationandadatabasestructuretovalidateandverifyWSM2.0.The estimatedcompletiondateisJune30,2016.Initsresponse,OFOprovidedinterim milestonestofacilitatemeetingtheestimatedcompletiondate. OIGAnalysis:OFO’sresponsemeetstheintentofthisrecommendation.The recommendationisresolvedandopen.WewillclosethisrecommendationwhenOFO completesthenecessaryactionsandsubmitsadetailedsummaryofactionstaken.   www.oig.dhs.gov 12 OIGͲ14Ͳ117 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security AppendixA Objectives,Scope,andMethodology  DHSOIGwasestablishedbytheHomelandSecurityActof2002(PublicLaw107о296)by amendmenttotheInspectorGeneralActof1978.Thisisoneofaseriesofaudit, inspection,andspecialreportspreparedaspartofouroversightresponsibilitiesto promoteeconomy,efficiency,andeffectivenesswithintheDepartment.  WeconductedanauditofCBPOFO’sWSMtodetermineitsreliabilityinestablishingthe numberofCBPOsneededtofulfillmissionrequirements.  Toachieveourauditobjective,weobtainedandrevieweddocumentationincludingthe WSM,CBP’sResourceOptimizationStrategy,andCBP’scontractwithRTRTechnologies, LLC,forWSM2.0WeinterviewedkeyCBPofficialsinOFO’sPlanning,Programand EvaluationOfficewhoaredirectlyinvolvedindeveloping,maintaining,andusingthe WSM.WealsointerviewedtheActingDeputyCommissionerofCBP,theDeputy AssistantCommissionerofFieldOperations,andCBPofficialsfromthefollowingoffices atCBPHeadquartersinWashington,DC:theOFOHumanCapitalDivision,theOfficeof InformationandTechnology,theOfficeofIntelligenceandInvestigativeLiaison,theOFO BudgetDivision,andtheOfficeofHumanResourcesManagement.  WevisitedthefollowingCBPfieldofficesandPOEs:  FieldOffice Baltimore,MD Baltimore Site(s)Visited BaltimoreSeaport(cargoandpassenger) Baltimore/WashingtonInternational ThurgoodMarshallAirport WashingtonͲDulles DullesInternationalAirport Buffalo PortofEntry Buffalo,NY LosAngeles,CA LosAngeles/ LongBeach SanDiego SanYsidro SanDiego,CA OtayMesa  Lewiston,Peace,Rainbow,andWhirlpool Bridges(cargoandpassenger) BuffaloNiagaraInternationalAirport PortofLosAngeles(cargoandpassenger) PortofLongBeach(cargoandpassenger) Palomar(UserFee)Airport SanYsidrobordercrossing(landpassenger only) OtayMesabordercrossing(landcargoand outboundpassenger) www.oig.dhs.gov 13 OIGͲ14Ͳ117 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Wejudgmentallyselectedtheselocationsbecausetheycollectivelyrepresentedmostof OFO’soperatingenvironments(cargoandpassengeroperations;air,land,andsea environments;andlargeandsmallports).Ateachlocation,weinterviewedCBPofficials andobservedCBPOsperformingtheirduties,includingtargeting;primary,secondary, andnonͲintrusiveinspections;radiationportalmonitoring;outboundoperations;and administrativeduties.  Wealsointerviewedthefollowingpersonnel:(1)thecontractortaskedwithautomating CBP’sWSM2.0,(2)officialsattheTransportationSecurityAdministration(TSA)involved withdevelopingthatcomponent’sstaffingmodel,and(3)thecontractorsthat developedTSA’sstaffingmodel.  WeinterviewedofficialsatCBPresponsiblefordeveloping,updating,andusingthe WSM.TodeterminethereliabilityofthemodelinestablishingthenumberofCBPOs neededtofulfillmissionrequirements,wereviewedtheWSM’smethodologyandhow datainputsareturnedintooutputs.Additionally,weexaminedtheunderlyingdataand report.Wedidnotperformdetaileddatareliabilitytesting,whichdoesnotimpactour findingandrecommendations.WeobtainedandreviewedallpertinentFederal,DHS, andCBPregulations,policies,proceduresandguidancepertainingtothedevelopment anduseofaWSM.  WevisitedasampleofCBPfieldofficesandPOEstoobtainrelevantdocumentationand interviewedofficialsaboutlocalparticipationindeveloping,updating,andanalyzingthe WSMandlocalinputondecisionmakingbasedonWSMoutputs.Weusedpertinent informationobtainedduringthesesitevisitstosupplementourreviewoftheWSM’s datareliabilityandpredictiveaccuracy.  WeconductedthisperformanceauditbetweenJuly2013andApril2014pursuanttothe InspectorGeneralActof1978,asamended,andaccordingtogenerallyaccepted governmentauditingstandards.Thosestandardsrequirethatweplanandperformthe audittoobtainsufficient,appropriateevidencetoprovideareasonablebasisforour findingsandconclusionsbaseduponourauditobjectives.Webelievethattheevidence obtainedprovidesareasonablebasisforourfindingsandconclusionsbaseduponour auditobjectives.    www.oig.dhs.gov 14 OIGͲ14Ͳ117 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security AppendixB ManagementCommentstotheDraftReport www.oig.dhs.gov 15  OIGͲ14Ͳ117 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security   www.oig.dhs.gov 16 OIGͲ14Ͳ117   7 1 1 Ͳ 4 1 Ͳ G O I  7 1   I G O S H D  :  e v c o r u g . o s S h d . g o w w w . i L A R E N E G R O T C E P S N I F O E C I F F O y t i r u c e S d n a l e m o H f o t n e m t r a p e D    C x i d n e p p A    l   y r t n E  f o s t  s r e o c P i f f d O n d a e  i s F e 0 c 2  i s f ’ f O O F  O d P B e C i F  f  o s p ’ O a M F O P B C l      7 1 1 Ͳ 4 1 Ͳ G O I  8 1 L A R E N E G R O T C E P S N I F O E C I F F O y t i r u c e S d n a l e m o H f o t n e m t r a p e D   v o g . s h d . g o w w w . i Source:DHSOIG OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security AppendixD ResourceOptimizationStrategy   CBP’sResourceOptimizationatPortsofEntryofApril10,2013,outlinesitsintegrated ResourceOptimizationStrategy,whichisdesignedto(1)optimizecurrentbusiness processes(businesstransformation);(2)identifystaffingrequirementsaccurately (WSM);and(3)explorealternativefundingstrategiestoincreaserevenuesourcesfor staffing(alternativefundingsources).  CBPResourceOptimizationStrategy  Source:CBP  BusinessTransformation–CBPisengagedinaseriesofbusinesstransformation initiativestoreassesscoreprocesses,incorporatetechnologyenhancements,assessuse oflawenforcementstaff,anddevelopadditionalautomationefforts.  WorkloadStaffingModel–theWSMistheprimarytoolforinformingstaffingdecisions atPOEs.ItconsidersallbusinessprocessesrequiredofCBPOs,aswellastheassociated workload,andthelevelofeffortrequiredtoeffectivelycarryoutthemissiondaily.  AlternativeFundingSources–CBP’sgoalistomovetowardconsistentappropriations anduserfeestosupportCBPOstaffing,basedonanannualsubmissionoftheWSMto Congress.Itisalsoexploringalternativefinancingsourcesforenhancedservicesinthe shorttermandlongterm.Forexample,intheshortterm,CBPwillcontinuetowork withtheUnitedStatesDepartmentofAgriculturetoensurefullcostrecoveryfor agriculturalinspectionalservices.ItslongͲtermstrategyseekstocreateamechanismfor publicͲprivatepartnershipstofundenhancedCBPservices.   www.oig.dhs.gov 19  OIGͲ14Ͳ117 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security AppendixE WSMTimelineofSignificantEvents   •CongressdirectsCBPtodevelopastaffingmodel •CBPengagessubjectmatterexpertsandconductssitevisits •CBPdevelopsinitialprototype FY2006 •CBPconductsadditionalsitevisitsforongoingenhancementsandinternalvalidation FY2007 •CBPinitiateseffortstoautomatethesystemwiththeCBPOfficeofInformationTechnologyand FY2008 AnalysisSystemsProgramOffice •CBPreproducesWSMcapabilitiesinBorderStat withthequerycapabilitybuiltforstreamlineddata FY2009 refresh •FullͲtimegovernmentemployeededicatedtoWSMdevelopment,maintenance,andoperation FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 •LMI(governmentconsulting)evaluatestheWSM •CBPBusinessTransformationOfficecompletesadministrativestudy •DHS'ProgramAnalysisandEvaluationTeamevaluatestheWSM •CBPprepares,butdoesnotsubmit,reporttoCongress •CBPsubmitsreporttoCongress,whichalignswiththePresident’sbudgetforFY2014 •CBPcontractswithRTRtoautomatetheWSMandcreateWSM2 •OFOapprovesWSMStrategyandActionPlan(2014Ͳ2017)inDecember2013;CBPDeputy CommissionerapprovesinMarch2014 •CBPreceivesfundingthroughtheConsolidatedAppropriationsAct,2014tohireadditionalCBPOs throughFY2015 FY2014& Beyond Source:DHSOIG    www.oig.dhs.gov 20   OIGͲ14Ͳ117 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security  AppendixF WSMMethodologyforCalculatingCBPOsNeededataPOE  TodeterminethenumberofCBPOsrequiredataPOE,theWSM:  1.Calculatesthetotalworkloadbymultiplyingvolumeandprocessingtime.  TotalWorkload=VolumexProcessingTime  TheWSMincorporatesthevolumeofallCBPOactivities,suchasinspectionsand seizuresofgoods,atthePOEfromthepreviousfiscalyear.EachCBPOactivityhasa processingtime,ortheaverageamountoftimeittakesaCBPOtocompletetheactivity. TheWSMmultipliesthevolumeofeachactivitywiththatactivity’sprocessingtime.It sumsthetimerequiredforallactivitiesatthePOEtodeterminethePOE’stotal workload.  2.TranslatesthetotalworkloadintoabaselinenumberofCBPOs,orworkloadfullͲtime equivalent(FTE),bydividingthetotalworkloadbythenumberofhoursaCBPOis availabletoperforminspectionsduringtheyear.  WorkloadFTE=TotalWorkload/AvailableHours  3.Assignsapercentageincreasefactorto“nonͲcountable”activitiesthatarenot transactionͲbasedactivitiescapturedbythevolumedata.NonͲcountableactivities includesupervisionandtimespentontargetingandenforcementunits.Toaccountfor timespentonthesenonͲcountableactivities,theWSMmultipliesaPOE’sworkloadFTE byeachpercentageincreasefactoraffectingthatPOE.Theseresultsareaddedtothe workloadFTE.  4.AccountsforcoveragefactorsrelatedtothePOE’sinfrastructure.Coveragefactors areindependentofvolume.Forexample,aPOEexitpointrequiresdedicatedstaffing regardlessofusagerates.CoveragefactorsareaddedtotheworkloadFTE.  ThefinalsumoftheworkloadFTE,thepercentagefactorincrease,andthecoverage factorsistheoptimalnumberofCBPOsneededtocarryoutOFO’smissionatthatPOE.  TheWSMaggregatestheCBPOsneededateachPOEtodetermineCBPOneedacrossall 328POEs.  www.oig.dhs.gov 21  OIGͲ14Ͳ117 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security  AppendixG MajorContributorstoThisReport  DonBumgardner,Director CeciliaCarroll,AuditManager KarenGardner,Auditor KevinKing,Auditor VictorLeung,ProgramAnalyst ShamikaMorris,Auditor KellyHerberger,CommunicationsAnalyst CarolynFloyd,IndependentReportReferencer www.oig.dhs.gov 22  OIGͲ14Ͳ117 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security  AppendixH ReportDistribution  DepartmentofHomelandSecurity  Secretary DeputySecretary ChiefofStaff DeputyChiefofStaff GeneralCounsel ExecutiveSecretary Director,GAO/OIGLiaisonOffice AssistantSecretaryforOfficeofPolicy AssistantSecretaryforOfficeofPublicAffairs AssistantSecretaryforOfficeofLegislativeAffairs ChiefPrivacyOfficer UnderSecretaryforManagement ChiefProcurementOfficer,DHS ChiefInformationOfficer,DHS AuditLiaison,CBP  OfficeofManagementandBudget  Chief,HomelandSecurityBranch DHSOIGBudgetExaminer  Congress  U.S.SenateCommitteeonAppropriations U.S.HouseofRepresentativesCommitteeonAppropriations U.S.SenateHomelandSecurityandGovernmentalAffairsCommittee U.S.SenateCommitteeonFinance U.S.SenateCommitteeontheJudiciary U.S.HouseofRepresentativesCommitteeonHomelandSecurity U.S.HouseofRepresentativesCommitteeonGovernmentReform U.S.HouseofRepresentativesCommitteeonTransportationandInfrastructure www.oig.dhs.gov 23  OIGͲ14Ͳ117 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION To view this and any of our other reports, please visit our website at: www.oig.dhs.gov. 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